Lead Opinion
The United States instituted an action in rem in the district court,
The district court tried this action on facts stipulated by the parties, which may be summarized as follows. From early June 1975 through January 1976, Thomas J. Connelly, Special Agent of the Burеau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, worked undercover investigating violations of the wagering laws in the Chelsea, Massachusetts area. During this period, Connelly observed Charles Zullo, claimant’s husband, collecting wagering slips and money from a barmaid in the Chelsea restaurant, placed wagers with and collected winnings from Zullo, and carried on a conversation with Zullo in which he told Connelly that he had “been in the booking business for forty years.” On October 14, 1975, Zullo told Connelly that he had traded his old car for a 1975 Pontiac Lemans Grand Am. On several occasions thereafter, Connelly either placed bets with Zullo while he was seated in the 1975 Pontiac or observed Zullo using the Pontiac to drive away from one of his betting transactions with wagers and wagering records in his possession.
On February 5, 1976, Connelly advised Special Agent Joseph V. Leone of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms that Zullo had used a 1975 Pontiac Lemans, white with red top, Massachusetts registration 4T6319 (“the Pontiac”), on October 23 and November 6, 1975, to transport wagering paraphernalia and related money, and that on December 2, 1975, Zullo had accepted a wager while sitting in the car. On February 5, 1976 a federal magistrate issued a warrant to search the person of Charles Zullo for “gambling records and wagering paraphernalia,” and on February 6,1976, the warrant was executed. Also on February 6, 1976, Agent Leone, acting pursuant to sections 7302 and 7321 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7302, 7321,
I.
Claimant urges us to hold that since the district court made no findings that she had intentionally used the Pontiac in violation of the internal revenue laws, the government was not entitled to forfeiture under section 7302. This argument runs counter to the common law theory of forfeiture. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
Section 7302 has been applied in light of this traditional view of forfeiture. In in-
terbartolo v. United States,
It is true that in United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
“When the forfeiture statutes аre viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.”
Id., 721-22,
It may be that forfeiture statutes cannot be constitutionally applied to one who alleges and proves “not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.” Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
II.
Claimant also asserts that the government is not entitled to forfeiture because agent Leone’s warrantless seizure of the Pontiac violated the provisions of section 7302 stating that “[a] search warrant may issue as provided in chapter 205 of title 18 of the United States Code and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the seizure of such property. . . .” She argues that since a forfeiture provision such as this is penal in nature, and therefore should be strictly construed, we should read this language as permitting sеizures only on authority of a warrant issued on probable cause, “absent applicable exigent circumstances” that would justify a warrantless seizure.
Although it is true that forfeiture statutes such as this one are in one sense correctly regarded as penal, see United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
Nor are we moved to adopt claimant’s reading by any constitutional difficulties that such warrantless seizures might present. It is true that the canons of statutory construction demand that we construe statutes to avoid raising questions of their constitutionality where such a reading is “fаirly possible.” NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
III.
Claimant also argues that the seizure of the Pontiac was unconstitutional because agent Leone did not possess probable cause to believe that the car was subject to forfeiture under 26 U.S.C. § 7302.
Claimant concedes that agent Connelly, who had conducted the investigation of Charles Zullo, had sufficient probable cause to seize the Pontiac. But she argues that Connelly did not convey a sufficiently detailed account of his observations to his superiors to provide an adequate basis for any other agent to effect the seizure. In particular, she says that the information on which agent Leone acted was both too stale and too conclusory and imprecise. We do not feel compelled to scrutinize the extent of agent Leone’s knowledge, since the cases that have addressed this question have consistently held that the existence of probable cause is to be evaluated on the basis of the collective information of the law enforcement officers engaged in a particular investigation. See United States v. Ashley,
IV.
We turn finally to claimant’s argument that warrantless seizure of the vehicle, absent exigent circumstances, violated the fourth amendment. The government responds that it acted under a well-recognized exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement which allows the seizure of forfeit automobiles without warrant. A panel of this circuit recently upheld such an exception in a case where the seizing officers had probable cause to believe that all the conditions imposing the forfeiture had been met. United States v. Pappas,
We adhere to the position taken by the panel in Pappas,
It would take a bold person to predict in a changing world that even such apparently solid precedent will always remain in place, but we think that changes, if any, should be left to a higher court. The law enforcement process is better served if not undermined by a plethora of diverse opinions around the country. We see no insult to personal liberty, or threat to property, arising from the present state of the law such as would encourage us to embark upon a new direction. We therefore hold that the warrantless seizure, undergirded as it was by probable cause, was constitutional, and that no special exigency was required.
There is a further reason to affirm in the present case. Once property is used in violation of the internal revenue laws, the government is entitled to its possession. See Boyd v. United States,
In Interbartolo we indicated that a prior unauthorized seizure of the object did not preclude a valid forfeiture. We do not pass at this time on the continued vitality of Interbartolo itself nor do we purport finally to decide the question we last raised; we only observe that it cannot easily be seen how defects in the temporary initial seizure of a forfeitable object would or should carry over in such a way as to prevent its forfeiture in a properly conducted proceeding like that below in which all conditions establishing the government’s title have been proven by evidence the genesis of which did not lie in the allegedly illegal seizure.
To be sure, as Chief Judge Coffin points out in his dissent, the concurring opinion in Berkowitz v. United States,
If illegal automobile seizures were a serious social problem, and if other means did not exist for deterring illegal conduct, perhaps such a new twist in the already byzantine law of search and seizure would make sense. As it is, we see little need and no precedent for such a new complexity. Should the police overreach to the extent of seizing an “innocent” vehicle, the victim will regain his vehicle at the forfeiture proceeding, and should he be able to show that the warrantless seizure was effected in bad faith and caused personal damage, he can bring a damages action against the offending officer. Our colleague’s proposal to deprive the government of the vehicle in those cases where its right to possession thereof was fully established at the forfeiture proceeding, would be the classic case of punishing the government, and the larger society, for the assumed procedural bumble of the magistrate where a more finely tuned remedy — a damages remedy — exists to accomplish, in a more coherent manner, the objective of achieving deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct.
Affirmed.
Notes
. “§ 7302. Property used in violation of internal revenue laws
“It shall be unlawful to have or possess any property intended for use in violating the provisions of the internal revenue laws, or regulations prescribed under such laws, or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such property. A
“§ 7321. Authority to seize property subject to forfeiture
“Any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under any provision of this title may be seized by the Secretary or his delegate.”
. This notion of the legal personification of property used in violation of the law has long been the object of criticism. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, c. 8, * 300 (seizure of innocent person’s property a “superstition” from the “blind days” of feudalism) quoted in United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
. E. g., 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (property used in connection with illegal importation); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (property used to facilitate violation of narcotics laws); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (property used in connection with counterfeiting).
. 26 U.S.C. § 7327 incorporates 19 U.S.C. § 1618 as follows:
“The provisions of law applicable to the remission or mitigation by the Secretary or his delegate of forfeitures under the customs laws shall apply to forfeitures incurred or alleged to have been incurred under the internal revenue laws.”
. The statute here is distinguishable from the forfeiture provision recently addressed in United States v. Pappas,
. The panel decision in Pappas has since been vacated, this court having reheard the case en banc; and in the new en banc decision, this court redecided Pappas on purely statutory grounds that do not bear upon the case at bar. The en banc court did not decide whether the constitution would have required a warrant.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I agree with the anаlysis and conclusions of Parts I — III of the court’s opinion. I cannot, however, join in my brothers’ conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless seizure of property pursuant to a forfeiture statute in the absence of such exigent circumstances as would prevent law enforcement officers from obtaining a judicially authorized warrant.
I.
The court cites numerous decisions of the circuit courts of appeals for its assertion that “seizure of an automobile has long been a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”
The court finds support for the Francolino line of cases in two fairly recent Supreme Court decisions. In the first of these, Cooper v. California,
The second case providing support for the Francolino line of cases is the Court’s recent decision in G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
“The seizures of the automobiles in this case took place on public streets, parking lots, or other open places, and did not involve any invasions of privаcy. In Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 272,15 L.Ed. 372 (1856), this Court held that a judicial warrant is not required for the seizure of a debtor’s land in satisfaction of a claim of the United States. The seizure in Murray’s Lessee was made through a transfer of title which did not involve an invasion of privacy. The warrantless seizures of the automobiles in this case are governed by the same principles and therefore were not unconstitutional. See also Hester v. United States,265 U.S. 57 ,44 S.Ct. 445 ,68 L.Ed. 898 (1924) (liquor seized in open field).” Id. at 351-52,97 S.Ct. at 628 (footnote omitted).
In a footnote, the Court added: “If additional support were needed for this result, it is found in the Court’s decisions sustaining the right of the Government to collect taxes by summary administrative proceedings.” Id. at 352 n. 18,
The precise rationale and scope of the Court’s holdings are difficult to discern. The prominent reference to “invasion of privacy”, together with the Court’s relegation to a footnote of its discussion of the special considerations inherent in tax levies, suggests that the opinion was based more on considerations of privacy than on the policies underlying effective tax collection. In United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Nova,
The Court stated in G. M. Leasing that the legality of the warrantless seizures of the taxpayer’s cars was governed by “the same principle” that underlay the decision in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
The purpose of the warrant requirement in a forfeiture seizure case is to obtain a neutral magistrate’s determination of probable cause to believe that the government in fact has a superior possessory right to the property. Where the government is entitled to a presumption of the correctness of its claim to property, as in a tax levy case pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6331, the magistrate would have no basis upon which to reject a warrant application. To require a judicially authorized warrant in such cases would, therefore, serve no salutary func
The majority asserts that no Supreme Court authority on point establishes the unconstitutionality of the seizure in this case.
191, 193,
In the leading circuit court opinion opposed to the majority’s decision, United States v. McCormick,
While I take issue with the majority’s reading of the relevant Supreme Court decisions, I differ most strongly with its conclusion that allowing warrantless seizures for forfeiture purposes works “no insult to personal liberty, or threat to property.” An individual’s privacy might not be violated to the same extent by a governmental seizure of his property as it is by a warrantless search. But the Fourth Amendment also protects the individual’s right to the use and possession of his property, see Katz v. United States, supra,
The court bolsters its argument by noting that an individual loses his interest in property used to violate the revenue laws at the moment of such illegal use. The court apparently finds the Fourth Amendment adequately served by the seizing officer’s determination that the property was in fact illegally used. In othеr words, the proposition is that once an officer thinks he has probable cause to believe that property has been used to further some activity proscribed by the statute, the owner no longer has any constitutionally protected interest in the property and a warrant is unnecessary. This reasoning, however, undercuts the basic premise of the warrant requirement. As the Court recently reiterated in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,
II.
The court also relies in part on the autоmobile exception to the warrant requirement. This exception was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States,
The degree of exigency required to bring a search or seizure within the automobile exception was left in doubt, however, by the Court’s decision in Cardwell v. Lewis,
“[ejxigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the time of arrest. The exigency may arise at any time, . . .” Id. at 595-96,94 S.Ct. at 2472 (citation omitted).
The four dissenters noted that “it can scarcely be said that probable cause was not discovered until so late a point in time as to prevent the obtaining of a warrant for seizure of the automobile.” Id. at 599,
In this case the investigation of Zullo had generated probable cause to believe that the Pontiac was subject to forfeiture several months before it was actually seized. The applicability of the automobile exception, therefore, turns on which of the competing Cardwell standards the court adopts.
The significance of the “mobility” of an unoccupied car subject to seizure under a forfeiture statute is different from that justifying the automobile exception in such cases as Chambers v. Maroney, supra. The plurality in Cardwell v. Lewis stated that there was no significant difference between a сar stopped on the highway and a car seized from a parking lot in terms of the inherent mobility of the car. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, however, the Court noted that the mobility of a ear, as a characteristic distinguishing it from other objects, becomes less significant when the car is unoccupied and not being used for any illegal purpose at the time of seizure.
The stipulated facts in this case paint something less than a convincing picture of exigency at the time of the seizure of the Pontiac. The car was unoccupied and was not involved in any criminal activity at the time it was seized. arrest, they could keep him from spiriting the car away. Nor is there anything in the record suggesting that after they began their effort to place Zullo under arrest, he was ever at large with the knowledge that he was a fugitive from justice. Although it is conceivable that claimant or a friend or accomplice of Zullo’s might have attempted to remove the Pontiac, the agents had no concrete evidence to believe that flight was imminent. I believe that exigency sufficient to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement must rest on more than mere speculation.
Nor do I think that the seizure of the Pontiac can be justified under the privacy rationale for the automobile exception. While the Court has increasingly relied on the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile to distinguish automobile searches from searches of other personal effects, see, e. g. United States v. Chadwick,
III.
The court states that even if the seizure in this case was unconstitutional, “it is not clear why an inadequacy in the process used to secure . . . possession would or should defeat the government’s entitlement to the property.” In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
In Berkowitz v. United States,
“Thus were we to sustain the present warrantless seizure, we would be holding that an automobile could itself be seized in the unbridled discretion of an officer although under One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, supra, had the same officer merely searched the same automobile without a warrant, any fruits of his search . would have to be suppressed as evidence in a future forfeiture proceeding involving the automobile. If there is any logic to such a result, we fail to see it. The right of the automobile owner not to have it searched is no more worthy of protection than his right not to have it seized without legal procedure.”356 F.Supp. at 1210 .
Concluding that the rationale of the exclusionary rule applies to illegal seizures for forfeiture purposes does not end the problem, however. The question remains how to apply the remedy in this context. The Supreme Court has stated that the “primary” justification for the exclusionary rule is deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct. See Stone v. Powell,
The exclusionary rule is a judge-made remedy, not a statutory prescription. It appears to me, therefore, both permissible and reasonable to treat forfeiture cases as what they are — sui generis —and apply the exclusionary rule not in the same manner as in the commonplace suppression case, but in a way that is consistent with the underlying purpose of the rule. Some guidance is suggested by rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that property obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure should be returned to a person entitled to lawful possession and may not be used in any subsequent criminal proceeding.
Such an approach would be consistent with the balance struck by the Supreme Court between the rights of the individual and the needs of society inherent in effective law enforcement. When the exclusionary rule is applied to exclude evidence at a criminal trial, the result is often, though not necessarily, the destruction of the government’s case and the release of a defendant who is guilty of the crime charged. This is a social cost we are willing to pay to preserve the rights guaranteed to all by the Fourth Amendment. But the Court has been unwilling to extend the rule to bar the government from proceeding against an individual who was illegally arrested. See United States v. Crews, - U.S. -, -,
For these reasons, I believe that because the seizure of the car in this case was violative of the Fourth Amendment, the government is barred from having forfeiture in this or any future proceeding.
. To the extent that the court’s opinion incorporates the opinion of the panel of this court in United States v. Pappas,
. The majority’s citation of Justice Brennan’s dissent in Cady v. Dombrowski,
. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
. The Court emphasized that section of the California statute providing that an officer making a narcotics arrest was to seize any vehicle used to transport or facilitate the possession of narcotics and that the vehicle was “to be held as evidence until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11611. The Court mentioned only in a footnote section 11610, which provides that an owner’s property interest in such a vehicle is extinguished. See also United States v. Zaicek,
. The automobiles actually belonged to a corporation that the I.R.S. determined was the alter ego of the taxpayer.
. This explanation of G. M. Leasing is not inconsistent with the importance the Court apparently attached to the absence of any invasion of privacy in seizing cars parked on a public street. I do not believe the Court intended to hold that the only Fourth Amendment interest implicated in a forfeiture seizure is the possible invasion of privacy incidental to the execution of the sеizure. Instead, I read the Court as saying that although the government need not, under the special circumstances present in G. M. Leasing and Murray’s Lessee, obtain a warrant to levy against a debtor’s property, it must still avoid any other invasion of the debtor’s privacy unless it comes armed with a search warrant. See G. M. Leasing,
. The majority also suggests that by going ^gainst “solid precedent” and creating diversity of rules in the circuits we would be undermining the processes of law enforcement. Although the weight of authority favors the majority’s view of the legality of warrantless forfeiture seizures, the courts are not unanimous. See United States v. McCormick,
. We are concerned in this case only with items of derivative contraband, otherwise innocent objects that become tainted by illegality as a result of their use in some illicit activity. Different considerations of exigency might enter thе calculus if the object to be seized was inherently dangerous or per se contrary to public policy. See Melendez v. Shultz, supra,
. Justice Powell did not address the merits at all, stating instead his opinion that the Court should not review Fourth Amendment challenges to state court convictions on petition for habeas corpus.
. In United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Nova,
. In Chambers, the Cоurt said that a warrant-less seizure of a car was justified when the circumstances providing probable cause were unforeseeable and the opportunity to search was fleeting due to the mobility of the car.
. To the extent that an automobile moves on the highway, is subject to state regulation, and may endanger others, its owner may have a diminished possessory interest under some circumstances. See, e. g., Cady v. Dombrowski,
. In Interbartolo v. United States,
. The 1972 amendments to rule 41(e) deleted a provision that granted the government authority to retain property, notwithstanding its unlawful seizure, if the property was “otherwise subject to lawful retention”. The amended rule, therefore, implicitly rejects the argument made by the court that the government’s assertion of a statutory right to possession of property somehow negates the owner’s right to redress for an unlawful seizure.
. As I have noted above, see note 8, supra, this rule should apply only to items of derivative contraband, not objects that are per se illegal or inherently dangerous.
