UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. QUICKEN LOANS INC., Defendant.
Civil Action No. 15-613 (RBW)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed 11/14/2016
Filed 11/18/2016
Mr. Michel has not shown that he has suffered an individualized injury such that he can maintain this action. This alleged diminution of his vote for United States Senators is the type of undifferentiated harm common to all citizens that is appropriate for redress in the political sphere: his claim is not that he has been unable to cast votes for Senators, but that his home-state Senators have been frustrated by the rules and leadership of the United States Senate. This is far from the type of direct, individualized harm that warrants judicial review of a “case or controversy.” It is instead a request for the Court to “assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority which plainly [it] do[es] not possess.” Mellon, 262 U.S. at 489. This would not only require the Court to become “a higher legislature where a [Senator or Representative] who has failed to persuade his colleagues can always renew the battle,” see Melcher, 836 F.2d at 564, but would also require it to entertain suits from all citizens who feel that their representatives have been treated unfairly by the legislative process. Although such claims may at times be justified, the Framers of the Constitution left their resolution to the political branches, not the judiciary.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED and Plaintiff‘s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 12) is DENIED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Jeffrey B. Morganroth, Morganroth & Morganroth, PLLC, Birmingham, MI, Thomas M. Hefferon, A Better Childhood, Inc., Chappaqua, NY, for Defendant.
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Reggie B. Walton, United States District Judge
The government initiated this action against Quicken Loans Inc. (“Quicken“) pursuant to the False Claims Act,
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2012, the government initiated an investigation into Quicken‘s origination and underwriting of single family residential mortgages insured by the FHA. Gov‘t Opp‘n, Exhibit (“Ex.“) 1 (Declaration of Christopher Reimer of May 14, 2015 (“Reimer Decl.“)) ¶ 6. After unsuccessful settlement negotiations, the government informed Quicken on March 30, 2015, that it intended to file this suit during the week of April 20, 2015, id. ¶ 10, and this action was filed on April 23, 2015, see Compl.
On April 17, 2015, six days prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, Quicken filed an Administrative Procedure Act (“APA“) claim against the government in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Gov‘t Opp‘n, Ex. 3 (Complaint (“APA Compl.“)) at 1. On April 29, 2015, Quicken filed in this matter a Motion to Stay or Transfer in Light of a First-Filed Action Pending in the Eastern District of Michigan. Defendant Quicken Loans Inc.‘s Motion to Stay or Transfer in Light of a First-Filed Action Pending in the Eastern District of Michigan (“Def.‘s Mot. to Stay or Transfer“), ECF No. 4. On May 29, 2015, this Court stayed the proceedings in this case pending the resolution of the government‘s motion to dismiss the Michigan APA case, see Order, ECF No. 18, and the APA case was thereafter dismissed with prejudice on December 31, 2015, see Quicken Loans Inc. v. United States, 152 F.Supp.3d 938, 955 (E.D. Mich. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-1250 (6th Cir. March 2, 2016).
On January 19, 2016, the Court denied without prejudice Quicken‘s Motion to Stay or Transfer, “with permission to file a revised motion seeking such relief that reflects these developments in the Eastern District of Michigan.” Minute Order, Jan. 19, 2016. On February 19, 2016, Quicken filed its Renewed Motion to Transfer this Action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Def.‘s Mot. at 1.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a threshold matter, a district court must determine that the proposed transferee court is located “in a district where the action ‘might have been brought.‘” Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. First Tenn. Nat‘l Bank, 856 F.Supp.2d 186, 190 (D.D.C. 2012) (Walton, J.). If so, then a district court considers both the private interests of the parties and the public interests of the courts[.] The private interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiffs’ choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants; (2) the defendants’ choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses ..., but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. The public interest considerations include: (1) the transferee‘s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F.Supp.2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 1998) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
There is no dispute that the current action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Michigan, see
A. The Private Interest Factors
1. The Parties’ Choice of Forum and Where the Claims Arose
Generally, the party moving for a transfer of venue “bears a heavy burden of establishing that [the] plaintiffs’ choice of forum is inappropriate” because the plaintiff‘s choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference. Thayer/Patricof Educ. Funding, L.L.C. v. Pryor Res., Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 21, 31 (D.D.C. 2002) (citations
Quicken argues that the District of Columbia‘s connection to this case is insubstantial, and the government‘s choice of forum should be accorded no deference. Def.‘s Mem. at 8. To the extent that Quicken‘s endorsement of FHA loans and submission of insurance claims to the government were processed by the government in the District, Quicken notes that these documents were submitted electronically and processed automatically, id. at 9 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 40, 93-95, 98), and “[t]hus the automated processing by the FHA‘s electronic systems creates no significant connection for purposes of § 1404(a),” id. at 9-10. Furthermore, Quicken argues that the Eastern District of Michigan is the more appropriate venue because “Quicken Loans is incorporated in Michigan; has its headquarters in the Eastern District of Michigan; transacts business in the Eastern District of Michigan; and underwrote, endorsed, and certified the loans in question in the Eastern District of Michigan.” Id. at 7. According to Quicken, “all of the facts that the United States alleges gave rise to its claims occurred in Michigan,” including: the underwriting of the loans in question; the alleged false certifications that the loans complied with FHA guidelines; the allegedly false annual certifications of FHA compliance; the approval of exceptions to lending guidelines; the alleged “value appeals” to obtain inflated appraisals; the alleged manipulation and miscalculation of borrower income; the compensation of the underwriters; the alleged manipulation of borrower data; the alleged failure to perform quality control and report compliance failures to FHA; and the writing of numerous emails and documents cited in the Complaint. Id. at 12-13 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 103-201).
The government responds that it chose to file this matter in the District of Columbia due to the “intimate involvement of FHA and HUD [United States Department of Housing and Urban Development] employees and officials in this district.” Gov‘t Opp‘n at 11. According to the government, the claims arose in this federal district, not in the Eastern District of Michigan, because “the most significant events occurred here—namely, false statements made by Quicken Loans to HUD and FHA personnel in the District of Columbia.” Id. at 26. The government argues that the allegedly false certifications made by Quicken, as well as the FHA loan payments that followed from those certifications, were submitted and processed through systems administered by FHA staff in this district. Id. at 13-15. Moreover, the government claims that its policies for underwriting and endorsing FHA loans, including the loans at issue, were generated and reviewed by government officials in this District. Id. at 16-19. Furthermore, the government argues that Quicken‘s preferred venue should be afforded no weight because Quicken “engaged in improper forum shopping by filing its preemptive action.” Id. at 26. According to the government, the “failed [Michigan] suit, and the delay and inconvenience that it caused, should be treated by the [C]ourt as a factor that weighs against a transfer of this action.” Id.
The Court concludes that the government‘s choice of forum in this matter is entitled to little deference because there is an insubstantial nexus between the District of Columbia and the factual circumstances underlying the government‘s False Claims Act allegations. See New Hope Power Co., 724 F.Supp.2d at 95. The only
The Court disagrees with the government that Quicken‘s failed preemptive suit warrants denial of its motion to transfer. See Gov‘t Opp‘n at 6. The cases cited by the government in support of this contention, see id. at 6-8, are distinguishable from the facts in this matter, as all but two of those cases involved parallel preemptive suits that were still ongoing at the time the motions to transfer venue were denied; thus, the parties that filed the preemptive suits would have been rewarded for their earlier-filed preemptive suits if their motions for transfer had been granted. See EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did not abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss a second-filed action pursuant to the first-filed rule given “the totality of the circumstances,” specifically that “[t]he timing of the [first-filed action] in the District of Columbia indicates an attempt to preempt an imminent subpoena enforcement in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania“); Spanx, Inc. v. Times Three Clothier, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-710-WSD, 2013 WL 5636684, at *1, 4 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (granting the defendant‘s motion to transfer to the Southern District of New York a declaratory judgment action that the plaintiff filed in the Northern District of Georgia before the defendant filed its patent infringement action in the Southern District of New York because the plaintiff‘s choice of forum for her “anticipatory” action was not entitled to any deference); Michael Miller Fabrics, LLC v. Studio Imports Ltd., No. 12 CV 3858(KMW)(JLC), 2012 WL 2065294, at *1, 5, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting the plaintiff‘s motion for an injunction to restrain the defendant from prosecuting
2. The Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses and the Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
Quicken argues that the Eastern District of Michigan is the more convenient forum because all of the Quicken employees identified in the Complaint, “nearly all” of the rest of Quicken employees who may be called as witnesses, and all of Quicken‘s loan files and other relevant documents, are located there. Def.‘s Mem. at 14. According to Quicken, although some government witnesses may be located in the District of Columbia, others may be located at HUD‘s Homeownership Centers in Pennsylvania, California, Colorado, and Georgia. Id. at 14-15. Quicken also argues that the non-party witnesses, such as the appraisers and borrowers, “are far more likely to be located near Detroit than D.C.” Id. at 17-18.
The government responds that the District of Columbia is the most convenient forum for the United States because nearly all of its witnesses are located in the District of Columbia. Gov‘t Opp‘n at 27. The government agrees that the HUD Homeownership Center employees may appear as witnesses, but notes that the Philadelphia Homeownership Center, which is responsible for Quicken‘s principal lending region, is much closer to the District of Columbia than to the Eastern District of Michigan, and thus this District would be more convenient for those witnesses. Id. at 21. As for non-party witnesses, the government argues that because Quicken “is a national mortgage lender with a broad national reach,” this case will involve witnesses “such as borrowers, appraisers, and other persons relevant to specific loans” from across the nation, and the Eastern District of Michigan will not be more convenient to those witnesses than this District. Id. at 30-31. Finally, the government claims that because Quicken‘s files “are nearly all electronic,” this factor is less important because electronic documents can easily be “transported” to this District. Id. at 32.
Because a number of parties and witnesses in this dispute are located in both this District and the Eastern District of Michigan, and the majority if not all of the documents are electronic, the Court con-
B. Public Interest Factors
Because the parties agree that the first public interest factor, the transferee‘s familiarity with the governing law, is neutral, see Def.‘s Mem. at 23; Gov‘t Opp‘n at 34; see also Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, 856 F.Supp.2d at 194 (“[A]ll federal courts are presumed to be equally familiar with the law governing federal statutory claims.“), the Court need only assess the following two public interest factors, see Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C., 24 F.Supp.2d at 71 (listing the public interest factors for a court to consider under
1. The Relative Congestion of the Transferee and Transferor Courts
“In this District, potential speed of resolution is examined by comparing the median filing times to disposition in the courts at issue.‘” Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, 856 F.Supp.2d at 194 (quoting Spaeth v. Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law, 845 F.Supp.2d 48, 60 (D.D.C. 2012)). According to the latest statistics concerning federal judicial caseloads, the median filing-to-disposition period in this District was 8.0 months, compared to 11.7 months in the Eastern District of Michigan. U.S. District Courts—Combined Civil and Criminal Federal Court Management Statistics at 2, 40 (June 30, 2016), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2016/06/30-1. Thus, the relative congestion of the Eastern District of Michigan weighs against transfer to that court, “but not by much.” See, e.g., Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, 856 F.Supp.2d at 194 (concluding that a median filing-to-disposition period of 7.2 months in the District of Columbia slightly weighed against transfer to the Southern District of New York, where filing-to-disposition periods ranged from 6.4 to 9.8 months).
2. The Local Interest in Deciding Local Controversies at Home
Quicken argues that because the conduct at issue occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan, that District “has a substantial interest in adjudicating a controversy that arose there and that concerns disputes between a large Michigan company and the federal government.” Def.‘s Mem. at 20 (footnote omitted). The government responds that this case is not a local controversy at all, but “involves the issuance and endorsement of mortgages for properties across the country that adversely affects taxpayers throughout the nation.” Gov‘t Opp‘n at 35. While the Court agrees that the case has national implications, the Court also agrees with Quicken that there is a stronger local interest in this matter in the Eastern District of Michigan, where “Quicken Loans underwrote the FHA loans at issue, endorsed those loans, and certified its compliance as to those loans.” Def.‘s Mem. at 4, 12-13. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Quicken.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that the balance of factors outlined in
SO ORDERED.
Susana B. NAVARRO, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 15-1712 (CKK)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed November 18, 2016
Filed 11/21/2016
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, United States District Judge
Susana B. Navarro, pro se.
Lauren Donner Chait, Social Security Administration, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint [ECF No. 9]. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, a resident of the Philippines, see Compl. at 1, was awarded “monthly widow‘s insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act effective May 2006 ... based on the Social Security record of her deceased husband, Eugenio Navarro,” Brief in Support of Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.‘s Compl. [ECF No. 9] (“Def.‘s Mot.“), Nicoll Decl. [ECF No. 9-1]