OPINION
Michael A. Page pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine and mari
I.
Page’s plea agreement contains no stipulated facts section, so we must look to the transcript of Page’s change of plea hearing where the prosecutor rеad into the record the relevant factual background. According to the prosecutor, Page recruited females from the Sandusky, Ohio area to be drug couriers in 2001. The women were brought to Cleveland and then to New York, where they were given airline tickets to travel to Guyana, South America. Once in Guyаna, the women were “strapped” with cocaine and then would return to the United States, bringing the cocaine with them.
Page was allegedly responsible for recruiting at least eight females and one male to transport cocaine into the United States. Of those, only six of the females actually traveled to Guyana, and each of those women allegedly transported between two and four kilograms of cocaine back to the United States. Pagе was responsible for recruiting the drug couriers, helping them to obtain their passports, and transporting them from the Sandusky, Ohio area to Cleveland. When they rеturned from Guyana, Page picked them up in Cleveland, and paid each woman $10,000 for each trip she took.
Of the six women recruited by Page who transported cocaine from Guyana, one was apprehended in Guyana with 5.23 kilograms of cocaine on her person, and another was stoppеd in New York with approximately 3.5 kilograms of cocaine. According to the prosecutor, Page was responsible for the importation of between fifteen and fifty kilograms of cocaine from Guyana over the course of the conspiracy.
Page was indicted in two counts of a multiple-defеndant, multiple-count indictment. He was charged in Count One with conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1) and 963; and in Count Two with сonspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
Page eventually pleaded guilty to Count One in exchange for the government’s agreement to drop Count Two. He was sentenced to 204 months’ imprisonment, within the suggested guidelines range of 168-210 months.
Page now appeals his conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was not a knowing waiver of his constitutional rights because he was never properly made aware of the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(G).
II.
1. Standard of Review
Page failed to object during his plea colloquy to the district court’s alleged violation of Rule 11(b)(1)(G). As such, we evaluate his claim under the heightened plain-error standard of review.
United States v. McCreary-Redd,
2. Rule 11(b)(1)(G)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(G) “requires that, before a court accepts a guilty plea, it must ensure that the defendant understands,
inter alia,
‘the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading.’”
United States v. Valdez,
Page’s argument that the district court did not adequately address the nature of the charge focuses on a two-question give and take during the hearing:
The Court: Have you read the indictment in this case?
Mr. Page: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Any question in your mind that you don’t understand the chаrges, which are also set forth in the plea agreement at paragraph 2, with respect to Count 1, conspiracy to import narcotics? Havе you read that?
Mr. Page: Yes, your Honor.
While the second question above is less than clear, and would lead a rational person to query whether or not Page truly understood thе nature of the charge to which he was pleading, this short baek- and-forth with the district court is not representative of the entire transcript of Page’s hearing. A review of the entire record of Page’s change of plea hearing reveals that the district court met the requirements of both Rule 11(b)(1)(G) and Rule 11(b)(3) when it established a factual basis for Page’s guilty plea, and ensured that Page understood the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty.
Specifically, Count One of the indictment, to which Page pled guilty, was included in the plea agreement which was read into the record by the government. While simply reading the criminal chаrge may not be enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(b)(1)(G) in complex cases,
see, e.g., United States v. Syal,
Most importantly, the district court instructed the government to “articulate for the record the summary of the evidence if this case went to trial.” Following the district court’s instruction, the government read into the record the facts, summarized at the beginning of this opinion, detailing Page’s alleged involvement in the scheme tо import cocaine into the United States. The district court then asked Page if he understood the evidence that the government planned to prove at trial against him, to which Page answered in the affirmative. The district court asked Page if he had anything else to add, to which Page’s attorney offered a smаll correction to the facts read by the government. Only after this factual basis was determined, and only after ensuring that Page understood the rights he was giving up and thе charge against him, did the district court accept Page’s plea of guilty pursuant to the plea agreement.
While less than a model of clarity, the tоtality of the record supports the government’s argument that the district court established a factual basis for Page’s guilty plea, and that Page understood the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. Accordingly, we find that Page has failed to meet the high burden required by the plain-error standard of review governing this case.
III.
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM Page’s conviction.