Case Information
*1 Before: GILMAN and COOK, Circuit Judges; and COHN, District Judge. [*]
COOK, Circuit Judge. Cary Paradis pleaded guilty to two counts of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and the district court, after applying a six-level enhancement for creating “a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor,” sentenced him to concurrent 188-month sentences. Because the district court did not err in calculating the Guidelines range, we affirm.
I
Paradis admitted the following facts in his plea agreement: On October 30, 2003, a sheriff’s deputy pulled him over, found him without a driver’s license, and, searching him incident to arrest, spotted twenty-seven grams of methamphetamine. With Paradis’s consent, law enforcement then searched his home and found Paradis’s girlfriend, Heather; her three-year-old daughter, Meagan; and a meth lab. Officers arrested Heather for child endangerment, and Paradis admitted that he had taken a “substantial step” toward manufacturing meth.
Results of this search supported the first count in Paradis’s bargained plea; the second count came about from a later meth bust. Using the 2005 Guidelines, the presentence report (“PSR”) grouped these two crimes for sentencing and held Paradis accountable for a drug quantity corresponding to a base offense level of 32. PSR ¶¶ 25, 26 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d)). The probation officer recommended a three-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, as well as a six-level “substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor” enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(6)(C) (renumbered at § 2D1.1(b)(10)(D) in the 2007 Guidelines). Setting Paradis’s criminal history category at II resulted in a 188-to-235-month sentencing range.
Paradis objected to the six-level enhancement, and two witnesses testified at the sentencing hearing. Detective Dwayne Hill, for the government, described the October 30 search. Paradis’s mother Susan Michaud, who owned the house, testified on his behalf. After hearing this testimony, the court delivered a thorough oral decision, which included findings resolving disputed factual issues.
Specifically, the court found that the “lab was in operation,” “Heather and her child Meagan were living at the house and they had been living at the house for at least two weeks,” and Paradis “knew that the child was in the house.” Addressing the risk to Meagan, the court found “that the child was subjected to the chemicals, not only from the air that the child was breathing but [also] other chemicals that may have been present in the house.” The court also noted that Paradis put Meagan at risk of fire and explosion inside the house, explaining that it had presided over “somewhere between 10 and 50 cases where there have been explosions and fires during the process of methamphetamine manufacture.” In view of these findings and considering the applicable Guidelines provision and its factors, the court found “by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was a substantial risk of harm to the child Meagan in this case created by the operation of the methamphetamine laboratory, and therefore the presentence report has correctly applied the six-level increase for this.” The court otherwise approved the PSR’s calculation and sentenced Paradis to concurrent 188-month terms.
Paradis reasserts the objection raised at sentencing.
II
Paradis’s procedural challenge requires that we confirm the district court “correctly
calculat[ed] the applicable Guidelines range.”
Gall v. United States
,
The Guidelines do not define “substantial risk of harm,” but the accompanying application
note provides a list of nonexclusive factors that a court should consider: (1) the quantity of hazardous
materials and the manner in which they were stored; (2) the manner in which hazardous substances
were disposed and the likelihood of their release into the environment; (3) the duration of the offense
and the extent of the manufacturing operation; and (4) the location of the laboratory (i.e., in a
residential neighborhood or remote area) and the number of lives placed at substantial risk of harm.
Whited
,
As explained below, we agree with the district court that Paradis’s drug activity posed a substantial risk to Meagan’s life. In particular, the evidence showed that Meagan had a bedroom only a few feet away from Paradis’s meth lab.
Considering Factors (i) through (iii)
Paradis admitted cooking meth at the house, and, as the district court found, officers then
discovered numerous hazardous items and strong toxic fumes corroborating that admission. When
Detective Hill entered the house, he smelled a pungent chemical odor. Upstairs in a bedroom,
officers found over fifty items used to produce meth, including: forty-nine grams of
pseudoephedrine, beakers, dishes with white residue, hydrogen peroxide, Coleman fuel, acetone, lye,
antifreeze, coffee filters, matchbooks without strikers, and rubbing alcohol. Jars of chemicals sat
on a dresser and on the floor, a microwave in the room contained soaking red phosphorus, a gas
generator sat on the floor, and down the hall under the bathroom sink Hall found a gallon of muriatic
acid. Outside, officers found assorted “meth trash.” The items recovered here are almost
indistinguishable from those recovered in
United States v. Layne
, where, in affirming a risk-of-harm-
to-human-life enhancement, we observed: “Although these chemicals are probably typical of those
used in indoor methamphetamine labs, the inherent danger of the[se] chemicals” favors the
enhancement.
As for the second factor, other than Hill’s brief statement that officers found “meth trash,”
little establishes how Paradis disposed of the meth materials. But a lack of evidence on this factor
does not necessarily aid Paradis.
See United States v. Patterson
,
Third, the “duration” factor is met by the district court’s finding that Paradis operated the lab
while Meagan and Heather lived in the house. Where the risk of harm involves a minor living at the
place where the drug is being manufactured, federal courts have not required proof that the child was
present during numerous cooks or for any particular length of time.
See Whited
,
Considering Factor (iv)
The main dispute here centers on whether Meagan’s life was placed at risk by the meth- manufacturing activities, and we agree with the district court that it was.
At the sentencing hearing, Michaud testified that Paradis had moved back home a couple weeks before the search and that Heather and Meagan would often sleep over. As she told it, Meagan at first slept “downstairs on the couch,” until they finished preparing her bedroom “next to Cary’s room upstairs.” Michaud’s testimony matched Hill’s recollection that, when officers arrived, Heather and Meagan came to the front door and that Heather later told him “[t]hey were living upstairs.” Hill estimated that only “5 to 7 feet” separated Meagan’s upstairs bedroom from the lab.
Paradis argues there was no proof at sentencing “other than the generic-type proof that
methamphetamine ingredients and odors can cause harm to other persons.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.
Federal courts usually reject such attempts to downplay the risk posed for two reasons. First, “[t]he
Guidelines do not require the sentencing court to find that the . . . children were
actually harmed
by
the [defendant’s] production of methamphetamine, . . . only that their lives were placed at substantial
risk
of harm.”
United States v. Bivens
,
The district court properly applied the enhancement.
See Brain
,
Paradis’s situation differs from that in
United States v. Davidson
, where a meth lab did not
pose a substantial risk to human life when operated in a remote, locked barn loft—we labeled that
“one of the (relatively) safer places a person could set up an illegal methamphetamine lab.” 409 F.3d
304, 314 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, in contrast, a three-year old child slept in a house for not
insubstantial periods of time mere feet from where Paradis admits he operated a meth lab. It is
irrelevant that, as Paradis suggests, Hill could not remember whether he used a breathing apparatus
when entering the house, Appellant’s Br. at 17, or that Michaud was allowed back into the house that
night,
id.
at 18.
See Brain
,
Finally, we cannot agree with Paradis that his case is like United States v. Carney , 117 F. App’x 928 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). There the sentencing court read the enhancement to require “[n]ot a risk to the life of the minor, but a risk of harm.” Id. at 930. Paradis likens himself to the defendant in Carney by targeting a single statement at sentencing where the court found “a substantial risk of harm to the child Meagan.” JA 84. We are assured, however, by the court’s reading of the enhancement’s full language before announcing its sentence that it made the requisite findings and spoke only in shorthand—the same shorthand defense counsel used. See JA 30 (“It’s the six-level enhancement relative to the substantial risk of harm to a minor child.”). Paradis failed to object, moreover, to any perceived shortcomings in the court’s articulation, despite being offered an opportunity to do so.
III
Paradis argues that, even if a preponderance of the evidence supported the enhancement, due
process required the government to justify its application by clear-and-convincing evidence because
the enhancement nearly doubled his advisory range. (Had the offense level been 29, the range would
have been 97 to 121 months.)
See United States v. Staten
,
This circuit faithfully applies the preponderance standard. We rejected identical arguments
before
Booker
,
see Layne
,
Brika clarified that challenges to “large enhancements . . . should be viewed through the lens of Booker reasonableness rather than that of due process.” 487 F.3d at 462. Having rejected Paradis’s sole objection to the procedural component of his sentence, the relevant lens of reasonableness here is that of “substantive reasonableness.” Because the district court’s independent sentencing assessment comports with the views of the Sentencing Commission—i.e., because Paradis’s sentence falls within the correctly calculated range—we afford this “double determination” a presumption of reasonableness. Vonner , 516 F.3d at 389; Rita , 127 S. Ct. at 2462. Paradis advances no argument to rebut this presumption, much less one to establish that the district court abused its discretion in selecting the 188-month sentence. See United States v. Christopher , 415 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2005).
IV
Finding that the district court properly applied § 2D1.1(b)(6)(C) to enhance Paradis’s offense level to 35, we affirm.
Notes
[*] The Honorable Avern Cohn, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.