United States v. OwensUnited States v. Owens
Pending before the Court is a petition under
I. BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2016, the grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Owens with being a Prohibited Person in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of
On November 2, 2016, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Owens pleaded guilty to Count One. See ECF No. 27. On March 1, 2017, the Court sentenced Owens to a period of 12 months of incarceration, to run consecutively to any state sentence imposed. See ECF No. 43. The Court also imposed a two-year period of supervised release. See id. Owens did not appeal his conviction and sentence. On July 28, 2025, Owens filed a pro se petition under
II. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND OBJECTIONS
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge first recommends that the Court deny Owens‘s request for counsel. He then finds that the Petition fails on the merits and recommends that it be denied.
The R&R informed the parties that they had fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the R&R to file “specific written objections, identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis of such objection.” R&R, ECF No. 62, at 9. It further warned them that the “[f]ailure to file written objections . . . shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id.
When reviewing a magistrate judge‘s R&R, the Court must review de novo only the portions to which an objection has been timely made.
III. DISCUSSION
As discussed below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge‘s conclusions. Even assuming, as the Magistrate Judge does, that the Petition is timely, it fails.
Owens asserts that his counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and discover evidence of his service-related psychological and neurological issues. He asserts that the issues had a “significant impact on his cognitive and executive function at the time of his crime(s) . . . thereby mitigating the outcome of his proceedings.” See ECF No. 61 at 6. On December 31, 2024, he received a diagnosis of PTSD “stemming from a history of combat and training related traumas.” Id. On February 24, 2025, he was diagnosed with “T2 prolongation of periventricular and subcortical
Pursuant to
The Court notes that pro se allegations are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers and must be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
A. Appointment of Counsel
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized that “[t]here is no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.” Hagie v. Pinion, 995 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987)). The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge on this question, finds that the appointment of counsel is not warranted in this case, and denies the motion to appoint counsel.
B. Ineffective Assistance
Criminal defendants have a right to effective legal assistance under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish that counsel‘s assistance was not reasonably effective, a petitioner must satisfy a two-pronged analysis. First, he must show that counsel‘s performance fell below an
When considering the performance prong, courts apply a “strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Id. at 689. Whether representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness is measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Lewis v. Wheeler, 609 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The court must judge counsel “on the facts of the particular case” and assess counsel‘s performance “from counsel‘s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential[.]” Id. at 689. A court must consider “the practical limitations and tactical decisions that trial counsel faced.” Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1363 (4th Cir. 1991).
To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. If it is clear that a petitioner has failed to
Here, the Court concludes that Owens‘s counsel‘s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to discover evidence of Owens‘s psychological and neurological conditions. As Owens points out, his psychological and neurological deficits were unknown prior to the filing of the Petition, and Owens admits that they “could not have been presented at the time of trial or sentencing.” ECF No. 61 at 7, 14. Owens‘s Presentence Investigation Report, which the parties had an opportunity to review and which was adopted by the Court, indicates that Owens had no reported history of mental or emotional issues or history of treatment. See PSR, ECF No. 40, at ¶ 89. There is not a sufficient record before the Court to show that reasonable counsel should have been on notice that Owens might have mental or neurological issues that were relevant to his plea or sentencing.
Further, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that even if Owens could show that counsel was on notice of his psychological and neurological issues, the Petition should still be dismissed. The unknown nature of Owens‘s diagnoses is the reason why his Petition fails and also the only reason why his Petition could be considered timely. Owens is aware that the Petition was filed
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court ORDERS as follows:
- The R&R is ADOPTED [ECF No. 62 in 1:16-CR-61; ECF No. 5 in 1:25-CV-70];
- The motion to appoint counsel is DENIED [ECF No. 56 in 1:16-CR-61];
- The motion to exceed page limitations is GRANTED [ECF No. 67 in 1:16-CR-61; ECF No. 8 in 1:25-CV-70];
- Owens‘s objections are OVERRULED [ECF No. 68 in 1:16-CR-61; ECF No. 9 in 1:25-CV-70];
- The Petition is DENIED and DISMISSED with prejudice [ECF No. 52 in 1:16-CR-61; ECF No. 1 in 1:25-CV-70];
- Case No. 1:25-CV-70 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the Court‘s active docket; and
The Clerk SHALL enter a separate judgment order in favor of the United States in 1:25-CV-70.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, the district court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” “If the Court denies a certificate, the parties may not appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22.”
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record by email and to Owens by certified mail, return receipt requested.
DATED: July 7, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA