United States v. PrettyUnited States v. Pretty
Defendants Patricia Whitehead and William Pretty appeal their convictions and sentences arising out of a bribery and money laundering scheme. The government charged that the defendants, with Patrick Kuhse, conspired to take advantage of Whitehead’s position in the Office of the Oklahoma State Treasurer (“the Treasurer”) by arranging various securities transactions and sharing the commissions earned on those transactions. A jury found Whitehead and Pretty guilty on all counts. We affirm.
I.
The alleged crimes began after Claudette Henry was elected Oklahoma State Treasurer and named Whitehead as Deputy State Treasurer, in January 1991. Whitehead, Pretty, and Kuhse knew each other before this time. In 1990, Whitehead worked at Planner’s Independent Management (“PIM”), a securities firm in San Diego. She sold securities and insurance and Kuhse was her supervisor. Whitehead knew Pretty from selling insurance together. The two had formed a corporation, the Professional Business Education Association (“PBEA”), in 1990. Through PBEA, Whitehead and Pretty conducted seminars to train insurance agents and sold videotapes of the seminars. Pretty met Kuhse in 1989, when Pretty was marketing PBEA materials and Kuhse was selling insurance.
As Deputy State Treasurer, Whitehead was the Treasurer’s “chief trader,” in charge of investing the state’s money in low-risk securities. She held a securities license, registered with PIM, but she was not very experienced in the institutional bond market. She had her license suspended while holding her official position. The Treasurer had several investment policies: each transaction was to be the result of a competitive bidding process among approved brokers; each approved broker was required to have an in
In November 1990, before Whitehead was officially appointed, she called Kuhse in California. Kuhse arranged with Mary Limoges, the president of PIM, to set up an account to do business with the Oklahoma Treasurer. PIM began conducting transactions with the Treasurer in March 1991. PIM used the New York-based Mabon-Nugent as its clearing firm. When the Treasurer wanted to buy or sell securities, PIM would call Ma-bon-Nugent for a quote аnd relay that information to the Treasurer. For each transaction, Mabon-Nugent would collect a “clearing fee” and pay PIM, the brokerage firm, a “markup.” The markup would be the difference between what the Treasurer paid for the security and what the security cost Ma-bon-Nugent. PIM’s representative would then get some percentage of the markup as a commission on the transaction.
Of all the securities transactions supervised by Whitehead during her tenure with the Treasurer, 6.5% were brokered by PIM. PIM was paid markups by Mabon-Nugent that were no greater than 3/4% of the transaction value, well within the 5% “safe haven” guideline of the National Association of Securities Dealers. As PIM’s representative for the Treasurer account, Kuhse received in commissions approximately 90% of the markups paid to PIM in these transactions. About 96% of Kuhse’s income during the time of the alleged scheme was from commissions on transactions with the Treasurer, amounting to well over three million dollars. Whitehead knew that Kuhse was PIM’s representative and was making commissions, but she testified that she did not know how much he mаde on these transactions.
During much of this trading, PIM did not have an in-state representative as required by the Treasurer. According to the government, Pretty tried to become PIM’s in-state representative, but he did not pass the necessary licensing test. Pretty claims that he sought a securities license merely to assist him in running the PBEA seminars. In any event, Pretty’s address and fax number were listed on transaction sheets purporting to name PIM’s Oklahoma representative. Pretty forwarded the mail he received in this capacity to PIM in California.
The media began to look into Whitehead’s dealings with PIM, and a federal investigation soon followed. The government discovered that in 1990, before the alleged scheme began, Whitehead, Pretty, and Kuhse had made a total of five phone calls to each other; from 1991 to early 1994, during the period of the alleged scheme, the total was 956. Furthermore, the three often made weekend trips together during Whitehead’s tenure; the defendants characterize these trips as innocent personal vacations. After the three met in Arizona one weekend early in 1992, the level of thе Treasurer’s trading through PIM jumped considerably.
The government investigation also uncovered numerous financial transactions among Whitehead, Pretty, and Kuhse. According to the government, the transactions were evidence that Whitehead was receiving kickbacks from Kuhse in return for sending business his way, many of which were funneled through Pretty as a middleman. According to the defendants, all of these transactions had a legitimate purpose. For example, Kuhse bought PBEA from Pretty for $600,-000. According to the government, PBEA had very little value, and the “sale” was merely a way fоr Kuhse to funnel money to Pretty and eventually back to Whitehead. An expert testified for Pretty that PBEA was worth more than $600,000 at the time. Other transactions involved real estate. Pretty and his wife bought a house from Whitehead and her husband. Pretty then set up a trust that was funded by Kuhse, and Pretty authorized a loan from the trust to Whitehead to finance the Whiteheads’ new house. Pretty wrote several other checks to Whitehead, all of which followed checks written to him by Kuhse. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that much of this money was to repay Whitehead for work she had done while still with PBEA.
The government charged the defendants with three types of crimes: (1) engaging in a bribery or kickback scheme, in violation of
At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered objections by Whitehead and Pretty to the “amount of loss” calculated in the presentence investigation report. The court sustained the defendants’ objections in part and overruled them in part, fixing $3,894,391.28 as the amount to be used in calculating each defendant’s sentence. The court also heard objections by both defendants to the imposition of a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. The court overruled these objections, finding that both 'Whitehead and Pretty had committed perjury throughout the trial. "Whitehead was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, and was ordered to forfeit $220,000; Pretty was sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, and was ordered to forfeit $473,471.50.
II.
Whitehead and Pretty argue that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to convict them of conspiracy, bribery, and money laundering. While these crimes have different elements, the sufficiency question as to all three turns in large part on whether it was reasonable for the jury to believe that Whitehead, Pretty, and Kuhse entered into the alleged scheme. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and decide whether a rational jury could have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia,
The government has no direct evidence to prove that the defendants plotted to defraud the Treasurer, but it argues that the circumstantial evidence was enough to show that the superficially legal transactions that occurred among the three acquaintances constituted an illegal kickback scheme. At trial, the government asked the jury to draw the following inferences from the evidence: “When Whitehead knew that she would be named the Treasurer’s chief trader, she called her friend Kuhse in California, who agreed to start an account for the Treasurer with PIM. Whitehead and Kuhse asked Pretty, who lived in Oklahoma, to serve as the instate representative. Even though he did not pass the necessary securities exams, he functioned as the in-state representative, forwarding all the mail to California. Whitehead, Pretty, and Kuhse agreed to share Kuhse’s commissions on a small scale to check if all would run smoothly. After several transactions were completed without a hitch, the three met in Arizona and decided to move ahead with their plan on a larger scale. From that point on, Kuhse would funnel back portions of his commissions to the other two, sometimes to Whitehead directly and sometimes to "Whitehead through Pretty. The transfer of money was occasionally direct, such as when the three split a commission check in thirds, but more often subtle, such as when Kuhse, through Pretty, funded the mortgage trust for Whitehead. Throughout the sсheme, the conspirators often talked on the phone to each other to discuss the flow of money among them, and they met on several weekends to solidify their plans. They formulated excuses, such as the allegedly thriving PBEA business, old debts, and the desire to invest in real estate, to make the money transfers look legitimate.
The defendants, on the other hand, focused on the apparent legality of their transactions, asking the jury to accept the following story: Oklahoma made money from its securities trading through PIM, and Kuhse made money from commissions on transactions with the Treasurer just as other licensed representatives doing business with the Treasurer did. All the money that flowed back to Whitehead could be traced to previous debts and arms’length real estate transactions. There was
The jury believed the government’s version of the story, and we hold that there was more than sufficient evidenсe to support this conclusion. We discuss in turn the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to each of the three types of violations.
A.
To prove a conspiracy in violation of
The government’s conspiracy charge rests, as does the whole case, on the circumstantial evidence showing that the scheme existed; there is no direct proof that the defendants agreed to any plan or that they knew the essential details of the plan. Deciding whether there was a conspiracy is tantamount to deciding whеther there was a scheme at all. Having found sufficient evidence to support the finding that the scheme existed, we have no trouble finding that the evidence supports the conspiracy charges. The scheme was an agreement requiring willful participation and overt acts by all three members. Whitehead argues that even if Pretty and Kuhse had a scheme going, she was not a participant. We reject this argument, because Pretty and Kuhse could not have had a scheme without Whitehead’s willful participation — Pretty and Kuhse would not have funneled money to Whitehead if Whitehead had not been involved in the scheme.
B.
The defendants argue that even if they were involved in some sort of scheme, there was no evidence that they violated
There is no dispute that federal funds exceeding $10,000 a year come through the Oklahoma State Treasurer’s Office, but Whitehead and Pretty argue that there is no evidence that the Treasurer “benefits” from
If Whitehead was an agent of the state, rather than only of the Treasurer, then
In response to Whitehead’s argument that no evidence supported an inference that her official decision-making was influenced by any bribery or kickbacks, the government correctly points out that the statute requires only intent to be influenced, rather than actual influence.
C.
Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for their money laundering convictions under
Section 1957 punishes the knowing
engage[ment] in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity
The charges under
Whitehead argues that these transactions cannot be the basis of
The “follows in time” language does not bear the weight that Whitehead places upon it. In
Edgmon,
we considered whether a conviction for both conversion and money laundering violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Examining the legislative history of the Money Laundering Crimes Act of 1986, we found that because Congress intended to make a new, separately punishable offense, the conviction did not pose a double jeopardy problem.
Id.
at 1212-14. Our “follows in time” comment was intended to express merely the separateness of money laundering and the underlying crime for double jeopardy purposes, not a strict temporal relationship. In
United States v. Lovett,
Classic examples of
Even if we were to hold that money laundering must without exception follow in time the underlying “specified unlawful activity,” we would affirm Whitehead’s
This analysis accords with our holding in
United States v. Kennedy,
III.
Both defendants argue that the district court erred in enhancing the base levels of their sentences by two based on obstruction of justice. We review the district court’s factual findings on this issue under the clearly erroneous standard,
United States v. Urbanek,
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant’s offense level must be increased by two “[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Perjury can be the basis for such an enhancement.
Id.
§ 3C1.1, comment, (n. 3(b)). A defendant commits perjury for the purposes of this Guideline if he “gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony.”
United States v. Dunnigan,
The district court explicitly found that both defendants had committed multiple acts of perjury. It found that almost all of Whitehead’s testimony at trial was false, including her testimony as to her intent in the real estate transactions. (Tr. 1402-03; Order of July 28, 1995 at 5.) As to Pretty, it found that he lied about, among other things, the real estate transactions and the reasons for the sale of PBEA. (Tr. 1454-56; Order of July 28, 1995 at 5.) These findings satisfied the requirements of the Guidelines and Dunnigan, and we see no error in them.
Whitehead argues that the district court was too conclusory in finding that she intended to commit perjury. Careful not to allow overly conclusory findings that a defendant obstructed justice by committing perjury, we have required judges to identify or describe the perjurious testimony in circumstances such as these.
United States v. Massey,
Whitehead and Pretty argue that the district court erred in increasing the base levels of their offenses by thirteen based on the amount of money involved. The court considered the defendants’ objections to the $6,749,888.91 “amount of loss” mentioned in the presentence investigation report. Pretty argued that he should be credited with the amount of money that he paid Whitehead. Whitehead argued that she did not cause the state of Oklahoma to lose any money at all. The court sustained the defendants’ objections in part and overruled them in part, fixing $3,894,391.28 as the “amount of loss” to be used in calculating the sentence for each defendant. We review the court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Whitehead,
The Guidelines provide for an increase in the offense level for bribery if
the value of the payment, the benefit received or to be received in return for the payment, or the loss to the government from the offense, whichever is greatest, exceeded $2,000.
U.S.S.G. § 201.1(b)(2)(A). The court used the benefit received by Kuhse as a benchmark. It found that Kuhse made $4,056,-657.58 from commissions with PIM over the relevant time period. Citing testimony that 96% of this money was from trades with the Oklahoma Treasurer, the court reached the $3,894,391.28 figure, which increased each defendant’s offense level by thirteen. Id. § 2Fl.l(b)(l)(N). Whitehead argues that she should be sentenced based on the amount of money that she rеceived, $268,950.90, which would increase her offense level by only eight. Id. § 2Fl.l(b)(l)(I). Pretty argues similarly that his sentence should be based on the amount he received, $1,061,-581.04, which would increase his level by eleven. Id. § 2Fl.l(b)(l)(L).
All parties agree that the issue turns on whether the amount of money received by Kuhse was reasonably foreseeable to the defendants.
Id.
§ lB1.3(a)(l)(B). The defendants claim that they could reasonably foresee only the amount that they personally received. The commentary to the Guidelines cautions that the relevant conduct for setting the offense lеvel is not necessarily the same for each member of a conspiracy.
Id.
§ 1B1.3, comment, (n. 2). Still, this note does not mean that only the amount received by each individual conspirator may be used to calculate that conspirator’s sentence; rather, the question is whether the amount received by Kuhse was reasonably foreseeable to the defendants in light of the nature of the conspiracy;
See United States v. Torres,
Although the defendants argue that there was no evidence of the foreseeability to them of the amount of money Kuhse received, thе nature of the conspiracy was such that each participant almost certainly knew how much money was going where; the scheme was based on keeping track of money flowing from one conspirator to another. The district court explicitly found that the amount of $3,894,391.28 was foreseeable both to Whitehead, (Order of July 28, 1995 at 3 n. 5), and to Pretty, (Order of July 28, 1995 at 6 n. 8). We see no reason to hold that these findings were clearly erroneous.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Notes
. A government "agency” includes any subdivision of the executive, legislative, judicial, or other branch of government,