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United States v. Ramiro Montoya-De La Cruz
861 F.3d 600
5th Cir.
2017
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Docket

*1 other, contracts. similar readily found statutory Thus, common canons

See id. Traxxas. not aid

construction do that the district

holdWe contract that the it determined

err when thus, ambiguous, summary judg- Traxxas’s denied

properly Appar- motions. See JA

ment and Rule 50 law,

el, York F.3d at 396. Under New left appropriately district court ambiguous contract

interpretation of this jury.

to the See id.

IV. CONCLUSION reasons, hold that foregoing

For ap- to hear jurisdiction

this court judgment of the AFFIRM the

peal

district court. America, STATES

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee Cruz, La

Ramiro MONTOYA-De

Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-50804 No. 15-50808

Consolidated with Case Appeals,

United States Court

Fifth Circuit. 30, 2017

Filed June *2 traveling nationals Jr., undocumented Mexican Gay, Assistant U.S. At- Joseph H. Lubbock, Texas, Office, to .seek work. Attorney’s Western torney, U.S. TX, reentry after de- Texas, Antonio, guilty illegal pleaded Ken- San District moved to The Government then Attorney, portation. Assistant U.S. Kaplan, neth P. for his 2013 Montoya’s probation Office, revoke Attorney’s Western District U.S. *3 illegal entry offense. Texas, Paso, TX, Plaintiff-Appellee. El for Coltharp, Assistant Federal Donna F. court, Chief August In Franco, Defender, Public Maureen Scott simultaneously con- Judge Biery presiding, Defender, Federal Public Federal Public hearing on Monto- sentencing ducted Office, of Tex- Western District Defender’s and on illegal reentry offense ya’s Antonio, TX, as, Defendant-Appel- San for his 2013 probation revocation of his lant. reentry offense.1 This was the sec- illegal Montoya appeared time that ond GRAVES, JOLLY, SMITH, Before Judge Biery, who had been Judges. Circuit Montoya’s 2013 offense. judge for JOLLY, Judge: E. Circuit GRADY sentencing hearing, the district At the applicable Guidelines (“Monto- provided Montoya-De La Cruz Ramiro counsel range for each offense and asked illegal ya”) challenges his sentences “[a]nything there that would whether was reentry of the terms of his and violation change responded that.” Counsel “No.” ground release on the that the supervised The court then asked defense counsel by failing to why “any legal whether there was reason him an to allocute be- provide [Montoya’s] supervised ... release should AF- pronouncing fore his sentences. We again not be revoked.” Defense counsel FIRM. further comments said “No” and made no I. hearing. during the entry in illegal was convicted of then addressed Mon- The district court entry deportation after in illegal 2012 and toya. He asked him whether he was “the 2013, receiving probationary 2012 and in Montoya-De La who’s same Ramiro Cruz deported He last sentence each time. reentry illegal again,” convicted here on By in 2013. from the United States “Yes, Montoya responded, which sir.” The States, in the United was back why coming him he kept court then asked time again he violated the law. This where kept getting caught. Montoya back he driving aggravated he was of convicted of need.” The court asked responded, “Out alcohol, while under the influence of driv- money he made while he was how much license, driving ing without a driver’s up; responded locked road, wrong receiving side of the on the had none. The court noted custody, ninety days eighty- of sentence in federal court and repeatedly been eight suspended. which were of asked, you you’re going get know “So answered, ‘Tes, caught, right?” Montoya April agents In Border Patrol asked, you The court “Once finish found in the United sir.” again eases, your punishment other in these what do group time with a States —this speaks Spanish. proceedings were conducted with the 1. The interpreter because assistance of the court States, you plan to do?” replied, “Stay 129 S.Ct. (2009) (citations my country, sir.” The court responded, omitted). 173 L.Ed.2d 266 “Okay. Because next time—instead of a If requirements met, those three are couple years prison, next time it’ll be have discretion error, to correct the but years, four and the next time it’ll “only be seven if the ‘seriously affect[s] eight. you fairness, Do understand how it integrity public now reputation of answered, ‘Tes, Montoya again judicial (citation works?” proceedings.’” Id. omit- ted). sir.”

The district court sentenced A. imprisonment fifteen months of and three years supervised release for the 2015 begin by We considering whether *4 illegal entry The court also re- offense. the district court committed by voked probation and sentenced failing to Montoya offer the opportunity to him eight imprisonment to months of to allocute sentencing before him. run consecutively to his sentence for the Montoya although contends the new offense. Both sentences were at the engaged in a colloquy him, brief advisory range. Guidelines exchange did not comply with Rule 32 Montoya confirmed that he understood his because the clearly court never and un- sentences, and neither he nor his counsel equivocally him right offered the speak to objected to either sentence. any subject on of his choosing before sen- timely appealed.2 He Further, tencing. Montoya argues, contends That the district court plainly questions'were by driven its con- by erred him denying right his to allocute cerns, not receiving his interest in a lower sentencing before him in contravention of sentence. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3 The Government counters that the dis- trict court complied by with Rule asking II. Montoya open-ended questions that en- object Because compassed mitigation why issues such as in the district court to the denial of his again committed the same crime and right to we review his claim for planned how he to avoid recidivistic behav- plain error. 358 ior in the future. 2004) (en banc). F.3d prevail, Montoya to

Therefore, must show: The district court (1) (2) defect”; “an error or that is by failing “clear an allocution obvious, or subject rather than to reason pronouncing before his sen (3) dispute”; able and that long required “affect[s] [his] tences. We have strict com Puckett v. United rights.” pliance Thus, with Rule 32.4 order to “[i]n prison imposing released from on Au- sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). gust subject but remains to a three- Therefore, year supervised term of release. 4. See, Palacios, e.g., United States v. appeal is not moot. 2016) (holding a that discussion between the district court and de requires sentencing 3. Rule 32 court to regarding acceptance fendant credit for personally “address the defendant in order to responsibility specific was not "a and un permit present defendant to equivocal opportunity speak mitigation mitigate information to the sentence” before sentence”); of his United States v. Montalvo- particu- on must addressed the district court satisfy Rule issues, enough lar which is not that the de- ‘unequivocally’ communicate Echegollen-Barrueta, Rule 32. See by making right a to allocute” fendant has (citation omitted). And the F.3d at 789 to the defen- personal inquiry “a directed clearly convincingly record does not 445 F.3d Magwood, dant.” United States (citations omitted). he had a 2006) demonstrate that knew 826, 829 any subject he chose on enough is “[I]t (citation he was sentenced. See id. particu- a a defendant on court addresses omitted). Accordingly, we hold issue, lar affords counsel failing provide court erred specific speak, or hears opportunity. with an allocution presentence report.” objections to language clear of the rule and “Given the (cita- 195 F.3d at 789 Echegollen-Barrueta, ..., this er- Supreme ... Court case law omitted). quotations tion and internal plain.” Reyna, ror was obvious court, prosecutor, and the de- “[T]he very least interact must at the fendant clearly convincing-

manner that shows ly the defendant knew he had B. any subject choosing on *5 Next, we consider whether the dis imposition of sentence.” Id. prior to the (citation omitted). Montoya’s trict court’s error affected sub rights. stantial colloquy court’s brief with

The district compliance Montoya attempt does not to establish Montoya fell short of strict actually prejudi- unequivo- not that the error here was Rule The court did Moreover, acknowledges that: he had a cial. cally state that appli- of the subject before his was sentenced the bottom any on he chose an exten- ranges; cable Guidelines he had imposed. was See United States sentence colloquy sentencing judge; with the Villa-Lujan, Fed.Appx. 286 sive 2016) (5th any argu- though even neither he nor his counsel (holding Cir. variance; and, ex- for a when “and the district court ments the defendant downward he had reason to dis- tensively topics several asked whether discussed sentences, ranges, his counsel pute the district the Guidelines imposition of his Nevertheless, that he did not. Mon- it did not stated [plainly] erred because toya presume that we should give op- an contends [unequivocally] [the defendant] neither he nor his attor- any subject prejudice on in miti- because portunity sentences”). Moreover, opportunity an to make ney was gation of his (5th any topic choosing,” speak on of his Rodriguez, 476 2012) (holding plain that it was error for the plainly denied him the to allo- which the defendant an cute); district court to not allow Echegollen-Barrueta, United States opportunity to address the court before im- 1999) (hold- 789-90 sentence, though posing the court even personal ing the district court's address that questions several asked the defendant defendant, "asking he had twice whether ” arguments made several on defense counsel say,' 'anything failed to Rule 32 behalf); United States v. Per- the defendant's ez, demonstrated when the defendant's answers may that he not have understood 2012) (holding that the district court’s any subject a on had questioning of defendant on several factual choosing). opportunity topics provide him "an arguments for a downward variance.5 review, On rejected we argument that, disputes The Government that Monto- circumstances, under these his substantial ya’s counsel had no to make Reyna, rights were affected because we mitigation arguments suggests explained, may the Court infer from defense counsel’s contemplated failure to move for a downward that at variance least some—and perhaps that counsel knew such a motion would be all—defendants who were de- frivolous. nied allocution at revocation sentencing, but who nevertheless received a sen- We conclude tence at the guideline court’s error did affect sub range, and who never even advanced Where, here, rights. stantial as the error arguments that might have resulted was the denial of the defendant’s allocution sentence, lower would not be owed right, generally “presume we de [a presumption prejudice plain-error on rights were affected fendant’s review. if he shows there an opportunity Id. the error ‘to played a role in the ” decision.’ We reached the same conclusion Gonzalez-Reyes, United States v. 582 Fed. Villa-Lujan case near — a 2014) Appx. (quoting ly indistinguishable from this one. In that 351-52). Reyna, Reyna Under case, review, which was also on plain error presume prejudice to a defendant who defendant, who was denied the right to was not sentenced at the bottom of the allocute, pleaded guilty to the same of but, range, correct Guideline as we ex Montoya, fenses as had an collo extensive where, here, plained as a defen quy judge, with the was sentenced at the *6 dant is sentenced at the bottom of the applicable ranges, Guidelines applicable ranges, prejudice Guidelines argue and did not for downward variance presumed should be “the district or a different Guidelines calculation. Villa- ‘rejected arguments by has the de Lujan, Fed.Appx. 661 at 286-87. The de in fendant that would have resulted a low fendant made the argument same as to the ” E.g., (quoting Reyna, id. er sentence.’ presumption prejudice of 353); Montalvo-Rodriguez, 358 F.3d at 476 now makes. Id. rejected at 286. We Fed.Appx. at 29. argument, holding that the defendant “had ample opportunity, during either before or require- cannot sentencing hearing, the to for a move proffered any arguments ment. He never variance, departure downward ... or that would have resulted in a lower sen- for a different Guidelines calculation” and Moreover, situations, tence. in similar so, given his failure to do we would have declined presume prejudice. not presume prejudiced by that he was Jimenez-Laines, In denial of allocution. Id. at 286-87. defendant, who sentenced the bot- tom range presented of the Guideline and never ar- We are with no reason to Reyna. sentence, gued depart for a from of applications lower was denied his these 889, right Fed.Appx. Accordingly, to allocute. 354 894- we hold that district requires imposing Fed. R. 5. Rule 32 also the district court to fore sentence. Crim. P. not, however, 32(i)(4)(A)(i). "provide attorney opportu- an does nity specifically provision. on the defendant’s behalf” be- claim a violation of this 606 ty allo- then concludes that the district denying Montoya in his

court’s by failing Montoya’s not affect sub- rights cution did it then holds that Thus, Montoya right has not met his to allocute. But rights. stantial af- rights showing that the court com- were his burden hand, gives it it mitted reversible error. fected. What with one justifies takes with the It this move other. III. by declining pre- afford sumption prejudice post-Reyna that our reasons, foregoing we AFFIRM For the Reyna, applied. cases have See the district court’s sentences. (holding “presume that we should GRAVES, JR., Circuit JAMES E. when a defendant shows a viola- prejudice Judge, dissenting: and the right tion of the a role in the played violation to have such Procedure 32

Federal Rule of Criminal decision”) (quot- requires the district court to “address 276, Adams, v. 252 F.Sd ing United States in personally permit order to defendant (3d also, 2001)); e.g., United 287 see any present the defendant Gonzalez-Reyes, Fed.Appx. 582 States mitigate the sentence” be- information to 302, 2014); 304 United States imposing fore sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 28, 476 29 Montalvo-Rodriguez, (i) (A)(ii). (4) guarantees Rule 32 the de- Garcia, 2012); States v. United impor- “an fendant’s 504, Yet tant, right” deep- that “is highly respected so, majority ap- doing apparently ly legal in our tradition.” United rooted plies presumption its own States v. —that prejudiced was not the denial 2004) (en banc). Indeed, any topic himself on jurisprudence been enshrined our since choosing. country. founding before the of this Green States, v. United us, I the record before fail to see On (1961). S.Ct. 5 L.Ed.2d definitively conclude that noth- how we can important several functions. It serves ing Montoya would have said would “First, gives it one more defendant so, Particularly difference. conviction ‘to throw opportunity describes his brief several ” *7 mercy of the court.’ Unit himself on the he would have made had he statements (5th 979, Dabeit, ed v. 231 F.3d 981 States specified allocuted. a defendant has When 2000), abrogated 358 F.3d mitigation arguments favor persuasive may “The counsel 344. most made, properly given would have be able to defendant as past remanded opportunity, we have might, halting eloquence, defendant resentencing recognized because we Green, 304, speak for himself.” right to allocution in that the denial of the symbolic The “also has 81 S.Ct. 653. “seriously such circumstances affect[s] perceived eq importance,'‘maximizing fairness, integrity, public reputation ” Dabeit, [sentencing] process.’ uity of the See, judicial proceedings.” e.g., United 231 F.3d 981. 602, Avila-Cortez, 607 States (5th 2009); see also United States v. majority recognizes The 527, Palacios, importance of the 844 2016); Aguirre-Romero, than strict States v. long required nothing less United 16-40231, 291, 296-97, 2017 majori- Rule The compliance to 728694, 23, at *4-5 WL Cir. Feb. (Feb.

2017), 24, 2017); as revised United Perez,

States v. 460 Fed.Appx. 2012); Lister, There these, significant

is no difference between anything,

cases and the case at bar. If

Montoya’s inability to speak on his own prejudicial,

behalf was more rather than

less, because his counsel failed also

any arguments in favor of mitigation. this, legal

When the tradition is as old as this, important is as as and the this,

rule is as clear as

judge simply needs to follow the rule.

I respectfully dissent. BANK, Plaintiff-

1ST SOURCE

Appellee,

Joaquim NETO, Salles Leite

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1058 Appeals,

United States Court of

Seventh Circuit.

Argued May

Decided June

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Ramiro Montoya-De La Cruz
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 30, 2017
Citation: 861 F.3d 600
Docket Number: 15-50804 Consolidated with Case 15-50808
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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