Thе present action involves the seizure and forfeiture of the above-captioned Oldsmobile Sedan by the District Director, Bureau of Narcotics, Treasury Department, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, under the provisions of Sections 781 and 782 of Title 49 U.S.C.A. The charges in the case involve the use of the automobile by Frank Short, the owner, to facilitate the sale of a narcotic drug, to wit: heroin. The activities involved in the sale occurred on December 12, 1952, and the seizure of the automobile was effected on Mаrch 18, 1953. The testimony in the case establishes the following.
William H. Newkirk, an undercover United States Treasury Narcotics Agent, had been dealing with and had made purchases of narсotic drugs from Frank Short, claimant herein. Agent Newkirk had previously paid Short for a delivery of heroin which Short had failed to deliver up to December 12, 1952. In the afternoon of thаt day Newkirk went to Short’s home at 3843 Brown Street, in the City of Philadelphia, and demanded delivery of the illicit drug for which he had already paid. Short protested that he was unable to mаke delivery at that time but promised delivery the next day. Newkirk persisted in his demands and Short made an arrangement to meet him at a restaurant located at 1725 South Street in the City of Philadelphia at 7 P.M. that evening. The parties met as arranged and proceeded to Speedie’s Bar, located directly across the street from the restaurаnt, where each consumed a glass of beer. Short again informed Newkirk that he was still unable to make delivery of the paid-for drug but suggested that if Newkirk really wanted drugs and would pay for them, he, Short, would undertake to get some for him that evening. Newkirk demurred at first inasmuch as he had already paid Short but finally agreed to make an additional purchase and to pay therefor. Short then took Newkirk in his, Short’s, automobile, the one here in question, to the vicinity of 20th and Naudain Streets. Leaving Newkirk in the automobile, Short entered a house nеar 20th and Naudain Streets and returned in a relatively short time, accompanied by one Thomas Gaskins, a narcotic dealer. The three thereupon drove to a restaurant in *323 the vicinity of 40th and Chestnut Streets where they had dinner together. The ostensible purpose of this dinner conference was to assure Gaskins of New-kirk’s criminal background and his rеliability as a member of the underworld with whom drug purchases could be safely transacted. Apparently Gaskins was satisfied and the parties left the restaurant and drove in the Oldsmobilе to 3843 Brown Street where Short left the automobile, went into his home and remained there approximately fifteen minutes. After coming out of the house he drove his car to Uniоn and Aspen Streets (40th and Aspen Streets) and parked it. Short then directed Newkirk to pay $30 to Gaskins, which Newkirk did. Gas-kins then left the automobile, walked north on Union Street and disappеared. He returned in about ten minutes and handed Newkirk a package which admittedly contained heroin. No Revenue stamps were affixed to the package and Newkirk gave neither Gaskins nor Short the Treasury Order Form required by statute. The parties then separated. Based on these facts, the District Director, on March 18, 1953, as aforesaid, оrdered the Oldsmobile automobile seized. The libel for forfeiture followed.
The claimant bases his defense of the action on two grounds. First, that Short had no part in the actual transfer of narcotics and that the use of the automobile was incidental to the illegal transaction, citing Piatt v. United States, 10 Cir., 1947,
The case of Platt v. United States, supra, upon which the claimant places almost sole reliance is completely distinguishable on its facts. There the court held that where the mother knew her daughter was a dope addict but did not know when the daughter asked to use her mother’s automobile that she intended to go to a drugstore to obtain morphine, the automobile was not subject to forfeiture for it was not used to “facil.itate” the purchase of the morphine within the meaning of the statute. Thе court reasoned that the entire transaction occurred within the drugstore itself and that the automobile merely enabled the daughter to reach the drugstore, but did not “faсilitate” the purchase of the morphine. . The court observed that .many other means of transportation, including walking, could have been used to reach the drugstore; аnd the use of the car was only incidental to the purchase.
The facts of the instant case certainly do not warrant the application of the doctrine enunсiated in the Platt case. The facts here are more analogous to the cases of United States v. One 1941 Pontiac Sedan, D.C.N.Y.1948,
The second defense is likewise without merit. The identical contention was advanced in the case of United States v. One 1952 Ford Victoria, D.C. Cal.1953,
The statement of facts and conclusions of law set forth above may be considered as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court in this case. Counsel for each party have presented requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Court affirms Plaintiff’s Requests for Findings of Fact Nos. 1 to 6 inclusive and Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 tо 9 inclusive.
The Court refuses Claimant’s Requests for Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9; and affirms Requests Nos. 4, 6 and 7.
The Court refuses Claimant’s requested Conclusions of Law Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5; and affirms Request No. 2.
An order decreeing forfeiture of the Oldsmobile Sedan may be prepared and submitted by the United States Attorney.