MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On March 15, 2013, twenty-two defendants were charged in a four-count superseding indictment. (Docket No. 518.) Among them, Nelson Pereira and Carlos Camacho-Santiago were each charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it and with aiding and abetting others to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. A jury trial commenced against seven of the indicted defendants — including Per-eira and Camacho — on March 3, 2014. (Docket No. 1278.) On April 7, 2014, at the close of the government’s evidence, both defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal as to all counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (“Rule 29”). (Docket No. 1422.) After hearing arguments from both sides, the Court denied defendants’ Rule 29 motions. Id. On April 14, 2014, the jury found Pereira and Camacho guilty of counts one and two. (Docket Nos. 1445 & 1448.) Each defendant filed a timely,
I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
A. Rule 29 Standard
A court may enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c). In reviewing a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, a district court must consider the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether the “body of proof, as a whole, has sufficient bite to ground a reasoned conclusion that the government proved each of the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Lara,
B. Pereira’s Conviction for Both Counts; Camacho’s Conviction for Count Two
Each defendant’s motion contains less than one page of legal argument. Pereira’s motion makes no reference to the facts of the case, while Camacho’s motion makes only broad and passing reference to the evidence presented at trial. Because Pereira’s motion contains no developed arguments regarding either count, the Court DENIES his Rule 29 motion for the reasons articulated in the government’s opposition (Docket No. 1497), and for the same reasons it denied Pereira’s earlier oral Rule 29 motion. For these same reasons, the Court also DENIES Camacho’s Rule 29 motion as to count two.
C.Camacho’s Conviction for Count One
Camacho’s motion references one possible — albeit poorly developed — argument relevant to his conviction for count one. Camacho contends that the evidence established the existence of multiple independent drug trafficking conspiracies among multiple independent suppliers, but did not show any interdependence between the suppliers. (Docket No. 1459.) Because the evidence did not establish an ongoing overarching conspiracy, Camacho argues, the Court should enter a judgment of acquittal on duplicity grounds. Id. (citing Kotteakos v. United States,
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Conspiracy
To prove a drug conspiracy, “the government must show ‘the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant’s voluntary participation in the conspiracy.’ ” United States v. Bristol-Martir,
In this case, the superseding indictment alleged an agreement among twenty-two defendants, and other known and unknown co-conspirators, to possess multiple kilograms of cocaine with the intent to distribute them to the United States using American Airlines commercial flights. The jury heard sufficient evidence at trial to find Camacho guilty of participating in the drug-trafficking conspiracy knowingly and voluntarily. Wilfredo Rodriguez-Rosado (a/k/a “Mogoyo”) was the “boss” or hub of the drug trafficking organization (“DTO”). (Docket No. 1404 at p. 42.) Three of the government’s cooperating witnesses at trial identified Camacho as a member of the DTO who acted as an intermediary for suppliers transporting drugs to the East Coast of the United States via Rodriguez-Rosado’s smuggling operation. (Docket No. 1497 at pp. 6-7.)
Cooperating witness Gerardo Torres testified that after the DTO experienced a decrease in drug shipments, Camacho brought co-defendant Carlos Arce-Lopez into the DTO as its new drug supplier. (Docket No. 1374 at pp. 70-72.) Torres explained that Rodriguez-Rosado asked Camacho for help obtaining a new supplier because “they knew each other for many years back” and Camacho “was up to date about everything.” Id. at p. 79. According to Torres, as a result of that connection, Arce began sending around 80 kilograms of cocaine per week. Id. at p. 91. Torres also “received kilos from [Camacho] that [Camacho] brought to be transported from Puerto Rico to the United States.” Id. at p. 71. On at least three occasions, Torres traveled with Camacho to Newark to pick up suitcases of cocaine in order to test Arce’s route, and to deliver money back to Puerto Rico. Id. at pp. 57, 62-65, 84-85.
Cooperating witness Javier Olmo-Rivera also testified that he received kilograms of cocaine from Camacho. (Docket Nos. 1374 at p. 85; 1409 at p. 23.) Additionally, cooperating witness Arnaldo Sierra testi-fiéd about an incident during which Camacho pointed a pistol at Sierra’s head while DTO members questioned Sierra about some missing kilograms of cocaine. (Docket No. 1292 at pp. 127-33, 143-45.)
Assessing these witnesses’ testimony in the context of the entire trial, a reasonable jury could have concluded (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that Camacho knew of the conspiracy, and (3) that Camacho voluntarily participated in — and attempted to further the goals of — the conspiracy. See United States v. Bristol-Martir,
2. Single Conspiracy or Multiple Conspiracies
In determining whether the evidence supports a finding of a single conspiracy, courts look at the totality of the evidence, Dellosantos,
The government, pointing to several factors, contends that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that there was a conspiracy to distribute cocaine via American Airlines commercial flights from Puerto Rico to the East Coast of the United States; (2) that each defendant knew of the conspiracy by virtue of their roles receiving or delivering drugs, packaging or handling cocaine-filled luggage, collecting or delivering monies obtained from the drug shipments, or attending meetings with other co-conspirators where the drug smuggling operations were planned and discussed; and (3) that each defendant voluntarily participated in the single conspiracy. (Docket No. 1497 at pp. 17-19.) The Court agrees.
The trial transcript contains the following evidence, which — taken as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict — supports the jury’s guilty verdict as to a single conspiracy. In the conspiracy’s infancy, Rodriguez-Rosado transported the drugs from Puerto Rico to the East Coast of the United States himself, hiding kilograms of cocaine in carry-on luggage that he would smuggle through the American Airlines cargo area with the help of co-conspirator Wilfredo Santiago-Rios. (Docket Nos. 1358 at pp. 115-122; 1404 at pp. 46-47.) After airports heightened security measures in the wake of September 11, 2001, Rodriguez-Rosado employed another American Airlines employee, Roberto Rodriguez-Cruz, to hire a truck driver to smuggle the cocaine-packed suitcases from the American Airlines cargo area into aircraft bound for the East Coast of the United States. (Docket Nos. 1285 at pp. 58-63; 1292 at p. 41, 46; 1335 at pp. 18-22; 1358 at p. 125; 1374 at p. 47.) Rodriguez-Cruz paid the individuals who delivered the suitcases of cocaine to the cargo area, as well as the American Airlines employees who smuggled the suitcases onto planes. (Docket Nos. 1335 at pp. 66-70; 1358 at pp. 11-35, 130-140; 1374 at p. 42; 1396 at pp. 6-8; 1398 at pp. 35-38; 1404 at p. 53.)
During the duration of the conspiracy, DTO members played various parts within the operation, often compartmentalizing their participation while receiving payment and/or instruction from the same individuals. (Docket Nos. 1335 at pp. 66-71; 1365 at pp. 81-85; 1374 at p. 77; 1396 at pp. 6-12; 1409 at pp. 37-41.) Rodriguez-Rosado hired an American Airlines employee at the airport in Newark, New Jersey, Franklin Pratts, who' in turn hired other airline co-workers to ensure that the drugs arriving from Puerto Rico were placed on conveyor belts and ultimately delivered to their intended recipients. (Docket No. 1374 at p. 84.) Pursuant to Rodriguez-Rosado’s instructions, these employees were paid with money generated by the cocaine smuggling operation. Id. Pratts and other DTO members — including Pedro San Lucas, Braulio Burgos, Olmo, and Torres — would collect, store, and deliver back to Puerto Rico Rodriguez-Rosado’s and other suppliers’ drug proceeds through money couriers. (Docket Nos. 1374 at pp. 92-96, 105; 1403 at pp. 37-38; 1409 at p. 75.)
After American Airlines discontinued its commercial flights to Newark in 2007, the
Given the totality of this testimony, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy existed. First, resolving all credibility judgments in favor of the jury’s verdict, DTO participants shared a common goal. The trial testimony indicates that the DTO and all of its participants shared a common goal of smuggling cocaine from Puerto Rico to cities on the East Coast of the United States on American Airlines commercial flights. See Pórtela,
For these reasons, the jury could have reasonably found the existence of a single conspiracy, and that Camacho participated in the conspiracy. Accordingly, Camacho’s Rule 29 motion as to count one is DENIED.
II. Motion for New Trial
Both defendants move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33. “Motions for a new trial are directed to the discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Wright,
The defendants’ arguments leave much to be desired on the Rule 33 front. Per-eira’s Rule 33 argument consists of three sentences,
III. Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, the Court DENIES both Pereira’s and Camacho’s motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. (Docket Nos. 1452 & 1459.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. A defendant may move the Court for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based on grounds other than newly discovered evidence within fourteen days after a guilty verdict or after the discharge of the jury, whichever is later. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1), 33. In this case, the guilty verdict and jury discharge occurred on April 14, 2014. (Docket No. 1442.) Because both defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal within fourteen days of the verdict, their motions are timely.
. "Appearing defendant moves this Honorable Court to grant a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, ■ taking into consideration the interests of justice; the interests of justice includes: eviden-tiary errors during trial [f/.S. v. Vicaria,
. "That a new trial is further requested taking into consideration the interest of justice, such as evidentiary errors during trial and insufficiency of evidence to convict. U.S. v. Smith,