Case Information
*1 Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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KELLY, Circuit Judge.
*2
Ramiro Salazar-Aleman pled guilty to aiding and abetting the possession of more than 500 grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Salazar-Aleman objected to the pre-sentence investigation report, seeking a reduction in his offense level for a mitigating role pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (2011). The district court denied this objection and imposed a sentence of [1]
108 months, the lowest end of the calculated guidelines range. Salazar-Aleman filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal as requested. The district court granted the motion and re-sentenced Salazar-Aleman. Now on appeal, Salazar-Aleman contends his sentence is both procedurally unsound and substantively unreasonable. He argues the district court erred in refusing to apply a mitigating role reduction and failed to give proper weight to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. We affirm.
I. Background
In December 2010, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were conducting surveillance on a suspected “stash house” for methamphetamine when agents observed a vehicle leave the garage and return several times. On the last trip, the Sheriff’s Office executed a traffic stop. Salazar-Aleman was driving the vehicle accompanied by a passenger. During the course of a consensual search of the vehicle, the officers discovered 831.7 grams of methamphetamine hidden in the trunk. Salazar-Aleman states that he was unpaid for his services, but knew drugs were being loaded into the vehicle. He was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine as well as aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Salazar-Aleman pled guilty to the aiding and abetting charge, and the conspiracy count was dismissed after sentencing.
II. Discussion
In reviewing the district court’s sentence, “[w]e ‘must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error.’” United States v. Feemster,
A. Mitigating Role Reduction
Salazar-Aleman first argues the district court committed procedural error by
denying him a mitigating role reduction pursuant to § 3B1.2 of the sentencing
guidelines. Section 3B1.2 provides for a two- to four-level reduction in a defendant’s
offense level when the defendant “plays a part in committing the offense that makes
him substantially less culpable.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(A). The district court’s
grant or denial of a mitigating role reduction is a factual finding reviewed for clear
error. United States v. Ellis,
As the sentencing guidelines make clear, a defendant’s entitlement to a
mitigating role reduction requires a comparative analysis: “each participant’s actions
should be compared against the other participants, and each participant’s culpability
should be evaluated in relation to the elements of the offense.” United States v.
Deans,
Instead of this comparison, Salazar-Aleman emphasizes his involvement was
limited to being a courier in a single transaction. Even if we accept these assertions
as true, the Eighth Circuit has never found someone’s role as a courier in and of itself
sufficient to warrant a mitigating role reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Pruneda,
B. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors
Salazar-Aleman next argues the district court committed procedural error in failing to properly consider all the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review sentences “whether inside or outside the Guidelines range” under “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (quotation omitted).
More specifically, “[w]e do not require a district court to provide a mechanical recitation of the § 3553(a) factors . . . . Rather, it simply must be clear from the record that the district court actually considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining the sentence.” Id. at 461 (quotation omitted); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. *5 338, 358–59 (2007) (acknowledging that the judge could have said more about considering the sentencing factors, but the record made clear he “listened to each argument” for a below-guidelines sentence). The record in this case makes clear that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors. The district court expressly stated, “I’ve [] reviewed all of those sentencing factors set out in § 3553(a)” and specifically invited Salazar-Aleman to underscore any of the factors for particular consideration. There is no evidence in the record to suggest the district court did not consider the arguments Salazar-Aleman presented, and we find no procedural error.
C. Substantive Reasonableness
Finally, Salazar-Aleman argues his sentence was substantively unreasonable
because the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors. The substantive
reasonableness of a sentence is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Feemster, 572
F.3d at 461 (citing Gall,
This deferential standard of review is coupled with a district court’s wide
discretion. The district court “has substantial latitude to determine how much weight
to give the various factors under § 3553(a).” United States v. Ruelas-Mendez, 556
F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Gasaway,
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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Notes
[1] The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
