*1 Relatedly, state make.60 Congress scope of feder- determine law does argu- Horton’s jurisdiction.61 diversity
al therefore, is, unavailing.
ment
IV light section 1348 construe
We jurisdictional maintain intent to
Congress’s the one national banks on
parity between corporations on banks and
hand and state that the definition We hold
the other. limited to the national bank’s
“located” is and the state place of business
principal and its certificate organization in its
listed in a This results
articles of association. having access to federal
national bank’s diversity jurisdiction to the same
courts similarly state bank or
extent as a situated that, under section It follows
corporation. necessarily is not a national bank every in each and state which
“located” branch, the district court did
it has a holding. in so
not err
AFFIRMED. America, STATES of
UNITED
Plaintiff-Appellee, (03-1735); Sean
Patrick CARNEY (03-1736),
Carney Defendants-
Appellants. 03-1735, 03-1736.
Nos. Appeals, Court of
United States Circuit.
Sixth 15, 2004.
Argued: June Filed: 2004.
Decided and Oct. Mas, at 1399. War- Pharm. Div.
60. Bianca Parke-Davis 61. Co., 396 & n. ner-Lambert Cir.1984). *5 Detroit, MI, Attorney, United States Appellee. KRUPANSKY, RYAN,
Before: COLE, Judges. Circuit KRUPANSKY, J., delivered opinion court, RYAN, J., joined. in which COLE, 453-56), J. (pp. delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
KRUPANSKY,
Judge.
Circuit
The defendants-appellants Patrick
(“Patrick”)
Carney
Carney
and Sean
(“Sean”),
(col
respectively
father and son
lectively
Carneys”
“the
or “the defen
dants”),
federally-licensed
both
firearms
dealers, have assailed their
jury
correlative
(1)
multiple
convictions for
aiding
counts
abetting
the felonious utterance of
Chapman, Chap- knowingly
ARGUED: Ronald W.
false statements
customers
Associates,
Hills, MI,
man &
Bloomfield
in the defendants’ firearms transfer
rec
*6
(18
(2)
924(a)(1)(A)),1
Appellants.
Peregord,
§
for
Jennifer J.
As- ords
U.S.C.
and
Detroit,
Attorney,
sistant United States
the felonious creation or maintenance of
MI,
Appellee.
for
ON BRIEF: Ronald W. willful omissions
falsehoods in their
and/or
Mammel,
Chapman,
Chapman
David B.
& firearms
regarding
transaction records
the
Associates,
Hills, MI,
name,
Ap-
age,
place
Bloomfield
for
and
of residence of fire
(18
922(b)(5)).2
pellants.
Peregord,
purchasers
Jennifer J.
Assistant
arms
U.S.C.
subject
posits:
1. The
statute
(5) any
or-piercing
firearm or arm
am-
(a)(1) Except
provided
as otherwise
in this
any person
munition to
unless the licensee
chapter, whoever—
records, required
kept
notes in his
to be
(A) knowingly
any
makes
false statement
pursuant
chapter,
to section 923 of this
the
representation
respect
or
with
to the infor-
name, age,
place
and
of residence of such
required by
chapter
kept
mation
this
to be
individual,
person
person
if the
is an
or the
person
in the
a
records of
licensed under
identity
principal
places
and
local
chapter
applying
any
this
or in
for
license
person
person
business of such
if the
is a
exemption
disability
or
or relief from
under
corporation
entity.
or other business
provisions
chapter;
the
of this
922(b)(5).
A
violation
18 U.S.C.
"willful”
proscription
felony.
of that
a
constitutes
title, imprisoned
shall be fined under this
Choice,
924(a)(1)(D);
U.S.C.
United States
years,
not more than five
or both.
(6th Cir.2000).
years.
924(a)(3)(A). (Emphases
18 U.S.C.
add-
alleged
initial
rationale
As their
ed).
convictions,
of their
the defen
for reversal
However, contrary to the defen
government
that the
protested
dants have
contention,
of
interplay
dants’
law,
erred,
by proceeding
of
as a matter
924(a)(1)(A)
924(a)(3)(A), respec
924(a)(1)(A),
under section
against them
which,
whereby
tively,
pose
does not
an instance
felony
according
statute
to the de
fendants,
apply only against
general statutory language
entirely
is
su
should
maker(s)
knowingly
statutory
false material state
perseded
specific
terms which
ments to a
seller for inclusion
Edmond v.
precise
address
matter.
firearms
Cf.
legally-required
States,
seller’s
transac
within the
United
U.S.
S.Ct.
which, allegedly by
tion records but
Although
445
However,
leged....
general
There is .no
government
the
elected
rule
leni-
924(a)(1)(A),
§
to the
under
proceed
ty
requires
government
to
to fore-
924(a)(3)(A).
§of
See United
exclusion
go
felony prosecution simply
a
because
Batchelder,
114, 123-24,
442
v.
U.S.
States
may
misdemeanor
applica-
statute
also be
(in
(1979)
755
60 L.Ed.2d
ble.”)
99 S.Ct.
(citations omitted).
In the case in-
conduct
structing that where a defendant’s
stanter,
proof supportive
record
of each
statute,
federal
offended more than one
924(a)(1)(A)
§
pertinent
count of conviction
any
him
may prosecute
authorities
under
that
revealed
Johnson and his named fe-
enactments);
all such
United States v.
accomplice
male
had made material mis-
(6th
Schaffner, 715 F.2d
Cir.
representations of fact on the official Form
1983)
that,
(explaining
where a defendant’s 4473, which the defendant seller
to
knew
satisfied the elements of
alleged conduct
false,
willfully
be
and which false data was
offense,
felony
and a
both a misdemeanor
Carneys’
retained in the
legally required
to
Attorney
States
was “free
the United
transaction records.
any applicable statute
prosecute under
Accordingly,
trial proof sup
more
regard
without
to which statute is
that,
ported
jury’s finding
tailored to the
facts
al-
specifically
'go
the extent that it
to
after’ the first link in chain
is
inconsistent with this
forcement
opinion.” Logan,
Although
supply
willful
Choice,
chored
United States v.
documentation,
exposed
which
them to
(6th Cir.2000),
F.3d 837
wherein the Sixth
”
“accomplice
felony liability under 18
924(a)(3)(A) (the
§
distinguished
Circuit
924(a)(1)(a); hence,
gov-
§§ 2
U.S.C.
&
statute
assigned
which
misdemeanor liabil-
clearly
ernment
was not constrained to ity to a licensed firearms dealer who know-
Carneys only
prosecute
instead
under
ingly
representation
made a false
in his
924(a)(3)(A)
rule,
the section
misdemeanor
records)
922(b)(5) (the
§
transaction
from
924(a)(1)(A)
§
indepen-
does not
even if
liability
basic statute which created
for a
dently apply to fabrications of material
licensed armaments trader
failed to
who
by
on
misinformation
firearms dealers
offi-
name,
maintain a
age,
record
cial transfer documents.
firearms,
place
buyer
residence
Thus,
correctly reject-
court
the district
court
Choice
further found to be
ed
defendants’ motion to
dismiss
punishable
felony
under
924(a)(1)(A) counts,
§
because
those
924(a)(1)(D)
transgression
where that
properly charged
counts
with
“willful”).
Choice,
had been
See
having
and abetted the felonious
aided
(“The
plain language
of this statute
frauds committed
Johnson and his ac-
924(a)(1)(D)
governs
indicates
complices
completion
legally
in the
re-
offense,
Choice’s
and therefore the district
quired firearms transfer records.
correctly
court
found that Choice had
terms,
pleaded guilty
felony. By
to a
its
Next,
argued
have
924(a)(3)(A) clearly
applies only to li-
if they
properly
were
convicted as
censed dealers who make false statements
“aiders and abettors” of their customers’
sales,
in connection with firearms
and not
representations
fraudulent
under
keep any
to those who fail to
records at all.
924(a)(1)(A),
then their associated con
924(a)(3)(A)
Furthermore, §
refers
922(b)(5)
invalid,
victions under
were
ei
knowing
implicitly
offenses and therefore
(1)
ther
an alleged
because
fatal inconsis
from
excludes Choice’s willful violation
its
tency
jury
inhered in the
verdicts
(Citations omitted).
scope.”).
the defendants purportedly could not be
simultaneously guilty
aiding
of both
Choice had failed to maintain
record
records,
firearm,
abetting
although
the creation of
of the sale of a
false
*11
contrast,
By
to
required by
square-
law
the Seventh Circuit
knew that he was
he
in
ly
controversy
addressed the issue
in
Following
a record.
Id.
838.
maintain
Rietzke,
retention false pronounced The Rietzke court further qual- to no information at all—can opposed 924(a)(3) “[n]othing suggests 922(b)(5) §a violation for failure to ify as li- it under which a provision is the sole information, of that as maintain a record charged.” could be censed firearms dealer 924(a)(3)(A) for opposed to a offense Rather, reading a fair Id. at 546. a false rec- merely knowingly maintaining 924(a)(3) 922(b)(5) §§ in tandem re- information, directly was not ord of sales Congressional permit vealed a intent According- court. posed before the Choice li- prosecutors option prosecuting ly, any language contained Choice which willfully censed firearms dealers who have might support pos- be construed to either name, age, and failed to record the correct (either interplay construction of the by sible omission or complete address information) regarded statutes must be as mere of false under two the substitution (the 922(b)(5) 924(a)(1)(D) felony §§ noncontrolling dictum. sufficient, because, knowingly retaining developed tions was provisions), or *12 924(a)(3)(A) (the § under above, false records prosecution the not restricted was statute). Id. at 546. misdemeanor subject proceeding on the to record only the defendants under reviewing court concludes The instant 924(a)(3)(A) § record-keep- for their willful analysis rul- Circuit’s and that the Seventh Likewise, persuasive, ing and thus failures. no fatal inconsis- ing in Rietzke were Whereas, it. hereby adopts court as this tency jury manifested the verdicts was relationship the between regarding which found the defendants liable for the 924(a)(1)(A) 924(a)(3)(A) §§ and evolved 922(b)(5) § willfully failing felonies of above, undoubtedly will exist situations accurate, complete, truthful transcribe proper- could be wherein a defendant name, age, information about the and ad- 924(a)(3)(A) § ly under either prosecuted firearms; buyer dress of the of certain 922(b)(5), not either in the alter- or but concomitantly guilty which found them both, nor such a circumstance was native aiding abetting their customer’s Rather, judice. in the sub posed cause 924(a)(1)(A) provision felonious of know- proof sup- the instant of record could have ingly false information for inclusion in the either, both, ported under convictions defendants’ sales transaction records. bottom, statutes. At the mere fact that willfully accepted, and main- Thirdly, the defendants have as records, tained in their incorrect informa- sailed the igno trial court’s “deliberate name, regarding age, tion and address instruction, jury rance” which had tracked firearms, buyer op- of certain nearly verbatim the Sixth Circuit’s Pattern posed simply failing to record infor- (“Deliberate Jury Ignor Instruction 2.09 subjects mation on those their transac- ance”).8 The Sixth Circuit has endorsed records, tion is an immaterial distinction. Jury Pattern Instruction 2.09 as a correct 922(b)(5) plain language The covers law, governing summation of the scenarios, both in that a licensed dealer’s data, jury forecloses the risk that a might con willful recordation of false instead of data, the accurate is both the moral and vict on the basis of negligent failure to equivalent the functional of the willful re- know rather than virtual knowledge. See regard- no information at all cordation of Mari, United States v.
ing
legally required
matters. See 18 (6th Cir.1995). Nonetheless, although a
922(b)(5).
U.S.C.
jury charge might be a correct statement
law,
of the
a trial
Accordingly,
sup-
give
the record evidence
court’s election to
922(b)(5)
porting
Carneys’
convic-
that
by reviewing
instruction is examined
(3)But
this,
ignorance” charge
8. The
you
"deliberate
read to
to do
must be convinced
jurors
stated:
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
(1) Next,
explain something
high probability
I want to
about
dants were aware of a
proving
knowledge:
a defendant's
buyer
David Johnson
was
actual
of the
(2)
responsibility
No one can avoid
for a
firearms, and that the defendants deliber-
by deliberately ignoring
crime
the obvious.
ately
eyes
closed their
to what was obvious.
you
If
are convinced that defendants Sean
Carelessness,
negligence,
or foolishness
Carney
Carney deliberately ig-
and Patrick
part
on defendants'
is not the same as
high probability
nored a
that David John-
knowledge,
enough
and is not
to convict.
buyer
son was the actual
of the firearms
course,
This,
you
is all for
to decide.
indictment,
you may
named
then
find
that David Johnson was the
knew
buyer
actual
those firearms.
discretion,9
even L.Ed. 1557
See also
States
because
United
court for abuse
(6th Cir.1993)
Fountain,
may, in
F.3d
facially
instruction
correct
(instructing
prove
that the defendant must
totality
of the
light
proof,
of record
probable
that “it is more
than not that the
jury charges, or other circumstances
verdict.”).
materially
error
affected the
case,
incomplete, misleading, confusing,
be
prejudicial.
See United
or otherwise
protested
have
621-22
Beaty,
States
presiding
judge
lower court
had
*13
Cir.2001)
that
the trial court’s
(directing
prejudice by
abused her discretion to their
legally-correct
recitation of a
“deliberate
instructing
jury
igno
on “deliberate
sup-
ignorance” charge which was not
proof
rance” because no direct
had been
by the case evidence constituted an
ported
admitted
either defendant’s actual
discretion; however, that error
abuse of
knowledge that Johnson was
actual
harmless)
Mari,
ultimately
(citing
su-
was
buyer
of the
firearms. That as
);
702,
76
pra
Corp.,
Innes v. Howell
F.3d
signment
facially
of error was
ill-formulat
(6th Cir.1996).
714
plain language
pattern
ed. The
of the
jury
instruction authorizes a
to find
Conversely,
legally-er
even a
“knowledge”
upon
based
circumstantial
justify
jury charge
roneous
will not
rever
proof
compels
the conclusion that
probable
of a conviction if its
effect on
sal
defendant(s)
must have known the fact
inconsequential. Barnes v.
the verdict was
at
it
op
issue because was “obvious”—as
Fiberglas Corp.,
F.3d
Owens-Coming
201
having merely
posed
negligent
been
(6th
(“We
Cir.2000)
not re
822
will
subject
failing to discover or realize the
of an errone
verse a decision on
basis
they
fact which
should have known.
is
jury
ous
instruction where
error
harmless.”).
error,
contrast,
including
By
proof
an
if
existed that
No trial
direct
instruction,
had
that
jury
compel
will
re
the defendants
known
Johnson
erroneous
buyer
weapons,
actual
no
a conviction unless the defen was the
versal of
dants)
in-
any
ignorance”
“deliberate
prove
alleged
can
“either that the
need
events,
have arisen.
In all
inherently prej
misconduct
was
struction would
[or error]
furnished no
prejudice.”
proof,
that it caused actual
the defendants have
udicial or
conjecture,
speculation,
empty
than
Barger, 931 F.2d
371 other
United States v.
(6th Cir.1991).
proof
hypothesizing,
guesswork,
or documen
creative
“Absent
ju-
thinking,
that
to conclude that the
prejudice,
tation of
we do not assume
wishful
rors did not follow the clear letter of the
prejudice occurred.” United States
Maxwell,
charge, or were
ignorance”
Cir.
“deliberate
Barnes,
1998).
po
any way confused or misled. See
assessing a trial error’s
When
(“Federal
generally
courts
impact,
appellate
In of those the conclu initial prosecu defendants’ trial. The inescapable sion per was rational proffered tion had son, proof that evidence as an experienced let alone licensed fire merchant, Carneys that the would have known knew that Johnson was arms buyer purchaser the true the actual of the weap Johnson was fire arms, Patently, proof ons. the defendants and as plan would have of a common or operandi scheme and consistent modus been convicted with or without the “delib ex Moreover, ignorance” instruction. erate ecuted the defendants and Johnson.11 operative posits: 10. The have also averred that the 11. The rule ignorance” jury charge preju- "deliberate had crimes, wrongs, Evidence of other or acts jurors diced because it authorized them prove is not admissible to the character of a find, proof, in the absence of direct that the person in order to show action conformi- defendants had known that Johnson was a however, ty may, therewith. It be admissi- precluded convicted felon from the lawful ac- purposes, ble proof for other such as However, quisition possession of firearms. motive, intent, opportunity, preparation, whether or not knew that Johnson was a plan, knowledge, identity, irrelevant, or absence mis- knowledge convicted felon was as take or accident[.] of that fact was not an element of either the 924(a)(1)(A) 404(b) added). (emphases Fed.R.Evid. counts of conviction nor of the 922(b)(5) charges 404(b) of conviction. actually To "This [Rule ] is a rule of contrary, respective exclusion, defendant’s knowl- inclusion rather than since Johnson, edge that rather than his female permissible one use is forbidden and several cohort, buyer subject was the actual of the uses of such evidence are identified. The list firearm(s) prove was sufficient to his knowl- permissible uses is not exclusive. Courts edge falsity implicated of the ATF Form recognized permissible have other uses of 4473, key which in turn was the material fact evidence; example, such to show a com- buttressing each count either defen- plan." mon scheme United States v. Blank- dant.
451
(6th Cir.1984),
denied,
cert.
469
allowance of
U.S.
judge’s
A district
404(b)
1021,
440,
is reviewed for abuse
105
F.3d Gener Feinman, United States v. 930 F.2d 142-3, Joiner, v. 522 U.S. al Electric (6th Cir.1991). (1997); 139 L.Ed.2d Inc., Roadway Express, v. Trepel have assailed the Cir.1999)). (6th jurist’s The trial evidentiary final ruling lower court’s its admissibility proffered Rule assessment wit, analytic stage, to that the faulted evi 404(b) follows: proceed should evidence probative substantially dence’s value out
First,
trial court must ascertain
prejudicial
unfair
im
weighed
potential
its
is rele
proffered
evidence
whether
pact upon the defense. “A district court is
proper pur
for a
vant and admissible
‘very
granted
broad’ discretion
deter
Zelinka,
pose. United States
mining
danger
prej
whether the
of undue
Cir.1988).
(6th
rele
To be
F.2d
outweighs
probative
udice
value of the
vant,
to a
must relate
“the evidence
Vance,
evidence.” United States
issue,’
‘in
deal
is
and must
matter which
Cir.1989) (citation
572, 576
omit
substantially
conduct
similar
with
ted).
judicial
“If
self-restraint
is ever de
reasonably near
time to the offenses
sirable,
[prejudicial
it is when a Rule 403
being tried.”
for which the defendant is
a trial court is reviewed
analysis of
effect]
*15
775 F.2d
Blankenship,
States v.
United
by
appellate
an
States
tribunal.” United
Cir.1985) (citations
(6th
735,
omit
739
(6th Cir.1984)
384,
Zipkin,
729 F.2d
390
ted).
prof
To determine whether the
omitted).
(citation
conducting
In
review of
proper
for a
fered evidence is admissible
rejected
objection, the
prejudice”
“undue
decide,
the trial court must
purpose,
in
at the evidence
“look[s]
Sixth Circuit
probative
is
of a
“whether that evidence
light
proponent,
to its
max
most favorable
issue other than character.”
material
minimizing
imizing
probative
its
value and
States,
Huddleston v.
U.S.
United
(citations
prejudicial effect.” Id. at 389
its
681, 686,
1496, 1499, 99
108 S.Ct.
omitted).
(1988).
L.Ed.2d
adjudicator’s judgment
trial
that the
The
Finally,
the court must determine
of the evidence
contro-
probative worth
probative
whether the
value of the evi-
.
any
versy substantially outweighed
possi-
“substantially outweighed by
dence is
Carneys,
prejudice
ble risk of unfair
prejudice.”
of unfair
Fed.
danger
prevailing
under
deferen-
when examined
Huddleston,
403;
R.Evid.
U.S.
standards,
sus-
patently
tial review
was
687,
453 testimony!)]”); Thigpen Cory, of the women’s tion v. 804 the admission trial court to (6th Cir.1986). 893, gun them as the sellers F.2d Each 895 trans identifications by any purported taint caused by reason of action a count of conviction was unduly suggestive procedure. See Sto an an ATF Form memorialized 4473 which 301-02, Denno, 293, 87- v. 388 U.S. vall Carney identified either Sean or Patrick as (1967). 1967, 1199 When 18 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. implicated weapon(s). the seller of the objection an neglects to mount a defendant Moreover, every eyewitness in-court iden trial, precluded at he is from to evidence tification harmonized with the ATF Form was appeal on that its admission arguing identity pertinent as to the sales unless, constituted flawed its allowance addition, eyewitness man. In identifi See, e.g.,. United States v. plain error.12 reliable, inherently cations were even Cir.2004) (6th Combs, 925, 369 F.3d 938 alone, standing by reason of the extended omitted). (citation “Plain error is defined opportunity each woman had to ob error, directly egregious an one seller; “high-im serve the firearms miscarriage justice.” leads to a United event; nature of pact” and the relative (6th 855, Krimsky, 230 F.3d 858 States v. temporal proximity of the events to the (citation Cir.2000) omitted),. . cert. de testimony two (approximately and one-half —- nied, -, 158 U.S. Manson, years). See 432 U.S. at doc “plain L.Ed.2d 92 error” States, 2243; Simmons v. S.Ct. United only in sparingly, be used trine “is to 19 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. solely exceptional circumstances (1968); 895; Thigpen, 804 F.2d justice.” miscarriage United avoid Hamilton, United States v. 684 F.2d (6th Hook, States (6th Cir.1982). (citations omitted). Cir.1986) A reviewing Hence, judge the district did not apply “plain error” doc court should plainly by failing sponte err sua to disallow if trine to “reverse errors were so testimony by any eyewitness. identification apparent rank that should have been Furthermore, if the had even defendants objection, or that judge to the trial without preserved opposition an to that properly fairness, honesty, or strike at fundamental evidence, the thereof would not admission trial.” reputation of the United public ’ an abuse of have constituted discretion. Evans, 496, 499 States Cir.1989). Accordingly, each of the defendants’ five assignments of trial error was miscon- satisfy cannot
Manifestly,
*17
ceived. The convictions of the defendants
in
in-
exacting
proof
standard of
AFFIRMED.
are
appeal.
possibility
No
of misidentifi-
stant
Brathwaite,
cation existed. Manson v.
GUY,
dissenting.
Judge,
Circuit
98, 114,
53 L.Ed.2d
432 U.S.
S.Ct.
(1977)
in con-
paperwork
falsified
in
The
(“reliability
linchpin
is the
with
sales of firearms to a
admissibility of identifiea- nection
their
determining the
rights.
If these con-
Any
(unpreserved) assignment of
that affects substantial
forfeited
12.
met, may
"plain
we
exercise our discre-
error is reviewed for
error.” United
ditions are
only
Page,
543-45
the error
States v.
and notice the error
if
tion
fairness,
Cir.2000).
explained:
integrity,
has
"seriously
The Sixth Circuit
or
affects
judicial proceedings.”
public reputation of
objection, review
Where there has been no
(citations
omitted).
52(b).
and brackets
Id. at 543-44
plain
is for
error. Fed.R.Crim.P.
Cotton,
535 U.S.
See also United States v.
pursuant
an error
to
We cannot correct
631-32,
52(b)
455
of a
across
convey
transportation
the
woman
state
to
an
surprisingly indirect route
message.”
purposes.”
lines for
The statute
easily
“immoral
expressed
and
important
Prods.,
explicitly provide
punish-
511 U.S.
itself did not
for
Film
Landgraf
USI
1483,
ing
being transported,
229
was
114
128 L.Ed.2d
the woman who
S.Ct.
States,
the woman
Dowling v. United
but in Gebardi
was convicted
also
See
3127,
226,
theory.
207,
aiding-or-abetting
S.Ct.
87 under an
The
473 U.S.
(“The
(1985)
conviction,
her
Supreme
...
Court reversed
Government
L.Ed.2d
adoption of an in-
that:
stating
presumes congressional
prob-
to a
blunderbuss solution
direct but
supposed
It
to
that the consent
is not
be
consid-
precision when
lem treated with
adultery
of
to
with
person
an unmarried
directly.”).
ered
the
person,
a married
where
latter alone
offense,
guilty
is
of the substantive
final
strike
The third
an
or a
would render
former
abettor
is
reading of the statute
majority’s
acquiescence
conspirator, or
of
exception
common-law
to
well-established
age
a
under the
of consent would
woman
routinely
liability, which is
aider-or-abettor
co-conspirator
her a
with the man
make
which,
of
for lack
a
to crimes
applied
statutory
upon
to
herself.
rape
commit
tango.
it
to
two
description,
better
takes
case,
principle,
The
determinative
this
accom-
explains,
As the Model Penal Code
is the same.
liability
not
to conduct
plice
does
extend
(internal
to the main
“inevitably
incident”
is
Id. at
citations
Thus,
merely buys
omitted).
someone who
offense.
Similarly, in
States v.
United
(2d
personal
Amen,
Cir.1987),
for
use cannot be
heroin
381-82
aiding
abetting
or
the distribution
with
a
Circuit held that
statute that
Second
consents
heroin;
fourteen-year
a
old who
con-
applied
“kingpins”
to
did not
so-called
forty-year
old cannot be
to sex with
template
aiding-or-abet-
extension
statutory
aiding
abetting
charged with
to
ting liability
apply
accessories:
acces-
to
her ser-
rape;
who sells
prostitute
liability
sory
kingpin
to the
statute would
charged with
a client cannot be
treating kingpins
vices to
purpose
defeat
prosti-
abetting the solicitation
aiding or
than
harshly
their
subordinates.
more
924(a)
924(c)
case, §
tution.
In our
true in our case. Con-
The same holds
inevitably
two
harshly
deal
with
sides
almost
more
than
gress treated customers
knowingly accepts fal-
dealers;
coin: a seller
same
dealers
treat licensed
licensed
buyer
from a
who know-
paperwork
sified
under-
to the customers
as accessories
punish
To
ingly
paperwork.
falsifies
Congress’s intent.
mines
aiding
the latter
abetting
the former
majority’s
interpretation
The
is redundant.
922(b)(5)
from the same
suffers
§of
but
interpretation
Indeed,
routinely
problems
its
the federal courts have
our decision in United
also is at odds with
statutes with this
federal criminal
imbued
Choice,
Cir.
serting age, America, a address of UNITED STATES purchaser.” straw Plaintiff-Appellee, Again, the reading Government’s would subject virtually all licensed dealers who liability,
file to false records dual render- PENSYL, Jon Clark Defendant- 922(b)(5) ing duplicative. Choice, And in Appellant. at when rejecting challenge No. 03-4468. felony conviction under provision 922(b)(5), arguing with the dealer United States Court of Appeals, 924(a) subjected only him to misdemean- Sixth Circuit. liability, explicit we an drew distinction submitting
between false records Argued: Sept. 2004. records, keeping noting no Congress Decided and Filed: Oct. 2004. “punish[ed] knowing- licensed dealers who ly falsify harshly records less than dealers willfully keep
who fail to at records
all.” Id. at language 840. This Choice not, majority contends,
was as the “mere * *) noncontrolling (Majority dictum.”
Rather, if the reading Government’s
statute were correct—that the falsification inevitably
of records also resulted dis- liability
tinct for the attendant failure to
record the true information' —then the ba- holding
sis for our in Choice would be
undermined.
In both of holdings, majority its has statutory interpretations
embraced Congress
assume that created
multiple liability for the same conduct cases, all
virtually but also that it did inso
an indirect when a fashion more direct
means was available to it. I give would
the statutes their natural reading, which
leads to the inevitable conclusion that Con-
gress wanted federally licensed dealers
who falsified paperwork charged only be federally licensed dealers who falsified
paperwork. I therefore would reverse the
convictions. reasons,
For preceding respectful- I
ly dissent.
