United States v. Paul D. Wood

692 its discretion in complained leg prison that exercised Johnson

Mr. denying the interview. See Seattle-Tacoma swelling, prescribed and was cramps and Parker, Guild, stocking # v. Newspaper Local 82 480 leg stocking. He asserts that the He 1062 In a letter to Hard cut off his circulation. tight and was too leg stocking, designed Copy, prison it had examined the stated contends circulation, pre policy re- improper request light departmental “in improve condition. Mr. Johnson’s garding for his access to correctional facili- scription media requires reveal he has received con- policy records ties. This decisions medical Lansing Insti care at cerning medical such access consistent access consider whether noted, Mr. the district disruption orderly oper- tution. As to the cause complaint I, amounts to a difference Rec., Johnson’s facility.” ation of vol. doe. 8 ex. 5 staff, (letter medical does which opinion Information Officer to Public level of a constitutional viola- 1992); id., not rise to the 5, Copy, see also ex. 6 Hard Nov. I, 10, rec., doc. at 1-2. We (Internal vol. tion. See Policy Management & Procedure of this claim as frivolous. affirm the dismissal 08-104, Facili- “Media Access to Correctional Lamm, 559, See ties”). Ramos Denying media access conduct denied, 1041, Cir.1980), cert. U.S. interviews with inmates is consti- face-to-face (1981); Smart S.Ct. means long tutional as as alternative for com- Villar, are municating with the media available. Pell, 827-28, 2806-07; U.S. at S.Ct. complaint second concerns Mr. Johnson’s Saxbe, 94 S.Ct. at prison access to of media denial Here, Mr. is free to communicate Johnson interviewing him. The televi- purpose through the mail Copy with Hard and tele- requested program Copy Hard sion news phone, so. and indeed he has done Conse- inter- permission to conduct face-to-face quently, First Mr. Johnson’s Amendment Mr. has view with Mr. Johnson. Johnson rights were not violated. program representatives communicated through telephone and the mail. After AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue initially being prison, access denied forthwith. request Copy in a letter. reiterated Hard by again responded denying ac- prison complains that this con- cess. Mr. Johnson

stitutes a violation First Amendment. standing has no as

Mr. Johnson rights First Amendment of Hard

sert the

Copy. the media has “no consti prisons right of access to or their

tutional beyond inmates afforded the America, UNITED STATES Procunier, public.” Pell v. U.S. Plaintiff-Appellant, (1974); Co., Washington see also Saxbe v. Post Defendant-Appellee. WOOD, Paul D. L.Ed.2d denying press ability (prison policy 92-2172. No. personal interviews individual conduct unconstitutional); Appeals, not inmates Oklahoma United States Court Co., Publishing Hosp. Ass’n v. Oklahoma Tenth Circuit. (media Cir.1984) 1421, 1425 does Sept. right unlimited possess constitutional Pell), citing

newsgather, cert. L.Ed.2d

(1985). regard to Mr. own

With Johnson’s rights, the Amendment record shows

First Friedman, A. Atty.,

Richard Appellate Sec- tion, Div., Justice, Dept, Criminal Wash- (Don ington, Svet, Atty., DC J. Kleindienst, Sp. Wallace H. Asst. Atty., NM, Albuquerque, briefs), him for plaintiff-appellant.

David L. Norvell of The Norvell Law Firm, NM, Albuquerque, defendant-ap- pellee. McKAY,

Before Judge, Chief LOGAN and TACHA, Judges. Circuit

LOGAN, Judge. Circuit appeals the district court’s dismissal of the against defendant Paul D. Wood for failure to state a offense. We have pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1989 the FBI and a federal Phoenix, Arizona investigating alle-

gations political corruption involving Peter MacDonald, Sr., Navajo Chairman of the Na- tion of Indians. Defendant is the manager company of a construction that had significant done a amount of business with Nation, Navajo and FBI inter- viewed him in his office .dealings about his During with MacDonald. the course of the meeting, government alleges that defen- misleading dant made several false or state- relating to an ments automobile Mac- Donald had borrowed from defendant. De- subsequently charged fendant was with mak- ing agent, false statements to an FBI violation of 18 U.S.C. and with ob- justice, struction of in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. car to appeal,1 at the time he loaned the MacDonald prior remand

On approximately miles on it. Defen- had the indictment for failure dismiss moved to expected that he had dant told the The district court offense. state a criminal days, a few receive the car back within were act that because held fly eventually Flagstaff, had to he auspices of Phoenix ing Arizona, weeks He retrieve it three later. with was to jury, discussion defendant time had miles thereby falling said that the car at that 2500 judicial proceeding, part of a odometer, he returned to on the and that “judicial exemption function” within the Albuquerque. § liability for false statements charge, § the court ruled As 1503 government alleges that in The defendant unsworn false statements would defendant’s give purchased intending to it to fact the car probable consequence natural and not as a MacDonald, daughter, and that the not to his justice. impede the due administration had on it when only car 150 miles MacDonald policy noted a court also number The Further, alleg- possession. took MacDonald apply § why 1503 should not reasons weeks, edly eight the car for not retained defendant, given by nature statements three, possession retook and when defendant charge well. therefore dismissed and Albuquerque, in- he did not return to but appeals government now these dismiss The disposed Vegas, in stead of the car Las Ne- als. vada. The contends that it did pursue aspect investigation not this II defendant, charged talking him after jus- rule, false and obstruction of statements reviewing a “[i]n As a learning after truth about tice the car. granting denying a order or trial court’s indictment, appel- motion to dismiss ruled that defendant’s district court if only reverse court court can the lower late prosecuted statements could not be under 18 its discretion.” United States abused “judicial § because of the func- U.S.C. 1001 F.2d Strayer, 846 exception recognized tion” United However, if, here, the court dismisses Industries, Inc., Deffenbaugh interpretation its indictment based on Cir.1992). (10th Section 1001 statutes, legal that is a governing determina “Whoever, any provides, pertinent part: Tramp de novo. tion we review depart- matter within the Cir.1992). ... ment or of the United States false, fictitious or court the makes fraudulent Because the district dismissed retrial, purposes representations shall be of review we statements or case before $10,000 imprisoned government’s allegations fined more than accept as true years, not more or both.” Read indictment. United States v. than five made (1st Co., literally, up per- this section “would swallow Barker Steel Cir.1993). According government, jury plethora to the a of other federal statutes and making proscribing rep- explain asked defendant to statutes false surrounding lending respect agencies of a resentations in circumstances of' car Defendant answered that activities of Government. Extension to MacDonald. breadth, however, recently purchased section its literal he the car for his had justified by legislative history.” daughter, that MacDonald asked to had Bedore, Albuquerque it to drive from to Win- United States v. borrow (9th Cir.1972) (footnote omitted).2 Rock, cir- Arizona. Defendant stated that “Most dow on counts. United States v. At a first trial the district court dismissed trial both Cir.1992). justice charge, jury open, obstruction of and the found We left howev- F.2d er, guilty the false on statement count. present appeal. before us in the issues The district court ordered new trial on that See id. at n. 19. charge prosecution's specific relating jurors acts judicial and (9th Cir.1985).3 Mayer, 775 F.2d officers, and also contains an “omnibus” The district court ruled that the FBI clause: corruptly “Whoever by or agents who interviewed defendant were act force, by any threats or threatening or letter ing authority under the of the Phoenix communication, influences, obstructs, or or jury. Although government argues impedes, influence, obstruct, or endeavors to agents acting indepen were also in their impede, justice, or the due administration of investigatory capacity, dent we note that the $5,000 shall be fined not more impris- than or specifically agents states that the oned not years, more than five or both.” interviewed defendant “in furtherance of an There are three core elements that investigation by the United States Grand government must prove establish to a vio- Phoenix, Jury sitting in Arizona.” Also it is lation of the omnibus clause of section undisputed that at the end of the interview (1) 1503: pending judicial there must be a subpoena served a duces tecum on (2) proceeding; the defendant must have seeking defendant’s business records for that knowledge pending or notice of the pro- grand jury. may This fact be considered. ceeding; and the defendant must have Brown, See United States v. corruptly acted intent to (10th Cir.1991) (“[I]t permissible is and obstruct proceeding or in its may be desirable where the facts are essen justice. due administration of tially undisputed, for the district court to Williams, United States predicate examine the factual for an indict (5th Cir.1989). Further, although ment to the defen- determine whether the elements of dant need not charge attempt the criminal can succeed his sufficiently be shown case.”). justice, for a obstruct supports submissible conduct must be such It ruling probable district court’s “that its natural and effect would be working on behalf of the interference with jury. the due administration “[Gjrand justice.” jury investigations Thomas, pro are criminal United States v. (11th Cir.1990).

ceedings judicial pro that are a F.2d govern- Deffenbaugh, cess.” argues vigorously against adoption 752-53. ment Thus, because defendant’s statements were the “natural require- effect” Any person who failed to tell the truth to the was enacted. A literal construction aof statute myriad government investigators repre- bring is not to be resorted to when it would matter, any regardless sentatives about of how consequences, flagrant injus- about absurd or trivial, criminal, whether civil or which was tices, produce by results not intended Con- department within the of a gress. guilty of the United would be Id. at 90. greater severity a crime with perjury.... inquiry might that of An be made Rodgers, In United States v. concerning citizen criminal cases of a (1984), Supreme nature, minor or even of civil matters of little development exception, Court noted the consequence, wilfully and if he falsified his expressed opinion validity “no of this statements, it would abe violation of this stat- line of Id. at cases.” 483 n. 104 S.Ct. at 1948 Congress ute. It is inconceivable that had n. 4. portion such intent when this of the statute power necessary, deception is and abuse of is element massive Thomas. This

ment of acts, however, “although distinguishable exculpatory clearly from the particular because interfering aspect explanation provided some the defendant before arguably may beyond equate loaning be justice, of an us. administration We political scope nexus to infamous 1503 because automobile with most proceeding history. of a too atten progress in our nation’s United scandal Cir.1985), statutory Hawkins, and the construction there uated States v. F.2d 1482 too strained.” United States v. Wala fore rt. ce (3d Cir.1975).4 sek, (1986), United Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 Cir. States v. Here;, proceeding was 1984), prevent conspired to the defendants way and the informed defen learning an account in the FBI from pendency of its outset of dant assigned and loan to a savings investigation quali A interview. They arranged for a third person. fictitious judicial proceeding” “pending for fies as person, hopes of party pose as that in the purposes of the statute. eventually receiving money federal insurance 975 n. 18 account. See also posture, procedural Given case’s Cir.1989) (de- Barber, must conclude that the letters fendant sent false of recommendation prove spe- acted that defendant able judge in sentencing support of another cific intent to the due administration denied, 922, person), 495 110 S.Ct. cert. U.S. justice.5 only remaining issue is The 1956, (1990); L.Ed.2d 318 United States 109 nat whether defendant’s statements had the (3d Cir.) (defen Nelson, 706, F.2d 711 852 impeding probable ural and effect documents), dants jury fabricated modified investigation. denied, 262, 909, cert. 109 S.Ct. a When this case was before this court (1988); Vesich, United States ago, have year we stated that “we not found (5th Cir.1984) (defendant person a reported where one case testimony prospec- attempted to influence with, of, charged much less ob- convicted witness); tive States v. justice structing on false based unsworn Cir.1979) (de- (3d Shoup, 608 F.2d agents investigating to FBI on statements city conspired fendant councilman to jury.” of a Id. n. 19. behalf concerning voting ma- report submit false government now cites a number of situa- fraud). chine in which false tions unsworn statements prosecuted. They type in fact all involve a find difficult to deception We believe significantly

active that is distin- investiga FBI would terminate their exculpatory guishable explanations from the self-serving exculpatory tion by based on provided the instant case. Haldeman, explanation by If offered defendant. United States v. 559 F.2d 31 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc), denied, that defendant cert. had reason believe political participant 250 was MacDonald’s L.Ed.2d (1977), charged corruption, they expect would a full con using not defendants were inter investigation FBI fession in the context of an unsworn the CIA obstruct investigation eventually re- Watergate into the break-in. This case of view. That proof government Although government onerous burden of on the than contends speculative "probable does effect” test. the more Thomas court its own Eleventh Circuit misread law, probable anything, ef- if the "natural demanding fect” test is less enunciated appears to be no clear definition for the There in an earlier the circuit. In United case from phrase justice." One "due administration of Cir.1984), Perkins, States v. 748 F.2d 1519 perfor- that it court concluded "refers the court false by discharge "[w]hen stated that statements required mance of acts law in the obstruction, alleged appearing giving form the basis of the as a witness and duties such prove testimony subpoenaed.” must that the statements had when truthful Williams, impeding justice.” (quotation at 976 omit- the effect of Id. at 1528. place 874 F.2d n. 24 This "actual a more ted!. effect” standard government claims is the I. vealed what the STANDARD OF REVIEW they the car is evidence that did truth about We review the dismissal of an indictment rely exclusively on defendant’s state- for failure to state a offense de conclude that defendant’s un- ments. We See, e.g., Levine, novo. United States v. given in exculpatory statements sworn — Cir.), cert. interviewing own office to did not -, L.Ed.2d have the natural and effect of (1992); United States v. justice impeding the due administration of This standard means required by the sense that we are not bound the district court’s prosecution under that section is therefore interpretation charging statute. Walker, barred. 947 F.2d at 1441. accept allegations must in the indictment

AFFIRMED. true, showing no deference to the district court’s construction of allegations. those Co., TACHA, Judge, dissenting. United States v. Barker Circuit Steel (1st n. 2 Although & appeal, In this we address Paul Wood’s whole, we read the indictment as a see Rus- challenge sufficiency of his indictment. so, 527 F.2d at because each count of safeguard A criminal indictment must two regarded an indictment is separate as a in- guarantees: constitutional “the Sixth Amend- dictment, sufficiency particular of a count right ment to be informed of the nature and depends solely allegations contained in prepare cause of the accusation in order to count, express language absent of incor- defense; protec- and the Fifth Amendment poration, Hernandez, against being placed tion jeopardy twice (2d Cir.1992); Gainey see also for the identical offense.” United v. United Russo, (10th Cir.1975) 1051, 527 F.2d (internal omitted), denied, quotations cert. affirming the court’s dismissal district 906, 2226, 426 U.S. 96 S.Ct. indictments, majority the relies on the (1976). An indictment conforms to these finding district court’s agents that the FBI (1) minimal constitutional when it standards working on behalf contains the essential elements of the offense jurisdiction. a matter outside the FBI’s Re- (2) charged, sufficiently ap-

intended to be lying however, on finding improper, prises pre- the accused of what she must be accept because we must as true all of the pared against, to defend enables the allegations factual found in the indictment. plead acquittal accused to an or conviction jury In a criminal trial the district court has under the indictment as a bar to finding subse- no fact regard gener- role with quent prosecution Rather, al guilt for the same issue of or offense. innocence. States, 749, responsibility

Russell v. United has the 369 U.S. to determine 763- 64, was, 1038, 1047, fact, whether the “matter” at (1962); issue 82 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d jurisdiction” “within the Walker, of the FBI. 1439, See v. United States 947 F.2d Knox, 77, United States v. 396 U.S. 83-84 & 7, n. S.Ct. & n. L.Ed.2d 275 applying After this test to the indictment (1969) (question whether false statement was us, majority before affirms the district willfully, required by § made as is court’s conclusion that both counts of the “general issue” to be resolved at they should be dismissed because 12(b) pretrial motion); trial and not on Rule fail to state the essential elements of the King, charged. offenses intended Because I (10th Cir.1978) (“The by appel matter raised agree majority’s standard of ‘capable lees’ motion was not of determina- review, indictment, reading of method general tion without the trial of the issue.’ It or its construction of the relevant criminal was the issue. Until the matter is statutes, put I respectfully fact, dissent. to trial before trier the dis- of knowingly and States agency of the United jurisdiction to decide a no has trict court false, or fictitious willfully ... (emphasis makes guilt.”) or innocence defendant’s representations.” statements fraudulent added). Thus, court had the district because Relying on role, majority improperly finding no fact by this court exception recognized function finding that the the district court’s relies on Indus., Inc., Deffenbaugh of States acting on behalf the United agents were FBI (10th Cir.1992), 752-53 jury. that the FBI concluded district court rely- compounds its error majority investiga- independent did not exercise FBI evidence ing on extrinsic they authority interviewed when tive tecum on Wood subpoena duces served authority of the exercised but instead It is well the interview.

the conclusion “department jury, is not a which sufficiency of an indict- established States.” agency of the United Applying allegations made solely on on ment rests above, review as outlined proper standard of See, Sampson, e.g., its face. erred. district court I conclude that the 75, 78-79, 83 S.Ct. (1962); v. United Costello L.Ed.2d 136 law, I of the indict- Count As a matter 406, 408, 359, 363, sufficiently alleges that the interview ment (1956); King, L.Ed. 397 lied to the during which Wood outside the indictment (holding that evidence agency or jurisdiction of an was within of whether to a “is irrelevant determination States. Count department of the United sufficient”) legally itself is the indictment provides: omitted); (internal United States quotations 22, 1989, May within On or about (3d 1139, 1142 Cir. Gallagher, Mexico, defen- and District of New State 1979) remand, that, trial (holding on WOOD, knowingly and did PAUL D. dant testimony presented at the may not consider false, willfully fictitious and fraudu- make sufficiency of the testing first trial representations lent statements dismissed, indictment), 444 U.S. cert. Agents Special Michael material facts to and cert. 62 L.Ed.2d Pullano, George Black Linda Bateman and Investigation, in Bureau of of the Federal (1980). Thus, stage at this matter within our role is to determine proceedings, Justice, Department United States allegations the indict- the factual whether the United department true, by them- ment, taken as are sufficient States.... a offense. Wo'od to state selves gov- sufficiency of the only challenge the can added).1 allegation Although the (emphasis evidence case with extrinsic ernment’s statutory jurisdiction tracks the after presented its case his government the has generally sufficient that language, is “[i]t trial, may at which time Wood move second in offense the words set forth the indictment pursuant to Fed. judgment acquittal itself, long as words of those of the statute time, trial the 29. At that R.Crim.P. directly, expressly, fully, themselves law, whether, may a matter the decide uncertainty ambiguity, set any without government is suf- presented evidence necessary to constitute all the elements forth factual ele- essential ficient to establish the punished.” to be Ham the offence intended beyond doubt. guilt a reasonable ments of 87, 117, 94 ling v. 418 U.S. (in 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d UNDER II. FALSE STATEMENTS omitted); see also quotations ternal § U.S.C. that the at 974. I conclude statuto- regarding agency statute, ry language 18 U.S.C. false statements The sufficiently safeguards Wood’s Fifth and “[wjhoever, in matter punishes § rights. Amendment Sixth any department or jurisdiction of within the as known to Wood agents, and the facts alleges particu- true I 1. The remainder of Count time. made to the FBI larity Wood the false statements Indeed, majority ity require does not conclude submit an I, face, that Count on its fails state the compliance affidavit of presented when he agency jurisdiction. essential element of In- response to a grand jury subpoena federal stead, allegation it reasons that the that the duces tecum to the Antitrust Division rather acting FBI was “in furtherance an investi- directly grand jury. Deffen gation” by jury, appears only which baugh, 957 F.2d at 753. power Because the indictment, in Count II of the ren- somehow subpoenas to issue exclusively rests allegation agency jurisdic- ders Count I’s grand jury, that, we reasoned to the extent errs, majority tion insufficient. The howev- Department of Justice officials were er, sufficiency I, because the of Count which exercising any authority, authority expressly incorporate allega- does not flowed jury. from the Id. Since the II, depends solely tions of Count grand jury judicial process, is allegations contained in that count. concluded, Department of Justice officials acting were not juris on a matter within the proper if “grand Even it were to tax the department diction of a agency. See id. at jury” allegation in against Count II 752-53. jurisdiction” I, “agency allegation in Count allegations these two are not inconsistent. ease, however, In this nothing in the indict FBI, any police agency, like has at least suggests ment the FBI first, goals investigates two when it a crime: exercising grand jury’s unique subpoena offenders, apprehend it seeks to power they when By interviewed Wood. second, gather enough it seeks to evidence holding otherwise, majority im makes it prosecution for the to sustain a conviction in possible for the to obtain suffi Because, waiver, any future trial. absent cient indictments or sustain convictions prosecuted citizen cannot be in federal court against defendants who make false state him, unless a indicts the FBI also ments to during pendency necessarily govern- seeks to obtain on the grand jury investigations, since FBI in ment’s behalf sufficient evidence to sustain vestigation point is at that partly at least grand jury finding cause to in- furtherance of the investigation. my judgment, dict. these related activi- I cannot Congress believe that intended this statutory ties of the FBI all fall within the passed Thus, § result when it al authority prosecute of the FBI to “detect and though agree I day that it too late crimes,” and thus are matters within the hold that no exception function ex jurisdiction of the FBI. See United States v. ists, my judgment, majority stretches 475, 481, Rodgers, exception beyond proper boundaries.2 (1984) (citing 533(1)). Construing phrase “in fur- III. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE grand jury] investigation” therance of [a UNDER 18 U.S.C. light government, most favorable to the Count II of the charges Wood phrase only conclude that the states that the with a violation of the “omnibus clause” of present any FBI would evidence it obtained statute, justice the obstruction of grand jury, actually not that it was § appeal, 1503. As we held in the last that exercising grand jury’s authority. the (1) clause contains four essential elements: (2) majority’s contrary departs pending judicial conclusion proceeding, defendant’s (3)

from the rationale of our in knowledge proceeding, decision of the defendant’s Deffen- case, baugh. In that we that impede proceeding, held the De intent to the and partment statutory of Justice had no author impedes conduct which or constitutes an Although majority majority's reasoning the also warns that the in footnote 2 that Con- literally, up perjury read statutes,” "would swallow gress punish- could not have intended harsher danger happening there is no of that in misrepresentations per- ment for trivial than for this case because Wood's statements were un jurious expressly rejected by statements has been Deffenbaugh, (noting sworn. 957 F.2d at 752 Cf. .Supreme Rodgers, Court. See 466 U.S. at that defendant's false statements were contained 482-83, 104 S.Ct. at 1948. signed compliance). in a affidavit of nex- proper of this definition would treat proceeding. See impede the to endeavor of the element separate essential Today, the first us not as of the element offense, explanation a fifth element —the adds time, majority justice.” See impede to its “that natural of an “endeavor such must be conduct Thomas, the interference F.2d at 651. be probable effect justice” administration due —and mind, I in conclude this definition With the indictment II of holds that Count then sufficiently II the indictment that Count allege to fails dismissed because should justice. The impede alleges an endeavor Although it is a element. essential new this endeavor “did alleges Wood count that this con- disagree with I also question, close by justice” administration impede the due clusion. prevent order agents “in lying the FBI element, this new fifth deciding to add facts learning the true jury] from [the of the Eleventh the lead majority follows D. concerning PAUL WOOD’S purpose v. Thom- States United decision Circuit’s auto- red Pulsar conveyance of a Nissan Although I as, F.2d 647 August, 1988.” to Peter MacDonald mobile limiting ele- version agree that some apprises adequately Wood language This in some instances necessary because isment of the purposes against him for charge and “the particular acts nexus between Notwithstand- Fifth Sixth Amendment. atten- too proceeding is aof progress it “diffi- majority finds ing fact that there- construction statutory and the uated agents would the FBI that cult believe strained,” v. Wala States see United too fore investigation based terminate (3d Cir.1975), I believe sek, explanation offered exculpatory self-serving majority and the the Thomas that con- defendant,” alleges the indictment by Many of nexus. required overstate jury could a rational by Wood which duct defining “en- circuits other cases from earlier ca- doubt was beyond a reasonable conclude required justice” state impede deavor to diverting pable of possibility rather nexus terms The fact investigation. that States United example, probability. For facts does eventually learned true (11th Cir.1985), Brand, 775 F.2d 1460 v. that its implication preclude the reasonable proscribes conduct court stated that by delayed Wood’s been discovery could have pro- capable produces or which “which Griffin, United States tactics. See justice from prevents ducing that an effect (5th Cir.) (stating perju 1465; see duly Id. at being administered.” justice impede jury witness can rious Cole United also punishment guilty.”), “delaying the Cir.) (same), 377 U.S. cert. denied 48, 62 444 U.S. cert. denied (1964). Al 12 L.Ed.2d (1979). Thus, I conclude strictly in favor § 1503 though read we must sufficiently states II of the indictment Count accused, required define the § 1503. under an offense running afoul of narrowly without nexus too of “endeavor” Supreme definition Court’s reasons, respectfully dissent. For these obstruc- an earlier codification essay to do or “any effort or statute as tion the section

accomplish purpose the evil prevent.” enacted to 260, 261, Russell, 138, 143, 41 S.Ct. (1921). de- I would therefore

65 L.Ed. 553 justice”

fine “endeavor to impeding capable due

conduct which is justice.3 like

administration majority, court,

the Thomas but unlike requisite intent to had the particular the "natural dant 3. That a act had White, justice. impeding justice See United States would re- effect” of 1977). (10th Cir. question defen- whether the main relevant some of the notes because appeal, room. were found in the On Levin, F.Supp. 2. See also United States v. charge justice ruled that the obstruction of (D.Colo.1953): dismissed, erroneously a new was ordered recognized ‘judicial euits have function’ ex- made in connection proceed- with a ception application ing, they based on exempt prosecution are pursu- finding ‘department that a court is not a “judicial ant to the exception. function” See agency’....” Deffenbaugh, 957 F.2d at 752. also United Masterpol, States v. exception, (2d Under this false statements made Cir.1991); judicial proceeding to a court in a are not Abrahams, by § exception covered 1001. Since the suggested in first “there has been no Ill response Congress either re- Defendant charged was also with obstruc- pudiating refining the limitation or it. It justice, tion of in violation of 18 U.S.C. day therefore seems too late in the to hold prohibits 1503. That section a number of exception that no exists.” United States v.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Paul D. Wood

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 23, 1993

Citation: 6 F.3d 692

Docket Number: 92-2172

Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.