UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Philip Michael SEBOLT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14-4547.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Decided: Feb. 3, 2015.
Submitted: Jan. 27, 2015.
Martin also was not informed that the detective suspected him of illegal activity. Further, the type and degree of questions posed did not, as the district court found, “rise above a level of routine questioning in light of [Martin‘s] comment and circumstances.” Based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, as directed by the factors listed in Mendenhall, we conclude that the encounter between Martin and Leonard was not a seizure, but rather a consensual encounter that did not “trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (“[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.“).
Martin contends that his encounter with the officer is similar to that in United States v. Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 295-99 (4th Cir.2012), in which we determined that a seizure occurred based on the fact that uniformed officers in a police vehicle followed Jones’ car on the streets and into an apartment complex, blocked Jones’ vehicle from leaving, and immediately asked Jones and his companion to lift their shirts to show that they were unarmed, provide identification and grant permission for a pat down search. Jones, 678 F.3d at 295-99. We disagree. Here, unlike in Jones, Martin was not aware of the officers’ presence until after the vehicle he was riding in had stopped at the motel. His means of exit was not blocked by the officers. Additionally, Detective Leonard‘s inquiries of Martin concerning why he was in the parking lot and why he pulled all the way to the back parking lot, were not as confrontational and accusatory as the officers’ initial requests in Jones that the defendant lift his shirt to show whether he possessed a weapon.
Martin also contends that an unlawful seizure occurred when Detective Martin informed him that he called Martin‘s probation officer and that the probation officer was on his way to the motel. As the district court found, this occurred almost simultaneously with the discovery that Anderson, Martin‘s companion, was in possession of the illegal pills. We find no seizure and no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s denial of the motion to suppress and affirm Martin‘s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.
Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Thomas K. Johnstone IV, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Philip Michael Sebolt appeals the life sentence imposed following his conviction for advertising child pornography, in violation of
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, including improper calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration of the
Where the sentencing court imposed a variant sentence, we determine “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A substantial departure must “be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. However, we “must defer to the trial court and can reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable,” even if the sentence would not have been our choice. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir.2008).
Sebolt first argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider a departure under
Sebolt also argues that the court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. He asserts that the court placed improper emphasis on its assessment of his future dangerousness and the need to protect the public from future crimes. He also asserts that the court improperly relied on a letter Sebolt wrote to another inmate expressing his intention to continue molesting children upon release from imprisonment, given that he is expected to serve an additional fifty years imprisonment and the fact that his statement may have been mere exaggeration or boasting.
We find these arguments unpersuasive. The fact that the court strongly emphasized Sebolt‘s future dangerousness and the need to protect the public as a sentencing factor does not render the sentence unreasonable. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 476 (4th Cir.2007). Nor is the substantial extent of the variance sufficient to render the sentence unreasonable where the court‘s thorough
In sentencing Sebolt, the court conducted a thorough, individualized assessment of the offense and Sebolt‘s history and characteristics, in light of the
AFFIRMED.