OPINION
Dеfendants Randall Shoemaker and Larry Norman were both convicted of various drug and firearm offenses in connection with a drug transaction at a Hardee’s restaurant. Shoemaker was also convicted of drug and firearm offenses in connection with a later search of his home, which produced numerous guns and substantial evidence of drug trafficking.
Both appеal their convictions, raising a plethora of arguments. We reject all of these arguments except one: that the district court erred in not dismissing Shoemaker’s indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for having firearms in his home. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I
Norman and Shoemaker were charged in the same five-count indictment. Counts One, Two and Three, respectively, charged Shoemaker, in connection with the search of his home, with possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), using and carrying a firearm in relation to the marijuana charge, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Counts Four and Five, respectively, charged both Norman and Shoemaker, in connection with the transaction at Hardee’s, with conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, under 21 U.S.C. § 846, and using and carrying a firearm in relation to a marijuana conspiracy, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Shoemaker moved to dismiss Count Three of the indictment on the ground that section 922(g)(1) did not apply to his possession of firearms in his home. The district court denied the motion and submitted all five counts to the jury. Shoemaker was convicted on all five counts; Norman was convicted on Counts Four and Five. Both appeal.
II
Shoemaker contends that the district court erred in not dismissing Count Three, which charged that his possession of firearms in his home violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l)’s prohibition against possession of firearms by a convicted felon. We agree.
Section 922(g)(1) prohibits “any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm in interstate commerce. “[C]rime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is defined in sеction 921(a)(20), which provides in part:
Any conviction ... for which a person ... has had civil rights restored shall not be considered [a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year] for purposes of this chapter, unless such ... restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
It is uncontested that Shoemaker was convicted of manslaughter in North Carolina and sentenced to six years imprisonment, and that his civil rights were restored following this conviction. Shoemaker, thus, cannot be indicted under section 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm unless his restoration of civil rights “expressly provide[d] that [he could] not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” Whether his rеstoration did so “expressly provide” is the only issue before us.
We have previously held that in determining whether a defendant’s restoration “expressly provide[d] that [he could] not ship, transрort, possess, or receive firearms,” a court must examine not only the state’s certificate granting restoration of civil rights,
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but the actual effect of the restoration under the state’s firearms laws on the defendant’s ability to ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
United States v. Essick,
In McLean, the defendаnt, who had been previously convicted of a drug felony but had had his civil rights restored, was charged with violating section 922(g)(1) by carrying a handgun. The defendant’s restoration certificate indicated that it did not entitle him “to own, possess, receive, buy, or otherwise acquire firearms of any description.” Id. at. 217. Under North Carolina law, however, he was entitled to possess firearms ovеr a certain length and to possess any type of firearm in his home or business, and all restrictions on his firearm possession ceased after five years. Id. at 218-19 & n. 4. Thus, looking both to his certificate and state law, id. at 218, the defendant’s restoration provided that he could not possess firearms under a certain length outside of his home for five years. The only issue in the case was whether the defendant’s restoration had placed him within the section 921(a)(20) exception to section 922(g)(1); his restoration did place him within this exception to 922(g)(1) unless it “expressly provide[d] that [he could] not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”
We did not resolve whether this restoration “expressly provide[d] that [he could] not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms” by answering simply “yes” or “no.” Instead, wе focused' on the underlying section 922(g)(1) charge and examined whether the conduct that the government alleged violated section 922(g)(1) was conduct that was expressly prohibited by the rеstoration. Id. at 219. Because “[t]he facts alleged ... — that McLean was carrying a handgun within five years of his release from prison — f[e]ll squarely within the express provisions” of the restoratiоn, id., we concluded that, for the purposes of that particular case, the defendant’s restoration did “expressly provide that [the defendant could] not ship, transport, possess or receive firearms” within the meaning of section 921(a)(20). Id.
We followed the same approach in
Essick
and
United States v. McBryde,
Applying the analysis of McLean, Essick, and McBryde to the case at bar is straightforward. Shoemaker’s restoration certificate stated that it did not еntitle him to “own, *56 possess, receive, buy, or otherwise acquire firearms of any description.” Under North Carolina law, however, he was entitled to possess firearms over a certаin length and to possess any type of firearm in his home or business, and all restrictions on his possession of firearms ceased after five years. N.C.Gen.Stat. 14-415.1(a) (1986). Thus, as did the restorations in McLean, Essick, and McBryde, Shoemaker’s restoration provided that he could not possess firearms under a certain length outside of his home for five years.
To determine whether his restoration “expressly provide[d] thаt [he could] not ship, transport, possess or receive firearms” within the meaning of section 921(a)(20), we must examine the section 922(g)(1) charge against Shoemaker and determine whether thе conduct that the government alleged violated section 922(g)(1) was conduct that was prohibited by his restoration.
McLean,
Ill
For the reasons stated, we reverse Shoemaker’s conviction on Count Three, but affirm his convictions on Counts One, Two, Four, and Five and affirm Norman’s convictions on Counts Four and Five.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
Notes
Shoemaker and Norman make several other contentions as well. Shoemaker argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on any of the counts charged and that Counts One, Two and Three were improperly joined with Counts Four and Five. Norman argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on Counts Four and Five and that, in any event, he was entitled to a new trial because the jury heard certain inadmissible evidence which prejudiced him. After reviewing the record and the briefs, we reject all of these contentions.