United States v. Q.United States v. Q.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO (D.C. No. CR-03-2155-JP)
Alonzo J. Padilla, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
The Government filed a sealed superceding information charging Defendant McQuade Q., a juvenile, with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,
The Government moved to proceed against McQuade as an adult under
On appeal, McQuade argues the district court erred when it: (1) failed to give proper weight to McQuade‘s upbringing and failed to find the first four statutory factors under
Our review of
I.
“The purpose of the federal juvenile delinquency process ‘is to remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation.’” United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990)). The district court must balance this important interest against the need to protect the public from dangerous individuals. Id. Juvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate unless the government establishes that prosecution as an adult is warranted in the interest of justice. Id.; see also Leon, D. M., 132 F.3d at 589.
Section 5032 provides six factors to guide district courts in determining whether transfer to adult status is “in the interest of justice”: (1) the age and social background of the juvenile; (2) the nature of the alleged offense; (3) the extent and nature of the juvenile‘s prior delinquency record; (4) the juvenile‘s present intellectual development and psychological maturity; (5) the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile‘s response to such efforts; and (6) the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile‘s behavioral problems.
II.
In this case, McQuade asks us to re-weigh the six statutory factors such that we might reach a different result than the district court. We decline to do so. The district court carefully considered each of the factors listed in
In examining each factor, the court first recognized that McQuade has suffered an unfortunate background and has spent “the majority of his upbringing . . . in foster care or in a school dormitory.” The court found McQuade‘s mother provided no parental support and that his father “served as a bad adult example.” The court then recognized that “[t]he lack of parental love and support has resulted in a number of McQuade Q.‘s severe psychological problems.” The record fully supports the court‘s findings.
When discussing the second and third factors, the court found the offense for which McQuade was charged involved “the forcible rape of different young girls” and one offense “was particularly violent and resulted in significant, multiple injuries to the girl.” The court also throughly reviewed McQuade‘s prior delinquency record and found that he has been charged with numerous juvenile offenses. Although the court indicated most of McQuade‘s prior offenses were non-violent, McQuade has a history of regular fighting at school. Again, the record fully supports the court‘s findings.
Next, the court made explicit findings under the fourth factor involving McQuade‘s present intellectual development and psychological maturity. The record shows McQuade was diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome at the age of six and testimony at the transfer hearing indicated that such a diagnosis may render McQuade “less amenable to treatment, especially in juvenile treatment facilities.” Further, relying upon the report and testimony of Dr. Samuel Roll, a clinical psychologist, the court found McQuade suffers from, among other things, “an extreme anti-social personality disorder, is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness and harmfulness of his actions, exhibits frequent loss of control of sexual and aggressive impulses, [and] has narcissistic tendencies.”2 Dr. Roll testified that juveniles suffering from narcissism are more difficult to treat than juveniles who do not exhibit narcissistic tendencies.
The record further supports the court‘s findings under the fifth statutory factor involving the nature of past treatment and McQuade‘s response to such treatment.
Lastly, the court found under the sixth factor that juvenile facilities are not equipped to handle McQuade‘s necessary long-term psychological treatment. Although McQuade argues the sixth factor only requires the unavailability of programs to treat a juvenile‘s “behavioral” problems rather than psychological problems, the district court logically concluded McQuade‘s psychological problems are directly related to his behavioral problems. Accordingly, the treatment of one over another would not facilitate McQuade‘s recovery. See Anthony Y, 172 F.3d at 1252-53 (indicating the sixth statutory factor simply addresses the availability of “treatment programs” in general and does not distinguish between “behavioral” or “psychological” treatment programs).
Further, the record supports the court‘s finding that juvenile facilities are not capable of handling McQuade‘s psychological treatment. Dr. Roll testified:
I think this man who has suffered this much, including separation from his mother right at the age when you begin to develop a conscience at three years old, really is going to need long-term treatment. And I think he is going to need treatment by highly trained people. Usually, unfortunately, at juvenile centers we spend less on our juveniles than we do on the adults, we don‘t have people who are well-trained, who have PhDs, who have long-term internships and post doctorates.
Dr. Roll continued and testified that McQuade will require treatment one to three times a week by a licensed psychologist for at least four to five years and juvenile facilities are simply not equipped to handle that need. The testimony of Dr. Elliott J. Rapaport, also a clinical psychologist, supports Dr. Roll‘s conclusions. Dr. Rapaport testified that juvenile facilities “don‘t have the kind of licensed psychologist on staff that would be required to engage in three-day-a-week intensive psychotherapy towards the end of changing personality.” Accordingly, the court properly concluded, based upon the report and recommendation of Dr. Roll, that the interest of justice required the transfer of McQuade to adult status because federal correctional institutions have the best programs and staffing to treat McQuade.
III.
The record establishes that the district court carefully considered each of the statutory factors and made a difficult decision as to how to weigh them. Even if the decision might not have been our own, in light of the deference we afford the district court, the court‘s decision must stand. Accordingly, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Government‘s motion to transfer McQuade to adult status.
AFFIRMED.