UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. THOMAS JOHN QUINONES
No. 96-9442
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
(March 11, 1998)
D. C. Docket No. 1:96-CR-90-1-HLM; [PUBLISH]
Before COX and HULL, Circuit Judges, and KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Background
Quinones was convicted of credit card fraud in the Northern District of Georgia and sentenced to a prison term followed by a term of supervised release. While serving this prison term, he was convicted in the District of South Carolina for another instance of credit card fraud and sentenced to terms of imprisonment and of supervised release that were to run concurrently with the terms imposed by the Northern District of Georgia.
While Quinones was serving these concurrent terms of supervised release, Quinones‘s probation officer sought to revoke them on several grounds, including Quinones‘s commission of the felony of unlawfully entering a motor vehicle. The South Carolina and Georgia cases were consolidated in the Northern District of Georgia. At a revocation hearing there, the court found (based on Quinones‘s admission) that Quinones had broken into a car for the purpose of stealing a leather jacket, a Class B violation of supervised-release conditions. See
Discussion
This question is one of first impression in this circuit, but not elsewhere. In United States v. Cotroneo, 89 F.3d 510 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 533 (1996), the Eighth Circuit resolved this precise issue against the defendant. The court reasoned that
Alternatively, Quinones asserts that by analogy to
We reject Quinones‘s position and embrace the Eighth Circuit‘s. The district court acted within the confines of
We decline, furthermore, to invoke an analogy to initial sentencing under
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
