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United States v. Phillip Masiello and Francis Lester Stickel
235 F.2d 279
2d Cir.
1956
Check Treatment

*1 person produces them) ar- who a taxable- ufacturer sold the wholesaler’s salvage, junk scrap, mark-up handling costs, ticle from material, or selling, over- profit. or raw head

as well as from new I would reverse. material, (1) by manip- processing, changing

ulating, of an or the form combining article, (2) by or as- or sembling or two more articles. “(b) circumstances, certain Under person or where manufactures per- produces a for a taxable article son who materials and re- furnishes America, UNITED STATES of thereto, person tains title Plaintiff-Appellee, whom the taxable article is manufac- produced, per- and not the tured Phillip MASIELLO Francis Lester actually son manufactures Stickel, Defendants-Appellants. produces it, will be considered the No. Docket 23917. manufacturer.” Appeals United States Court of wholly sep- Polaroid and Greist are Second Circuit. and distinct entities who struck an arate Argued May 10, length bargain whereby arm’s Greist July 18, 1956. Decided independent contractor “manufac- Certiorari Oct. Denied of mak- tured” the cameras the sense See 77 S.Ct. 100. fabricating them, putting ing them, them employees together, own out of with its materials, purchased parts it

its own parties, then sold them from third agreed price to Polaroid. The for an patents of Polaroid’s because fact legally could have had and Greist for the cameras and the customer accord- cameras were made fact that specifications ing sub- Polaroid’s inspection ject seem to me beside Certainly point. if Greist in viola- patent and its contract law tion camera or cameras sold a Polaroid with than Polaroid it Would other some one on those for the tax cameras. liable ordinary me lan- seems guage was the manufacturer and Greist purchaser who sold the cam- Polaroid impose Thus to wholesale. eras Polaroid to base the tax not on on tax price sale manufacturer’s accord- the statute but the whole- ance price, naturally sale saler’s includes, greater presumably, since it goods cost of the addition (the price for which wholesaler the man- *2 portentous perish- because of the

product.

able nature of their Masiello and in Stickel were single conspiracy, dicted on a of count per implicating

and no evidence other Hence, sons introduced at the was trial. told, government as the had prove defendants, of both against or the case both failed. The evidence that Masiello committed sub abundant, stantive acts of extortion is conceded; defendants contend tending that the evidence to incriminate support Stickel is too tenuous to verdict, jury’s and that con hence both victions must be reversed. Turinet See ti v. F.2d 15. agree, We cannot for we think that a City Pécora, New York Ferdinand study pat of all the evidence reveals a Ludwig Frohlich, Teller, (Schwartz & intelligent, tern jury events from an which City, Horowitz, New York David H. and rationally could and as a matter of defendants-appellants. brief), for on undoubtedly common sense find! Megargee Brown, Sp. Asst. U. Peter participant Stickel active in this con City Y., Atty., New York D. N. S. S. tinuing profitable conspiracy. and Atty., Williams, (Paul New U. W. S. By 1949 Stickel was in control brief), plaintiff- City, York appellee. on the Although Local No. teamster the- committees, had number of union the- CLARK, Judge, and Before Chief record indicates charge ini that Stickel was Judges. HINCKS, executing bargain- Circuit FRANK collective milk, ing contracts with over-the-road haulers, Dairy Judge. members of CLARK, Trans- Chief port Association, (DTA). Inc. Stickel! appeal judgment from a Defendants announced when the contracts would be- convicting upon them of verdict signed, where, and under what circum- conspiracy interstate commerce to affect exert, position He was in stances. in violation of the Anti- extortion control over crippling haulers the use of Racketeering Act, 1951, and 18 U.S.C. § against opera- strikes their sentencing years prison. five them to authority power- His was the tions. agent, and was a business Masiello necessary to enforce a successful scheme- Secretary Treasurer, of Stickel extortion. 445 of the International No. Local letters, Chauffeurs, May 27,. Teamsters, In identical dated Brotherhood haulers, Helpers America, and sent Stickel. Warehousemen agreement already- that an stated had of this local union The members AFL. employees haulers, reached between the DTA and Lo- of milk were copies engaged transporting He cal No. 445. enclosed milk re- the- were neighbor- contract and uniform instructed the- farms of six from the ceived ing metropolitan haulers to come to the union office om the New York states sign letters,, contract. The milk haulers were de- June these Since area. union, signed personally by uninterrupted progress’ Stickel as a pendent pf officer, warning upon receipt ended with operations that he- their continuing “expect recipient “sign upon [ed]” for- contract union up will, they good and “clear vulnerable to us” were issues are- union holding up completion negotia- stoppage, made our of a even threats work Although quested placed the cash to Masiello or there was tions.”1 envelope place men negotiating where the had the table taken some according Although spring, that were seated. no evidence there was actively par- ne- Stickel did not were sent the time the letters at gotiations *3 ticipate take uncompleted cash or lay issues the transfer of it, effort up overt was no it be notice of there remained cleared unless to be him. made payoff and to conceal the transfer the claimed to Masiello Stick- n el, government. meeting by Masiel as the After June 1 asserted the of participating haul 1° visited one of the Four hauler-witnesses testified that had been ers and told him that a mistake va- Masiello communicated with them at money had made in amount of the meeting xious the of June times before envelope. haul This handed over in the they pay- 1 and demanded that make Similarly paid er more then over cash. in amounts of ei- ments of sums cash paid another hauler $500 price the of reeeiv- .ther $300’ $500 year. ing day appointed the On contract. the following years In three similar the testifying oth- haulers —those and and the conferences between Masiello appeared and at the union office (cid:127)ers — by receipt were followed haulers by one into a room about were called by the haulers and the union contract x feet in size wherein was 10 20 Stickel by receipt of cash One em- Masiello. with the contracts seated behind table ployer, paid $2,000 $2,- Turco, piled of him. Masiello was also in front $2,500 and another in 1952. according and, present in the room early temporarily when fell witnesses, seated of the was at some payments, behind in his he was ex- put As one witness table Stickel. payments by to hasten horted Masi- it, “within handshak- the two men were complained ello, Stickel was ing of each other. After distance” money, signed to receive the anxious had and the hauler Stickel Gilnack, hauler, agreement, hauler handed a Another either received the containing May, envelope appear plain but white the re- letter failed to by signed parties rep- Team Brotherhood the Union and the 1. “International resenting Association, namely, sters, Warehousemen Chauffeurs and Mr. Helpers Nye. of America Mr. Marcus We have been n “Affiliated with the American Federa- up trying signed to clear the issue of a Haulers, Labor tion of for sometime with contract your “(Vignette) members Association. signed “The matter of a Local contract was Union Stickel "“Lester brought “Secretary-Treasurer to the attention of our No. Executive upon acted Board “2 matter Post Street following manner and ruled that— N.Y. “Yonkers signed “Telephones: must be a contract cov- ering the individual haulers of 3-7997 YOnkers 8-3640 —YOnkers milk delay. May 27, further without The actions of the approved Board was Executive membership '“Gentlemen: day February arrang- so therefore we are “On 2nd Representatives ing agreement to have our was reached and between at our office, Association, Dairy Transport located at 32 Inc. Middletown James Wednesday, Middletown, Street, 1st, June N. our A Y. and Union. at stipulation your P. M. with a contract up and a was cover was drawn tract expect you setting operation agree- sign which we forth will thereto (cid:127)attached up clear us and settled also in the issues was are ment as it holding up completion negotiations. following: stipulation of our is the you. agreed Employ- “Thank “It has been truly “Very yours, jurisdiction coming under the ers Stickel, “Lester who are mem- named Local Union above “Secretary Dairy Transport Treasurer, & Association bers sign separate “Local Union No. uniform but contract will “Lester attached hereto. Stickel/lm Stipulation “ceiu;153” was . “The Contract ' Feeling money. Shortly “over a meeting there- manded the of June 1. hauling oper- Hillman some time consented and barrel” milk after strike of his paid an addi- and also began un- cash $250 later ations and he hurried year. made present- tional sum later in He headquarters, ion where Stickel payments in sign. other subsequent years. Masiello substantial extortion him ed with a contract present; weeks a few was not then was

later he told that Stickel Gilnack meeting In 1953 there between money, “impatient” and Gilnack for his Hillman to dis- Stickel Masiello and period sev- paid about over a $750 driv- cuss the transfer of union certain eral months. from another 445: ers local to Local No. *4 discussing In early the comments of another 1950 Stickel Late in 1949 in transfer, garage union official about such a and Masiello visited Gilnack’s said that wanted this official Stickel additional and instructed him to hire an $10,000 for the Hill- transfer of certain employee,- Gil- one Richard Winters. employees; that ground Stickel observed that he need- man nack refused on the asking anything “crazy the official was employees; a re- no and as ed further like that.” operations for four sult his struck were days. advised Gil- or five Then Masiello Then Masiello and Stickel offered Pizzo, labor relations nack counselor, hire effecting to help their to Hillman in thing “straighten out.” to necessary told Hill- transfer. Stickel presence of Stickel and Later (Stickel) everything man that he “knew Masiello, Pizzo that he told Gilnack Masiello, turn, that Masiello knew.” in shop to would have hire Winters (Masiello) advised Hillman that he union-designated steward, position. everything “knew knew.” that Stickel After lunch Hillman from subject Masiello took retroactive At this time dining room, the hotel' had -where employees pay arose. for Gilnack’s sitting, lobby, to where he de- presence in Pizzo told Gilnack per manded man for the transfer. $125 and that he would Masiello both Stickel result of the Hillman pay.” As a conversation $1,-200 pay “retroactive haveto paid Masiello $500. later times Masiello at different Ip places collectedthis sum from Gilnack' the summer of 1953 after certain complained did not installments. The evidence haulers cash had Union, telegram ever reached Gil- that of it was show International employees, ordering re- inference and the nack’s him to cease ne- sent Stickel strong piece gotiations of a that it mained was on all milk contracts. After payments conspiracy Masiello. made the other and no with terminated the. , Additionally payments similar to and in a manner further were made. employers, made of other Gilnack December, 1953, Hickey, Thomas L. year payments of about further $750 president of the International Un- a vice ion, 1950, 1951, and 1952. Masiello over control took of Local No. Hillman, hauler, trustee informed Stickel that F. another in as a Paul of the local union were sus- from officials a demand Masiello the received running price pected of for their own of the bene- new for $500 Hickey Then Masiello told tract; when he received Stickel’s fit. (Masiello) May question” presence of Stickel that he was “no letter “rap” Hickey take the if would final mind what sentence would ap- report “lay off Stickel.” Later Stickel he Still refused meant. Hickey suggestion hauling opera- proached with payoff, and his milk along go with the “deal” offered a. m. at 3:00 Faced were struck tions Elaborating, speci- got by Masiello. Stickel disaster unless he business rap” rolling, “take the reported that Masiello would Hillman to Stick- fied milk (cid:127) Hickey “lay sign off would Stickel” and was then contract to el go Masiello, who de- “let free.” downstairs Stickel taken power monéy presented the haul- question whether extract evidence, ers, an active would to make himself of all the not on basis summary participant Masiello’s scheme. is a the above which proper elements, important it was Further, practical as a matter Stick- for the determination case to submit the hardly mcrely d could have been benevo- evi_ no offered The defense °f the ^ lently indifferent activities Masi- not take did defendants dence Thug _ ello of which was aware> issue. If a is the This sole the stand. gtiekel important anwas official of the ^ prop present, question it was was unjon. bjs unj0n’s and both own and jury under a erly submitted damaged repUtati0n being severely were carefully charge the re stated activity. Masiello-s proof crimi m quirements of burden likely find he would allow exception is which no cases and to nal g0 cos-yy merely activities to continue made- illegal for the benefit of a subordinate. suggest all of is moreover obvious Masiello’s Defendants prove government’s with statements and is consistent actions *5 ig- highly incriminating hypothesis (1) was that Stickel to Stickel. Stiek- an (2) el, man, permit activities that as an innocent of would not Masiello’s norant incriminated; though ignorant, benev- Stickel, was himself to be thus or so part, might indifferent, jury rationally naturally olently took no active the and spoils. But none of the hold. and received they purposes practical for all rely alternative, We return then to the first hypot entirely the esis first nameiy) ignorant that of Stickel was strength For even if asserted and its Masie]]o what trary was But the con doinff. jury accepted the alterna- latter regts compelling upon conclusion rationally indeed, could, and tive testimony, from and there gui y. , e en an s n e s ou nQ.g challenge evidence whatsoever to it. , , , „ , times, course, , when a . of are There sophisticated bystander mi The , , by , presup- . . view asserted defendants may rely on his .... ,, but innocence, dazzling-m poses . a naivete its . , , „, innocence; , „.. . as - indifference . own TTT1What, example, was to Stickel think hardly apply powerful can to that employers deposited envelopes on force is coercive leader whose union amply ]?he“ the table at which he was slttln» actually the and is attested envelopes handed to Masiello after re charged. illegal acts for the foundation ceiying What, their contracts ? ex permits knows and If such Stickel, did the Treasurer of the amPle> l°cal power of his to ex- threat of the use union, happened $1,200 think employers, he payments from the tort pay Gilnack, in retroactive which with conspirator, wheth- made himself has standing by, pay Stickel was ordered to proceeds or in the illicit he shares er employees? Moreover, we must not by Masi- threat wielded not. So the isolating make the mistake each inci power of notorious Stickel was the ello separately denigrating thus dent and it. toor call contract a union withhold Actually mosaic, all evidence was a hauling operations. crippling strike making sign- contribution, its bit own each issue calls for For Stickel ing building up compelling all strikes for and order whole contracts knowing jury first court “non-cooperation,” that as and second Masi- actually using view it.2 Thus we these manifestations of should should was ello by illegal general pattern discovered arrest is one of the fea 2. This distinguishing sharply seizure. accused this case from search and tures right Re, was seated front seat v. Di 332 U.S. States passed 210, heavily where the driver L.Ed. relied automobile eoun- coupons gasoline by gov- ration terfeit to a The issue there the defendants. ou seat, admissibility different, being informer ernment the back was exercising powers pat that enforced as the riot such matters overlook spe- compliance, while Masiello made called ness with the strikes were by the cash. re cific demands and collected when Masiello’s demands Stickel certainly effort (as made no incidents Masiello mained But unsatisfied Hillman), from to conceal his alliance with Stickel testified to Gilnack just completeness he did In fact identi truckers. with which Stickel opposite; did so he advertised it and Masi fied himself and all with Masiello four-year continuously duration. knowledge for its ello’s such to the haulers course, passes credulity, Hillman, revealing Stick- conversation obvious It is el alone never heard of it. Hillman Hillman to the transfer haulers proper from the of the drivers to the local union and thorough shake- finally believed at the time therefor,- bonus working ly the two men were request downs consistent International many together. Knowing and the this Hickey Vice President let Masiello neat- so go where their activities rap incidents take free. and allow him ly their detriment of dovetailed to the rule To as matter of law that all victims, remained the idea Stickel not evidence for the Stick throughout ignorant blissfully is not to guilty knowledge depart el’s is to speedy grounds credited. of rational sense. common long case showed its practical in this verdict In the know affairs of life we quick result. sophisticated reaction to a common-sense power executives Judges than money more naive groups should ful are not so oblivious of including others, jurors. Notwithstand- passing eyes. before their Nick v. Unit *6 resting upon ing heavy the States, Cir., 660, 670, burdens the ed 138 122 F.2d diffi- 791, prosecution of the obvious because A.L.R. denied 314 U.S. certiorari testimony par- procuring 687, 302, 550, culties of rehear S.Ct. 86 L.Ed. victims, ing ticipants 411, and and Stickel’s 715, denied 314 U.S. S.Ct. avoiding many open mis- in 570, 316 shrewdness 86 L.Ed. 62 S.Ct. U.S. quite takes, as disclosed we find the case 86 L.Ed. 1776. ample support conviction. to complain Defendants there was reaching yet joint the conclusion not more evidence of or inte- grated judge But, by no error in action. the that the committed as disclosed sending jury, testimony, not the case to the we have these were individu- shrewd part the als and a of the their cited or stressed well-established success of conspiracy compart- here test for the to' was the careful rule determining mentalizing apply in in each. what rational activities of jury may course, conspirators per keep ferences of fact a Of tried to separate testimony distinct, to draw from the their roles with mitted is- Stick- generalities speaking only in same in civil and criminal el subtle cases3 necessarily later identified the driver as the does not ibly involve act vis- party. guilty Di Further in- criminal. If Re bad differences are witnessed by following extract, passing papers hand, of from hand dicated 332 U.S. to it page page- they 68 S.Ct. at 228: would not follow that he knew were at participation coupons, of in “An inference ration and if he saw that spiracy coupons, not seem to were ration it not does be sustained would follow peculiar by the facts to this case. that he know them to be counter- appeared ‘accompanies argument Indeed it one feit. the trial to require expert to an establish that fact. a crime rendezvous’ to cannot be Presumptions lightly bystander, of are not assumed enough to be a forceful indulged meetings.” circumstances, from mere in some far- is Valenti, meeting United States v. when F. is not secretive fetched Castro, suspicious 2d and United States v. in a hide-out but or broad daylight, plain sight passers-by, be taken as representative long public large city, of a street of line cases. and where alleged 'the substantive crime one which attempt To prosecution’s case ful death. some subtle dis because we view strong justify comparative re tinction sufficiently confuse this as ly simple problem question sult, are doctrines whatever nuances charge proper been applied. has the rule But since stated,4 differing applicable properly standards misunderstood and again if civil proper and criminal -cases.5 Both as to state it seems pects judge’s preliminary historic decision allowed its is to be —the charge now as to the facts and his later finders fact —as function as many jury having carefully Supreme by attend Court stressed — below, resulting Pennsylvania just cases, ed to convic such as Schulz Co., tions 608— must therefore be 350 U.S. R. own be accredited its it is to Affirmed. important responsibility proper as administration,

agency FRANK, Judge law (concurring). Circuit permitted infer to make such also be admittedly guilty 1. Masiello was data from the known ences deductions not, the substantive crime. He was as are common sense under the circum-. guilty however, of the sole crime for basic facts stances. And such will e., conspiracy which he was indicted —i. cases; vary to criminal from civil guilty with Stickel —unless Stickel was testimony speed position mute conspiring with Masiello. I think tire except of an automobile disclosed evidence, for one item —the that — suddenly ap although enough support judgment when the brakes are treads story plied government, will plaintiff not tell as to what for the were it the actually happened prosecu suit, in a criminal sup- in a civil does not suffice to manslaughter port agree tion for another a criminal conviction.1 IBut damages wrong personal injury damning one item is so Compare concurring opinion judge. declined to be uttered Castro, perpetuate develop United States v. F. effort these *7 807, 808, 2d which states that man a elaborate unserviceable definitions is a may put though one, to-day be chiefly to death even the trial useless serves to judge upper purposes court “are aid sure that of the tactician. It Wigmore no reasonable men his would believe that should abandoned:” on guilt proved,” 1940). e., (3d lias thus “be § i. Ed. Evidence It seems yond judge a reasonable doubt” —and thus turns even constructive to less force the expense wholly apply yard- the rule inside out at to indeterminate meaning. prelimin- deciding its stick ary himself in to question and otherwise clear-cut as to 5. opposite contrasting or here rule permissible inferences of fact what are prayed clear; for is made none too it requirement evidence. on the Such a judge deciding seems to bo that nothing justice add would either or what of fact inferences are rational judicial process, to trial convenience permissible testimony from the promote yield but would confusion and charge somehow himself witli the ulti- only vague, though undoubtedly best a given jury finding mate admonition against vigorous, claim of error the trial beyond proven a crime a reasonable doubt judge. normally inferences, so that rational example agree, marks, example, from the tire be- 1. I cannot for that it credulity “passes come irrational criminal cases. that Stickel alone never Wigmore’s this contention Dean common- heard” Masiello’s shake-downs which accomplished by attempts implied sense comment on various to Masiello threats' charge embroider the reasonable Stickel doubt that otherwise use his of pertinent: bring practice, is “In these fice to about strikes. detailed Often a amplifications usually agent successfully of the doctrine creates have crooked the- degenerated impression princi a into mere tool for counsel false pal that his innocent entrap judge party unwary in- desire is authorized to or has forgetfulness prec- of some obscure misdeeds. edent, or to save a cause for a new trial as to the incident when evidence by quibbling, appeal, Hillman over the Stickel told that Masiello “knew verbal propriety everything or turns out form of words uttered that Stickel knew” reasonably requires find jury that the criminal standard that could that guilty, judge Masiello, direct a for Stickel, verdict the ac- therefore judge reasonably cused if beyond doubt. thinks a reasonable that the for conviction is such particular for that it not Were might persuade jury it that a reasonable I dis testimony, For dissent. I would “preponderance” find that meets the it colleagues’ agree my that statement with “beyond-a- test does not meet the apply de “the test test, reasonable-doubt” and that his fail- termining what rational do ure to so reversible error. constitutes permitted to draw jury fact a Contrary my colleagues’ critical com- testimony civil is same from the ment, those courts do not hold that the cases,” and the statement and criminal judge may trial decide whether de- Feinberg, United States guilty beyond fendant a reasonable “that A.L.R. doubt. Those courts do hold necessary send of evidence standard judge should direct a verdict the ac- in both the same a case to cused, judge reasonably if the thinks concur cases”. In a criminal civil and that a reasonable could not find Castro, ring opinion in States v. guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt. my rea I stated disagreeing thesis. sons for suggested3 (I It has been think cor my desirable, col because I think rectly) (a) “by that the civil standard — leagues’ the emphatic of that reiteration preponderance” that the infer —means (and, case, amplify instant sis in the ences are such as to modify)2a my respect, com in one persuade that the occurrence of an es case.2b the Castro ments in likely probable was more sential fact legal part non-occurrence, (b) our than is a vaunted government’s proof “beyond in the criminal that the tradition reasonable test — persuasive case must be more doubt”—means a criminal those inferences case, e., proof plaintiff’s civil i. are such as to in a convince that the than occur while, case, a rence of an essential civil to sustain fact was much likely probable proof verdict, plaintiff’s must be than its non-occur evidence,” Recently, Denning, J., “preponderance in a rence. an unusu n ally English government plain- explained judge, able ease in an opinion prove “be- differences in tiff must defendant’s burden of proof case, yond as follows: In a doubt.” In a civil civil a reasonable the evi judge reasonably dence need gree have the trial “reasonable de *8 probability”; of the favorable if “the evidence most siders evidence such that plaintiff say, is tribunal can is such that a reason- ‘We probable persuaded it jury not,’ think than would not be able discharged, “pre- but, is proba burden if the that evidence meets the find that equal, standard, judge it ponderance” are is not.” In the trial bilities a crim n should case, go a inal guilty, before case defendant is not allow the found evidence jury “the need not direct a verdict reach should for the cer but tainty carry high Many courts, including degree but it must a sev- defendant. probability. against appeal, If the of have held eral federal courts infra, scrutiny, think, quite 2a. footnote 8. See I careful entirely interpre- capable innocent Castro, previously I 2b. As said I had tation. acquiesced in that thesis. proof no whatever is of Stickel’s Morgan, Some Problems of Evidence participation in the shake-downs that the (1956) For a 84^-85. somewhat similar haulers believed that “the two victimized statement, McBaine, see Burden working together.” men were Degrees Belief, Proof: 32 Calif.L. (1944). Hickey Kev. I refer my opinion. colleagues’ reported in proves strong a re- believes the evidence the ac- so to leave a man is guilty beyond can cused a reasonable possibility in his favour which mote jury sentence, doubt. If the ‘Of finds ac- then dismissed with guilty, judge cused a possible, not the least must enter is but course it judgment conviction, sending beyond proved a probable,’ is the case jail nothing despite man to doubt, short of to his but reasonable death — judge This, think, the fact that the feels certain will suffice.”4 jury that a Supreme when it reasonable could have meant Court what the had no more than ac- said, a belief that in Holland v. guilt 127, 130, proved cused’s had been S.Ct. U.S. * * * preponderance actions the evidence. “Unlike civil L.Ed. always prove prosecution must put succinctly, To even if the charge beyond reasonable judge no jury has doubt * * * government must doubt. reasonably comply cannot with his * * * prove every of- element acquit admonition that it must un- though beyond doubt a reasonable fense guilty less it finds the accused be- certainty.” mathematical yond not to a e., a reasonable doubt—i. if he has no doubt that a reasonable view,5 Departing earlier from its jury guilt by could find no more years ago, Circuit, contrived its some preponderance than a of the evi- doctrine,5a is as follows: own judge dence—nevertheless the judge (a) re- The trial commits jury verdict, let the return a if if, error in criminal case versible that verdict is adverse to the ac- charge, fails to tell the cused, judge may properly that, jury find ac- in order to set aside the verdict and enter a they guilty, must conclude cused judgment acquittal. guilt proved be- that his has Thus in this Circuit the reasonable- yond doubt. a reasonable significance standard doubt has no what- (b) But the trial commits judge; ever for the its sole function is failing to di- error no reversible part jury. as a of the instructions to the accused, verdict for rect a So, in Castro, Cir., United States v. entering judgment of ac- in not majority opinion (after quittal a verdict adverse rejected theory “that the accused is accused), (1) if he thinks that protection greater to a entitled than that reasonably could reasonable must be told that must not preponderates the evidence believe have fair doubt of the government’s favor, even accused,” added, “whether reasonably (2) feels that a sure in all the doctrine the circuits we need jury could reasonable not believe inquire, thoroughly for it is the es- proves accused that the evidence doctrine in tablished this circuit that the guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. only difference between a civil action In such he must let the case prosecution a criminal is in the in- *9 go jury provided he to given jury that must struction to — charge includes in his the statement jury] that must [the be convinced acquit unless that the must beyond all fair doubt.” 1947, Pensions, See, 2 4. v. Minister of g., Wishnatzki, Miller e. States v. 2 United Engl.L.Reports, Cir., 357, 372. All 360; F.2d 77 United States v. Silva, 2 109 F.2d 531. g., See, v. 5. e. Fraina United words, present In other Second Cir- 28, Cir., 255 F. 35. crystallize fully cuit doctrine did not until fairly recently. beginning It 5a. Even after tlie enunciation became fixed first doctrine,” Valenti, Circuit this court in 1943 with United “Second States v. Cir., 134 to its earlier view. F.2d sometimes reverted proof by doctrine,”6 preponderance. a I with but See Circuit This “Second Helvering 391, Mitchell, also 397, v. 303 U.S. reduces the crimi- erroneous. think 405-406, 630, 403, L.Ed. S.Ct. than a verbal to little more standard nal ritual, includ- of words ceremonial set a charge. appears judge’s This ed think, court, This I has not heretofore statement, this court’s attempted explain the reason for to Valenti, Cir., doctrine, except States Fein in United States v. proof “requirement be- berg, 154 A.L. to a direction yond doubt is reasonable dis R. “refused to where court jury” be accorded which “cannot tinguish between the evidence which gen- than as a quantitative value other satisfy men, and the should reasonable cautionary admonition.” satisfy eral reasonable evidence which should beyond doubt”, men a reasonable because judge, if, for the If that be correct— long “in them is run the line between test, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt can day day for The rea greater too thin use.” “quantitative value” no have soning dis test, thus seems to be that “preponderance” and there than the tinction too to be understood tenuous may test use the criminal he not fore practically applied anyone, ei pre-verdict post-verdict either reasoning juries.6a judges ther That jury then, if the check — certainly my implicit in more than easily is may guilty, we the accused finds colleagues’ ease statement in the instant judge let where the have a case “tell one that the same evidence cannot although he is sure stand the verdict story happened as to in a criminal what reasonably guilt have could not manslaughter prosecution an for by anything proved more than a damages personal injury for ox- other preponderance of the evidence. wrongful death”—a statement according doctrine, short, a crim saying amounts the two stand necessarily not conviction does inal actually identical, ards are albeit guilt adjudication beyond an mean identically. assume, worded I shall doubt, well mean ad reasonable moment, rate for the is a that that judication which can reason interpretation correct of this court’s rea only. preponderance ably One soning. assumption, suppose On that easily reconcile that doctrine too cannot juror, A this: who had earlier served Commissioner, 2 Mitchell v. judge, civil asks the trial aft this court held that F.2d 873. There given charge er he has in a criminal action, acquittal of Mitchell in a criminal case: “Is thex-e a difference we must tax, attempt evade a did for wilful ‘preponderance observe between a judicata res constitute Mitchell’s ‘beyond and Suppose evidence’ a x-easonable later, in civil action before favor when doubt’?” were to sought Appeals, Board of Tax say, Suppose juror “Yes.” were liability civil United States avoid ask, you sitting “If then to were as a very pay the tax failure to same juror, you always, if the issues evade, intent a lia with fraudulent same, were the arrive at the very ver bility upon same founded same evi regardless dict, gave whether the case was as its reason This court dence. my civil or criminal?” colleagues If one of holding acquittal two for so judge, were the trial then adjudication ac merely proof cording doctrine, to the Second Circuit to overcome all rea was not sufficient the, would, fairness, 'guilt think have to re of the ac doubt of: sonable ply, any. “Yes. I am unable to see cused, intel- *10 was therefore not at odds infra, point 5, I shall discuss justification 6a. an alter- .label will be The interpretation explanation. native majority of this opinion, found not in -the headnote, but in the States v. .United7 . Castro, Cir., 2 228 F.2d 80

289 distinguish ju- it eumstantial evidence” ligible practical difference.” “Well, from inquire, “direct evidence.” alert, ror, then if why, difference, in a crim- no is A testimonial involves an inference charge give you case, aus do inal credibility; evaluation of witnesses’ charge case?” in a civil from the varies once a fact is inferred on of a the basis sug- colleagues my two leave it to inference, any testimonial rivately then fact de- gest response. (i. e., from inferred fact import considering 4. When evidence”) “circumstantial will in doctrine, present it is nec- this circuit’s and of itself involve no evaluation keep essary, in mind order to credibility. jury re- functions spectively, [Because no one testifies to a fact thus distinguish different two derivatively inferred, it is sometimes my kinds inferences: fact,” or, colleagues called a “mute When, (a) in a witness put it, “mute evidence.” It has been fact, the of a testifies to occurrence derivatively said that fact thus in- may properly him, in- jury, if belives ferred, e., evidence,” i. “circumstantial fact occurrence of that fer the singularly reliable, is therefore so inference, testimony. based Such that a fact to which some di- witness testimony, directly “testimonial is a rectly testified, because “circumstances primary (or in- a direct inference” ference). cannot lie.” That cannot be correct: entirely jury’s on the It rests inference, The testimonial from which credibility reliability—of belief — derivatively inferred, such is it- fact testimony A wit- witness: some self derives from of witness directly a fact which ness has testified to may who have lied or a mistake made believing him, takes as a fact. jury, memory in observation or or in re- is Accordingly, oft- inference such an port memory. at the trial of his “It “direct evi- (misleadingly) called en seems,” Wills, said “to have been over- 6b dence.” * * * looked that circumstances in- (b) proved by testimony; From one or more testimonial human be although ferences, however, lie,’ inferences further ‘circumstances cannot may may; that, facts other wit- the occurrence of them like narrators e., drawn, facts, they may as to exist- i. bi- of other nesses * * *”7a concerning facts or occurrence or mistaken “Grant- ence ased Any lie, in- ing has such testified. which no cannot witnesses that facts convenience, report ference, be de- can and them may,” Burill, “derivative an “indirect” or said Circumstantial Evi- scribed as (1868) Often it is labelled “cir- 223.] dence inference.” (i. e. evidence”), misleading. “circumstantial enees is For 6b. “Direct evidence” past Stephen, jurors see, g., do not see or hear e. Introduction to The past 46; events; events, (1872), learn those Evidence Act Indian 41 — (3rd hand, principally Wigmore, ed.) from the Evidence Section tes- second Katingo 25; timony American Tobacco Co. of witnesses. put evidence, jipatera, document 194 F.2d When Had authenticity 451; usually is based on testi- B. v. Universal Camera N. L. R. (con mony. Corp., so “real evidence” Even called Corp. curring opinion); impliedly vouched for a witness. A Wabash v. Ross demeanor, Corp., called “de- 601- sometimes Electric witness’ evidence,” opinion); Maine, Village (dissenting meanor affects the “testimonial 1881) 317-318; (4th ed. drawn from witness’ testi- inference” Communities Frank, Death, mony. of Sickness and Short (1951). 559-564 N.Y.U.L.Rev. important 7. For nature dis- Wills, (or (Fifth 7a. Evidence between “testimonial” “di- Circumstantial tinction evidence”) Eng. 1905) notes, American “derivative” infer- ed. with rect *11 290 sup- any testimony case, will a credible which or a civil In a criminal determining port jury’s the verdict. judge, in

federal trial may grant trial, a new whether to determining Although, in whether parts his own or disbelief sider belief judgment direct a verdict or to enter testimony may draw his thus of the notwithstanding verdict, the trial But, inferences. own testimonial judge rely should never on his own tes- granting trial, judge does not a new (since, pur- timonial inferences for such merely case; the de- he leaves decide the poses, question of witness’ credibili- jury. cision to another ty jury), nevertheless, is for inquire any however, determining, should whether whether asserted de- In defendant, inference, support rivative in a essential a verdict for the direct a may verdict, judge When, case, is irrational: civil a civil or criminal case, credibility any inference, properly an asserted of derivative consider the constituting may proper- witnesses, e., component an essential i. of of the inferences, party, irrational, for ly rely a verdict on his own testimonial drawing judge should in- direct a verdict for ad- of those but must leave the versary, or, against verdict, jury. Arid, after verdict after that ad- ferences to versary, judgment accept jury’s in- enter a n. o. v. in his testimonial he must In favor.9 a criminal if an as- when he determines whether ferences judgment serted irrational n. o. derivative inference is civil case to enter a a guilt, judge essential verdict of enter a in a criminal case to v. whether or, guilty judgment acquittal despite must direct a for verdict the accused guilt, making judgment after is, verdict enter deter- verdict.8 That such acquittal. minations, judge accept findings judge, my concurring opinion trial insofar as 8. In in United States Castro, Cir., 807, consist of testimonial 809-810, 2 based on v. 228 F. I testimony orally-testifying witnesses in a intimated criminal case tried judge judge whose demeanor the trial observed. a trial to a properly can sometimes upper may reject any But court direct a verdict on the basis of judge’s the trial rational incredibility in derivative his own evaluation government ferences if other alternative de rational witnesses. That intimation open. See, g., probably erroneous; rivative inferences are e. cf. Katingo Renda, Cir., American Tobacco Co. v. The Hadjipatera, v. 2 States 56 F.2d 601. Cir., 451; 2 194 F.2d However, respect a distinction in this Reinhard, Cir., E. F. Drew v. 2 & Co. 170 conceivably might be made between a 679, 684; F. 2d re Kellett Aircraft a civil ease in the federal Corp., Cir., 197, 200; 3 186 F.2d Wabash Amendment, courts: The Seventh Corp. Corp., Cir., v. Ross Electric solely cases, relates to civil contains the (dissenting opinion); F.2d 601-603 jury, provision that “no fact tried Higgins, Cir., 537; v. Orvis be otherwise re-examined in shall Prince, cf. Gindorff 189 F.2d than Court of the United accord- 897. ing to the rules the common law.” up- true an Whether same is when Amendment, which The Sixth relates per findings reviews court of a trial solely cases, to criminal contains no such judge sitting ain criminal case without a provision. perhaps pos- is therefore yet jury, considered, has not so far argue that, in a sible to criminal case good I know. see no reason for judge jury, (or the trial even tried difference. appeal) upper court on has a wider upper different when an The rule is examining power facts, ben- the rational federal court reviews deriva defendant, therefore efit of a federal tive inferences administra reject patently which seems agency. N. L. R. B. tive See v. Universal Appeal Shapiro, Criminal Cf. false. Corp., 190 F.2d Camera Sys- and The Federal Judicial the Facts opinion); (concurring N. L. R. B. v. (1939) tem, Ill.L.Rev. Co., 490; Dinion Coil Broadcasting case upper v. Allentown civil tried cf. F. C. C. In a federal jury, (ex Corp., court must 349 U.S. without a accept cept circumstances) unusual 99 L.Ed. 1147. .the

291 apply determinations, in a crimi- fed- the same rule making Does such judge, “weigh in such nal case? Must the trial the evi- judge does not trial eral case, apply de- test to such a same he considers that in the sense dence” However, (“circumstantial evi- rivative credibility. inference he questions of dence”) permissible as in civil Is the differ- case? whether must determine ence standards —as to between two plus rational inferences testimonial degree probability the tively of a deriva- (i. e., “direct” inferences derivative (“circumstantial evidence) inferred fact evi- are plus the “circumstantial” ig- dence”) judge for a case out to make —one sufficient says now nore? take over Second Circuit jury. doing, not he does In so say, Many I Yes. other courts No. jury’s function.10 think correct. the latter answer point, all the Up I think to this 5. assumed, supra, I that this court’s agree (although the courts federal explanation of the reason for its doc varies). Cir- The Second phraseology intelligible, practical, trine is that no disagrees however, with others cuit difference exists between the two standa cerning applicable, in a crim- rule colleagues Perhaps, however, my rds.11 distinguished from a civil inal say they that what mean is that following situation: yet difference exists it is too testimony justifying (a) There is judges, juries, for tenuous for inferences, (b) par-A some testimonial explanation understand it. Such (i. e., “cir- inference derivative ticular comprehend: jurors find difficult If evidence”), drawn from cumstantial tests, can differentiate two cannot inferences, is essential those testimonial judges? judges in Federal other cir (c) party, That de- for one to a verdict thought apparently so, cuits have rational, e., i. on inference rivative apply possible have found it inference, occur- the basis of that reversing criminal when criminal test may in- essential fact rence of an convictions.12 Are the district and cir although rationally, no one has ferred singu judges cuit in the Second Circuit fact, support (d) testified to larly obtuse? (“direct in the testimonial case, supra As I said the Castro evidence”) for that derivative inference Supreme [228 F.2d does 809] Court e., (i. that “circumstantial evi- judges engage not deem unable “to dence”) that the occurrence of is such drawing. requires such similar line It probable inferred fact is than judge perform when feat non-occurrence, but is not much more jury. sits a criminal case without a probable. civil case of In a judge requires a to make a not unlike judge sort, should not direct a ver- pro- denaturalization distinction properly, ceeding after ver- (which judge-tried); dict—and de- judgment government dict, n. o. v.—at vari- enter cision for the such a case a derivative with such inference if ance will be reversed it rests measuring (i. e., merely up “circumstantial evi- to the standard of dence”). preponderance evidence.13 Con- 324, 329; Cooper course, States, Cir., trial 10. Of a federal does 10 64 F.2d U.S.App.D.C. States, 343, a verdict for the defendant in a v. 94 direct United judgment 39; States, ease and enters 218 F.2d Friedus v. United ac- judgment 598; appealable. U.S.App.D.C. cordingly, his is not Rodriguez power States, “abuse” his thus without v. United He can possibility of F.2d 820-821. reversal. Feinberg, v. 11. States United Baumgartner States, v. United 592, 594, 154 A.L.R. 272. 1525; 1240, 88 L.Ed. 64 S.Ct. U.S. States, g., See, v. United v. United U.S. e. Chicco Schneiderman 434; 87 L.Ed. 1796. Parnell 284 F. *13 * * * pable degree probab judge-tried in difference also a suit sider ility.17 instrument; establish a in such lost cases, several kinds other My colleagues say18 that, under judge’s trial will decision be reversed adhere, rule to which “nor- those courts * proof * * unless the ‘clear and convinc- mally rational inferences be- ing’ case, (or like).14 patent In a come irrational in criminal judge’s prior decision use of the as cases.” all. Not at What those courts patented must be reversed unless device hold, analyze opinions, as I their is that proof leaves no reasonable doubt.”15 rationally a crucial fact inferred a (i. e., derivative inference a fact crucial support position, my To col- their testified) to which (1) no one has suffic- leagues mention, illustrative, as a case if, es to sustain a verdict in a civil case “speed where “the as to evidence” on inference, the basis of that oc- position of an automobile” is “disclosed currence probable of that fact is more by the treads when the are sud- brakes non-occurrence, than its (2) does denly applied.” colleagues, My as above suffice to sustain a verdict in a crimi- noted, say that such evidence cannot nal case unless the occurrence of that sensibly story “tell as to what actu- derivatively crucial a, inferred is fact ally prosecution happened in criminal probable much more than its non-oc- manslaughter for and another for dam- currence. ages injury wrongful personal for such, not, rephrase Perhaps civil, To death.” in a case: the rule: In a as testimony (a) If as well as in action, judge, there is to the tire a criminal that, testimony e., photo- on a marks —i. a defendant’s motion for a directed graph verdict, competently of those marks was must ascertain whether accurately made or near “substantial” support evidence to plaintiff’s verdict; when collided or reaching time two cars a car in jury’s'testi- clusion, into a man-^-then the credibility ran he must assume the monial inference of existence of of testimony the witnesses whose favors questioned by plaintiff, marks the the those cannot be and he must then decide (b) support judge.16 such a whether the With testimonial for evidence n inference, (“circumstan- ra- derivative the difference between a inference evidence”), tial derivative inference in a civil and essential tional to a verdict for plaintiff, “substantial”; but, criminal case—the difference in the in a degree probability might impal- higher because of — jury proof-burden, pable for and the both the the word “substantial” meaning extraordinary has a (except in most circum- different from its mean- ing imagine). stances, in a hard civil case.19 But in the Wherefore it will cite, prop appellate not do to federal where other for instances the Sec- doctrine, following Circuit have distinction .ond made a between courts from eases, States, 239, Pierce pal- and criminal there was 252 civil U.S. “weighing Chappell, evidence,” exist 14. This court so held in Cullen v. and that “weighing” talk of 2 116 F.2d 1017. this context relies misleading most what meta- Deering Works, Harvester 15. v. Winona phor. Corp., v. Jo Ann See Larson Cab 118, 15 S.Ct. U.S. L.Ed. . 929. F.2d 153 18. 5. See their footnote above, Except, -granting noted 16. (as distinguished granting new trial Gyp 19. Cf. United v. United States States judgment verdict or ac- a directed Co., D.C., F.Supp. 613, 629, 632, sum quittal v.). n. o. approval Curley cited with v. United U.S.App.D.C. States, case, supra, 389, Castro As I said grant application Cooper neither v. United I certainty, U.S.App.D.C. yields standard' that -no scales 251-252, 64 L.Ed. submit the court would have held being a derivative inference drawn from the “There substantial 542: charges, support same would have been sub- court enough support peremptorily stantial a verdict erred if it had would have *14 plaintiff.20 any acquittal upon the an directed question ef- The whether the counts. My colleagues surprisingly cite, over- fect of the evidence was such support position, of their Schulz v. Penn was doubt come reasonable sylvania Co., R. 350 U.S. court, jury, the to decide.” for not the negligence a civil for action found It should noted that the Court wrongful death under E. L. A. There F. there was “substantial evidence.” testimony, plaintiff, jus the favorable to said, Moreover, previously the Court had reported by tified testimonial page 250, page 252 U.S. at at S.Ct. Supreme the Court as follows: 202, the evidence was “abundant.” Day 1949, On Christmas at about 5:15 suggest all ab- Court did not at P.M., deceased, reported Schulz, for meaning sence a difference job H, City, Jersey work on his at Pier “substantial” evidence in a criminal Jersey, assigned New was and to work distinguished from a civil case. tugboats by on four docked side side Consider, instance, for Parnell v. immediately there. He went to cheek States, United 64 F.2d waiting change the boats without rehearing where on the court held that working from his street to his clothes. the trial should have directed a Returning alongside pier tugs accused, verdict in favor of one of the o’clock, reported about seven Schulz Hays, charged conspira- with criminal checking he had finished his and was cy. question The court said the basic going change now back to the boats to Hays partner was whether was a proceed his work clothes and his co-defendant, Parnell, merely an em- other duties there. He was last sefen ployee. that, It concluded evi- since the walking alive in the direction of the theory was dence with the consistent tug. supervisor nearest At 1:25 A.M. a employee, that he was an was not error found Schulz was not on the boats. His to direct a for him. verdict reach- hanging upper street clothes were ing conclusion, this the Court summariz- engine tug where room attendants “Hays ed as follows: usually changed pack- clothes. His lunch helped operate construct and still on age tugs was also there. Three of the Slade, the Tidwell Farm. With one he wholly unlighted at all were times surety became a on the bail bond of Jake dark; partially by one was illuminated Strieber, charged who was vio- with the pier. spotlights night from the was prohibitory laws; liquor lation of the above cold —10 zero —and there was he, Muse, with Parnell and one was also tugs. ice some Because the com- surety on the bond of Jake Bock enough pany did have workers that still, was interested in the Tidwell night perform properly to making duties negro was active in bond required, try Cuba, were Schulz had employed named who had been tugs by still, of all four charged take care himself. both with a violation step liquor Suppose do this he had to from laws.” To one boat this had against Hays except been a civil suit another the dark for such in which plaintiff’s illumination as case limited turned on could obtain whether flashlight. Hays partner was enterprise; Several weeks after 39; Rodriguez 20. For C. 218 F.2d other v. instances reversals United States, 232 F.2d 819. convictions where I think it See also clear Silva, Cir., v. results have been United States otherwise (as previously noted) dvil, see, g., had the suits been decided before e. United Litberg, 20; fully States v. the Second Circuit doctrine had Cooper crystallized. U.S.App.D. compelled his to draw disappeared it would not have been from the boats Schulz very ‘The body near ad- such inferences. For essence found in the water was nothing among jacent its function is select from pier. He was clothed colleagues, flashlight conflicting My was inferences’ ”. shorts socks. A effect, that, defend- He was in conclude if the had drowned. hand. He in the Schulz case were indicted alcohol when ant not under the influence of manslaughter, boat, and if at the trial he did commit he came to the by suicide, play, evidence were introduced no same was foul prosecutor, Supreme He a ca- Court would accident. met his death experienced who had hold that same derivative inference pable workman defendant, support convic- employed for sev- would the defendant’s *15 seriously years. a I most doubt that con- directed tion. eral The trial I We affirm- clusion. would entertain same verdict for the defendant. gov- ground plaintiff had been the 222 F.2d 540—on doubt ed —2 reasonably prosecuting the inferred ernment defendant it not be could & P. U. death crime in Tennant v. Peoria that Schulz’s a Ry., from the 29, 409, by proximately 88 L.Ed. default 321 U.S. caused “was Kurn, 520, v. part The Su- or in Lavendar U.S. of the defendant.” on the 916, holding reversed, 740, inor preme that the 90 L.Ed. S.Ct. Court Co., York, R. H. H. jury deriva- v. New N. & have made reasonable Cahill could reversing to sustain 350 U.S. S.Ct. tive inferences sufficient Wigmore plaintiff. For as The Court said: 224 F.2d 637. verdict for 2498): (Evidence, “In certainly puts it find Section men could “Fair-minded the extreme caution and civil cases foregoing facts that defendant from the persuasion positiveness re- unusual negligent requiring Schulz was not obtain.” quired criminal cases do icy dark, underman- work on these could reasonable men And ned boats. higher requiring reason for discovery of Schulz’s from also find probability in a criminal standard flashlight grip- body with a half-robed course, is, criminal con- case slipped from ped hand that in his entails far conse- viction serious unlighted tug groped about in the as he judgment. quences than a civil If the attempting perform his du- darkness responsibility judges abandon de- took this below But the courts ties. termining juries whether reasonable possi- because of from case find derivative could might bility have fallen that Schulz evidence”) (“circumstantial meet spot happened particular where there higher standard, I think cut might ice, have fallen or that oft-repeated that, to be no out our boast heart partially illum- jailed land, put one boat that from no man can or in this lights. government Doubtless the proof shore inated unless death (had found court have so could beyond has established of his function) perform it allowed doubt.21 reasonable opinion). (concurring For that repeat what I said 21. I States obliged reason, I civil suits feel while Castro, 2 810: v. of this court recent decisions follow criminal action involves a man’s “Since g., disagree, see, my concurring e. ought liberty, not, in we such an life O. opinion & in Rieser v. Baltimore sanctity R. action, much to stare de accord Co., Cir., precedent I feel F.2d free by adhering ato favora cisis any of our decisions prosecutor, dissent if we now consider ble to n rules adverse markedly unreasonable, on established undesirable, based crime, when I think those unjust. accused discussion and citations in See unjust.” Scully, Cir., rules United States

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Phillip Masiello and Francis Lester Stickel
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Oct 22, 1956
Citation: 235 F.2d 279
Docket Number: 19-3985
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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