United States v. Patterson, 29 F. 775

United States v. Patterson

29 F. 775 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1887

Bradley, Justice.

I have duly considered the matter aforesaid, and will proceed to state the conclusion to which I have come, and the reasons thereof. It is manifest that the judgment or sentence in this case is uncertain in this respect: it imposes the penalty of imprisonment at hard labor in the state’s prison for the term of five years upon each indictment, and adds that tlio said terms shall not run concurrently, but does not specify upon which indictment either of said terms of imprisonment is to be undergone. If the prisoner is to he detained in prison for three successive terms, neither he, nor the keeper of the prison, nor any other person, knows, or can possibly know, under which *778indicttnent he has passed his first term, or under which he will have to pass the second or the third. If, for any reason peculiar to either of said indictments, as, for example, some newly-discovered evidence, should be a different face put upon the case, so as to induce the executive to grant the prisoner a pardon of the sentence on that indictment, no person could affirm which of the three terms of imprisonment was condoned. If a formal record of any one of the indictments, and the judgment rendered thereon, were, for any reason, required to be made out and exemplified, no clerk or person skilled in the law could extend the proper judgment upon such record. ■ He could not tell whether it was the sentence for the first, the second, or the last term of imprisonment. Without the last words of the sentence, declaring that -the terms of imprisonment should not run concurrently, it would be sufficiently clear and certain. It would then, by force of law, be a sentence of five years’ imprisonment on each indictment, and each sentence would begin to run at once, and they would all run concurrently. Such a sentence is lawful and proper. But the addition that they were not to run concurrently, without specifying the order in which they were to. run, is uncertain, and incapable of application. It seems to me that the additional words must be regarded as void.

The words used are undoubtedly equivalent to the words, “the said terms shall follow each other successively.” But, if these words had been used, the case would not have been different. The inherent vice of being insensible and incapable of application to the respective terms, without specifying the order of their succession, would still exist. The joint sentence is equivalent to three sentences, one on each indictment. One of them is applicable to the indictment for misapplication of funds; but, if they are successive, which one? That which is first to be executed, or that which is secondly or thirdly to be executed ? No intelligence is sufficient to answer the question. A prisoner is entitled to know under what sentence he is imprisoned. The vague words in question furnish no means of knowing. They must be regarded as without effect, and as insufficient to alter the legal rule that each sentence is to commence at once, unless otherwise specially ordered.

If this were a mere error, it could not be considered on habeas corpus. The judgments of the district and circuit courts in criminal cases are final, and cannot be reviewed by writ of error, and a mere error of law, if in fact committed, is irremediable; as much so as are the decisions of the supreme court. But if a judgment or any part thereof is void, either because the court that renders it is not competent to do so for want of jurisdiction, or because it is rendered under a law clearly unconstitutional, or because it is senseless, and without meaning, and cannot be corrected, or for any other cause, then a party imprisoned by virtue of such void judgment may be discharged on habeas corpus.

I do not say that the judgment in this case is void. It is a good judgment for the term of five years’ imprisonment on each indictment. Perhaps these terms might have been lawfully made to take effect successively, if the order of their succession had been specified, although *779there is no United States statute authorizing it to be done. But this was not done. No distinction was made betweon them in this respect, and, as neither of them was made to take effect after the one or the others, they all took effect alike; that is, from the time of the rendering of judgment. The additional words as to non-concurrence are void, because they are incapable of application. Tt is as if a man should bo sentenced to successive terms of imprisonment on each of several indictments, and to hard labor, or to be kept on bread and water, during one of the terms, without specifying which. The latter part of such a sentence would clearly be void, for it could not be allowed to the jailer to exercise his discretion as to the application of the aggravated penalties.

If there were any way in which the district court could amend its judgment, the case might perhaps be different. But I see no way in which it could do so without passing a new sentence, and that it could not do now, after the term has passed, and after one term of imprisonment has been suffered. What right would the court have now to determine that the expired term was due to any particular indictment more than to either of the others?

I have carefully read the able opinion of the supreme court of New Jersey in the ease of Gibbs v. State, 45 N. J. Law, 379, and agree to all that the court there says as to the right of a criminal court to extend its judgment and proceedings on the record in proper form, regardless of imperfections in the minutes of its clerk. But in the present case there are no materials in existence for altering the form of the judgment under consideration,—at least nothing but what may rest in the bosom of the judge; and for him to resort to his memory at this day to alter the judgment would be to render a now judgment. It is unnecessary to say that the honorable judge of the district court would not adopt a proceeding so questionable and hazardous. The district attorney has supplied me with a certified copy, literatim, with all the erasures and interlineations of the rough minutes; but they exhibit nothing upon which the court could base any substantia] alteration in the judgment as recorded.

In this view of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions raised by the petition, and by the prisoner’s counsel on the argument. But it does suggest another question which cannot be entirely overlooked. When the habeas corpus was allowed, the first term of five years had not expired by lapse of time, although at least one of the sentences had been satisfied by means of the remissions allowed for good conduct. Considering the three terms of imprisonment as by law running concurrently, do those remissions apply to all three of the sentences, or to only one of them? If to only one, and I had to decide this case, as in ordinary civil actions, according to the state of things when the writ was issued, I might be obliged to remand the petitioner into custody, and put him to the expense and trouble of another writ. But I think that on a habeas corpus, where the personal liberty of the citizen is involved, the decision should ho made upon the actual status of the case. And as the five years have now entirely elapsed, and all the con*780curring terms have been fulfilled, the question of the applicability of the remission for good conduct to all the sentences may be waived, and the prisoner be lawfully discharged, without deciding it. He is discharged accordingly.