Case Information
*1 Before WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jennifer Haynes Rose, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER HAYNES ROSE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. *2
PER CURIAM:
This case returns to us following remand for
resentencing. Raphel Smith was convicted, following a jury
trial, of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base (“Count One”), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006); distribution of more than
five grams of cocaine base and a quantity of marijuana and
aiding and abetting the same (“Count Six”), and distribution of
a quantity of cocaine base and aiding and abetting the same
(“Count Fourteen”), both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (“Count Fifteen”), in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). The district
court sentenced Smith to concurrent terms of 235 months’
imprisonment on Counts One, Six, and Fourteen, and a consecutive
sentence of 60 months on Count Fifteen. On appeal, we affirmed
Smith’s convictions, but we concluded that the district court
committed procedural sentencing error in imposing a Guidelines
enhancement for managerial role in the offense. We therefore
vacated Smith’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. United
States v. Smith,
On remand, the district court sentenced Smith to concurrent terms of 168 months’ imprisonment on Counts One, Six, *3 and Fourteen, and a consecutive sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment on Count Fifteen. Smith appeals, challenging his convictions and the sentence imposed on remand. Because we again find procedural sentencing error, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing.
In his appellate brief, Smith argues that the district
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal,
pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
based on the sufficiency of the evidence to support each of his
counts of conviction. He also challenges the district court’s
drug weight calculation under the Guidelines. We considered,
and rejected, both of these arguments in Smith’s first appeal.
See Smith, 494 F. App’x at 321-22. Thus, these arguments fall
within the scope of the “law of the case doctrine.” See L.J. v.
Wilbon,
Smith also challenges the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence on remand. We review a sentence
*4
for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We
“must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error,” including improper calculation of
the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, and inadequate explanation of
the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). In
announcing a sentence, the district court is not required to
“robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,
particularly when imposing a within-Guidelines sentence.”
United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court must
conduct an “individualized assessment justifying the sentence
imposed and rejection of arguments for a higher or lower
sentence based on § 3553.” Lynn, 592 F.3d at 584 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Where the defendant or prosecutor
presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence
than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge
should address the party’s arguments and explain why he has
rejected those arguments.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court must provide sufficient explanation to
“demonstrate that it ‘considered the parties’ arguments and
*5
ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.’” Lynn, 592 F.3d at 576 (quoting
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). Such
explanation is required to “promote the perception of fair
sentencing” and to permit “meaningful appellate review.” Gall,
Smith asserts that on resentencing, the court erred in failing to provide a sufficient explanation for its denial of his request for a downward variance. We agree. In announcing its sentence, the court provided scant explanation of its reasons for denying the requested variance and for the within-Guidelines sentence it ultimately selected. The court provided only a brief response to Smith’s argument that his limited criminal history warranted a downward variance sentence, and it did not specifically address Smith’s assertion that his criminal history score was exaggerated. Nor did the court specifically address counsel’s arguments regarding Smith’s history and characteristics, including Smith’s loving relationships with his family and post-incarceration rehabilitation. The court did not refer at any point to the § 3553(a) factors or indicate its calculus under those factors. Thus, we conclude the court failed to conduct an adequate individualized assessment of Smith’s case or to provide *6 sufficient explanation for its decision to reject Smith’s request for a variance.
Procedural sentencing error, including failure to
adequately explain the chosen sentence, is subject to review for
harmlessness. Lynn,
We conclude that the Government has not met its burden to establish harmless error. While the record clearly establishes that the court considered at least some of Smith’s arguments for a variant sentence, and the arguments Smith raised were not particularly compelling, we cannot say with “fair assurance” that the court would not have reached a different *7 result had it more precisely addressed these arguments on the record. [1] Perhaps more importantly in this case, the transcript of the resentencing hearing is simply insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review of the substantive reasonableness of the sentence or to ensure that the court conducted the required individualized assessment of Smith’s case.
Because we conclude there exists significant procedural error in Smith’s sentence, we have no occasion to address its substantive reasonableness. [2] See United States v. Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s convictions, vacate Smith’s sentence, and remand *8 for resentencing to permit the court to provide an individualized assessment and more thorough explanation of the sentence imposed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
Notes
[1] We recognize that the district court more clearly expressed its reluctance to vary downward from the Guidelines range at the original sentencing hearing when addressing arguments similar to those raised by Smith at resentencing. Even assuming these prior statements could be used to support the sentence imposed on remand, they do not fully address the nonfrivolous arguments raised by Smith during the resentencing hearing. Moreover, the court’s remarks at resentencing provide no basis to infer that the court intended to adopt or incorporate its prior rationale when refusing to vary downward in resentencing Smith.
[2] Insofar as Smith argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to depart downward based on his argument that his criminal history score was overstated, this issue is not reviewable on appeal, as the record provides no basis to question that the court properly understood its authority to depart. United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008). Because we do not reach the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, however, we again decline to express any view on the propriety of the district court’s rejection of Smith’s arguments for a downward variance.