*1 Before TJOF LAT, BIR CH and G ODBO LD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case arises from a motion to withdraw as appointed appeals counsel
pursuant to Ande rs v. Calif ornia,
“This court reviews de novo the legality of a sentence, including a sentence imposed pursuant to revocation of a term of supervised release.” U.S. v. Aimufa, 122 F.3d 1376, 13 78 (11th C ir. 1997). In d etermining w hether appo inted counse l’s motion to withd raw sh ould be granted this cour t review s the full re cord to determin e wheth er the case is who lly frivolo us. Anders, 386 U .S. at 744 . If it finds “any of the legal points arguable on their merits . . . it must, prior to decision, *3 afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Id.
In U.S. v. Gresham this court found that 18 U.S .C. §3583(e)(3) authorizes a
court revoking a person’s supervised release to impose both a new prison term and
a new term of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(3) caps the length of
supervised release pending on the class of felony originally committed and any
prison term served after the initial supervised release revocation is subtracted from
this cap.
Supervised release following revocation -- When a term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a requirement that the defendant *4 be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment. The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
The above language differs from subsection (e)(3) in that it is silent on the
issue of whether credit ought to be g iven for time previously served on p ost-release
supervision. The only credit that subsection (h) clearly enumerates is time served
in prison post revocation of supervised release. The Supreme Court has held that
“[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence
of a contrary legislative intent.” U.S. v . Smith,
Moreover, the appellant contends that the original sentence of three year supervised release ordered by the court binds the court on revocation to the maximum of three years that m ay be divided between add itional supervised release and/or prison term. 18 U.S.C § 3583 (g) states that the court shall revoke the term of supe rvised re lease for e numer ated instan ces includ ing failing to comp ly with drug testing and repeatedly testing positive for illegal controlled substance. Upon revocation the court will “require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e) (3).” Subsection (e)(3) authorizes the court to impose additional prison term and/or supervised release not to exceed “5 years in prison if the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony,” the class of felony of which the appe llant had b een con victed. T hese tw o subse ctions rea d in conjunction with subsection (h) authorize the court to divide the 5-year maximum sentence between prison term and supervised release as the court sees fit. The language of §3583(e)(3), (g) and (h) makes clear that the length of additional supervised release and prison term upon revocation is not bound by the original term of s upervis ed release but by th e class of f elony of which the appe llant is convicted. Thus “the aggregate of pre-revocation and post-revocation supervised *6 release terms may exceed the maximum length of supervised release that § 3583(b) dictates should attach to the underlying offense.” Gresham, 325 F .2d at 12 68. Counsel’s Motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the revocation and sentence are AF FIRM ED.
