United States of America v. Raul Flores Marin
No. 19-3214
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Submitted: June 17, 2020; Filed: February 24, 2021
Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City
Before LOKEN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges, and PITLYK,1 District
PITLYK, District Judge.
Responding to a report of an unknown vehicle on a remote farm in the middle of
Based in part on evidence collected from Marin‘s truck during and after that traffic stop, a jury later convicted him of possеssion with intent to distribute a controlled substance, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.
On appeal, Marin challenges two holdings of the District Court2: (1) that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction for possession of a fireаrm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and (2) that the traffic stop that led to his arrest did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.
I. Background
Shortly after 2:40 AM on July 19, 2017, the Sheriff‘s Office of Osceola County, Iowa, received an emergency call from Jerry Seivert, who reported an unfamiliar pickup truck with Minnesota plates on his property. Dispatch sent Deputy Caleb Edwards to investigate. Edwards had been to Seivert‘s farm in rural Osceola County a few weeks before to investigate another report of a suspicious vehicle. Edwards also knew that Seivert had recently reported a daytime burglary of his residence, in which firearms and ammunition had been taken.
At 2:53 AM, about two miles from Seivert‘s property, Edwards encountеred a Ford F-150 pickup truck traveling in the opposite direction, away from the farm. It was the first vehicle Edwards had encountered since leaving the Sheriff‘s Office. As the truck passed, Edwards observed that it had Minnesota plates. Because the truck matched Seivert‘s description of the vehicle that had been on his property, Edwards turned around to follow it. Shortly thereafter, the truck veered onto the left-hand side of the road, nearly entering a ditch on the opposite side. When Edwards caught up to the truck, he initiated a traffic stop.
Edwards approached the truck and asked the driver—later identified as Raul Marin—what he was doing. Marin responded that he was looking for his friend Clint Reiter to оbtain the title to a trailer. Edwards requested Marin‘s driver‘s license, registration, and proof of insurance and asked Marin to accompany him to his squad car. Edwards also asked Marin if he had any weapons on his person; Marin responded in the negative. Edwards then asked to pat Marin down. Mid-pat-down, Marin reported having a Swiss army knife in his pocket, whiсh Edwards confiscated.
Observing that Marin‘s speech was excited and fast, Edwards suspected that Marin might have been impaired. In response to questions about drug use, Marin admitted to using marijuana only once many years ago; he denied any other drug use. Edwards then obtained Marin‘s consent to take his pulse, which measured 120 to 125 beats per minute. Edwards radioed Deputy Matt Julius, a certified Drug Recognition Expert, for assistance. Edwards told Marin that, because his pulse was
Deputy Julius arrived about 20 minutes after Edwards radioed him and 35 minutes after the initial stop. Julius asked Marin if he had anything illegal in his vehicle, and Marin reported that he had a loaded handgun in the backseat under an article of clothing. Julius found the firearm where Marin had indicated. Edwards asked Marin if he had a permit to carry the firearm, and Marin responded that he did not. Edwards placed Marin under аrrest and took him to jail. On inventory of the vehicle, Julius found methamphetamine, brass knuckles, a large amount of cash ($1,240), and cell phones. The Government obtained a grand jury indictment charging Marin with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of
The Government later obtained a superseding indictment against Marin, adding a charge of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
Marin timely filed this appeal, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of possession of a firеarm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and that the July 19, 2017, traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
II. Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
Marin contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of possession of a firearm in furtherance of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute under
“We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidеnce de novo.” United States v. Johnson, 745 F.3d 866, 868-69 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, and affirm if any rational [factfinder] could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ojeda-Estrada, 577 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“To satisfy the ‘in furtherance of’ element of
The Government presented sufficient evidence at Marin‘s trial to satisfy the “in furtherance of” element of
Marin argues that the above testimony is undercut by testimony from Jose Leones that a gun would interfere with collection of a debt, and from Luis Magallanes that Marin had bought the gun to address predatory animals attacking his chickens. But this Court will not second-guess a jury‘s credibility determinations or the weight it assigns to conflicting testimony. See United States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, it is axiomatic that this court does not pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony. Credibility determinations are uniquely within the province of the trier of fact, and are entitled to special deference.” (cleaned up)).
Considered “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” Ojeda-Estrada, 577 F.3d at 874, the evidence presented at trial established that (1) Marin sold methamphetamine to Rеiter, among others; (2) Reiter owed Marin money for methamphetamine; (3) Marin went to Seivert‘s property on July 19, 2017, to find Reiter; (4) Marin and others often bought and sold drugs on Seivert‘s property; (5) Marin told associates that he had brought a handgun to collect a drug debt; and (6) the gun was found near brass knuckles and large amounts of methamphetamine and cash, all of which were accessible to Marin as he drove his truck on July 19, 2017. Such a showing certainly could have led a rational factfinder to find Marin guilty under
Because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Marin‘s
B. Constitutionality of the July 19, 2017, Traffic Stop
The
“We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but the underlying factual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn by law enforcement officials.” United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 982 (8th Cir. 2012)). “We will affirm the district court unless the denial of the motion is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was made.” United States v. Dillard, 825 F.3d 472, 474 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
a. The traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
“A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and must be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2012)). Marin contends that Deputy Edwards had neither reasonable suspicion to believe that Marin was engaged in criminal activity nor probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred, making the stop an illegal seizure in violatiоn of the
“Under the Fourth Amendment, ‘[l]aw enforcement officers may make an investigatory stop if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.‘” Dillard, 825 F.3d at 474 (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2005)). “A law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion [to conduct an investigatory stop] when the officer is aware of particularized, objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime is being committed.” United States v. Williams, 929 F.3d 539, 544 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hollins, 685 F.3d at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidenсe standard.” United States v. Daniel, 887 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). “[W]hen determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we consider the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Woods, 829 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2014)).
b. The extension of the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Marin contends that the July 19, 2017, traffic stop “exceeded the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made,” rendering his detention unconstitutional. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015). Edwards could not have developed reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, Marin claims, if the officer had not improperly prolonged the initial stop to question Marin. He argues that the officers unlawfully engaged in a “blended process” by detaining him for reasons unrelated to the lane violation that hаd been the stop‘s original purpose. See United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 2008) (traffic stop was unlawfully extended where officer “engaged in a ‘blended process’ of conducting a routine traffic stop and a drug interdiction investigation“).
Marin‘s argument is unavailing. Here, unlike in Rodriguez, the initial traffic stop was justified by more than “a police-observed traffic violation.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350-51. As described above, Deputy Edwards‘s reasonable suspicion was also based on the vehicle‘s temporal and geographic proximity to a reported crime involving a vehicle matching its description. Therefore, the initial stop was not limited to “the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket....” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (cleaned up)). Rather, the officer was justified in taking a reasоnable amount of time to investigate both the traffic violation and the vehicle‘s suspected involvement in the reported crime. See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 878 F.3d 246, 254 (8th Cir. 2017) (assessing the reasonableness of the duration of a stop where “the mission of the stop was... to determine whether and to what extent the Taurus was involved in the bank robbery“).
Consistent with the stop‘s initial justificatiоn, Edwards questioned Marin about his erratic driving and his presence on Seivert‘s farm. Marin offered implausible explanations for both. He also manifested excited speech and mannerisms, and his heart rate was elevated.3
In Peralez, on which Marin relies, we noted that we were not addressing a situation in which “the officer develops reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot,” in which case “the officer may expand the scope of the encounter to address thаt suspicion.” Peralez, 526 F.3d at 1120. Here, we address precisely that situation. During a traffic stop based on a traffic violation and suspected involvement in a reported crime, Deputy Edwards developed reasonable suspicion
that “other criminal activity [was] afoot,” which justified his expansion of the scope of the encounter to investigate that suspected activity. Id.
Considering the complex rationale for the original traffic stop and the fact that Marin‘s conduct gave rise to reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity, we find that the 35-minute duration of Marin‘s detention was reasonable. See, e.g., Sanchez, 417 F.3d at 975 (45-minute wait for a drug dog was reasonable); see also United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (one-hour delay was reasonable).
Because there was sufficient justification for both the initiation and the duration of the July 19, 2017, traffic stop, we affirm the District Court‘s denial of Marin‘s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of that stop.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the District Court are affirmed.