228 F. 561 | D. Idaho | 1915
This is an action to recover from the defendant penalties for five different alleged violations of what is commonly known as the “Hours of Service Act” (34 Stat. 1415). Upon the coming in of the defendant’s answer to the complaint, the plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, and by agreement between counsel the cause has been finally submitted upon the questions of
A carrier is liable if, in the language of the act, it “requires or permits” an employé to remain on duty more than 9 hours; and under section 3 it is “deemed to have had knowledge of all acts of all its officers and agents.” The precise point urged by the defendant is that, not having actual knowledge that Weston was working overtime, it cannot be held to-have “permitted” the unlawful act, for the term “permit” necessarily implies both knowledge and consent. Gregory v. United States, 10 Fed. Cas. 1195, 1197; In re Wilmington (D. C.) 120 Fed. 180, 184; Wilson v. State, 19 Ind. App. 389, 46 N. E. 1050, 1051; People v. Conness, 150 Cal. 114, 88 Pac. 821, 824; Words and Phrases, vol. 6, p. 5317. The difficulty with the argument is that if it is given place, section 3 of the act is rendered wholly ineffective, for if the knowledge thus imputed cannot, when considered in connection with inaction on the part of the carrier, be made the basis for an inference of permission or consent, it can serve no useful purpose at all. If not only knowledge, but permission in fact, must be proved, and if, as contended, permission in fact cannot be predicated upon the imputed ' knowledge, it necessarily follows that actual knowledge must always be affirmatively established as any other material fact. In the argument the knowledge referred to in section 3 was assumed to be constructive only, but it is to be noted that it is not so designated in the act. The declaration is that the carrier shall be “deemed to have had knowledge” — not constructive knowledge. A corporation can, of course, acquire knowledge only through its officers and agents. Under the rules of general law it is chargeable with the knowledge, not of all of its officers and agents, but of only certain classes thereof. But, within the scope of the rule, actual notice to the officer or agent is deemed to be actual notice to the corporation.
It is thought that the statute here simply operates to enlarge the application of the general rule beyond those certain classes to which it is now confined by extending it to all officers and agents, and therefore the knowledge which comes to the corporation through an inferior agent is of the same quality as that which comes through one having general authority; in both cases the notice is deemed to be actual and not merely constructive. I am unable to yield to the suggestion that the only effect of section 3 is to cast upon the carrier the burden of showing that it was without knowledge. The language is -inapt to express such a purpose. The declaration is absolute and unqualified:
*563 “In all prosecutions * * * the common carrier shall be deemed to have had knowledge,” etc.
The statute identifies the carrier with all of its agents, inferior as well as superior, and to it is imputed the knowledge of any one of them. It once appearing that some officer or agent had knowledge, it becomes quite immaterial to show that other officers or agents were without such knowledge. It is doubtless true that, so interpreted, the act is rigorous, and may now and then operate harshly upon the carrier; but, upon the other hand, it is apparent that under the view urged by the defendant it would be a much less efficient means for accomplishing the manifest purpose for which it was designed. From the discussion it follows that the answer states no defense to the first four causes of action, and as to them the motion for judgment must be allowed. It should be added that, while the reasoning may in some respects be distinct, the conclusion is fully supported by O. W. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. United States (D. C.) 213 Fed. 688, and is, to say the least, not out of harmony with the views expressed by the Circuit Court o E Appeals in its opinion of affirmance in that case. 223 Fed. 596, -C. C. A. —.
Accordingly, as to the fifth count, the motion will be denied, and the complaint dismissed.