Appellant was convicted by a jury of kidnapping his estranged wife with the intent of committing “immoral” acts (sexually assaulting his wife while their child watched), being a felon in possession of a gun, and using a gun to commit a crime of violence in interstate commerce. He appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the district court erred in denying him the services of a court-appointed psychiatrist to determine his sanity at the time of the offense and his competence to stand trial; that the court erred in instructing the jury on the scope of the indictment; and that the government’s failure to disclose certain materials denied him a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After Lisa Dana (hereafter “Dana”) filed for divorce from Paul Dana Williams, a/k/a Paul William Dana (hereafter “Williams”), the two separated and lived apart. Their two year-old son lived with Dana. On or about November 1, 1991, Williams came to Dana’s home and convinced her to bring their son out with him to a local shopping mall, so that they could pick out a shiny new wagon for the boy. After they shopped unsuccessfully for a wagon, they returned to Williams’ van.
*261 Dana later testified that after they returned to the van, Williams began choking her and produced a gun, threatening to kill her with it. He took her to the back of the van and raped her. Afterward, he bound her with tape and wire, and took her and their son on a journey from Texas to Oklahoma and back again. Along the way, defendant repeatedly threatened, beat and sexually assaulted his wife in front of their young son, who became highly distressed by what he was forced to witness. Williams told Dana that he came prepared to kill her and that he had a shovel in the van with which he would bury her.
Finally, Dana persuaded Williams to hand her the gun and return her to her home. She immediately sought the advice of friends. These friends told her to go directly to a hospital for medical care and an examination to preserve evidence of the rape, and to go to the police to turn over the gun and tell her story. Dana followed this advice. The medical examination revealed that Dana had been violently sexually assaulted.
Williams was convicted by a jury of (1) kidnapping his wife with the goal of accomplishing an “immoral purpose,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (count one); 1 (2) possessing and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce despite being prohibited from doing so based on a prior conviction for a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (count two); 2 and (3) carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (count three). 3 Defendant was acquitted of a fourth count pertaining to transporting a person in interstate commerce with the intent to commit rape, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421 and Oklahoma Criminal Code Title 21 § 1111(B). Defendant was sentenced to 420 months imprisonment.
ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Count one of the indictment charged Williams with kidnapping Dana for an immoral purpose. Counts two and three of the indictment referred to a particular gun (listing its serial number). Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the “immoral purpose” element of the kidnapping charged in count one, and that there was insufficient evidence to show that the gun introduced at trial in support of counts two and three was the same gun used by him in 'kidnapping and assaulting his wife.
To the extent that there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, the verdict must be sustained. 4 The appellate court’s *262 role does not extend to weighing the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. 5 If a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the essential elements of the crimes charged, the conviction should be upheld. 6 We conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to support its contention that Williams kidnapped Dana for an immoral purpose and used the gun with the particular serial number listed in the indictment.
The government presented evidence establishing an unbroken chain of possession from the time Dana turned the gun in to the police. Not only did Dana testify that the gun presented in evidence was the same gun used to threaten her, but another witness testified that he believed he had sold that particular gun to Williams.
7
In any case, because Williams made no objection to the admission of the pistol into evidence, he has waived his right to object to its admission on appeal.
United States v. Leichtnam,
Williams claims that because the jury acquitted him on count four (rape), there must have been insufficient evidence to convict him on count one (kidnapping for an immoral purpose), and that therefore the jury should have acquitted him on count one. His argument is
not so much
premised on' insufficiency of the evidence on count one, for it clearly was sufficient,
8
but on the inconsistency of the two verdicts. Williams’ argument fails for two reasons. First, the “immoral purpose” of the kidnapping in this case may or may not have been rape. The government presented evidence that Williams raped
and
assaulted his wife in the presence of their infant son, while Williams was transporting his wife and son in interstate commerce against their will. Thus, the jury may have found that the defendant actually intended other “immoral purposes” besides rape — e.g., assault. The government presented evidence of a variety of immoral purposes Williams sought, any one of which would have supported the conviction. Second, even if the two verdicts were inconsistent, a jury may return inconsistent verdicts . in criminal cases, even where the inconsistency is the result of mistake or compromise.
See e.g., United States v. Fesler,
II. DENIAL OF MENTAL EXAMINATION
A district court may order a mental examination of a defendant at public expense under several statutes. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A; Insanity Defense *263 Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, 4242. 9 None of these statutory provisions requires that the defendant be granted a mental examination on demand.
In support of his motion for a mental examination on the twin issues of competence to stand trial and the defense of insanity, Williams stated that he “was under medical and psychiatric care as well as medication,” and had been under such care at the time of the offense. The district court never ruled on Williams’ request for a mental examination on insanity at the time of the offense, because Williams’ attorney explicitly waived the defense at a hearing held on the motion for a mental examination. The district court denied Williams’ request for a mental examination on competence to stand trial because it found that there was no reasonable cause to believe that Williams might be unable to understand the proceedings and assist in his own defense. Our review is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion. 10 Under that standard, we cannot say the district court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a mental examination. For the sake of clarity, we will review the denial of defendant’s request for a mental examination on sanity at the time of the offense separately from the denial of defendant’s request for a mental examination on competence to stand trial.
A. DENIAL OF MENTAL EXAMINA- ■ TION ON SANITY AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
Under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4242, the court is authorized to order a mental examination on the defendant’s sanity at the time of the alleged offense, if the defendant has provided notice of his intention to rely on the insanity defense and the government has moved for such an examination. A psychiatrist appointed under § 4242 at the government’s request or on the court’s own motion is “expected to be neutral and detached,”
United States v. Theriault,
The parties dispute whether the defendant gave timely notice of the defendant’s intent to rely on the insanity defense at trial. We find that he did give timely notice.
11
However, at a hearing on the motion for a mental examination, held after the date on which notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense was due, defendant’s counsel denied that defendant would rely on the insanity defense. For that reason, we find that the defendant has waived the issue of the denial of a mental examination on his sanity at the time of the alleged offense.
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Pillado,
Even if the issue of the denial of a mental examination on insanity at the time of the offense was not waived, 12 the defendant has not made the required threshold showing that his sanity was likely to be a significant factor at trial, 13 such that the denial of a mental examination amounted to a denial of due process under Ake v. Oklahoma, or an abuse of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. 14 Before we can say that the district court abused its discretion in denying a mental examination on sanity at the time of the offense, there must have been some factual showing that would be sufficient to give the trial court reasonable ground to doubt the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense. That factual showing is lacking in this case.
B. DENIAL OF A MENTAL EXAMINATION ON DEFENDANT’S COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
While prior to
Ake v. Oklahoma
we cautioned against conflating the legal standards for the grant of a mental examination on competence to stand trial with those applicable to the grant of a mental examination focusing on sanity at the time of the offense,
see United States v. McEachern,
*265
Under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4241,
16
the district court is explicitly authorized to grant a mental examination on the issue of competence to stand trial, upon motion of the defendant or the government, or on the court’s own motion, provided there is “reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may be presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
17
United States v. McEachern,
The district court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for a mental examination. At that hearing, defendant’s counsel reported to the court that defendant had been treated for depression, 19 that defendant was considered aggressive by the jail in which he was confined, and that he sometimes became agitated. R. vol. 3, 6, 7, 14. Defendant’s counsel noted that Williams was “helpful with regard to his defense and very rational” at times, although other times he “[became] extremely agitated and it [was] difficult to obtain coherence with regard to what we [were] trying to focus on.” R. vol. 3, 13-14. Counsel stated that Williams advised him to file certain motions, including the motion for a mental examination. Most tellingly, the court was presented with evidence that Williams had been handling pro se a custody case involving his son in November and December of 1991, the very same period of time in which he was alleged to have kidnapped and sexually assaulted Dana using a firearm, and just weeks prior to the hearing on the motion for a mental examination on his competence to stand trial. In connection with the custody case, Williams had filed numerous coherent briefs with a Louisiana state court, challenging its jurisdiction over him. 20
After the hearing on Williams’ motion for a mental examination, the district court denied *266 Williams the opportunity for an examination on the issue of his competence to stand trial because the court found there was no reasonable cause to believe that Williams might be “unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding against him or to assist properly in his defense.” R. vol. 3, 41-42. In light of the compelling evidence that the defendant was rational and able to assist his attorney, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Williams a mental examination under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 or 3006A.
Under § 4241, to establish reasonable cause to believe the defendant
may be
incompetent to stand trial, there must be grounds for the court to believe that he
“may be
presently so incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense.”
McEachern,
In
Lewellyng v. United States,
Similarly, in United States v. McEachern, supra, after the district court denied the defendant’s motion for a mental examination on competence to stand trial, this court remanded for a mental examination, finding that the defendant’s motion established reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant might be unable to understand the proceedings against him and properly assist in his own defense. Psychiatrists had previously recommended that McEachem be committed to a mental institution, for he had a demonstrated history of psychosis, a mental disturbance involving detachment from reality (often accompanied by auditory and visual hallucinations).
In another instructive case,
United States v. Crosby,
By contrast to the detailed allegations of possible incompetency that the defendants *267 provided in Lewellyng, McEachern and Crosby, Williams supplied only the bare allegation that he has a “history of mental problems,” and has been “under medical and psychiatric care as well as medication.” Contradicting Williams’ allegations of incompetence was evidence that Williams was instrumental in preparing his own defense, while at the same time ably handling pro se the custody case involving his son. 22
Even if true, the bare allegation that he has seen a psychiatrist and taken psychotropic medication, without more, would not suffice to establish reasonable grounds to believe that Williams might be so mentally compromised as to be unable to understand trial proceedings or to assist in his own defense. Williams’ counsel did not describe the nature of Williams’ alleged psychiatric history, nor did counsel set forth the precise manner in which counsel’s interactions with Williams indicated that Williams might be incompetent. Instead, the court was presented with evidence indicating that Williams was attuned to reality and was highly competent.
Thus, Williams’ claim is like that Of the defendant in
United States v. Teague,
Finally, while we are not prepared to say that the standards for the grant of a mental examination on competence to stand trial are equivalent under sections 3006A and 4241, we find that just as the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a mental examination to determine his competency under § 4241, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant the services of an independent mental health expert under § 3006A.
See Alden,
III. THE JURY CHARGE
Defendant contends that the court’s instructions to the jury impermissibly broadened the scope of the indictment on counts one through three. This argument has no merit.
As to count one (kidnapping), defendant objects to the court’s instruction that the defendant could be convicted of'kidnapping for immoral purposes if the jury found that the defendant forcibly and unlawfully held his wife against her will, transported her in interstate commerce while she was so confined, and intended to derive “some benefit” to himself from the kidnapping. The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), does not contain the phrase “for an immoral purpose,” but instead the phrase “for ransom or reward or otherwise,” which this court has determined is equivalent to “ransom, reward, or other benefit.”
United States v. De La Rosa,
IV. DENIAL OF ACCESS TO VICTIM’S MEDICAL RECORDS AND GOVERNMENT AGENTS’ NOTES
Defendant contends that the government’s failure to disclose records of Dana’s rape trauma counseling denied him due process, effective assistance of counsel, and a fair trial. He contends that the records would reveal that his wife was mentally deranged at the time of trial, and therefore an incredible witness. The government contends it is unaware of any rape trauma counseling records, but would consider it unnecessary to release such records if they existed. Defendant also contends that the government should have divulged certain documents or notes compiled by FBI agents (“Forms 302”), because they allegedly contain statements by Dana with which defendant might have impeached her testimony at trial. We find no merit to defendant’s - claim that any of these documents should have been disclosed to him.
The court issued an order directing the government to permit defendant to inspect and photocopy any potentially exculpatory documentary evidence in the government’s possession, and any material that would fall within the scope of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(2), 23 provided that disclosure would be “in the interests of justice.” The order listed documents that the court contemplated would be discoverable, including records of mental and physical examinations of witnesses. If the government’s attorney believed that it would not be “in the interests of justice” to disclose any of the materials covered by the order, she was only required to inform the defendant of the “type” of materials being withheld.
Although the government denies awareness of any rape trauma counseling received by Dana, the government apparently disclosed records of outpatient counseling Dana received prior to the rape. The government also released records of Dana’s medical treatment following the rape. Had the government learned that Dana received counseling specifically pertaining to the rape she suffered, we think it beyond cavil that the disclosure of those particular mental health records to the defendant would not have been “in the interests of justice.” The defendant already had obtained records of psychiatric care received by the victim. The disclosure of the additional mental health records would in this case have been merely cumulative on the issue of the victim’s credibility as a witness.
See, e.g., United States v. Moore,
*269
Defendant also complains that the government failed to disclose FBI Forms 302, which he alleges contained statements of Dana that he might have used to impeach her testimony. The district court’s discovery order did not specifically direct that any FBI Forms 302 be disclosed to the defendant. Under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, these FBI Forms 302 are only discoverable if they contain a written, signed statement of a government witness, or a “substantially verbatim recital” of an oral statement made by a government witness. 18 U.S.C. § 3500;
United States v. Mora et al.,
Although the Forms 302 were based on FBI agents’ interviews with Dana, they were not signed by Dana, nor do they contain substantially verbatim statements by Dana relating to the subject matter on which Dana testified, as opposed to “scattered jottings” made by the FBI agents.
See Mora,
Even though the FBI Forms 302 are not discoverable under the Jencks Act, they would be discoverable if they would be exculpatory or tend to reduce the defendant’s sentence, or if they would help the defendant to impeach a government witness.
Giglio v. United States,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) describes the federal offense of kidnapping as follows:
(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when:
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce.... shall be punished by imprisonment of any term of years or for life.
. Defendant previously had been convicted of kidnapping, sexual assault, and manslaughter. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
The gun used by defendant in the kidnapping incident was manufactured in California, purchased by defendant in Texas, and utilized in the kidnapping in the states of Texas and Oklahoma.
. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides that persons who carry firearms "during and in relation to any [federal] crime of violence” are subject to penalties additional to those imposed for the crime of violence itself.
.
See Glasser v. United States,
.
See, e.g., United States v. Straach,
.
Jackson
v.
Virginia,
. Because the seller had failed to keep a record of the serial number on the gun, the seller admitted that he could not "swear” that the gun presented as evidence against the defendant was the very same gun he had sold the defendant months earlier.
.
See, e.g., United States v. McBryar,
. We note that defendant's brief in support of his motion for a mental examination cites to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4242. Defendant cites to § 3006A for the first time in his reply brief on appeal.
. We review denials of mental examinations under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 for abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., United States v. McEachern,
The same standard of review applies to a denial of the services of an independent mental health professional under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin,
. The court’s Pretrial Order (dated November 27, 1991) provided that all pretrial motions were due by December 27, 1991. See R. vol. 1, 28; Defendant's Record Excerpts tab 5. Under Fed. R.Crim.P. 12.2(a), a defendant must give the government notice of his intent to rely on the insanity defense "within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may direct.” Williams filed his motion for a mental examination on December 27, 1991. The district court erroneously concluded that the motion was due on December 17, 1991, when in fact it was due December 27, 1991. Defendant’s counsel called the error to the attention of the court. See R. vol. 3, 40.
. There is some evidence that defendant’s counsel intended to retract the waiver of the insanity defense. R. vol. 3, 40.
. See infra, pages 265-66 (facts revealed at hearing on mental examination).
.
See Ake v. Oklahoma,
.See supra, note 14 and accompanying text.
The legal standards for a jury verdict of "not guilty only by reason of insanity” are, of course, different from those governing a court’s finding that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. To succeed with a defense of insanity at the time of the offense, the defendant must persuade the jury by clear and convincing evidence that he was "as a result of a severe mental disease or *265 defect ... unable, to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.” 18 U.S.C. § 17. To find the defendant incompetent to stand trial, the court must find that the defendant is so mentally compromised that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his own defense. 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
. In 1984, The Insanity Defense Reform Act replaced 18 U.S.C. § 4244 with 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Former § 4244 provided for slightly different procedures than § 4241 now does.
. The First, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that even if the defendant does not make a motion for a mental examination, if the district court is aware of circumstances amounting to "reasonable cause” to believe the defendant
may be
incompetent to stand trial, the court
must,
on its own motion, provide the defendant with a mental examination by an expert.
United States v. Huguenin,
. When there is no reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may be incompetent, or when the motion for a mental examination is made frivolously or not in good faith, the court does not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
See, e.g., McEachern,
. Defendant’s counsel stated that he had been unable, even after several months of trying, to obtain any records of defendant’s treatment by the psychiatrist by whom defendant alleged he was treated.
. These briefs were admitted into evidence at the hearing on the motion for a mental examination. The district court had also received correspondence from the defendant during November and December, 1991. The letters evinced a high degree of rationality.
. Note that it is within the discretion of the court to decline a hearing on the matter under § 4241, while a hearing is mandated under § 3006A.
. Williams handled the custody case pro se beginning in the same month he kidnapped Dana and their son. He continued to be handling the custody case pro se when the district court in the instant case held the hearing on Williams' motion for a mental examination, approximately three months after the kidnapping took place.
. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(2) provides that the defendant may discover any documents which are material to the defendant’s defense and/or which are intended to be used hy the government as evidence against the defendant at trial. The rule specifically provides that "internal” memoranda and reports prepared by the government in the preparation of its case are not discoverable. In addition, the rule provides that a "statement” made hy a government witness is not discoverable except as provided in' 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Under § 3500, a "statement” is (1) a written statement signed by the witness or (2) a "substantially verbatim recital” of an oral statement made by the witness. A "statement” is not discoverable until after the witness has testified on direct examination at trial, unless the statement does not relate to the subject matter to which the witness will testify at trial. If there is a dispute as to whether a statement of a government witness should be disclosed to the defendant, the trial court decides the dispute after reviewing the statement in camera.
. The cases cited by the defendant for the proposition that he should have access to Dana’s rape counseling record's are distinguishable.
See, e.g., United States v. Lindstrom,
. A prosecutor’s suppression of evidence which would tend to exculpate the defendant or reduce his sentence violates due process.
Brady v. Maryland,