*3 TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jason Wayne Pleau is accused of the armed robbery and murder of a gas station manager in Rhode Island. Pleau is currently serving an eighteen-year sentence in Rhode Island state prison for parole and probation violations, and has agreed to plead guilty to state charges stemming from the robbery and murder and to accept a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The issue presented in the current petition is whether the United States, after being rebuffed by the state of Rhode Island in its attempt to take custody of Pleau under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, may compel the same result by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The issue is brought to us accompanied by a statement by Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee that he would not transfer Pleau to federal custody because doing so would expose Pleau, a Rhode Island citizen, to a potential death sentence on federal charges, in contravention to Rhode Island's longstanding rejection of capital punishment.
The petition presents a question of first impression in this court, as it appears that never before has a state governor denied a federal request for custody under the IAD. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the federal government is entitled to choose between the IAD and an ad prosequendum writ in seeking custody of a state prisoner for purposes of a federal prosecution, but that once the federal government has put the gears *4 of the IAD into motion, it is bound by the IAD's terms, including its express reservation of a right of refusal to the governor of the sending state.
I. Background.
A. Facts & procedural posture.
On September 20, 2010, Pleau, along with two others, allegedly robbed a Woonsocket, RI gas station manager who was on his way to the bank to deposit the day's receipts. Pleau is alleged to have shot the victim, David Main, to death during the robbery. On November 18, 2010, the United States filed a criminal complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, and an arrest warrant was issued. Shortly thereafter, on November 22, the United States Marshals Service lodged a detainer with the warden of Rhode Island's Adult Correctional Institution, High Security Unit in Cranston, Rhode Island, where Pleau is currently serving a sentence for parole and probation violations. Pleau and his alleged cohorts were then indicted for robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce; and possessing, using, carrying, and discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1). The indictment noted that Pleau and his co-defendants are eligible for the death penalty, and specified statutory aggravating factors.
In order to facilitate Pleau's prosecution under the federal indictment, the district court entered an order transmitting the United States' request for temporary custody of Pleau under the IAD on May 25, 2011. Approximately one month later, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee denied the request for custody, citing Article IV(a) of the IAD, which states, in pertinent part, that after a request for temporary custody has been made, "there shall be a period of thirty days . . . within which period the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner." 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, art. IV(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), the federal government then petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, a form of habeas used to secure a defendant's presence in court. Pleau filed a motion opposing the request on the same day.
On June 30, the district court granted the Government's request, holding that Pleau lacked standing to challenge the issuance of the writ and denying his claim on the merits as well. The district court, noting that "[i]t appears that this is the first time a governor has dishonored a request by the United States" under the IAD, held that when the IAD "has been invoked and a detainer lodged against a state prisoner, Article IV may afford the governor of the sending State the right to dishonor the request *6 to transfer . . . but, in all events does not empower him, or his agents, to disobey a federal court's writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum as to that prisoner." United States v. Pleau, No. CR. 10-184-1S, 2011 WL 2605301, at *3 (D.R.I. June 30, 2011). The court issued the writ requiring Pleau's presence in federal court on Friday, July 8, 2011 at 11:00 a.m. for arraignment.
Pleau filed a motion in this court to stay execution of the writ as well as a motion seeking a writ of prohibition. On July 7, 2011, we granted a stay, directing the parties to file briefs and setting the case for oral argument. Governor Chafee appeared before this court first as an amicus curiae supporting Pleau, and later as an intervenor-appellant.
B. The IAD and habeas corpus ad prosequendum Before turning to the merits, we briefly sketch the background of the IAD and ad prosequendum writs, as well as the standards governing the use of writs of mandamus and prohibition.
The IAD, adopted by Congress in 1970, is an agreement
between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, and the United States. United States v.
Currier,
Like requests for custody under the IAD, writs of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum are creatures of statute. Ad prosequendum
writs were first interpreted as arising out of the First Judiciary
Act, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789), by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 98 (1807). In that case, Chief
Justice Marshall distinguished varieties of habeas, describing
habeas corpus ad prosequendum as the form of the writ "which
issue[s] when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to
prosecute, or bear testimony, in any court, or to be tried in the
proper jurisdiction wherein the fact was committed." Id. The
*8
present-day writ arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5). See Kenaan,
C. Writs of prohibition.
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), empowers federal
courts to issue extraordinary (or "prerogative") writs where
"necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions." Writs of mandamus instruct lower courts to take
certain specified acts; writs of prohibition instruct them to
refrain from doing so. See In re Perry,
(1st Cir. 1988); In re Pearson,
By contrast, advisory mandamus is not directed at
"established" practices, Horn,
III. Discussion
A. Standing.
As an initial matter, we note that Governor Chafee's
intervention in the present appeal moots a simmering dispute
between the original parties -- Pleau and the United States -- as
to whether Pleau had standing to contest the issuance of the habeas
writ. The district court noted that it is "axiomatic" that "a
state prisoner is without standing to contest a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum." Pleau, 2011
WL 2605301, at *2 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Derengowski v. U.S. Marshal,
(8th Cir. 1967)). The district court rejected Pleau's argument,
renewed on appeal, that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bond
v. United States,
The United States insists that Pleau does not have
standing "to interfere with agreements (or disagreements) between
executives concerning custody transfers," in part because a state
prisoner "may not complain if one sovereignty waives its strict
right to exclusive custody of him," as "[s]uch a waiver is a matter
that addresses itself solely to the discretion of the sovereignty
making it and of its representatives with power to grant it."
*12
Ponzi v. Fessenden,
However, Governor Chafee has since sought and been granted leave to intervene in this case in order to "fully vindicate his rights under the IAD." Governor Chafee, like Pleau, argues that once the United States has invoked the IAD, it may not later circumvent the IAD's express allocation of a right of refusal to the governor of the sending state by means of an ad prosequendum writ. Given that no one contests that Governor Chafee, as the representative of Rhode Island, has standing to raise such a claim, the concerns regarding whether Pleau does or does not have standing to challenge the issuance of the ad prosequendum are now moot, and we express no opinion on the merits of that issue.
B. Which writ?
The United States insists that Pleau's arguments do not
[2]
meet the standards for mandamus. The United States argues that
Pleau cannot establish (a) that he is "clearly entitled" to relief,
or (b) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. In mounting
this argument, the United States evidently presupposes that the
applicable writ is supervisory in character. However, as noted
above, supervisory mandamus is directed at correcting "established"
*13
trial court practices. Horn,
The standard for an advisory writ of prohibition does not
overlap with that for a supervisory writ. See Horn,
original). The applicable standard is, rather, whether the issue raised by Pleau is novel, of great or systemic importance, and likely to recur prior to effective review.
We believe the question presented meets all three criteria. Governor Chafee's denial of the United States' request for custody of Pleau appears to be unprecedented. The question of whether a state governor retains his or her prerogative under the IAD to deny a subsequent request for custody, even when that occurs under the guise of an ad prosequendum writ, has never been squarely considered by the First Circuit. Nor, for reasons we explain more fully below, is Supreme Court precedent dispositive on this point. The question raised by Pleau's petition is novel.
The question is also of great and systemic importance. As Governor Chafee made clear in a statement released on the same day as his denial of the IAD request, he opposes transferring Pleau to federal custody on grounds of Rhode Island's "longstanding policy" against capital punishment. While Governor Chafee's refusal to allow the federal government to seek the execution of a Rhode Island citizen "in no way minimize[s] the tragic and senseless nature" of Main's murder, he stated that he could not "in good conscience" allow the federal government to ride roughshod over Rhode Island's "conscious[] reject[ion]" of execution as an acceptable form of state punishment. Pleau had, at this point, already indicated his agreement to plead guilty to the state charges and accept a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Therefore, the only additional punishment that a federal conviction might bring would appear to be authorization to kill *15 Pleau. The present case thus presents a stark conflict between federal and state policy prerogatives on a matter of literally life-and-death significance. [3]
Finally, given the unsettled character of the question presented, the numerous states and territories that are party to the IAD, and the fact that, as the United States has represented to us, thousands of ad prosequendum writs are issued each year , it is not unreasonable to suspect that the question presented in the instant petition is likely to recur. Indeed, insofar as the United States is correct that the typical criminal defendant lacks standing to challenge the issuance of an ad prosequendum writ -- whether issued before or after the invocation of the IAD -– the question presented "may well recur before further appellate review is possible." In re The Justices of the Supreme Court of P.R., 695 F.2d at 25.
Moreover, Governor Chafee’s invocation of the IAD and intervention in this case present a unique opportunity for review *16 of this slippery issue: the Governor unquestionably has standing, where Pleau might or might not. The Governor's standing, though, might evaporate if Pleau were transferred, in which case it is unclear what remedy might be available to the Governor. This means that on direct appeal, if Pleau also lacks standing to challenge his transfer under the IAD (as the United States insists) then this question will evade effective review. In the end, we very well [4]
might not be able to consider this easily duplicable and important question if not now.
We conclude that Pleau's petition meets the standard for an advisory writ of prohibition. As prerogative writs such as writs of prohibition are discretionary rather than mandatory, we now turn to consider whether the writ should issue.
C. The merits.
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Supremacy Clause, states in part that "the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any *17 Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." As we have previously noted, a federal court's authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is grounded on a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5). Prima facie, it might well be the case that a state's refusal to honor an ad prosequendum writ would normally raise serious issues under the Supremacy Clause.
However, that is not the case now before us. Governor Chafee has not asserted a free-standing right to ignore federal ad prosequendum writs. Governor Chafee asserts, rather, that he is authorized under Article IV(a) of the IAD to decide whether to [5]
honor a request for custody made by a receiving state, and that an
ad prosequendum writ that post-dates the invocation of the IAD is,
under federal law, treated as just such a written request. We have
previously explained that, as a "congressionally sanctioned
interstate compact within the compact clause, the [IAD] is a
federal law subject to federal construction." Currier,
The United States insists that Pleau's petition has
already been foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Mauro,
in which the Court stated that Article IV(a) of the IAD "does not
purport to augment the State's authority to dishonor" an ad
prosequendum writ, and that "[i]f a State has never had authority
to dishonor an ad prosequendum writ issued by a federal court, then
this provision could not be read as providing such authority."
Mauro,
F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "the historic power of the [ad prosequendum] writ seems unavailing once the government elects to file a detainer in the course of obtaining a state prisoner's presence for disposition of federal charges.")
We are not as confident that Mauro is quite as clear as claimed by the United States. After all, Mauro had two core holdings which were necessary to resolving the cases consolidated before the Court, and both of these holdings undermine rather than *19 support the United States' position. First, the Court held that the United States is a party to the IAD not just as a sending state, but as a receiving one as well, and that it is therefore not exempt from the restrictions the IAD places on receiving states. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 354. Second, the Court held that while the federal government could choose to seek custody over a state prisoner by means of an initial habeas writ or under the IAD, once an effective IAD detainer had been lodged, "the Agreement by its express terms becomes applicable and the United States must comply with its provisions." Id. at 362. "[O]nce a detainer has been lodged," the Court noted, "the policies underlying the [IAD] are fully implicated," and thus there is "no reason to give an unduly restrictive meaning to the term 'written request for temporary custody.'" Id. Under these circumstances, "it clearly would permit the United States to circumvent its obligations under the Agreement to hold that an ad prosequendum writ may not be considered a written request for temporary custody." Id. Both of these holdings indicate that the United States stands, for purposes of the IAD, on an equivalent footing with other states, and that, once it has invoked the IAD, it is bound by the terms thereof, including Article IV(a).
Moreover, the interpretation of Mauro advanced by the
United States is not in any way self-evident. First, the portion
of Mauro cited by the United States occurs directly after the Court
*20
announced the rule that subsequent ad prosequendum writs are to be
treated as written requests under the IAD. See Mauro,
Second, Mauro’s suggestion that a governor lacks the
power to reject an ad prosequendum writ acting as a request for
temporary custody under the IAD occurs only in a conditional
phrase: “If a State has never had authority to dishonor an ad
prosequendum writ issued by a federal court, then this provision
could not be read as providing such authority.”
We have on one occasion suggested a contrary result in
dicta. See Kenaan,
Our result is further borne out by longstanding principles of statutory interpretation. First, we note that the IAD specifically excepts the United States from certain requirements, but not from a governor's right to refuse a transfer. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes to mind: in determining the effect of an amendment to existing statutory law, *22 "[e]xceptions strengthen the force of the general law and enumeration weakens it as to things not expressed." 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:23 (7th ed. 2010). In the context of the IAD, Congress amended the IAD after Mauro to add specific exceptions treating the United States differently from other parties. Pub. L. No. 100-960, Title [7]
VII, § 7059, 102 Stat. 4403 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
App. § 9). Aside from these enumerated exceptions, though,
Congress has stuck with the IAD's definition of the United States
as a “state” on the same footing as other receiving states. See
Mauro, 436 U.S. at 354; see also 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, art. II.
Because Congress specifically amended the IAD to add these express
exceptions, we can safely deduce that Congress did not intend to
make any others. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
Second, notwithstanding the United States’ argument that
the IAD’s purpose compels deviation from its plain language, it is
axiomatic that we must apply the statute as written. See Carchman
v. Nash,
Indeed, in an earlier line of cases, we tried deviating
from the IAD’s language in order to comport with its purpose, but
the Supreme Court abrogated the entire line. See United States v.
Kelley,
One last note remains to be sounded. The United States has argued that even if Article IV(a) governs ad prosequendum writs issued after invocation of the IAD, nevertheless disapproval of a written request under the IAD "may be premised only upon the requesting sovereign's failure to comply with IAD rules that are designed to safeguard the process and assure that the request is genuine." The United States insists that Governor Chafee's objection to the transfer of Pleau on grounds of Rhode Island's abhorrence of the death penalty is "not a valid basis" for refusing the request, and that allowing a governor to refuse an IAD request on public policy grounds "would be directly at odds with the IAD's goal of ensuring fast and orderly transfers." The United States cites no cases in support of this proposition, but rests its argument on the statutory text, which states that a requesting sovereign "shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has *25 lodged a detainer . . . made available." 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, art. IV(a) (emphasis added).
The United States' textual argument is unconvincing. It
is true that Article IV(a) states that a requesting sovereign
"shall be entitled" to have a prisoner made available to him after
a detainer has been lodged. However, the United States neglects to
mention that a few lines later, Article IV(a) explicitly qualifies
this statement, and states that this is "provided . . . [t]hat
there shall be a period of thirty days . . . within which period
the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the request for
temporary custody or availability." 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, art.
IV(a). See also Mauro,
The United States’ attempt to circumvent the IAD with an
ad prosequendum writ weighs in favor of our rejection of its claim
*26
for physical custody of Pleau. In RaShad v. Walsh,
For these reasons, we hold that once the federal government has elected to seek custody of a state prisoner under the IAD, it is bound by that decision. Any subsequent ad prosequendum writ is to be considered a written request for temporary custody under the IAD and, as such, subject to all of the strictures of the IAD, including the governor's right of refusal. The federal government is not required to seek custody under the IAD; it may elect to seek custody by means of a habeas writ. In that case, the Supremacy Clause requires states to conform to the habeas writ. But once the federal government has chosen to proceed under the auspices of the IAD, it may not seek to erase the memory of that decision by means of an ensuing habeas writ. [9]
IV. Conclusion
As we have recently noted, prerogative writs such as
mandamus and prohibition "are strong medicine and . . . should be
dispensed sparingly." In re Sony BMG Music Entm't,
Indeed, the federal government may "waive the federal
sovereign's strict right to exclusive custody of a prisoner" in
favor of state custody. Poland v. Stewart,
instructing the parties that the June 30, 2011 writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is to be treated in every respect as a written request for temporary custody under the IAD, and that the United States is bound by the IAD’s terms, including the governor’s right to refuse a transfer request. [10]
Petition granted.
-Dissenting Opinion Follows-
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Congress would surely be surprised to be told that it had empowered a state governor to veto a federal court habeas writ--designed to bring a federally indicted prisoner to federal court for trial on federal charges-- because the governor opposed the penalty that might be imposed if a federal conviction resulted. Of course, Congress has not provided states with any such veto power, and the Supreme Court has already made this clear in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
A federal grand jury indicted Jason Pleau on December 14, 2010, charging him with federal felonies related to the September [11]
20, 2010, robbery and murder of a gas station manager making a bank deposit in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Pleau was in Rhode Island state custody on parole violation charges when the indictment came down, and is now serving an 18-year sentence there for parole and probation violations.
To secure Pleau's presence in the federal prosecution,
the federal government invoked the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act ("IAD"). Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 1397 (1970)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2 (2006)). The IAD
provides what is supposed to be an efficient shortcut to achieve
*31
extradition of a state prisoner to stand trial in another state or,
in the event of a federal request, to make unnecessary the prior
custom of a federal habeas action to secure the state prisoner for
a federal prosecution. See IAD art. I. In this instance, Rhode
Island's governor refused the IAD request because of his stated
opposition to capital punishment. United States v. Pleau, No. 10-
184-1S,
The federal government then sought a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum from the district court to secure custody of Pleau--this being the traditional method by which a federal court obtained custody in such situations. E.g., Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615-16, 618 (1961). The federal habeas statute codifying this common law practice authorizes the writ to be issued by a federal court to secure a person, including one held in state custody, where "necessary to bring him into [federal] court to testify or for trial." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2006). This habeas statute, currently in force, long predated the IAD, Carbo, 364 U.S. at 614-19.
Pursuant to the habeas statute, the federal district
court in Rhode Island ordered Pleau to be delivered into federal
custody. Pleau,
An expedited appeal followed in which the Rhode Island governor was granted belated intervention. The panel majority has now held that the state's refusal to grant consent under the IAD effectively disables as well the grant of the subsequently filed traditional habeas corpus ad prosequendum writ. This conclusion is
remarkable both because Mauro held that lack of state consent would not affect the force of the habeas writ vis-à-vis the state and because it effectively thwarts a federal prosecution authorized by the United States Attorney and a federal grand jury.
Were the panel's position to prevail, Pleau could be
permanently immune from federal prosecution. He is currently
serving an 18-year term in Rhode Island prison and, if exempted now
from answering the federal charges in the district court, could
well agree to a life sentence under Rhode Island law for the
robbery and murder. See Br. for Amicus Curiae Governor Lincoln D.
U.S. Marshal, Minneapolis Office, Minn. Div.,
Chafee in Support of Pet'r Ex. A (letter from Pleau to Rhode Island Assistant Attorney General offering to plead to sentence of life without parole on state charges). Even if the term remains at 18 years, one could hardly count on necessary witnesses being available for federal prosecution two decades from now. Instead of a place of confinement, the state prison has been made a refuge against the federal courts.
To reach this result, the panel majority has circumvented
standing limitations on the power of a defendant to challenge the
writ, see note 12, above, as well as ordinary practice generally
reserving prohibition and mandamus writs for clear error by the
district court. E.g., In re City of Fall River, Mass., 470 F.3d
30, 32 (1st Cir. 2006). But, passing all that, on the core issue
the panel decision adopts a reading of the federal statutes that
disregards an explicit contrary determination by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Mauro,
Mauro disposed of two different federal appeals but, in
the one most pertinent to Pleau, the background is easily
summarized. The federal government lodged a detainer with state
prison authorities, and then summoned the defendant from state
prison to federal court by habeas writ, first for arraignment and
(after many postponements) then for trial. The defendant
repeatedly objected that he was being denied the speedy trial
*34
rights expressly protected by Article IV(c) of the IAD once its
procedures have been invoked.
After the defendant's federal conviction, the circuit
court held that he had indeed been denied the speedy trial
protections of the IAD, requiring dismissal of the federal
indictment with prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed, saying that
the detainer had triggered the IAD and the habeas writ comprised a
"written request" for initiating a transfer contemplated by Article
IV of the IAD. Mauro,
The Court went on, however, to expressly reject the suggestion that a state governor could resist a writ of habeas corpus by withholding consent to the transfer of a state prisoner to federal court. Indeed, the Court distinguished between the time limits of Article IV(c) triggered by the detainer and Article IV(a)'s reservation of the governor's power to withhold consent. The former represented Congress' concern about delays in the IAD procedure, which could adversely affect the defendant subject to the detainer, whether invoked by the federal government or a state.
By contrast, the latter reservation merely preserved for
the holding state its traditional authority to refuse an
extradition request from another state, Mauro,
We are unimpressed. The proviso of Art. IV(a) does not purport to augment the State's authority to dishonor such a writ. As the history of the provision makes clear, it was meant to do no more than preserve previously existing rights of the sending States, not to expand them. If a State has never had authority to dishonor an ad prosequendum writ issued by a federal court, then this provision could not be read as providing such authority.
Id. at 363 (internal footnote omitted).
That "a state has never had authority to dishonor an ad
prosequendum writ issued by a federal court" is patent. The habeas
writ has been codified by Congress, and under the Supremacy Clause,
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, Congress' power trumps any contrary
position or preference of the state. This principle has been
regularly and famously used to compel states, including their
governors, to respect orders of federal courts in civil rights
cases such as Cooper v. Aaron,
*36
defeat federal authority is a doctrine that was thought to have
vanished with the Civil War. E.g., Gonzales v. Raich,
That the federal statutory habeas ad prosequendum writ
overrides any state power to withhold the defendant has been
affirmed by three circuits with which the panel majority now
conflicts. United States v. Graham,
Mauro did not hold, as the panel majority supposes, that
the filing of a detainer with state authorities disempowers the
habeas writ or gives the governor a veto over its use; the Court,
in the indented passage quoted above, said exactly the opposite.
Nor do general canons of construction allow a lower court panel
majority to disregard the Supreme Court's own construction of the
IAD, namely, that "[t]he proviso of Art. IV(a) does not purport to
Branstad,
*37 augment the State's authority to dishonor such a writ." 436 U.S. at 363.
Here, a valid writ has been approved by a federal district court but is now effectively dishonored by the state and by the panel majority's writ of prohibition declaring that the governor is entitled to disregard the writ. Mauro is plainly to the contrary, and the panel majority's action cannot survive the inevitable further review now fated for it.
Notes
[1] Although the cases discussing the supervisory/advisory
distinction do so in the context of writs of mandamus, given that
writs of prohibition are "merely the obverse" of writs of mandamus,
In re Atl. Pipe Corp.,
[2] Because Governor Chafee's and Pleau's arguments are substantially similar, we treat them as one and the same.
[3] We pause to note that the crimes Pleau is alleged to have
committed -- armed robbery and murder -- are quintessential state
crimes, and betray on their face no hint of any uniquely federal
interest. See United States v. Jiménez-Torres,
[4] Other cases, including Mauro, have addressed IAD questions on
direct appeal, although always in the context of a prisoner
asserting his own rights under the IAD, such as his speedy trial
rights. See, e.g., Mauro,
[5] Section 2 of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act "sets
forth the agreement as [originally] adopted by the United States
and by other member jurisdictions." Mauro,
[6] Significantly, in none of these cases did the governor of the
sending state actually disapprove the federal government's IAD
request or seek to block transfer under a subsequent ad
prosequendum writ. See Trafny,
[7] For example, if a receiving state other than the United States does not hold a trial before returning the person to the sending state, the "indictment, information or complaint" from the receiving state "shall" be dismissed with prejudice. 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, art. IV(e). In contrast, under § 9 of the IAD, "Special provisions when United States is a Receiving State," if the United States is the receiving sate, then the dismiss of the "indictment, information or complaint may be with or without prejudice." 18 U.S.C. App. § 9(1) (emphasis added). Section 9 does not indicate that the United States can disregard or override a sending state's denial of its request for temporary custody.
[8] The IAD unambiguously states: "there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the request." 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, art. IV(a). The United States argues that this thirty-day period has no practical import -- that a prisoner can readily be transferred within the thirty days whether the sending-state governor approves, acquiesces, or disapproves. We reject this interpretation, which would render the mandatory thirty-day period meaningless. See United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st Cir. 1985) ("All words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.").
[9] The dissent implies that our result would effectively
“empower[] a state governor to veto a federal court habeas writ,”
which Congress never intended to do. See Diss. Op. at 1.
Respectfully, this criticism misapprehends the scope of our
holding. We do not hold that a state has a general right to
disregard a properly granted ad prosequendum writ; such a broad
holding would conflict with the Supremacy Clause and with the
Supreme Court’s statement in Mauro that “[t]he proviso of Art.
IV(a) does not purport to augment the State’s authority to dishonor
[an ad prosequendum] writ.”
[10] Pleau seeks an interlocutory appeal in addition to or alternatively to the writ of prohibition. Because we issue the writ, we need not address Pleau’s request for interlocutory review.
[11] Conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006), robbery affecting commerce, id., and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence resulting in death, id. § 924(c)(1)(A), (j)(1).
[12] E.g., Weekes v. Fleming, 301 F.3d 1175, 1180 n.4 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied,
[13] And this fundamental tenet of constitutional law is, of course, not confined to the civil rights context. E.g., Puerto Rico v.