United States v. OmeneUnited States v. Omene
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Oghenerho OMENE, a/k/a Harlims Oghenerho Omene; a/k/a Greg
Hotep; a/k/a Harlims Roosevelt Omene; a/k/a
Wilson Omene; a/k/a Imoyin Omene;
a/k/a Wilson Imoyin Omene,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-10359.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 15, 1997.
Memorandum Jan. 28, 1998.
Order and Opinion May 8, 1998.
Mark D. Flanagan, Slenkovich & Flanagan, Palo Alto, California, for defendant-appellant.
Miсhael J. Yamaguchi, U.S. Attorney, David W. Shapiro, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Oakland, California, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-94-40067-SBA.
Before: THOMAS and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges, and SEDWICK,* District Judge.
ORDER
Appellee's request for publication is granted. The Memorandum filed January 28, 1998, is redesignated as an authored оpinion by Judge Sedwick.
OPINION
SEDWICK, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Oghenerho Omene ("Omene") raised suspicions at the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") office in Hayward, California, by filing, as a tax preparer, tax returns with unusual similarities. An IRS investigation resulted in the identification of 302 tax returns that appeared to be part of a scheme to file false returns. After his arrest, Omеne admitted that he had filed a large number of tax returns while doing business as Ancient One and Rapid Return Service.
One month before trial, Omene moved, pursuant to
The next morning Omene and his attorney met with the judge. Explaining that he had an "overwhelming" belief his client would give perjurious testimony, defense counsel asked to withdraw. He advised the court that he could not explain further without disclosing confidential communications, although he also stated that Omene had not changed his story during the course of the representation. Counsel indicаted that he was caught in a quandary between his obligation to assist his client and his ethical responsibilities as a lawyer. He also stated that even if the motion were granted, the problem would persist. The district judge denied the motion to withdraw on the grounds that the defendant's rights to testify and to the assistance of counsel do nоt extend to giving false testimony with the aid of counsel, the interests of justice in continuing with a trial which had all but reached the conclusion of the government's case weighed against withdrawal, and there was a means of accommodating Omene's desire to testify by allowing him to give his testimony in narrative form as to those aspеcts which counsel felt would be perjurious while counsel continued to assist Omene in all other respects.
After denying the motion to withdraw, the district judge explained to Omene that he had an absolute right to testify, but should consider carefully his lawyer's advice not to do so. She explained that if Omene did not testify no inferencе could be drawn from that fact, but that if he did testify, the jury might draw negative inferences from what he said, or did not say. She advised Omene that his testimony would be largely in narrative form, and that the jury might or might not draw a negative inference from that mode of presentation. She also advised him that his lawyer would continue to represent him, but would not be able to argue evidence which the lawyer did not believe to be true. Professing to understand everything the judge told him, Omene expressed a desire to testify.
At trial Omene testified in narrative form. His testimony indicated that he set up a Nevada corporation named Ancient One International, Inc. intending to go into the import/export business with his brother Wilson Omene ("Wilson"), a resident of Lagos, Nigeria. To generate income for the import/export business, Omene testified, Ancient One was used as a tax preparation business. Omene explained that the tax preparation business would prepare the tax return and offer the customer a discounted refund amount in advance in exchange for the assignment of the refund check to be issued by the IRS. Neither Omene nor his brother knew anything about preparing tax returns, so Greg Hotep and Matthew Edema, two men living in Nigeria who had experience in filling out tax returns, were recruited to help in the business. Because advertising the business in California received marginal results, solicitation of clients was turned over to the three men in Nigeria, who obtained more than 300 customers. Omene told the jury that Hotep and Edema sent him blank, but signed, tax returns, along with the relevant information to be included on the tax return. Omene filled in the returns with the information provided and filed them with the IRS. Omene testified that he would pick up the refund checks, which were typically sent to post office boxes opened by Omene and send them to Lagos, New York or England for endorsement by the taxpayers as instructed by Hotep and Edema. Some of the endorsed checks would then be returned to Omene to be deposited into checking accounts opened in California by Omene.
The jury did not believe Omene. It convicted him on numerous counts of filing false tax returns in violation of
The Court finds that the defendant repeatedly provided false testimony, under oath, during the course of the trial. This false testimony included the defendant's assertion that he was acting on behalf of persons in Nigeria, that he believed that the tax returns were genuinе, and that he did not sign the endorsements on the refund checks. In addition to this false alibi, much of defendant's other testimony was clearly false. It is apparent to the Court that the defendant intentionally testified falsely in an attempt to mislead the jury.
On appeal, Omene contends that the district court erred by denying his
RULE 15 MOTIONS
Hoping to corroborate his account of events, one month before trial Omene moved, pursuant to
Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and preserved for use at trial, the court may upon motion of such pаrty and notice to the parties order that testimony of such witness be taken by deposition and that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material not privileged, be produced at the same time and place.
Omene argues that the district judge abused her discretion when she denied his
Here, the distriсt judge correctly focused on the fact that sufficient evidence was not presented to demonstrate that the individual who spoke to the investigator was Wilson. The district court stated that the identity of this individual "is crucial given the government's assertion that part of the evidence in this case is a driver's license in the name of Wilson Omene that bears the defendant's photograph and fingerprint." Further, in its written order on April 23, 1996, the district court stated:
If by May 1, 1996, any of these three proposed deponents appear at the American Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria with proper identification papers that can be validated by the apprоpriate Nigerian authorities, the Court is receptive to reconsideration of this matter.
As late as the time when Omene renewed his
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Omene argues that hе was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when the district court forced him to choose between not testifying and testifying in narrative form. This court reviews questions of constitutional law de novo. United States v. Ward,
Omene relies on United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,
The government relies on Nix v. Whiteside,
[W]e could not allow him to [testify falsely] because that would be perjury, and as officers of the court we would be suborning perjury if we allowed him to do it; ... I аdvised him that if he did do that it would be my duty to advise the Court of what he was doing and that I felt he was committing perjury; also, that I probably would be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular testimony. App. to Pet. for Cer. A-85.
Id. at 161,
In his habeas petition, Whiteside claimed that his right to counsel and to testify had been violated because, although he took the stand, his attorney had coerced him not to testify that he had seen a gun in Love's hand before stabbing him. The Supreme Court held that defense counsel's refusal to permit the defendant to testify in a manner the attorney knew to be false, based upon the defendant's own statements, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court wrote:
Robinson's admonitions to his client can in no sense bе said to have forced respondent into an impermissible choice between his right to counsel and his right to testify as he proposed for there was no permissible choice to testify falsely. For defense counsel to take steps to persuade a criminal defendant to testify truthfully, or to withdraw, deprives the defendant of neither his right to counsel nor the right to testify truthfully. In United States v. Havens, supra [
On this record, the accused enjоyed continued representation within the bounds of reasonable professional conduct and did in fact exercise his right to testify; at most he was denied the right to have the assistance of counsel in the presentation of false testimony.
Id. at 173-174,
Omene seeks to distinguish Whiteside because defense counsel in Whiteside knew, bаsed on the defendant's own statements, that the testimony the defendant intended to offer was false. Omene's counsel did not reveal to the judge the basis for his conclusion that Omene's testimony would be a fabrication, but he did say it was not based upon a change in Omene's story. While we are concerned that Omene's counsel did not lay out a firm factual basis for his position, we conclude that this case is, nevertheless, covered by the reasoning in Whiteside. Here, as there, the trial court made a specific finding after the trial that the testimony defense counsel had concluded would be perjurious was. In Whiteside the finding was made at a hearing on a motion for new trial. Here, the finding was made at the sentencing hearing. The consequence of the finding in both cases is the same. The loss of counsel's assistance was the loss of aid in presenting perjured testimony. Omene, like Whiteside, had no right to present perjured testimony.
It is true that Omene actually did present his perjury to the jury and in doing so he may have worsened his prospects for acquittal. However, that risk was clearly explained to him by the trial court during the ex parte hearing. When an accused presents perjured testimony to the jury, one of the risks he assumes is that the jury will draw negative inferences from his perfidy. Armed with the trial court's finding at the sentencing hearing, it is clear to us that Omene was not put to a choice between permissible testimony and effective assistance of counsel. Rather, it is clear from this vantage that Omene was afforded effective assistance of counsel, but spurned it by choosing to commit perjury.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
The Honorable John W. Sedwick, United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation