United States v. Peter A. MakresUnited States v. Peter A. Makres
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The issues in this case are (1) whether the trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing a juror for tardiness, and (2) whether the defendant may be convicted and cumulatively punished for both (a) possessing stolen mail and (b) uttering United States Treasury checks containing forged endorsements, when the stolen mail possessed consists of the Treasury checks. We answer both questions in favor of the prosecution and affirm.
A six count indictment was returned against defendant Makres charging him in three counts with possession of stolen mail on three specified dates, in violation of
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence showed the following facts: Makres opened an account under the name of Consolidated Investment Development II at the Harris Bank and Trust Company of Chicago on May 26,1976. During May, June, and July of that year he deposited approximately $64,000 into the account and withdrew the entire amount in cash, closing the account in August 1976. On June 7,15, and 17,1976, Makres deposited United States Treasury checks payable to persons other than himself into the account. These checks had been placed in the mail but had never been received by the addressee-payees; nor had any of the latter authorized Makres to possess the checks. Each check bore the forged signature of the payee. Siakres’ fingerprints were found on at least two of the checks.
The jury found Makres guilty under all six counts. The court sentenced him to incarceration for fifteen years: five years on each of the three possession counts, the sentences to run concurrently, and ten years on each of the uttering counts, the sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentences on the possession counts.
I.
Makres contends that the district court committed reversible error in discharging a juror who was late on the second day of the trial. Before trial, the parties stipulated in writing as follows:
After trial herein has commenced, a maximum of (not more than) two jurors may, if required, be excused from the full pan *1074 el of twelve by reason of illness or other good cause as determined by this Court.
At the conclusion of the first day of trial, the judge told the jury that the trial would resume at 1:00 p. m. the following day and admonished them to be on time. All the jurors except one arrived by the appointed hour. The judge waited until 1:25 p. m. and then decided to discharge the late juror and proceed with the remaining eleven. Before doing so, however, the judge attempted to communicate with the juror by telephone at her home and at her place of employment. The home telephone had been disconnected, and the employer stated that it was the juror’s day off. There was of course no way for the judge to know when, if ever, the missing juror would appear. As it turned out, she arrived about ten minutes after the trial had resumed.
Counsel for Makres objected to proceeding without the juror, arguing that the court should wait until the juror was one hour late. When the court overruled the objection, a motion for mistrial was made and denied.
Defendant relies principally upon the first opinion in United States v. Rodriguez, 564 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977), which held that the trial judge had erred in discharging a juror for tardiness and proceeding without the juror. On rehearing, the court in Rodriguez reversed itself and affirmed the conviction. United States v. Rodriguez, 573 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978). In so doing, the court followed United States v. Domenech, 476 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840, 94 S.Ct. 95, 38 L.Ed.2d 77 (1973), which held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in discharging a juror who was only ten minutes late on the day the court was to instruct the jury and who had appeared shortly after the trial had resumed without her.
We agree with these decisions of other circuits and find no abuse of discretion here. Judge Kirkland did not act precipitously, but made an effort to determine whether the juror was en route. From the information received, the judge could not determine whether the juror would appear at all. How long to wait under these circumstances was for the judge’s discretion. His decision was well within reason.
II.
Makres next contends that the district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for violations of
A.
The cases to which we look for guidance on the statutory interpretation issue begin with
Prince v. United States,
352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957), which held that a bank robber could not be punished cumulatively for two offenses defined in
Separate provisions of a single section of Title 18 were also involved in
Milanovich v. United States,
365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961). There the Court held that theft of government property in violation of the first paragraph of
When two crimes are defined in a single section of the code, usually their interrelationship will have been considered by Congress, and therefore the legislative intent is more readily assessed than it is when two separate sections are involved. When both are found in the same section, it is not unreasonable to expect to find in the legislative history some affirmative expression of an intent to punish for both if such an intent exists.
Cf. United States v. Gilbert,
553 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1977) (charges under
Neither the legislative history nor the structure and relationship of the statutory provisions are as likely to yield helpful indications of Congressional intent when separate sections are involved. Congress can hardly be expected, each time it considers a proposed criminal statute, to reexamine Title 18 to find other provisions that may under some circumstances be violated by the conduct prohibited in the bill under consideration. If, however, the two see *1076 tions “are addressed to the same concern and designed to combat the same problem,” Simpson v. United States, supra, 435 U.S. at 10, 98 S.Ct. at 911, Congress may consider the relationship of the two provisions and give some indication of whether punishment should be cumulative. See id. at 13— 14, 98 S.Ct. 909.
When one of two distinct crimes defined in a single section is also proscribed in another and cumulation of punishment under the single section would be impermissible, the prosecution has not been allowed to evade the rule by resort to the other section.
United States
v.
O’Neil,
436 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1970), involved a prosecutorial attempt to cumulate punishment for the armed robbery of a customs officer. Receiving and retaining was charged under
United States v. Seals,
545 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1976), is similar. There this court held that consecutive sentences under
We find this distinction too tenuous to override the strong policy manifested by Heflin and Miianovich not to convict upon two offenses when the robber is found in possession of the same goods he has stolen.
545 F.2d at 29 n.3. 3 The case at bar involves neither that policy nor prosecutorial resort to another section of the code in an effort to accomplish cumulation that would otherwise be impermissible.
In
Simpson v. United States, supra,
the defendant was convicted and sentenced under
The merger rationale of
Prince
and
Gad-dis
has been applied in a series of cases involving convictions and sentences for both possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and distribution of a controlled substance both in violation of
The merger concept is inapplicable in the case at bar. Neither
The gravamen of the [entering] offense is not in the act of entering Rather the heart of the crime is the intent to steal. This mental element merges into the completed crime if the robbery is consummated.
*1078
Prince v. United States, supra,
352 U.S. at 328, 77 S.Ct. at 407. The mental element necessary for possession of stolen mail under
In short, none of the circumstances that have been held to preclude cumulation are present. Neither the government nor Makres cites any relevant legislative history or other evidence of congressional intent; our research has revealed none. The two statutes are found in different parts of Title 18 and, while that fact is not dispositive, there is nothing to suggest any relationship between them. No single statute deals with both, so O’Neil and Seals are inapplicable.
Makres also relies on
Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), in which the Court held that the interstate transportation of two women in one automobile trip constituted only one violation of the Mann Act,
Similarly, Makres’ reliance on
U. S. v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp.,
344 U.S. 218, 73 S.Ct. 227, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952), is misplaced. There the Court held that § 15 of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
B.
There remains the question of whether cumulation of the two offenses violates the double jeopardy clause. In this case, involving, as it does, only consecutive sentences and not successive prosecutions, the question is answered by applying the Block-burger test. See Brown v. Ohio, supra, 432 U.S. at 166 n.6, 97 S.Ct. 2221.
In
Blockburger
the two offenses arising out of a single transaction were (1) selling narcotics in a package other than the original stamped package in violation of § 1 of the Harrison Narcotic Act, 38 Stat. 785, as amended,
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.
284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. Both convictions and sentences were therefore affirmed. See also Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785-786 n.17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed .2d 616 (1975).
This court applied the
Blockburger
rule in
United States v. Marzano,
537 F.2d 257, 273
*1079
(7th Cir.)
cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 734, 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1976), in sustaining convictions under
The
Blockburger
test is satisfied in the case at bar. Not only does each statute require proof of a fact the other does not, but, in fact, either of the offenses for which Makres was convicted can be proved without establishing any of the elements necessary to conviction for the other. The charge of possession of stolen mail in violation of
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Thus it was immaterial that the receiving which the government proved occurred two weeks after the asportation, which was not participated in by the defendant. See Milanovich v. United States, 275 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1960).
. The provisions involved in this case,
.
United States v. Crawford,
576 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied,
439 U.S. 851, 99 S.Ct. 157, 58 L.Ed.2d 155 (1978), is in accord. There the court held that the failure to instruct the jury that it could not convict of theft in violation of
By enacting§ 500 to proscribe the receiving and possession of stolen blank postal money orders, Congress intended to reach the illicit traffic in such money orders. [Citation omitted.] There is no obvious legislative intent to pyramid the penalties of§ 500 and§ 2114 .
Id.
at 800.
But see Brown v. United States,
458 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (in light of practical considerations, held
Gaddis
and
Heñin
preclude pyramiding of punishments, but not convictions, under
. Accord, United States v. King, 521 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Stevens, 521 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Curry, 512 F.2d 1299, 1305-1306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 55, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975); United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885, 97 S.Ct. 235, 50 L.Ed.2d 165 (1975). See also United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978, 986-987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1701, 52 L.Ed.2d 391 (1977) (holding that indictment charging possession with intent to distribute and distribution of a controlled substance in a single count is not duplicitous).
. “[P]etitioner and the Government cite as analogous other cases that involved fragmentation of crimes for purposes of punishment. None of these is particularly helpful to us because we are dealing with a unique statute of limited purpose and an inconclusive legislative history. It can and should be differentiated from similar problems in this general field raised under other statutes. The question of interpretation is a narrow one, and our decision should be correspondingly narrow.” 352 U.S. at 325, 77 S.Ct. at 405 (footnote omitted).
.
Heñin
and
Milanovich
were distinguished on the ground that Congress in adopting