FOLIAGE FOREST, COUNTRY JOE‘S NURSERY, CASTLETON GARDENS, PALM BEACH GREENERY, and MORNINGSTAR NURSERY v. E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 8, 2000.
221 F.3d 1201
Plaintiffs Foliage Forest, Country Joe‘s Nursery, Castleton Gardens, Palm Beach Greenery, and Morningstar Nursery, commercial nurseries whose plants were allegedly damaged by a DuPont product called Benlate, appeal the district court‘s orders finding that their fraudulent inducement claims were barred by the releases executed by plaintiffs in settlement agreements, and thereby dismissing the claims under
(1) Does a choice-of-law provision in a settlement agreement control the disposition of a claim that the agreement was fraudulently procured, even if there is no allegation that the choice-of-law provision itself was fraudulently procured?
(2) If Florida law applies, does the release in these settlement agreements bar plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement claims?
The Supreme Court of Florida has now answerеd the first certified question in the affirmative and the second certified question in the negative. See Mazzoni Farms, Inc., v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 761 So.2d 306 (Fla.2000).
In light of the Supreme Court of Florida‘s opinion we find that the Foliage and Castleton releases are subject to their respective Delaware choice-of-law prоvisions. The parties to those releases are therefore bound by the Delaware Supreme Court‘s recent holding that a release in a settlement agreement does not bar a nursery‘s claim for fraud in the inducement of the release. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Florida Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457 (Del.1999).
The releases exеcuted by Morningstar, Palm Beach Greenery and Country Joe, which do not contain a Delaware choice-of-law provision, are therefore governed by Florida law and subject to the Florida Supreme Court‘s ruling on the second certified question.
Accordingly, we reversе the district court‘s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims and remand this case for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ocie MILLS, Carey Mills, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-14934.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 8, 2000.
221 F.3d 1201
Ronald Wayne Johnson, Kinsey, Troxel, Johnson & Walborsky, P.A., Pensacola, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before CARNES, MARCUS and FARRIS*, Circuit Judges.
FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
We decide whether the defendants-appellees, Ocie Mills and Carey Mills, may seek extraordinary relief by way of a writ of coram nobis based on their allegation that jurors in their criminal trial considered extrinsic evidence. We reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the government.
The material facts are undisputed. In 1989, following a jury trial, the Millses, father and son, were convicted of discharging pollutants and unlawfully excavating a canal in the waters of the United States, in violation of the Clean Water Act,
Both were sentenced to twenty-one months’ imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and a fine of $5,000. The convictions were summarily affirmed on direct appeal. See United States v. Mills, 904 F.2d 713 (11th Cir.1990).
In 1990, Ocie Mills filed a Bivens1 action challenging his arrest and prosecution. The district court dismissed thе complaint. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
In 1991, the district court denied the Millses’ motion to vacate their sentences under
As of November 21, 1991, the Millses had completed their terms of imprisonment and supervised release.
On April 11, 1996, the Millses filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The basis for the petition was an attached affidavit from Quentin Wise, one of the jurors in the Millses’ 1989 criminal trial. Wise contacted Ocie Mills after seeing Mills air his grievances against the government in a television program. Wise‘s affidavit stated that the foreman of the jury, Thomas J. Smith, had given thе jury unfavorable information about the Millses that had not been introduced into evidence at trial. According to the affidavit, the source of Smith‘s extrinsic information was Smith‘s son, who allegedly had worked for the “State of Florida Water Management” and was familiar with the Millses and their prеvious misconduct and problems with the government. Wise‘s affidavit also stated that Wise felt intimidated by jury foreman Smith.
The district court declined to adopt the report and recommendation and instead concluded that the Millses had stated a cognizable basis for relief. It remanded the matter to the magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing on the substance of the Millses’ allegations of jury misconduct. The district court denied the government‘s motion for reconsideration, but granted its motion under
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. The Government‘s Position
Relying primarily on United States Supreme Court authority, the government contends that the basis for the Millses’ coram nobis petition—newly discovered evidence that the jury considered extrinsic evidence аnd therefore was not impartial—is unavailable to remedy alleged “prejudicial misconduct in the course of the trial, the misbehavior or partiality of jurors, and newly discovered evidence.” See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954). The government points out that the writ of coram nobis is available only to remedy errors “of the most fundamental character,” see Mayer, 235 U.S. at 69, and argues that expanding the availability of coram nobis relief by permitting the Millses to proceed would undermine the finality of criminal convictions and the sanctity of jury deliberations.
B. The Millses’ Position
The Millses contend that the government has misread Mayer, which, in their view, does not foreсlose pursuit of coram nobis relief on the basis they have asserted. In the Millses’ view, coram nobis relief is available where, as here, it is necessary to achieve justice when no other remedy is available and sound reasons exist for failure to seek earlier reliеf.
DISCUSSION
The issue is purely a question of law, which we review de novo. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.2000).
Federal courts have authority to issue a writ of error coram nobis under the All Writs Act,
The Millses have challenged the applicability of the holding in Mayer to this case. The defendant in Mayer, Albert Freeman, was convicted in federal district court of misuse of the mails. See Mayer, 235 U.S. at 56. He appealed his conviction. See id. Ten months later, after the expiration of the term of court during which Freeman‘s judgment of conviction was entered, Freeman filed a motion in district court to set aside his conviction or for a new trial.4 One of the grounds for the motion was Freeman‘s allegation that, during voir dire, one juror concealed a bias against Freeman. See id. at 57. Despite, (1) the expiration of the term of court during which Freeman was convicted, and (2) Freeman‘s pending appeal of his conviction, the government purported to consent to the district court‘s jurisdiction over the new trial motion. District Court Judge Mayer granted the motion. The government obtained an order from the court of appeals directing Judge Mayer to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue forbidding the granting of a new trial.
The Supreme Court held that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain Freeman‘s new trial motion for two independent reasons: (1) the term during which Freeman‘s conviction issued had expired, and the facts did not warrant recognizing any exceptions to this jurisdictional bar, see id. at 67-69, and (2) once Freeman appealed his conviction in the court of appeals, the district court was deprived of jurisdiction over his case despite the government‘s purported consent, see id. at 71.
The Court explained that where errors of the most fundamental character existed, a district court might have “correctional jurisdiction” like that available at common law under coram nobis. Id. at 69. The Court, however, explicitly refused to decide whether the writ of coram nobis remained an available remedy in the federal courts, and further stated that, even if it was, such relief would be unavailable to Freeman. See id. at 69. The Court ultimately held that the proper remedy “[i]n cases of prejudicial misconduct in the course of trial, the misbehavior or partiality of jurors, and newly discovered evidence” is “by a motion for а new trial.” Id.
Subsequent controlling opinions have confirmed the applicability in federal courts of the writ of coram nobis and, moreover, have treated Mayer as the source of the applicable rule governing the circumstances under which coram nobis relief is avаilable. Specifically, the Court in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954), citing Mayer, held that criminal defendants could pursue coram nobis relief to remedy errors “of the most fundamental character.” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512 (citation omitted).5
Post-Morgan decisions by the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit, and the Eleventh
We understand why the district court might consider juror misconduct to be an error of the most fundamental character. Were we writing on a clean slate, we might agree because, as a theoretical proposition, this argument is not without persuasiveness. After all, the Sixth Amendment expressly guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury, and thе United States Supreme Court has characterized this right as one of the few most fundamental interests guaranteed by the Constitution. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991).
Nevertheless, the argument that allegations of jury impartiality should be cognizable on coram nobis as error of the most fundamental charaсter may be compelling, but it is not the law. See Mayer, 235 U.S. at 69.
[The Supreme Court has told us] more than once ... that, “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court, the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); accord, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We do not acknowledge and we do not hold that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent.“). We have followed that admonition. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525 (11th Cir.1997) (“It may be that the Supreme Court has cut Alexander [v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)] back so far that it will not survive. Perhaps, but we are not convinced we are authorized to sing the dirge of Alexander. We will leave that to the Supreme Court, which has admonished courts of appеals ... ‘[to leave it] the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.‘“)(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484); Engineering Contractors Ass‘n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 903 (11th Cir.1997); Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir.2000).
Relying on Mayer, we have held that allegations of newly discovered evidence are not cognizable in a petition for coram nobis. See Moody, 874 F.2d at 1577 (holding that coram nobis is improper vehicle for claims of newly disсovered evidence, and observing that coram nobis petitions are similar to motions for new trial).
We therefore reject the Millses’ argument that the government‘s reading of Mayer is incorrect. In the Millses’ view, Mayer simply decided that Freeman could not seek relief in district court because he
The Millses, however, are mistaken. The Court‘s two grounds for concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction in Mayer were independent, each alone sufficient to dispose of the case. The Supreme Cоurt‘s holding in Mayer that Freeman‘s appeal of his conviction deprived the district court of jurisdiction did not affect its separate holding that Freeman had failed to allege error of a fundamental character such as would have warranted pursuit of coram nobis relief аt common law.
We reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the government.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Safiallah Muhammad NELSON, a.k.a. “Mo“, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 99-13906.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 10, 2000.
221 F.3d 1206