OPINION OF THE COURT
Paul F. Polishan appeals his conviction on charges of conspiracy, securities fraud and other related offenses. He argues that the District Court erred in rulings relating to pre-trial discovery procedures and to the admission of evidence at trial. We hold that Polishan waived his right to appeal the rulings on pre-trial discovery procedures by failing to comply with the procedural requirements of a local rule and we find no error in the admission of evidence to which Polishan objects. Thus we affirm.
I. Factual Background
In 1987, Polishan became the Senior Vice President of Finance, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer of Leslie Fay Companies (LFC). Polishan ran Leslie Fay’s Hanover, Pennsylvania facility, supervising its financial operations and the employees involved in those operations. In January 1993, accounting irregularities at LFC came to light, for which LFC’s Corporate Controller and Polishan’s direct subordinate, Donald F. Kenia, initially claimed full responsibility. The LFC Board of Directors’ Audit Committee began an investigation. Two weeks later, during interviews conducted by attorneys and accountants retained by the Audit Committee, Kenia stated that Polishan had directed the illegal conduct. Kenia similarly implicated Polishan in subsequent interviews with federal law enforcement authorities.
In September 1993, the Audit Committee issued a 369-page report concluding that, because of unsupported entries in its ledgers, LFC had overstated by more than *238 $75 million its pre-tax net income for the years 1990-1992. As part of the investigation resulting in the issuance of that report, LFC President Babcock asked Roger Vallecorse, former Vice-President of Human Resources, to interview Polishan, Ke-nia, and the divisional controllers who worked under Polishan and Kenia. The Audit Committee Report did not conclude formally that Polishan participated in the fraud, but did detail the evidence that supported such a conclusion (including Kenia’s statements). In October 1994, Kenia pleaded guilty to charges relating to the making of false statements in financial statements submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
II. Procedural History
In October 1996, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Polishan with, inter alia, conspiracy to falsify the books and records of LFC, the making of false statements in documents submitted to the SEC, securities fraud, bank fraud and wire fraud. Polishan was arraigned shortly thereafter.
A. Discovery
On November 26, 1996, the District Court appointed a Magistrate Judge to supervise discovery. The Government adopted an “open file” policy, whereby it made available to defense counsel all material in the Government’s possession, with the exception of privileged items and attorney work-product. Defense counsel had access to the room in the federal building where the file was located and permission to bring in a photocopier. Discovery was completed on December 15,1998.
On January 5, 1999, Polishan filed pretrial motions arguing, inter alia, that the “open file” policy of the Government had proved impractical. He requested relief in the form of continuing access to the discovery file and, to facilitate áceess, requested that the Court establish a supervised document depository where documents would be stored until trial. The Magistrate Judge rejected this request, concluding that Polishan was given adequate opportunities to conduct discovery.
Polishan also requested identification by the prosecution of material under
Brady v. Maryland,
B. Trial
While Polishan’s bench trial was initially scheduled for January 27, 1997, it began over three years later - on March 1, 2000. It continued for 35 days over four months. On July 5, 2000, the District Court found Polishan guilty of 18 of the 20 substantive counts. He filed post-verdict motions in August and September 2000. In those motions, he contended, for the first time, that the Magistrate Judge had erred in his rulings on Polishan’s pre-trial motions. On July 27, 2001, the District Court denied those motions. Thereafter Polishan was sentenced to nine years imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. This appeal followed. 1
III. Discussion
A. Discovery Procedures
Polishan argues that, by holding the Government satisfied its obligation to pro *239 duce documents, the District Court violated his rights under Brady and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2. The District Court held that Polishan had waived his right to object to discovery procedures by failing to seek reconsideration of the discovery rulings of the Magistrate Judge prior to trial. 2 We agree.
28 U.S.C. § 686 authorizes a district court to appoint a magistrate judge to hear and decide both dispositive and non-dis-positive matters. For the former, the statute mandates a specific time within which objections are to be filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (authorizing “any party” to “serve and file written objections” within ten days of service of the findings and recommendations on dispositive motions). In contrast, § 636(b)(1)(A), which authorizes a magistrate judge to hear and decide pretrial non-dispositive matters, provides only that the district court judge “may reconsider any pretrial matter ... where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law,” without specifying particular procedures for that reconsideration.
In all federal civil cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) requires a party to serve and file objections to a magistrate judge’s ruling on a “pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense” of any party “[wjithin 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge’s order,” and that “a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate judge’s order to which objection was not timely made.” There is no analogue to this rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but we have noted “the legislative history indicates that procedures are to be established by local rules.”
United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., Inc.,
1. Jurisdictional Defect v. Waiver
We reject the Government’s contention that Polishan’s failure to seek reconsideration under the procedures specified by the Local Rule means that we lack jurisdiction to review the Magistrate Judge’s holdings. We have always treated the defect as non-jurisdictional by allowing for review when “exceptional circumstances” exist.
Continental Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc.,
2. Waiver
Because Polishan did not seek reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s discovery ruling under the procedures specified by the Local Rule, he has waived the right to appeal that ruling. It is undisputed that, in civil cases, the right to appeal the ruling of a magistrate judge is waived if reconsideration before the district court is not sought in a timely fashion.
United Steelworkers,
Polishan urges us to follow the Ninth Circuit, the only court to hold that the waiver rule does
not
apply in criminal cases.
United States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257
F.3d 959 (9th Cir.2001).
4
The Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that there is no time for objections set out in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and no gap-filler provided in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Abonce-Barrera,
This reasoning is simply not applicable to Polishan. Unlike Abonce-Barrera, here there is “a clear basis in law and fact” to apply a waiver rule to this criminal case. The Local Rules for the Middle District of Pennsylvania provide a time within which objections must be filed to a magistrate judge’s rulings and that rule applies in both civil and criminal cases. Local Rule 72.2 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (“Any party may appeal from a magistrate judge’s order determining a non-dis-positive pretrial motion or matter in any civil or criminal case. ”) (emphasis added).
We note also that, by not timely seeking reconsideration by the District Court of the Magistrate Judge’s discovery rulings (instead waiting until after the trial), Pol-ishan deprived the District Court of the
*241
opportunity effectively to review that decision and to correct any errors.
Renfro,
We conclude that Polishan has waived his right to appeal the rulings of the Magistrate Judge. He failed to comply with Local Rule 72.2, which provides a specific time within which to seek reconsideration of the rulings of a magistrate judge. And we find no “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify exercising our discretion to ignore his lack of compliance.
United Steelworkers,
B. Admission of Evidence
Polishan argues that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We reject these contentions because Polishan failed to raise objections to any objectionable evidence, and the admission of any potentially objectionable evidence did not constitute plain error.
1. Admission of Testimony in Violation of Expert Witness Rule
Polishan contends that Government witnesses presented inadmissible evidence by testifying about the corporate culture at LFC and by giving opinions regarding Polishan’s mental state in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 704(b) and 701(b). The Government retorts that the testimony was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 as lay opinion evidence. We review decisions of the District Court to admit opinion evidence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Leo,
*242 i. Rule 704
We reject Polishan’s argument that the testimony of the Government’s witnesses violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Testimony about “an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact” is generally admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a). It is only inadmissible if the testimony comes from an “expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case,” in which case that witness may not “state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.” Fed.R.Evid. 704(b). The ultimate issue at trial was whether Polishan knew of and directed the accounting irregularities at LFC. He claims that the Government’s witnesses impermissibly gave their opinion on this issue, thus violating Rule 704(b). Because none of the witnesses to whom Polishan objects was an expert, that their testimony may have covered the issue of knowledge does, not make it inadmissible.
ii. Rule 701
We reject Polishan’s contentions of error under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Any testimony that is arguably inadmissible under Rule 701 was not contemporaneously objected to, and its admission was not plain error.
Under Rule 701, lay opinion is admissible so long as it is (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. A witness testifying about business operations may testify about “inferences that he could draw from his perception” of a business’s records, or “facts or data perceived” by him in his corporate capacity.
Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc.,
While we have never held that lay opinion evidence concerning the knowledge of a third party is
per se
inadmissible, we have certainly made this kind of evidence difficult to admit. If the witness fails to describe the opinion’s basis, in the form of descriptions of specific incidents, the opinion testimony will be rejected on the ground that it is not based on the witness’s perceptions.
United States v. Anderskow,
There is a fine line between statements that permissibly offer a witness’s testimony about his or her own perceptions while supporting inferences about knowledge, and statements that constitute opinions on a witness’s knowledge. In
Anderskow,
Most of the statements to which Polishan objected are analogous to the admissible statements in Anderskow. For example:
1.Vallecorse: Kenia was “totally committed” to, and “would do anything to please,” Polishan. Polishan was the “puppet master” and Kenia was “subservient.” Polishan had the “dominant personality” and Kenia “walked on egg shells” because he was “afraid.”
2. Falkowitz: “Paul Polishan knew about anything and everything that went on in our company.”
3. Pomerantz: Polishan was “completely knowledgeable about what was going on in my divisions” and “incredibly ... knowledgeable about the - all financial aspects of the business and intimately knew the details.”
These statements are based on the witness’s day-to-day knowledge of his or her business.
Lightning Lube, Inc.,
The evidence to which an objection could have been raised was not challenged contemporaneously. Vallecorse read into evidence a document that contained statements about the relationship between Polishan and Kenia, including the statement that “[i]t is difficult to believe ..., given, the culture in Hanover, that Don Kenia would have altered financials, without Paul’s knowledge or direction.” Polishan did not object to the reading, of this document. As his counsel stated, “I don’t have an objection, evidentiary, or whatever that word is, but, procedurally, these documents are in evidence, they speak for themselves. He doesn’t have to read them to the Court.” 8
We reject Polishan’s argument that, because he raised a general objection at the pretrial conference to testimony on knowledge and reiterated that objection several times during trial, he should not be penalized for his “failure to catch each
*244
iteration of the improper testimony, particularly when the court has already overruled counsel’s objections several times.” Reply Br. at 18 (citing to
American Home Assur. Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc.,
Because Polishan did not object to the admission of this testimony, we review its admission for “plain errors affecting substantial rights.” Fed.R.Evid. 103(d). An error affects the substantial rights of a party only if it is prejudicial.
United States v. Williams,
2. Admission of Audit Report
Polishan also maintains that the District Court erred in admitting the Audit Report because it was not a business record. Once again, the Government argues that Polishan waived his right to object by stipulating to its admission. Conceding he waived his right to object on most evidentiary grounds, Polishan counters that his waiver did not extend to the issue whether it was a business record. We agree. The relevant stipulation reads as follows:
The report of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of the Leslie Fay Companies ... may be admitted into evidence upon the trial of this matter, without prejudice to the rights and positions of the parties as to the truthfulness, accuracy or evidentiary weight of such document, or as to whether such document is a business record.
Its plain language gives Polishan a safe haven to object to the Audit Report as a business Report.
Having not waived his right to object to the Audit Report’s admission at trial as not a business record, it nonetheless does *245 not appear that Polishan ever exercised that right. Indeed, Polishan signed a second stipulation to the admissibility of the Audit Committee Report, with defense counsel’s initials next to that exhibit on the exhibit list, indicating his agreement that the document “may be admitted into evidence without any further foundation of proof, or authenticity, and without calling a witness.” He admitted during a telephone conference with the District Court that the Audit Committee Report was admissible so long as defense counsel could submit a responsive report. Finally, he failed to object when the Audit Committee Report was first introduced into evidence during the trial.
Thus, once again we review for plain error. At the outset, the error, if any, was hardly obvious or clear. As the Government notes, courts are divided on the question whether this document would be admissible as a business record.
Compare United States v. Frazier,
^ % * H* * H:
Polishan waived his right to appeal the rulings of the Magistrate Judge by not addressing his objections to the District Court in accord with Local Rule 72.2. As for the admission at trial of Vallecorse’s testimony and the Audit Committee Report, they were not contemporaneously objected to, thereby limiting our review to a search for plain error. We find none. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Notes
. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
. The District Court also concluded that the Magistrate Judge's holdings were not clearly erroneous. Because we conclude that Polish-an waived his right to object, we need not assess the merits of that conclusion.
. We note that an appellate court may lack jurisdiction to review dispositive decisions made by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) because that order is not final. Rather, it is a proposed finding and recommendation that must be accepted, rejected or modified by the district court.
Cf. United States v. Ritte,
. The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have, without comment, applied the waiver rule in criminal cases.
United States v. Akinola,
. Because we hold today that Polishan waived his right to appeal the rulings of the Magistrate Judge by not complying with Local Rule 72.2, we need not reach the issue whether, in the absence of that Local Rule, his failure to appeal the Magistrate Judge's rulings until after the trial also would have resulted in a waiver of his right to appeal those rulings.
. We may reverse a district court for a plain error only if we conclude (1) an error was committed, (2) it was plain (clear and obvious), and (3) it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.
United States v. Olano,
. If the opinion testimony is rejected on the ground that it is not helpful because it is repetitive, it follows that the admission of the opinion evidence will usually be considered harmless error.
See, e.g., Anderskow,
. The Government also argues that Polishan stipulated to the admissibility of the document. Polishan responds that he reserved the right to argue that its contents were inadmissible. Even if we were to assume that he did reserve the right to argue that the contents were inadmissible (an assumption, from the face of the stipulation, that may be overly generous to Polishan), we would still reject his argument because, as noted above, he failed to object to admission of the document at trial.
. Polishan also argues the inadmissibility of Vallecorse’s negative answer to the question whether he believed Kenia’s denials of Polish-an's knowledge. No objection was made to this answer. And its admission was harmless because the District Court sustained the objection that was made to the Government's next question. When the Government asked Vallecorse why he did not believe Kenia, and the defense finally objected, the District Court sustained the objection on the ground that "I generally don’t have witnesses testify as to whether somebody is credible in what they were saying.”