Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE United States of America
v.
Crim. No. 21-cr-156-JL
Opinion No.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
In advance of his trial on one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), defendant Steven Potter filed a motion to suppress evidence. [1] The motion turns on whether a police officer’s stop of the vehicle in which Potter was a passenger was constitutionally valid, such that the resulting seizure of controlled substances from Potter’s bag and his inculpatory statements can stand. The officer stopped the vehicle because the driver failed to signal before the roadway merged--reducing from two lanes to one, wide lane that gradually narrowed. Potter asserts that the signaling statute did not require the driver to signal, so the officer conducted a traffic stop without probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The government contends that the statute is ambiguous as to whether a signal was required under these circumstances, but the officer’s actions were nevertheless objectively reasonable and therefore lawful.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, viewing the roadway, and reviewing additional briefing at the court’s invitation, [2] the court grants the motion. The court finds that the plain language of the purportedly applicable statute is unambiguous and did not require the driver to signal under these circumstances. Further, because the statute is unambiguous, the officer’s mistaken belief that the driver violated the statute was not objectively reasonable under the agreed-to standard for reasonableness.
I. Applicable legal standard
Potter bears a threshold burden to show a Fourth Amendment violation in support of his
motion to suppress, which he has met. United States v. Young,
II. Background
The court makes the following findings of fact based on the testimony and other evidence submitted at the suppression hearing. The government called Officer Nicholas Kapteyn of the Hooksett Police Department as a witness, and Potter called Federal Public Defender Investigator J. Arsenault. The parties entered several exhibits into evidence by agreement, including the relevant police report. The court also took a “view” of the intersection in question prior to the suppression hearing by driving through it several times. Neither party objected to the court’s view or moved to exclude it from consideration. [3]
On May 31, 2021, shortly before 7:00 p.m., Officer Kapteyn was driving northbound in his marked cruiser on Hooksett Road in Hooksett, New Hampshire, near the intersection of Legends Drive and Lindsay Road. [4] The northbound side of Hooksett Road is a two-lane road as it approaches the intersection with Legends Drive. Officer Kapteyn was driving in the left lane. [5] After the intersection with Legends Drive, the northbound lanes of Hooksett Road merge together and eventually narrow into a one-lane road. [6] Before the dotted line separating the two lanes ends, there is a sign on the right side of the road indicating that the two lanes become one. [7] The court will refer to this portion of Hooksett Road as the “narrowing point.” The photograph below depicts the narrowing point. [8]
And this photograph depicts the narrowing point from above.
The following depicts the sign that appears before the narrowing point: The sign does not resemble the actual roadway or the configuration of the narrowing point, which does not present a termination of the right lane or require a lane change, abrupt shift, or the crossing of a middle or dotted line. About 1.5 miles north of this sign, the roadway presents a somewhat similar, but not identical, narrowing point. The signage there, however, contains not only the diagram depicted above, but also the words “Right Lane Ends.” [9]
Officer Kapteyn observed a gray Volkswagen Jetta that was travelling in the right lane before the narrowing point “start[] to merge left or move left” in front of his cruiser after the dotted line distinguishing the two lanes ended, without using a signal. [10] Importantly, Officer Kapteyn did not see the vehicle execute a lane change, or cross the dotted line. Officer Kapteyn, believing that the driver of the Jetta had committed a traffic violation by failing to signal,
activated his blue lights and stopped the vehicle. [11]
Officer Kapteyn approached the vehicle, identified himself to the driver and passenger, and explained the reason for the stop. [12] The driver, Shana Booth, provided her license to the officer. [13] Officer Kapteyn asked the passenger, Potter, if he would be willing to identify himself. Potter told the officer that he did not have an identification on him, and then incorrectly identified himself as “Jason Brady.” [14]
Officer Kapteyn eventually learned of Potter’s true identity and confirmed that he had outstanding arrest warrants in two New Hampshire counties. Potter was then handcuffed, placed under arrest, and put in the back of Officer Kapteyn’s cruiser. [15] Officer Kapteyn then seized Potter’s black bag and searched it prior to transporting Potter to the county jail for his pending warrants. He found suspected narcotics inside the bag, leading to an indictment charging Potter with Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). [16]
III. Analysis
The court acknowledges that what follows may appear as an excessively lengthy, highly formalistic, analysis of a simple traffic law. As more fully explained infra Section IV, however, the downstream constitutional question warrants the time and care expended in the analysis of the statute.
The crux of Potter’s suppression motion is the constitutionality of Officer Kapteyn’s stop,
as the seizure of incriminating evidence and allegedly inculpatory statements flow from that stop.
“A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and
therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v. North
Carolina,
Officer Kapteyn’s sole basis for stopping Booth was her failure to use a signal when moving through the narrowing point on Hooksett Road, which Officer Kapteyn considered a violation of RSA 265:45. This statute (“signaling statute”), entitled “Turning Movements and Required Signals,” provides as follows:
265:45 Turning Movements and Required Signals
I. No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in RSA 265:42, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
II. A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
III. No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal.
IV. The signals provided for in RSA 265:46, II, shall be used to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position and shall not be flashed on one side only on a parked or disabled vehicle, or flashed as a courtesy or “do pass” signal to drivers of other vehicles approaching from the rear.
RSA 265:45 (emphasis added). Section IV references Section II of RSA 265:46, which requires the use of “lighted signal lamps,” as opposed to “the hand and arm,” for vehicles of a particular size.
Potter argues that this statute unambiguously did not require Booth to use a signal under these circumstances. He further contends that the officer’s mistaken interpretation of the statute was not objectively reasonable. As a result, according to Potter, the stop was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. The prosecution construes the statute differently and further argues that, to the extent that the officer mistakenly viewed the statute as requiring a signal under these circumstances, that belief was objectively reasonable.
The court begins by examining the New Hampshire signaling statute; throughout this
analysis, the court follows the directive of the First Circuit Court of Appeals and applies New
Hampshire principles and rules of statutory construction. See Coffey v. New Hampshire Jud.
Ret. Plan,
A. Construction of the signaling statute
i. Plain, ordinary meaning of the statute
To determine the meaning of a statute, the court “first look[s] to the language of the
statute itself and, if possible, construe[s] that language according to its plain and ordinary
meaning.” State v. Surrell,
Furthermore, as is particularly important in this case, “if the language is plain and
unambiguous,” the court’s analysis is complete, and the court “need not look beyond [the
language] for further indication of legislative intent.” In re Guardianship of R.A.,
Following from these principles, the court begins its analysis with the words of the statute. Section I provides that a driver must not undertake certain driving movements “unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety,” including turning a vehicle at an intersection, turning a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turning a vehicle from a direct course or moving right or left upon a roadway. The first sentence does not require signaling for these four activities; it prohibits them, again, “unless and until” they “can be made with reasonable safety.” The second sentence of Section I then provides that a driver may not “so turn” a vehicle without giving an appropriate signal “in the manner hereinafter provided.” Sections II and IV provide that a driver must use a signal to indicate an “intention to turn right or left” and to indicate “an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position.” And Section III adds that a driver is prohibited from “stop[ping] or suddenly decreas[ing] the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein.” In plain terms, the signaling statute requires a signal before turning, changing lanes, or starting from a parked position. See RSA 265:45, IV. The question is whether Officer Kapteyn observed any one of these three occurrences.
He did not. Officer Kapteyn observed the vehicle travel north on a roadway that itself
merged two lanes into one. Importantly, the term “merge” as used here signifies traveling
forward on a straight roadway that narrows or blends two lanes into one, and not merging onto
one road from another road. By their plain and ordinary meaning, none of the enumerated acts in
the statute refers to the vehicle progress that Officer Kapteyn observed. A “familiar axiom of
statutory construction” guides that “[n]ormally the expression of one thing in a statute implies
the exclusion of another.” Joseph Hosp. of Nashua v. Rizzo,
“The force of th[is] maxim . . . is strengthened where a thing is provided in one part of
the statute and omitted in another[,]” as is the case here with respect to the act of “mov[ing] right
or left upon a roadway.” City of Manchester v. Sec’y of State,
The prosecution argues that the vehicle’s movement on the road could be encompassed within two of the enumerated acts--changing lanes or turning. See RSA 265:45, I, IV. This argument falters when tested against the physical realities of the road and familiar rules of statutory interpretation.
First, the prosecution attempts in vain to complicate the ordinary meaning of a lane change by referencing a 2009 report from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which begins by stating that a lane change is the “mov[ement] [of] a vehicle from one lane to another where both lanes have the same direction of travel.” [17] Then, the NHTSA describes the steps to completing a lane change--a steering input, a change in direction, lateral movement, and, finally, placement in an adjacent lane. [18] In the unlikely event that this court would employ a 2009 pronouncement of a federal administrative agency to determine the ordinary meaning of a phrase in a statute that the New Hampshire legislature last amended in 1981, and adopt the NHTSA’s definition of a lane change, it cannot be read to include or even address the circumstances present at the narrowing point on Hooksett Road. After the dotted line ends, there are no longer multiple lanes available to enter or exit. Instead of relying on the NHTSA’s explanation of a lane change, the court looks to the common, ordinary meaning of the term--a departure from one lane and the entry into an adjacent, parallel lane--a definition that does not conflict with that of the NHTSA.
Gov.'s Supp. Br. (doc. no. 32) at 4. Based on photographs of the narrowing point included in this order; other similar photographs in the record; videos of cars driving through the narrowing point, which were presented during the suppression hearing; and the court’s own observations from its view of the area, the narrowing point does not require vehicles to complete a lane change. There is no jagged cut or even a visible shift where one lane definitively ends at or after the narrowing point. Rather, after the dotted line ends, the road gradually narrows from the width of the former two lanes to the width of a single lane. Thus, cars passing through the narrowing point can continue moving along the roadway, either straight or veering right or left within the single, narrowing lane, but they do not move laterally to arrive in an adjacent, parallel lane with marked boundaries.
During the court’s view of the narrowing point, which included several drives through it,
originating from each of the two lanes, the court learned that nothing like a lane change, or even
a traditional merge onto a roadway, is experienced or executed by the driver.
[19]
After progressing
past the end of the divided lanes, a driver just follows the “outside” lines while continuing in the
same direction, as the two lanes gradually and almost imperceptibly blend into one lane. A
vehicle’s movement right or left while passing through the narrowing point does not constitute a
change of lanes, but rather just forward progress within a single, narrowing lane, executed by
following a smooth, straight path.
[20]
See Mahaffey v. State,
Next, Section I also confirms that, contrary to the prosecution’s contention, the vehicle’s
leftward movement within the road cannot be considered a turn, because the statute treats
moving right or left and turning as different actions. See Hendrick v. New Hampshire Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs.,
The prosecution focuses on this type of a turn and asserts that, since passage through the narrowing point “invariably requires turning the steering wheel to physically shift the vehicle’s direction away from a straight course,” the vehicle’s progress constituted a turn, which requires a signal. Gov.’s Supp. Br. (doc. no. 32) at 4. The prosecution’s characterization directly contradicts specific findings the court made on the record (based on photographs, videos, and its viewing of the narrowing point) that this part of the road does not require making a movement
The use of the conjunction “or” between “turn” and “move right or left” indicates that the
actions on either side of the conjunction are separate and distinct, since “or” is “defined as ‘a
function word to indicate an alternative between different or unlike things.’” Merrill v. Great
Bay Disposal Serv., Inc.,
left or right, but rather requires drivers to continue along the roadway as the two former lanes blend into one and the road gradually narrows. See T. at 118:16-119:5 The prosecution asserts that the absence of a comma between “otherwise turn” and “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway” in Section I indicates that the latter term is encompassed within the former term. To the extent that one might draw that inference from the omission of a comma, punctuation alone cannot serve to overcome the clear indications within the statute’s language of the legislature’s intent to treat ‘turn’ and ‘move[ment] right or left’ as distinct actions. See S UTHERLAND S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION § 47:15 (7th ed. 2021) (though “[p]unctuation may be helpful evidence to understand legislative intent or statutory meaning[,] . . . when punctuation is inconsistent with a statute’s otherwise established clear intent or meaning, courts should disregard the punctuation or repunctuate the act to effect legislative intent or statutory meaning”); W ILLIAM N. E SKRIDGE , J R ., ET AL ., C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON L EGISLATION AND R EGULATION , S TATUTES AND THE C REATION OF P UBLIC P OLICY (6th ed. 2020) (noting that the majority approach is that punctuation is looked at “as a less-than-desirable, last-ditch alternative aid in statutory construction”) (quoting Ray Marcin, Punctuation and the Interpretation of Statutes, 9 Conn. L. Rev. 227, 240 (1977)).
Familiar statutory canons – the presumption of consistent usage and the rule of
meaningful variation – also preclude the prosecution’s preferred interpretation. It is presumed
that “the legislature’s consistent use of” the same word is “intended to convey the same
meaning.” N. New England Tel. Operations, LLC v. Town of Acworth,
This distinction increases in significance in the last sentence of Section I. The first sentence requires safe operation while executing a “turn . . . at an intersection[,]” a “turn . . . to enter a private road or driveway,” a “turn . . . from a direct course[,]” or a “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway[.]” But the second sentence, requiring signaling, omits movement right or left and mandates signaling only for “turn[s].”
The prosecution tries to avoid the plain meaning of the statute by stating, in passing, that “move right or left upon a roadway” is a “catchall” phrase for a type of turning movement. The phrase “move right or left upon a roadway” does not present the characteristics of a catchall phrase, however. A catchall follows specific terms and employs general terms; once identified, a catchall is “construed to embrace objects [or items] similar in nature to those . . . enumerated by the preceding specific words.” S UTHERLAND S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 2021). The phrase “move right or left” is preceded by a list consisting of two specific types of turns and then a general phrase capturing a broad set of turns (“otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course”). See RSA 265:45, I. In this context, “move right or left upon a roadway” cannot reasonably be read as a general set of words that serves as a catchall for various turns. It is more naturally read as a particular set of terms that breaks away from the list of turns and describes a new, distinct category of vehicle movement.
The prosecution also disputes the plain meaning of the statute by suggesting that it leads to an absurd result, whereby a leftward movement before the end of the dotted lines would require a signal, and the same movement after the end of the dotted lines would not. That is not an absurd result; it makes good sense. The movement completed by a driver before and after the end of the dotted line is distinct, such that the requirement of a signal in the former situation, and not the latter, is not absurd. While the dotted line exists, the roadway consists of two lanes, and drivers must complete a lateral movement to move from one lane to the other. In this scenario, the signal indicates to other drivers that a car is taking an otherwise unforeseen or unexpected change in course. After the dotted line ends, drivers continue along the roadway by moving straight or being guided slightly left or right by the outside lines, but not by moving laterally, in order to remain between the boundaries of a wide, single lane that narrows gradually. In this scenario, a signal would provide no alert or indication to other drivers regarding a car’s movement that is not otherwise apparent or expected from the shape and nature of the roadway. In the simplest terms, the signaling statute requires traffic signaling before what it describes as “turn[s],” RSA 265:45, I, and it specifies those instances as turning, changing lanes, or entering the roadway from a parked position, RSA 265:45, IV. The narrowing point does not require a turn, a lane change, or even a merge onto a road from a parked position or from another roadway. And the statute does not require signaling before the movements taken at the narrowing point--“merging” (a very commonplace, ordinary term) or proceeding straight along a roadway that merges or narrows from two lanes into one. See Mahaffey v. State, 316 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Mahaffey I) (holding that a similar movement was not a “turn” under a similarly worded Texas signaling statute).
Having rejected the prosecution’s contention that the vehicle’s movement on the road is
encompassed within the statute’s enumerated acts of turning or changing lanes, the court
concludes that the prosecution’s interpretation of the statute necessarily (and impermissibly)
requires the court to “consider what the legislature might have said [or] add language that the
legislature did not see fit to include.” Smith,
An important point about ambiguity is worth noting here. In concluding that the statute is
not ambiguous, the court need not find that it has presented the only plausible construction of the
statute. As our Court of Appeals has stated, “genuine ambiguity requires more than a possible
alternative construction.” United States v. Jimenez,
ii. Statutory construction where ambiguity exists
Since the statute’s language is “unambiguous,” the court’s analysis is complete, and the
court “need not look beyond [the statute] for further indication of legislative intent.” In re
Guardianship of Kapitula,
In this case, both parties point to the New Hampshire Driver Manual, issued by the New
Hampshire Department of Safety, as a source of administrative gloss that can facilitate the
interpretation of the statute. New Hampshire’s “administrative gloss” doctrine provides that “a
longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those
responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that
such a construction conforms to the legislative intent.” New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass’n v.
State Tax Comm’n,
After describing how to appropriately signal, the Manual provides that “[d]rivers must
use the appropriate turn signal when [c]hanging lanes[;] [t]urning at an intersection[;] [e]ntering
or leaving a highway or roadway[;] [t]urning into a driveway[;] [m]erging onto another road[;]
[p]ulling away from a curb[;] [p]ulling over to the side of the road[;] [and] [p]assing another
vehicle[.]” Since the court must “apply the same principles of construction in interpreting
both” statutes and regulations, it begins by assigning the terms in the Manual their plain and
ordinary meaning. New Hampshire Resident Partners of Lyme Timber Co. v. New Hampshire
Dep’t of Revenue Admin.,
Finally, the prosecution points to two New Hampshire Supreme Court decisions
describing the purpose of the signaling statute as an additional aid to interpretation. According
to these decisions, the purpose of a predecessor statute governing signaling was to “prevent
collision with other vehicles as a result of a change in direction or speed without warning.”
[27]
Caldwell v. Drew,
Second, even if the court were to consider the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s description of the purpose of the statute, there is no basis for the court to find that imposing a signal requirement for drivers proceeding through the narrowing point would reduce the likelihood of a collision and thereby further the statute’s purported purpose. As previously explained, drivers follow a conventional, predictable course when proceeding through the narrowing point because there are no other options. See supra Section III.A.i. Finally, in order to “prophe[size] as to the state court’s likely stance” on the meaning of the signaling statute, the court has followed established principles of statutory construction that the New Hampshire Supreme Court has repeatedly employed and embraced. In this way, the court has pursued an approach that is supported by New Hampshire law.
In sum, the prosecution’s advocacy that this court consider extrinsic aids to statutory construction of an unambiguous statute cannot and does not persuade the court that the meaning of RSA 265:45 differs from what its plain language provides.
B. Reasonable mistake of law
The government also argues that the statute’s meaning is ambiguous, so, even if Officer
Kapteyn’s construction of the statute was mistaken, the traffic stop was lawful because the
officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable. An officer’s probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred “can rest on a mistaken understanding of
the scope of a legal prohibition.” Heien,
The court’s task is therefore a “straightforward question of statutory construction. If the
statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s judgment requires hard
interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake. But if not, not.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Hinton,
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has applied Justice Kagan’s “framework” for
determining whether an officer’s interpretation of a traffic statute was objectively reasonable.
United States v. Lawrence,
Moreover, the length of this ruling does not signify hard interpretive work; rather, the
court has merely sought to address the prosecution’s many arguments. This requires reasoning
and analysis, but where the arguments do not reveal ambiguity, or seek to resolve ambiguity,
such reasoning and analysis are not interpretive in nature. They are merely legal reasoning, with
no actual interpretation. Officer Kapteyn’s mistaken understanding of the statute was therefore
not objectively reasonable, and his stop violated the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.
Flores,
In support of its argument that Officer Kapteyn’s mistaken interpretation of the statute was objectively reasonable, the government cites several cases from other jurisdictions in which courts concluded that other states’ signaling statutes require drivers to signal under allegedly similar circumstances. It contends that these cases show that reasonable judges could agree with Officer Kapteyn’s interpretation of RSA 265:45. The court disagrees.
First, this argument ignores the central tenet of the reasonable mistake doctrine: the
statute at issue must be “genuinely ambiguous” in order for the officer’s mistake to be
objectively reasonable. As shown above, RSA 265:45 has only one reasonable construction and
is thus unambiguous as applied to the facts of this case. See Kisor v. Wilkie,
For example, the prosecution points to United States v. Morales from the District of
Kansas as “instructive” of the “correct legal path to follow here.” See
The government compounds its misplaced reliance on Morales by incorrectly framing the
objective reasonableness question as whether the officer’s interpretation is “open to reasonable
debate.” But for an officer’s interpretation of a statute to be objectively reasonable, there must
be “genuine ambiguity” in the statute, and “a statute is not ambiguous simply because litigants
(or even an occasional court) question its interpretation.” United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d
63, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The standard is applied from the standpoint of a
jurist, a “reasonable judge,” Heien,
A reasonable judge would not find the statute ambiguous for the reasons explained supra. And ambiguity is required to invoke the reasonable mistake doctrine. But a reasonable judge (as opposed to a police officer), and one with the view that the statute is in fact ambiguous (a view this court does not share), would be duty bound to consider whether this statute was: (1) void for vagueness; (2) subject to interpretation under the constitutional avoidance canon (see infra, footnote 36); or (3) subject to the rule of lenity. These doctrines would militate in favor of this court’s interpretation (at least), if not outright dismissal of the case or acquittal of the defendant of a violation. More importantly, no reasonable judge would fail to consider these rules and doctrines in interpreting the statute if she viewed the statute as ambiguous. The prosecution’s argument does not address these doctrines, and with one exception, the courts in the cases it cites do not. Officer Kapteyn’s view of the statute was therefore not a “reasonable” mistake of law under Justice Kagan’s expressly judge-centric standard, even if the stop itself does not strike one as immediately or obviously unreasonable.
The government next argues that People v. James from the Criminal Court of Queens
County, New York suggests that Booth’s vehicle movement constituted a “turn.” See 842
N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (Crim. Ct. Queens Co. 2007). This decision is similarly unhelpful. In James,
the court adopted a construction of the statute that treated the words “move right or left upon a
roadway” as a catchall type of “turn,” which, as discussed above (see supra, Section III.A.i), is a
plainly incorrect construction of the New Hampshire signaling statute. Second, the decision is
factually distinguishable because the driver was changing lanes from a traffic lane to a parking
lane, not moving through a road that, after the end of a dotted line dividing two lanes, gradually
narrowed into one lane, as here. The court simply held that the statute required motorists to
signal before changing lanes. Here, Booth indisputably did not change lanes. Third, James is
legally distinguishable because a different New York court had previously construed the statute
differently, whereas here, no New Hampshire court has construed RSA 265:45 under these
circumstances, let alone adopted a different construction than this court. And while the lack of
any New Hampshire state case law applying RSA 265:45 to the facts presented here theoretically
could weigh in favor of a finding of objective reasonableness, “lack of precedent alone cannot
rehabilitate a statutory interpretation [like Officer Kapteyn’s] that is unwarranted by the plain
language and structure of the statute.” People v. Burnett,
Here, while there is no ambiguity in the text, the title of RSA 265:45, “Turning
Movements and Required Signals,” is nevertheless consistent with the idea that signaling is not
required for every possible turn or movement listed in Section I. Various events requiring safe
operation are listed in Section I. The required signals are listed in Sections II, III, and IV.
Titling the statute “turning movements and required signals” does not indicate that there is
complete overlap between turning movements and movements requiring a signal. To the extent
that it indicates anything that might aid the interpretative endeavor if the statute were ambiguous,
it is that the statute does two separate things: (1) it lists out which events much be conducted
safely (first sentence of Section I); and (2) it lists out when signals are required (last sentence of
Section I, Sections II, III, and IV). See Gubitosi,
The government next relies on a series of decisions from various Texas state courts
interpreting a similar Texas statute. See, e.g., Mahaffey II,
The other decisions cited in the government’s supplemental brief are either factually
distinguishable, or inapposite because the statutes in question are materially different than RSA
265:45. See, e.g., State v. Starr,
The court therefore concludes that Officer Kapteyn’s mistaken interpretation of RSA 265:45 as requiring a signal under these circumstances was not objectively reasonable. Thus, the ensuing traffic stop was unlawful.
IV. Conclusion
As alluded to supra Part III, the court has conducted a near-exhaustive examination of New Hampshire’s signaling statute. The depth of analysis of what appears to be an uncomplicated traffic law may be viewed by some as a triumph of legalism over common sense, or an elevation of form over substance. What followed the traffic stop, however, was a seizure of the defendant’s person, and the reasonableness and constitutional permissibility of that seizure depends completely on the lawfulness of the traffic stop. Accordingly, the close parsing of RSA 265:45 is not only warranted here, but necessary in order to resolve the constitutional issue. While evidently conducted in good faith, the stop was not supported by the statute nor by a reasonable mistake about its meaning.
For the reasons set forth above, Potter’s motion to suppress is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.
Joseph N. Laplante
United States District Judge Dated: July 8, 2022
cc: Joachim H. Barth, AUSA
Alexander S. Chen, Esq.
Eric Wolpin, Esq.
Notes
[1] See Doc. No. 14.
[2] See Government’s Supplemental Brief (doc. no. 32); Def.’s Supplemental Brief (doc. no. 33).
[3] Transcript for January 6, 2022 Hearing on Motion to Suppress (doc. no. 26) [hereinafter “T.”], at 3-4.
[4] Id. at 6:17-23. Legends Drive intersects with Hooksett Road from the West, while Lindsay Road intersects with it from the East.
[5] Id. at 6:25-7:2.
[6] Id. at 7:3-4.
[7] Id. at 7:19-21.
[8] This is a cropped image of a screen shot from Google Maps of the northbound side of Hooksett Road. This image shows a driver’s vantage point when traveling north and passing through the intersection with Legends Drive.
[9] See id. at 57:4-10.
[10] Id. at 7:4-7, 9:19-22 (“After the dotted white line distinguishing between the two lanes ended, [the Jetta] started to merge left or move left.”).
[11] Id. at 7:8-11.
[12] Id. at 14-15.
[13] Id. at 15.
[14] Id.
[15] Officer Kapteyn provided additional details about the stop at the suppression hearing, but the court does not repeat them here because they are not relevant to the main issue raised by Potter’s suppression motion.
[16] See Indictment (doc. no. 1).
[18] Id. at 4-5.
[19] Neither the defendant’s witness, who observed and recorded traffic moving through the intersection over time on the afternoon of September 29, 2021, nor the court, during its view of the roadway, observed a single instance in which a vehicle signaled while proceeding through the narrowing point. See T. at 63:23-64:6, 70:21-23. Such observations do not aid in interpreting the language of the statute, which is the crux of the court’s analysis, but solely concern (and provide context regarding) the roadway to which the statute would apply here.
[20] The prosecution presents two pieces of evidence to attempt to refute this physical description of the road--Officer Kapteyn’s testimony describing the narrowing point and the “lane ends”
[23] Gov.’s Supp. Br. (doc. no. 32) at 5.
[24] If further confirmation that the statute does not require signaling before merging is needed, the
requirement to signal when a car enters the roadway “from a parked position” seals the deal. Id.
The court returns again to the familiar maxim that “the expression of one thing in a statute
implies the exclusion of another.” Rizzo,
[25] New Hampshire Driver Manual (doc. no. 14-5) at 15.
[26] The administrative gloss doctrine bears some similarity to the familiar federal Skidmore and Chevron doctrines, though it is not identical. But it is not readily apparent to the court whether the Manual actually rises to the level of “administrative law” that might constitute an interpretative aid under the doctrine. Neither party has explained the authority under which the Manual was produced or what administrative process the New Hampshire Department of Safety undertook to create it. Because the Manual ultimately does not impact the court’s understanding of an unambiguous statute, and would confirm that understanding even if it did, the court has not independently researched or considered the status of the Manual under New Hampshire administrative law or the “administrative gloss” doctrine.
[27] The prosecution also notes that the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s description of the purpose of the statute comports with Officer Kapteyn’s belief regarding the statute’s purpose. See Gov’s Supp. Br. (doc. no. 32) at 5-6 (citing T. at 54:13-18, 56:17-24). The court does not take this statement into consideration when interpreting the statute because the government does not provide any authority (nor does the court know of any) supporting the proposition that an officer’s subjective view of the purpose of a statute is a relevant aid to statutory construction.
[28] This is not to suggest that Officer Kapteyn’s work here was sloppy. His interpretation of RSA 265:45 was merely incorrect, and not reasonably so.
[29] See doc. no. 32, at 1-2.
[30] The Lawrence Court found that it would require “hard interpretative work” to overturn the officer’s judgment that a Massachusetts traffic law that requires vehicles to drive within one lane and move between lanes carefully “forbids drivers, on roads divided into lanes, from straying across a fog line.” Id. at 4. “[G]iven the statute’s language and the lack of any definitive commentary on the issue by Massachusetts courts,” the court concluded that “the statute’s application to the facts of this case” was “at best ambiguous.” Id. at 5. Indeed, in Lawrence, unlike here, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found the statute’s language ambiguous as to the facts of the case, and other judges in Massachusetts had reached differing conclusions as to whether crossing the fog line constituted a marked lane violation. Id. The officer’s understanding of the statute was therefore objectively reasonable and his stop of the defendant’s car was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 6.
[31] See doc. no. 32, at 6-14.
[32] Id. at 6.
[33] Doc. no. 32 at 6.
[34] Nor does this court, because the court finds no ambiguity and neither party raised these doctrines.
[35] The Gregoire decision further supports this court’s interpretation of RSA 265:45 because the
court found that a merge onto a highway (which required a move to the left) was not a lane
change or a turn. See
[36] The Burton court held that it was “not apparent from the language” of the signaling statute
“whether a signal is required when two lanes blend into one[,]” and the court therefore found the
statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to the driver’s conduct.
[37] Doc. no. 14.