UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jonathan POLAND, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 08-1203.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Decided April 2, 2009.
Heard Feb. 2, 2009.
35
Renee M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Paula D. Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges.
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.
The issue the parties have framed on this appeal is whether, where the district court adjusts a prior sentence to account for post-sentence cooperation by the defendant, the adjustment may reflect factors other than that cooperation. We sustain the district court‘s disposition of this case but on a narrower ground, deferring until necessary the larger issue-which may arise only rarely and implicates a difficult and delicate issue of statutory construction.
The defendant, Jonathan Poland, was eighteen years and three months old when he and his seventeen-year old cousin (who was just shy of his eighteenth birthday) made and detonated two pipe bombs during the Spring of 2004. Poland was indicted and convicted of unlawfully possessing an unregistered destructive device,
The explosion caused little damage but was close to a truck stop office and fuel of various kinds and so was no minor prank. Poland was sentenced to 63 months imprisonment, the three months over and above the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months being added because he committed perjury during a suppression hearing. Poland appealed, but later withdrew the appeal and cooperated with the government.
The cooperation led to successful government proceedings against Poland‘s cousin but, the matter having begun with a juvenile charge, the cousin received a sentence of only three months. After Poland cooperated, the government moved to reduce Poland‘s sentence to 48 months.
At a hearing on the motion, the district judge asked the parties to address the impact of new language in
In the end, the district court held that to so read the new rule would work a substantive change and violate the Rules Enabling Act,
The government‘s recommendation did not bind the district court, which concluded that a reduction to 40 months properly accounted for the cooperation provided by Poland. However, the court said that were it free to consider factors other than cooperation-in particular “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,”
Poland now appeals, arguing that under the current
The merits of the legal issue, to which we now turn, require a precise understanding of how
Consonantly, the Reform Act limited the judge‘s authority to alter a final sentence, confining it to three categories,
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that-
(1) in any case-
. . . .
(B) the court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure....
The Reform Act also rewrote
The court, on motion of the Government, may within one year after the imposition of a sentence, lower a sentence to reflect a defendant‘s subsequent, substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission....
Reform Act of 1984, § 212(b)(emphasis added).
Before the Reform Act became effective in 1987, Congress again added provisions to both 18 U.S.C. and to Rule 35, which furnished the district court authority, in both initial sentencing and re-sentencing, to impose sentences below prescribed statutory minimums based on a government substantial assistance motion, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, Title I, §§ 1007, 1009, 100 Stat. 3207-08 (1986); but we defer discussion of those changes.
Given the underscored language of
In 2002, in re-drafting the rules to improve clarity, the advisory committee proposed a “stylistic” change to
In fact, neither before nor after has the Commission adopted guidelines or policy statements directed to post-sentence reductions based on substantial assistance. There has been from the outset a general guideline provision, not using “reflect” language, for guideline departures based on substantial assistance, seemingly directed to original sentencing.
Despite the 2002 elision, the few circuits to address the issue continued to read
The next step in the chronology was the Supreme Court‘s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), making the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory to save them from constitutional invalidity. Thereafter, apparently believing that Booker required this change, the advisory committee recommended deletion of
Upon the government‘s motion made within one year of sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.
If this language alone were considered, Poland might well plausibly argue that a re-sentencing court could, in granting a substantial assistance motion, consider other factors and not just substantial assistance in setting the new sentence.
This is so even though the language changes that produced the present rule resulted from two apparent mistakes. The first is the advisory committee‘s belief that deleting the limiting “reflect” language from
As for the second change, the revisors’ view (although shared by the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir.2007)), quite probably misreads Booker. The jury trial concerns that led to invalidating mandatory guidelines for initial sentencing do not bear equally on every regulation of sentencing. Booker‘s Sixth Amendment rationale built on a tension with jury trial values insofar as the guidelines mandated an increased penalty because of additional conduct (e.g., using a gun, harming a victim) found only by the judge rather than the jury.
Neither the language of Booker nor its rationale appears to constrain Congress’ power to delimit, whether by guideline or otherwise, the conditions on which judges may reduce sentences once imposed; Congress can surely decide whether and when any reductions are allowed and surely as well who should make the downward adjustment and on what basis. Cf. United States v. Fanfan, 558 F.3d 105, 109-10 (1st Cir.2009) (constraining downward adjustment under
But despite faulty premises, the 2002 and 2007 changes in
The district court said that stripping out Congress’ “reflect” language from
The Rules Enabling Act‘s key language is opaque and its few constructions have occurred in quite different contexts. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 967, 94 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941). Among other difficulties, the statute brings into play both an enduring conundrum-the line between substance and procedure-and the puzzle of the statute‘s reference to “rights.”4 The rules process is among the most important endeavors in the judiciary; any constraining construction of the statute could have far reaching implications.
The sentencing question in our case arises out of a fact pattern that may not be common: usually the only new fact on a
Poland‘s reduced sentence was below the statutory minimum of sixty months.
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant‘s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.
Courts would surely have reached this result in re-sentencing cases, even if Congress had not echoed the “reflects” language in the Reform Act‘s version of
To put the matter differently, we hold that for re-sentence adjustments that go below the statutory mandatory minimum,
Poland‘s statutory mandatory minimum sentence is 60 months. The district court was entitled to reduce the sentence to reflect the assistance provided, which it calculated to justify a sentence of 40 months. It could not, as we read
Affirmed.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring).
I join the result, but write separately to express my views on our current sentencing regime as it affected this case.
As set forth below, all of the parties, including the district court, agreed that the sentencing disparity between Poland‘s sentence and his cousin‘s juvenile sentence supported a sentencing reduction to lessen that disparity. The plain text of
In order to understand my concerns, I will provide some background that was not essential to the majority opinion but is relevant here. After Poland cooperated, the government filed a motion to reduce Poland‘s sentence under
A hearing on the government‘s motion was held on January 9, 2008. The district court prefaced the hearing by asking the parties to address the recent 2007 amendments to
When asked by the district court whether the court was permitted to consider “the 3553(a) factors,” and, in particular, the sentencing disparity in reducing Poland‘s sentence, the government responded:
I do, I do. I-at your request I read the rule, I read the notation, the commentary to the rule, and it was very clear-I had a discussion with [Poland‘s counsel] about it, it was clear to both of us-that, like a typical sentencing, not a re-sentencing or situation such as this, if you were-you are essentially to treat the Rule 35 motion in the light you would a-if you were re-sentencing Mr. Poland today because you may look beyond the guidelines at 3553(a) factors. And the language of the statute used to be simply that you looked at the guidelines, which of course the Court knows is now advisory. So I read that to mean that the book is open in terms of the factors that you may consider both in the advisory guidelines as well as 3553(a) factors in coming to a conclusion as to what percentage of a departure should be imposed if a departure should be imposed.
So I do believe you can follow 3553(a). I would encourage the Court to do so. I certainly did so in general terms, theoretically, in coming up with the reasons why a Rule 35 motion was appropriate. But I do think that Mr. Poland has a number of indicia in his case that speak directly to many of the factors in 3553(a), such as the comparison of his behavior to that of a juvenile and the disparity between their sentences.
When asked, the government clarified that its recommended sentence of 48-months did not reflect the disparity between Poland and his cousin‘s sentences, but admitted that “I don‘t disagree with anything that [Poland‘s counsel] said in his response.” The district court asked if the government‘s “agreement that the [3553(a)] factors can govern reflect your office‘s consideration of the significance of this change?” The government responded that the “appellate division” had not addressed the issue.
After the hearing, the government attorney consulted with the U.S. Attorney‘s Office to determine its position. On January 10, 2008, the government filed a memorandum clarifying that position. In the memorandum the government stated that “while the Court may consider 3553(a) factors in reducing Defendant‘s sentence, it is the Government‘s position that it may do so only in determining to what extent to reduce the sentence based on Defendant‘s cooperation.” Foreshadowing the majority‘s reasoning, the Government then stated that “the extent of any reduction is strictly limited by
With this background in mind, I stress my discomfort with a sentencing regime (including its mandatory minimum sentences) in which the good faith efforts of the parties and the district court to do the right thing and reflect the disparity between Poland‘s sentence and his cousin‘s sentence, were essentially derailed by the complexity and uncertainty of the existing state of the law. The district judge, in fact, stated outright that “[i]f [it] were able to consider these additional § 3553(a) factors, [it] would reduce the defendant‘s sentence to thirty months.” United States v. Poland, 533 F.Supp.2d 199, 214 (D.Me. 2008). Instead, the district court was reduced to divining the propriety of several changes to
I also express disappointment with the government‘s change of position. That said, the government did go to great pains to point out that the disparity between Poland‘s sentence and his cousin‘s sentence was “difficult ... to justify at this point” and expressed great sympathy with Poland‘s position that the sentencing disparity should be considered. It is troubling that such concerns had to fall by the way side.
Taken together, the district court‘s and the government‘s actions are indicative of a sentencing regime (in particular, the mandatory minimum in this case) containing little flexibility. In the real life scenario of sentencing, such a regime makes little sense because it takes away much of the discretion from where it should be, those on the front lines of the criminal justice system. Our sentencing regime reflects the work of persons with a background of much theory and little practice in the art of sentencing. I do not begrudge the district court for its care in attempting to reach the right conclusion. The issue before us is difficult, and given the existing state of law, I am forced to agree with the result. But I am also obliged to vent my frustration with the situation in which we find ourselves mired, a sentencing regime plagued with uncertainty and rigidity.
