321 F.3d 355 | 3rd Cir. | 2003
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This is a civil forfeiture action against an aircraft the(cid:13) government claims was used to illegally transport aliens en(cid:13) route to the United States Virgin Islands. The owner of the(cid:13) aircraft contends the government did not meet its burden to(cid:13) obtain forfeiture. In this pre-CAFRA1 forfeiture, we hold the(cid:13) government demonstrated probable cause that the aircraft(cid:13) was used in violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a), and that the(cid:13) owner presented no contrary evidence. We also hold that(cid:13) CAFRA does not apply retroactively. We will affirm the(cid:13) judgment of forfeiture in rem.(cid:13) I(cid:13) Russell Robinson owned a Piper Aztec F DeLuxe Model(cid:13) 250PA Aircraft, bearing serial number 27-7654057 and(cid:13) United States registration number N6257H. The(cid:13) government alleged Robinson authorized pilot David Peltier(cid:13) to fly to St. Maarten and transport three illegal aliens to(cid:13) Anegada, British Virgin Islands. On July 3, 1998, Peltier(cid:13) flew an aircraft matching the registration number of the(cid:13) seized aircraft to Anegada where he dropped off the aliens(cid:13) and notified Robinson of their arrival.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. CAFRA refers to the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L.(cid:13) No. 106-185, S 21, 114 Stat. at 225 (codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1324 (note)),(cid:13) which Congress enacted after the seizure at issue here took place.(cid:13) 2(cid:13) The next day, a vessel docked at the Anegada Reef Hotel(cid:13) to collect the three aliens. British Virgin Islands’s customs(cid:13) agents stopped the vessel with Robinson and the three(cid:13) aliens on board. But they were forced to release the vessel(cid:13) once it entered U.S. waters. Later that evening, officers of(cid:13) the U.S. Virgin Islands Department of Planning and Natural(cid:13) Resources observed the vessel as it entered Cruz Bay 2(cid:13) without running lights and witnessed the aliens(cid:13) disembarking at the Virgin Islands National Park service(cid:13) dock. The three aliens did not have permission to enter the(cid:13) United States. On May 19, 1999, the government(cid:13) commenced forfeiture in rem proceedings, and on May 25,(cid:13) the District Court issued a warrant of arrest in rem. On(cid:13) August 25, 1999, U.S. Marshals arrested the aircraft and(cid:13) published notice. Robinson filed a notice of claim and(cid:13) posted a $5,000 bond to formally contest the forfeiture. On(cid:13) March 22, 2002, the District Court decreed the property be(cid:13) forfeited to the United States. Robinson has appealed.(cid:13) II(cid:13) A(cid:13) We first address the proper burden of proof. In 2000,(cid:13) Congress enacted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act,(cid:13) which changed the burden of proof in civil forfeiture(cid:13) actions. Under CAFRA, in "any forfeiture proceeding(cid:13) commenced on or after [August 23, 2000]," the government(cid:13) must prove forfeiture under a preponderance of the(cid:13) evidence standard. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of(cid:13) 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, S 21, 114 Stat. at 225 (codified(cid:13) at 8 U.S.C. S 1324 (note)). As noted, the government’s initial(cid:13) filing here occurred on May 19, 1999. At issue is whether(cid:13) CAFRA applies retroactively.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. According to the government’s uncontested evidence, Cruz Bay is not(cid:13) a port of traditional entry. The United States Code provides for criminal(cid:13) and civil penalties for bringing in and harboring certain aliens. 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1324. Under the Code, any conveyance involved in bringing an alien "to(cid:13) the United States in any manner whatsoever . . . at a place other than(cid:13) a designated port of entry" shall be liable for forfeiture. 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) SS 1324(a)(1)(A)(I), 1324(b).(cid:13) 3(cid:13) Most appellate courts have denied retroactive application(cid:13) of CAFRA. United States v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency,(cid:13) 303 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.(cid:13) $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 76(cid:13) n.5 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Wagoner County Real(cid:13) Estate, 278 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2002); United States(cid:13) v. Carrell, 252 F.3d 1193, 1198 nn.4 & 10 (11th Cir. 2001);(cid:13) Larson v. United States, 274 F.3d 643 (1st Cir. 2001). Only(cid:13) one appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth(cid:13) Circuit, has held otherwise. United States v. Real Property(cid:13) in Section 9, 241 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2001). In Real Property,(cid:13) the Sixth Circuit concluded it was proper to apply CAFRA(cid:13) retroactively where the application did not prejudice either(cid:13) party. Real Property, 241 F.3d at 798-99.(cid:13) Whether a statutory provision applies retroactively to(cid:13) pending cases depends on statutory interpretation. See(cid:13) Matthews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1998).3 CAFRA applies to "any forfeiture proceeding(cid:13) commenced on or after [August 23, 2000]." This language is(cid:13) clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, our inquiry is done.(cid:13) Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280; $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency,(cid:13) 303 F.3d at 1185-86 & n.5 ("Congress manifested a clear(cid:13) intent to apply CAFRA’s heightened burden of proof only to(cid:13) judicial forfeiture proceedings in which the government’s(cid:13) complaint was filed on or after August 23, 2000. Congress(cid:13) did not intend to apply the new law to cases filed before but(cid:13) pending on the effective date.").(cid:13) B(cid:13) An aircraft used to bring or attempt to bring aliens into(cid:13) the United States illegally is subject to forfeiture to the(cid:13) United States under 8 U.S.C. S 1324(b).4 Civil forfeitures of(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. In the absence of clear congressional intent, the Supreme Court has(cid:13) recognized a traditional presumption against retroactivity. Landgraf v.(cid:13) USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) ("[T]he presumption against(cid:13) retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and(cid:13) embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic."); see Lindh(cid:13) v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).(cid:13) 4. "Any conveyance, including any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft, that has(cid:13) been or is being used in the commission of a violation of subsection (a),(cid:13) the gross proceeds of such violation, and any property traceable to such(cid:13) conveyance or proceeds, shall be seized and subject to forfeiture." 8(cid:13) U.S.C. S 1324(b)(1).(cid:13) 4(cid:13) property used in bringing in and harboring illegal aliens are(cid:13) governed by the procedures provided in 18 U.S.C.SS 981 et(cid:13) seq.5 The government generally files a complaint for(cid:13) forfeiture in rem and obtains a warrant for seizure of the(cid:13) property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 981(b)(2). 6(cid:13) Robinson contends that each step of the litigation(cid:13) qualifies as a new "proceeding" and that his appeal, filed on(cid:13) April 1, 2002, brings this forfeiture proceeding under(cid:13) CAFRA. We disagree.(cid:13) We apply normal rules of statutory construction. The(cid:13) plain meaning of the statute controls unless the language(cid:13) is ambiguous or leads to absurd results. Abdul-Akbar v.(cid:13) McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); see(cid:13) Carrell, 252 F.3d at 1198 (interpreting the plain language of(cid:13) CAFRA). In Abdul-Akbar, we affirmed the American Plain(cid:13) Meaning Rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in(cid:13) Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)(cid:13) (internal citations omitted):(cid:13) It is elementary that the meaning of the statute(cid:13) must, in the first instance, be sought in the language(cid:13) in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if(cid:13) the law is within the constitutional authority of the(cid:13) law-making body which passed it, the sole function of(cid:13) the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.(cid:13) As the Supreme Court recently interpreted Caminetti,(cid:13) "[o]ur task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and(cid:13) where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain(cid:13) terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as(cid:13) conclusive." Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993).(cid:13) The plain meaning is conclusive "except in the rare cases(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. "For purposes of this section, the provisions of the customs laws(cid:13) relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, condemnation of(cid:13) property for violation of the customs laws . . . shall apply to seizures and(cid:13) forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under this section(cid:13) . . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 981(d).(cid:13) 6. "Seizures pursuant to this section shall be made pursuant to a(cid:13) warrant obtained in the same manner as provided for a search warrant(cid:13) under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . ." 18 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 981(b)(2).(cid:13) 5(cid:13) [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a(cid:13) result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its(cid:13) drafters." United States v. Ron Pair Enters. , 489 U.S. 235,(cid:13) 242 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).(cid:13) Here, CAFRA applies to "any forfeiture proceeding(cid:13) commenced on or after [August 23, 2000]." The plain(cid:13) language is clear: the commencement of a forfeiture(cid:13) proceeding can mean only the point when the government(cid:13) first files a complaint for forfeiture in rem under 18 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 981(b)(2). The proceeding commences with the(cid:13) government’s action and ends when the final appeal is(cid:13) exhausted. No other interpretation is sensible.(cid:13) Although unnecessary here, the legislative history is(cid:13) instructive. As the bill passed the House originally, it would(cid:13) have applied CAFRA to all "cases pending on the date of "(cid:13) enactment. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1658,(cid:13) 106th Cong., S 6(b)(1) (1999), reprinted in 145 Cong. Rec.(cid:13) H4858, H4878 (daily ed. June 24, 1999). But that language(cid:13) was deleted in the bill’s final version. Subsequent legislative(cid:13) history demonstrates that "the date on which a forfeiture(cid:13) proceeding is commenced is the date on which the first(cid:13) administrative notice of forfeiture relating to the property is(cid:13) sent." 146 Cong. Rec. H2040, H2051 (daily ed. April 11,(cid:13) 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde).(cid:13) Furthermore, Congress expressly applied CAFRA(cid:13) retroactively to S 14(c) of the Act, a section which prevents(cid:13) fugitives from pursuing forfeiture claims. That Congress(cid:13) drew a distinction between these two types of forfeiture(cid:13) claims is significant. See Lindh, 521 U.S at 329-330(cid:13) (describing the statutory analysis where two sections of the(cid:13) same statute evolved differently).(cid:13) We hold that CAFRA does not apply retroactively to civil(cid:13) forfeiture proceedings commenced before August 23, 2000.(cid:13) The civil forfeiture proceeding here commenced with the(cid:13) government’s filing of a complaint for forfeiture of the Piper(cid:13) Aztec aircraft, which was initiated more than one year prior(cid:13) to CAFRA’s enactment. We therefore will apply the pre-(cid:13) CAFRA burden of proof standard.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) III(cid:13) Robinson denies his aircraft was used to transport illegal(cid:13) aliens. Under the pre-CAFRA burden of proof, "[i]n all suits(cid:13) or actions brought for the forfeiture of any conveyance(cid:13) seized under this section, where the conveyance is claimed(cid:13) by any person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such(cid:13) claimant, except that probable cause shall be first shown(cid:13) for the institution of such suit or action." 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1324(b)(5).(cid:13) Although we have had no occasion to address it(cid:13) previously, several sister circuits have interpreted 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1324(b)(5) to require that the government demonstrate(cid:13) probable cause to execute a forfeiture in rem. Once the(cid:13) government demonstrates probable cause, the burden of(cid:13) proof shifts to the owner of the seized property, who must(cid:13) establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the(cid:13) property was not used in connection with illegal activities.(cid:13) E.g., United States v. $129,727.00 in U.S. Currency, 129(cid:13) F.3d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. One(cid:13) Beechcraft King Air 300 Aircraft, 107 F.3d 829, 830 (11th(cid:13) Cir. 1997); United States v. $94,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 2(cid:13) F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. 228 Acres of(cid:13) Land, 916 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.(cid:13) Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989); United States(cid:13) v. $250,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 900 (1st(cid:13) Cir. 1987); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 970-73(cid:13) (10th Cir. 1974).(cid:13) The government satisfied its burden of proof here. It(cid:13) offered the sworn testimony of pilot Peltier and Dean Foy,(cid:13) a British Virgin Islands customs agent, and the affidavit of(cid:13) INS special agent Brendan Hickey, who swore to facts that(cid:13) more than demonstrate probable cause.7 Peltier testified he(cid:13) piloted the seized aircraft that transported the illegal aliens(cid:13) from St. Maarten to Anegada. Customs agent Foy testified(cid:13) he stopped a vessel transporting the same illegal aliens(cid:13) from Anegada, but could not detain them because the boat(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. Despite Robinson’s contention, the District Court correctly admitted(cid:13) the hearsay evidence of Hickey’s affidavit. The government can rely on(cid:13) hearsay evidence to meet its probable cause burden. United States v.(cid:13) 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1989).(cid:13) 7(cid:13) drifted into U.S. waters. Special agent Hickey gave an(cid:13) affidavit that the three illegal aliens lacked U.S. visas and(cid:13) entered the country illegally. Based on this evidence, the(cid:13) District Court properly found probable cause that the Piper(cid:13) Aztec aircraft had been used to transport illegal aliens.(cid:13) With evidence demonstrating probable cause, the burden(cid:13) shifted to Robinson to disprove this presumption by a(cid:13) preponderance of the evidence. On appeal, Robinson(cid:13) asserts he met his burden because his criminal conviction(cid:13) was overturned.8 But the absence of a criminal conviction(cid:13) is irrelevant in a civil forfeiture proceeding, which is(cid:13) directed against the property, not the owner. United States(cid:13) v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Civil(cid:13) forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. . . . The innocence of the(cid:13) owner is irrelevant -- it is enough that the property was(cid:13) involved in a violation to which the forfeiture attaches.").(cid:13) Robinson fails to offer any evidence to controvert the(cid:13) government’s contentions. His failure to do so means he(cid:13) has not met his burden of proof.(cid:13) IV(cid:13) Robinson contends the pre-CAFRA burden of proof in(cid:13) civil forfeiture actions violates his constitutional right to(cid:13) due process under the Fifth Amendment. The pre-CAFRA(cid:13) system, which we apply here, involved multiple steps. As(cid:13) the statute provided, "the burden of proof shall lie upon(cid:13) such claimant, except that probable cause shall be first(cid:13) shown for the institution of such suit or action." 8 U.S.C(cid:13) S 1324(b)(5).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 8. On July 14, 1999, a jury convicted Robinson in the related criminal(cid:13) proceedings for knowingly and willfully bringing aliens into the United(cid:13) States at a place other than a designated port of entry. United States v.(cid:13) Robinson, No. 99-cr-00021-1 (V.I. filed July 14, 1999). But this court(cid:13) subsequently remanded the case to the District Court for a hearing on(cid:13) whether the jurors improperly had access to prejudicial information.(cid:13) United States v. Robinson, 263 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2001) (table). The(cid:13) District Court vacated the judgment of conviction and granted Robinson(cid:13) a new trial. The government has not filed new proceedings against(cid:13) Robinson.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) Robinson offers no argument why the pre-CAFRA burden(cid:13) of proof violates due process. It is common that criminal(cid:13) and civil matters may require different burdens of proof.(cid:13) Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 2002). For civil forfeitures, we have found the burden of(cid:13) proof is a preponderance of the evidence standard shifted to(cid:13) the claimant. United States v. R.R. #1, Box 224 , 14 F.3d(cid:13) 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1994); accord $129,727.00 in U.S.(cid:13) Currency, 129 F.3d at 492. We see no constitutional(cid:13) infirmity in this standard for a civil action against the(cid:13) seized property.(cid:13) V(cid:13) For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of(cid:13) forfeiture.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 9