The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated Operation Wild Horse to target heroin importation and distribution in the Washington area. Appellant Olurotimi Olatunde Layeni was caught during the investigation. A jury convicted him of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin as well as multiple counts of heroin distribution. He challenges his conviction on two grounds. First, he contends there was evidence from which a reasonable juror could find he had been induced by a government informant, albeit indirectly, to participate in the criminal activity and therefore the district court should have instructed the jury on the defense of entrapment. Second, he argues that the admission of the government’s expert testimony denied him a fair trial. He also challenges his sentence, arguing that in several respects the district court erred in calculating his offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). For the following reasons we affirm.
I
Layeni traces his misfortunes to his friendship with Arlene White. White, a drug broker, was the girlfriend of Layeni’s cousin Francis, a heroin supplier to street gangs in the District of Columbia. In June 1991 Lay-eni, at White’s request, obtained heroin from one of Francis’s associates and, posing as Francis, helped White sell the heroin to a man they knew as “Ralph Martin.” Unbeknownst to both White and Layeni, he was an undercover FBI agent. According to Layeni, the June 1991 deal was his first step into the world of illegal drugs. It was not to be his last. During the next two and one-half years Layeni conspired with others in the heroin trade and distributed large quantities of heroin to Ralph. In December 1993 the FBI arrested Layeni. An eleven-count superseding indictment charged him with conspiring to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, heroin as well as with ten counts of heroin distribution. At trial Layeni did not dispute that he committed all the acts charged in the indictment; indeed the transactions were recorded on audio and video tape. His sole defense was entrapment. He claimed he had been entrapped in connection with the initial (June 1991) transaction and that his criminal activities throughout the next two and one-half years were the product of the initial entrapment. The district court declined to instruct the jury on entrapment and the jury convicted him on all counts. The court sentenced him to 210 months of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.
II
A. Entrapment.
Layeni argues first that the district court erred in declining his request for an entrapment instruction. The entrapment defense has two elements: government inducement to commit a crime and lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime. “[1] [0]nce a defendant meets his burden of proving that the government persuaded him to commit a crime, [2] the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was ready and willing to do so.”
United States v. McKinley,
70
*517
F.3d 1307, 1312 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting
United States v. Whoie,
We view the evidence relating to the June 1991 deal in the light most favorable to Laye-ni as follows: As early as February 1990 Ellis Watson, a federal prisoner and an uncle of Arlene White’s brother-in-law, became an unpaid FBI informant. In this capacity he was in regular contact with FBI agent Wanda King, the supervisor of Operation Wild Horse. Watson set up a sting to nab Francis who, to repeat, was White’s boyfriend and Layeni’s cousin. To that end, Watson called White from prison in June 1991 and asked her to introduce his friend “Ralph” to Francis. White agreed, understanding that Ralph wanted to buy heroin from Francis, but she did not know that Watson had ties to the FBI. Meanwhile, Watson telephoned King, told her about the proposed sting and advised her that the FBI’s undercover agent should use the name “Ralph.” King assigned FBI Agent Edward Dickson to the case. He contacted White and introduced himself as Ralph Martin. White arranged for him to buy heroin from Francis on June 19. Francis, however, was out of town that day. White decided to take over the deal herself and have Layeni pose as Francis.
Accordingly, on the morning of June 19 White contacted Layeni. After describing the proposed transaction with Ralph, White asked Layeni to obtain the heroin from one of Francis’s associates (“Tunji”) and to help her consummate the deal. According to Lay-eni, he at first declined her request but eventually “relented” because White asserted that she needed money to pay bills. After agreeing to assist White, Layeni persuaded Tunji to supply the heroin and, after White introduced Layeni to Ralph as “Francis,” the two (White and Layeni) sold an ounce of heroin to Ralph. White split the profit with Layeni.
Layeni contends that White induced him to participate in the June 19 deal by making repeated requests coupled with pleas based on need, sympathy and friendship. White, however, was a private citizen, not an agent knowingly acting on behalf of the government, and there is no defense of private entrapment.
United States v. Burkley,
We begin by noting that “entrapment is a relatively limited defense” grounded on “the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the Government.”
United States v. Russell,
Our circuit has not been clear whether or under what circumstances a defendant may claim he was entrapped by an “unknowing intermediary.” In
United States v. Mayo,
In any event, assuming that under some circumstances a defendant may be entrapped by an unknowing intermediary, there is no basis to impute to the government White’s decisions to solicit Layeni and, allegedly, to induce him to assist her on June 19. There is no evidence that informer Watson used or acted through White to induce Layeni. The alleged inducement here — White’s plea based on need, sympathy and friendship — did not flow from Watson. More to the point, Watson solicited White to nab Francis, not Laye-ni; White deviated from Watson’s scheme when she allegedly induced Layeni. Indeed, even if White had induced
Francis,
the intended target of the government’s sting, Francis would not be entitled to an entrapment instruction because there is no evidence that Watson suggested that White should “use inducements” to bring him to the table.
United States v. Goodacre,
Both below and on appeal Layeni has relied on
United States v. Hollingsworth,
Perhaps the most accurate statement of the current law is that while there is no defense of either private entrapment or vicarious entrapment, there is a defense of derivative entrapment: when a private individual, himself entrapped, acts as agent or conduit for governmental efforts at entrapment, the government as principal is bound.
Id. But see id. at 1218-19 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
We fail to see how
Hollingsworth
helps Layeni. First, there is no evidence that Watson entrapped White when he asked her to arrange the introduction of Ralph to Francis. In addition to White’s own predisposition (she was a drug broker whose business was to put buyers and sellers together), the record plainly shows that Watson did not induce White.
Cf. supra
note 2 (mere solicitation is not inducement). Second, even if there were evidence that Watson entrapped White to introduce Ralph to Francis, Layeni could not benefit from Watson’s entrapment of White because she abandoned Watson’s scheme when she substituted Layeni for Francis.
Hollingsworth,
In rejecting Layeni’s argument we do not
sub silentio
endorse the derivative entrapment defense applied in
Hollingsworth.
The accuracy of the Seventh Circuit’s “statement of the current law” is disputed,
cf. Martinez,
We think the better rule is that the entrapment defense can be raised by a defendant who was induced by an unknowing intermediary at the instruction or direction of a government official or third party acting on behalf of the government (e.g., an informant). The defense should not apply if, in response to pressure put on him by the government, the unknowing intermediary on his own induces the defendant to engage in criminal activity.
B. Admission of Expert Testimony.
Layeni’s next assignment of error relates to the testimony of Agent Dwight A. Rawls, the government’s expert witness. The only argument that warrants discussion involves Rawls’s testimony about Nigeria and Nigerians. Layeni asserts it was inadmissible under rule 402 (irrelevant evidence inadmissible) or rule 403 (relevant evidence excludable if danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
First some background. Wanda King testified that Operation Wild Horse “specifically targeted Nigerian Nationals” because the FBI had learned from informants that heroin was coming into the Washington area from Nigeria. 10/4/94 Tr. at 89. In addition, Agent Dickson (Ralph) testified that the first time he met with Layeni after the June 1991 transaction he “gained a ton of intelligence and information about heroin trafficking from Lagos, Nigeria, to Washington, D.C., the cost of heroin ... in Lagos and the ultimate cost of that heroin here in Washington, how the heroin is smuggled and carried here to the United States, how money is smuggled out of this country into Lagos.” 10/7/94 Tr. at 15. Layeni telephoned his brother Olu, who was in London, and Ralph and Olu discussed Ralph’s establishing a direct heroin connection in Lagos. Olu and Ralph later devised a scheme whereby Olu would transport a kilogram of heroin from Lagos to London where Ralph would be waiting to smuggle it into the United States. When Ralph delayed his trip to London, Layeni himself traveled to Nigeria and returned to Washington with 500 grams of heroin which he tried, unsuccessfully, to sell to Ralph. The Lagos-London-Washington scheme fell through when Olu died suddenly in the fall of 1993.
The government called Agent Rawls as an expert in the field of drug trafficking, “particularly heroin including its importation, production, distribution and the financial aspects involved.” 10/19/94 Tr. at 37. Rawls testified about, among other things, the heroin market in Nigeria, Nigeria’s role as a “transshipment point” along trade routes in the international heroin market, Nigeria’s role as a major source of heroin destined for the United States and how Nigerians smuggle heroin into the United States. Layeni repeatedly objected “to the line of questioning focusing on Nigeria and Nigerians.” Id. at 44. The court overruled his objections.
Relying on
United States v. Doe,
The government here asserts that, contrary to
Doe,
“[t]he scope of Operation Wild Horse, as well as the evidence of appellant’s involvement in the Nigerian heroin trade, made the expert’s testimony both relevant and necessary.” Brief of Appellee at 28. But the scope of Operation Wild Horse was at most background information and Layeni was not on trial based on his involvement in the Nigerian heroin trade; he was charged with conspiracy to distribute (and to possess with intent to distribute) heroin in the United States and ten specific acts of distribution in the United States. We have difficulty with the government’s assertion that “Nigeria, and appellant’s link to it, was
directly
relevant to appellant’s participation in the conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin in the United States.”
Id.
at 31 (emphasis added). But even if the court erred in allowing Rawls’s testimony, we fail to see how the error could have been anything but harmless.
See
Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Layeni “never disputed that he engaged in the transactions alleged in the indictment” and his “only defense was entrapment.” Brief of Appellant at 7 n.6. Because we hold that the court correctly declined to instruct the jury on entrapment, there is no reasonable likelihood that the admission of Rawls’s testimony could have affected the outcome of the trial.
See United States v. Olano,
Ill
A. Relevant Conduct: Drug Quantities.
Layeni’s presentence investigation report (PSI) attributed 4,522 grams of heroin to him as “relevant conduct” and fixed his base offense level at 34. See USSG § 2Dl.l(e)(3) (base offense level 34 for offense involving at least 3,000 but less than 10,000 grams of heroin). The PSI total included 1,321 grams that Layeni in fact distributed to Ralph and another 3,201 grams that were neither distributed to Ralph nor seized by the authorities. The latter figure consists of (1) amounts that Layeni offered to Ralph but Ralph did not purchase and (2) amounts that Ralph agreed to purchase and Layeni promised to produce but did not. In a memorandum filed with the court, Layeni objected to the PSI tally. Citing former application note 12 to Guidelines section 2D1.1 (1994), 3 he argued that his sentence should reflect only the amounts he in fact distributed to Ralph. Former note 12 provided:
In an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount. However, where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing.
Relying on
United States v. Raven,
At sentencing, Layeni was questioned about each disputed amount listed in the PSI. In each instance Layeni testified that he lacked both the intent and the capability to produce the heroin and that he was only “puffing” when he made the offer or promise. (For example, Layeni allegedly had neither the intent nor the capability to produce the 100 grams of heroin he offered to Ralph on February 12, 1992 — notwithstanding that three weeks earlier (January 21) he sold 299 grams to Ralph and two weeks later (February 26) he sold 200 grams to Ralph.) The government argued that Layeni’s sentencing testimony did not undercut the trial evidence (including audio and video recordings of Lay-eni’s discussions with Ralph) indicating that Layeni had both the intent and the capability to produce the challenged amounts. The court agreed and expressed its frustration with Layeni’s insistence that he was “puffing” each time he offered or promised to sell amounts that ultimately were not distributed:
I don’t believe one word that Mr. Layeni testified to today. He simply cannot be believed. He is just dishonest. It was just evident. His manner of testifying, the way he answered questions, his demeanor, everything just made it clear to me that he just is dishonest.... My goodness, does he honestly and truly believe that someone would believe what he has testified to in here today? It was just evident, I think, to everybody in this courtroom that not one word he uttered was truthful. So, I don’t believe him. I don’t believe his testimony.
3/2/95 Sentencing Tr. at 85
Layeni raises a new argument on appeal. Whereas his sole argument below was that he had neither the intent nor the capability to produce the amounts that were never distributed, he now argues that the court should have ignored most of the disputed amounts because they were mere offers to sell or obtain heroin, offers Ralph did not accept and in some cases declined. An amount “under negotiation” (see former note 12) means an “agreed to” amount, he now contends, and if Ralph did not unequivocally accept an offer, there was no agreement. In other words, he now argues that the government failed to satisfy step one of Raven. See supra.
Arguments not raised in the district court are generally deemed waived on appeal absent plain error.
United States v. Broxton,
The weakness in Layeni’s argument surfaces in the following hypothetical. An undercover agent expresses interest in purchasing heroin and, after some discussion, the defendant responds by offering to sell him 100 grams, an amount the defendant plainly intends to produce and is in fact capable of
*523
producing. According to Layeni, the 100 grams may not be considered at sentencing unless the record manifests that the agent accepted the offer. But the defendant’s conduct and culpability are the same irrespective of the agent’s response. The “scale of the offénse” turns on whether the defendant had the intent or the capability to produce the drugs he offered (capability to produce bears on the issue of intent) not on whether the agent had the intent or capability to consummate the sale. USSG § 2D1.1, application note 12 (1994). The hypothetical would be different, of course, if the
agent
offered to buy 100 grams from (or sell 100 grams to) the
defendant.
Then it makes sense to determine what the defendant agreed to sell (or purchase) in order to ascertain his intent and thus properly quantify the contraband.
United States v. Ynfante,
In a separate argument, Layeni challenges the court’s inclusion of 1,001 grams in connection with two uncompleted distributions. First, Layeni and a coconspirator agreed on January 15, 1992 to deliver 1,000 grams to Ralph in Chicago but produced only 299 grams initially because their Chicago supplier insisted on releasing the heroin in small amounts; Ralph, apparently impatient, left Chicago before Layeni delivered the remaining 701 grams. Second, on May 8, 1992 Layeni sold 200 grams to Ralph and promised to return that morning with 300 more but was unable to do so because his supplier unexpectedly left town. Layeni challenges the court’s finding that he was capable of producing the additional 701 and 300 grams, respectively. His challenge fails.
First, in light of our conclusion above upholding the court’s inclusion of the amounts that Layeni offered to Ralph but Ralph never agreed to purchase, Layeni’s relevant conduct total would still exceed 3,000 grams (and thus his base .offense level would remain 34) even if the disputed 1,001 grams were erased from the record. Second, even if the district court had erred in finding that Layeni was
capable
of producing the additional 1,001 grams, Layeni does not appear to dispute the court’s finding (a finding well supported by the record) that he had the
intent
to produce the additional 1,001 grams. Under former note 12 the government need not show that Layeni had
both
the intent
and
the capability to produce the disputed amounts; the government need show only that he had
either
the intent or the capability to produce them.
Raven,
B. Acceptance of Responsibility.
Layeni next argues that the district court erred in, failing to award him a two-level reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines provide a two-level reduction “[i]f the defendant
clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” USSG § 3El.l(a) (emphasis added). The PSI did not recommend the reduction on the ground that Layeni “elected not to discuss the instant offense” with the probation office. PSI at 9. Layeni filed an objection to the PSI, arguing that “[t]he defendant’s willingness to discuss the offense with the presentence report writer ... is completely irrelevant to his eligibility for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.” Defendant’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing (Sentencing Mem.) at 7.
But see United States v. Corral-Ibarra,
The sentencing court “normally should deny the two-point reduction to a defendant who does not plead guilty.”
United States v. Jones,
[I]t remains the defendant’s task to manifest in some way that he has in fact acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct. The raising of an entrapment defense, in and of itself, does not constitute either an acceptance of responsibility or an expression of remorse for one’s criminal conduct. It may indicate that the defendant himself sincerely acknowledges the wrongfulness of his actions, or it may simply represent a tactical choice of counsel. Under § 3E1.1, the responsibility of indicating affirmatively that an assertion of an entrapment defense reflects the former, not the latter, lies with the defendant.
Corral-Ibarra,
C. Supervisory Role in the Conspiracy.
Layeni’s final argument warrants little discussion. The PSI recommended a two-level enhancement pursuant to section 3Bl.l(b) of the Guidelines on the ground that Layeni was a “manager” or “supervisor” in a conspiracy which involved at least five participants. The PSI noted that “[t]he defendant had extensive drug dealings with the undercover officer, made introductions, found resources of heroin for him, conducted negotiations for the supply of heroin to the undercover officer, dealt with other drug dealers and recruited co-conspirators.” PSI at 9. Layeni objected, arguing that there was no evidence that he supervised anyone. The court concluded that Layeni was not credible, explained that direct evidence was not necessary to support the adjustment and found that there was “circumstantial evidence galore” that he held a supervisory role. 3/2/95 Sentencing Tr. at 94. We discern nothing even approaching clear error. The finding is supported by the inferences *525 emanating from the mountain of evidence presented at trial.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
Notes
. Layeni appears to assume that if he prevails on this issue he is entitled not only to an entrapment instruction covering the June 1991 transaction (count two of the indictment) but also to the "continuing entrapment” instruction he requested to encompass his subsequent criminal activity. We recently rejected the continuing entrapment theory he relied on below.
United States v. Vaughn,
. Layeni reads far too much into Johnson. There an undercover police officer supplied a man named Turner with money to purchase narcotics and drove him to a restaurant. Turner went into the restaurant and returned with the defendant. At the defendant’s direction, the officer drove to a location where the defendant purchased heroin capsules with the officer's money. The defendant told Turner in the presence of the officer that he was keeping one capsule for his effort and handed the remaining capsules to Turner who gave them to the officer. We held that the defendant was entitled to an entrapment instruction because a jury could reasonably find that "the officer act[ed] through” Turner to induce the defendant. Id. at 128. Specifically, a jury could find that the defendant was induced by the "hope of reward” and that the officer was the source of the inducement, id. at 128-29 & n. 1, for only he, as owner of the capsules, could have authorized the reward. The jury could reasonably infer that Turner acted at the direction of the officer who used him to induce the defendant.
Johnson
held that the prospect of a reward
per se
could constitute inducement and thus the defendant who followed a criminal path with the "hope of reward” was entitled to an entrapment instruction. But we have since rejected "the proposition that an offer of reward standing alone entitles the defendant to an entrapment instruction.”
McKinley,
. The court used the 1994 version of the Guidelines in sentencing Layeni. Effective November 1, 1995, the Sentencing Commission deleted the text of note 12 to section 2D 1.1 and replaced it with a new note 12. We refer to the 1994 version as former note 12.
. The one incident involved 400 grams offered on September 30, 1992. Inclusion of the 400 grams does not affect Layeni's base offense level; he is well above the 3,000-gram floor for base offense level 34 irrespective of the 400 grams. See supra.
. We note that, unlike former note 12, the current version of note 12 provides that the court must exclude an amount if the court finds that the defendant was not capable of producing the amount or did not intend to produce the amount. USSG § 2D1.1, application note 12 (1995) C‘|T]he court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide or was not reasonably capable of providing.").
