OMNIBUS ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on the several motions of Defendants General Manuel Antonio Noriega and Lt. Col. Luis Del Cid to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the indictment which charges them with various narcotics-related offenses.
*1510 The case at bar presents the Court with a drama of international proportions, considering the status of the principal defendant and the difficult circumstances under which he was brought before this Court. The pertinent facts are as follows:
On February 14, 1988, a federal grand jury sitting in Miami, Florida returned a twelve-count indictment charging General Manuel Antonio Noriega with participating in an international conspiracy to import cocaine and materials used in producing cocaine into and out of the United States. Noriega is alleged to have exploited his official position as head of the intelligence branch of the Panamanian National Guard, and then as Commander-in-Chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces, to receive payoffs in return for assisting and protecting international drug traffickers, including various members of the Medellin Cartel, in conducting narcotics and money laundering operations in Panama.
Specifically, the indictment charges that General Noriega protected cocaine shipments from Colombia through Panama to the United States; arranged for the transshipment and sale to the Medellin Cartel of ether and acetone, including such chemicals previously seized by the Panamanian Defense Forces; provided refuge and a base for continued operations for the members of the Medellin Cartel after the Colombian government’s crackdown on drug traffickers following the murder of the Colombian Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla; agreed to protect a cocaine laboratory in Darien Province, Panama; and assured the safe passage of millions of dollars of narcotic proceeds from the United States into Panamanian banks. Noriega also allegedly traveled to Havana, Cuba and met with Cuban president Fidel Castro, who, according to the indictment, mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Cartel caused by the Panamanian troops’ seizure of a drug laboratory that Noriega was paid to protect. All of these activities were allegedly undertaken for General Noriega’s own personal profit. Defendant Del Cid, in addition to being an officer in the Panamanian Defense Forces, was General Noriega’s personal secretary. He is charged with acting as liaison, courier, and emissary for Noriega in his transactions with Cartel members and other drug traffickers.
Because of the activities alleged, Defendants are charged with engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the RICO statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d); conspiracy to distribute and import cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; and distributing and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine, intending that it be imported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Defendant Noriega is further charged with aiding and abetting the manufacture of cocaine destined for the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959 and 18 U.S.C. § 2; conspiring to manufacture cocaine intending that it be imported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; and causing interstate travel and use of facilities in interstate commerce to promote an unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Subsequent to the indictment, the Court granted General Noriega’s motion to allow special appearance of counsel, despite the fact that Noriega was a fugitive and not before the Court at that time. Noriega’s counsel then moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that United States laws could not be applied to a foreign leader whose alleged illegal activities all occurred outside the territorial bounds of the United States. Counsel further argued that Noriega was immune from prosecution as a head of state and diplomat, and that his alleged narcotics offenses constituted acts of state not properly reviewable by this Court.
Upon hearing arguments of counsel, and after due consideration of the memoranda filed, the Court denied Defendant’s motion, for reasons fully set forth below. At that time, the Court noted that this case was fraught with political overtones, but that it was nonetheless unlikely that General Noriega would ever be brought to the United States to answer the charges against him. 1 *1511 The former observation proved to be considerably more correct than the latter, in light of subsequent events.
In the interval between the time the indictment was issued and Defendants were arrested, relations between the United States and General Noriega deteriorated considerably. Shortly after charges against Noriega were brought, the General delivered a widely publicized speech in which he brought a machete crashing down on a podium while denouncing the United States. On December 15, 1989, Noriega declared that a “state of war” existed between Panama and the United States. Tensions between the two countries further increased the next day, when U.S. military forces in Panama were put on alert after Panamanian troops shot and killed an American soldier, wounded another, and beat a Navy couple. Three days later, on December 20,1989, President Bush ordered U.S. troops into combat in Panama City on a mission whose stated goals were to safeguard American lives, restore democracy, preserve the Panama Canal treaties, and seize General Noriega to face federal drug charges in the United States. Before U.S. troops were engaged, American officials arranged a ceremony in which Guillermo Endara was sworn in as president and recognized by the United States as the legitimate head of the government of Panama. Endara was reported to have won the Panamanian presidential election held several months earlier, the results of which were nullified and disregarded by General Noriega.
Not long after the invasion commenced, Defendant Del Cid, the commander of about two thousand Panamanian troops located in the Chiriqui Province, surrendered to American forces. He was then transferred into the custody of agents from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, who thereupon arrested Del Cid for the offenses for which he is under indictment in this Court. The apprehension of General Noriega was not quite so easy. He successfully eluded American forces for several days, prompting the United States government to offer a one million dollar bounty for his capture. Eventually, the General took sanctuary in the Papal Nunci-ature in Panama City, where he apparently hoped to be granted political asylum. Noriega’s presence in the Papal Nunciature touched off a diplomatic impasse and a round of intense negotiations involving several countries. Vatican officials initially refused to turn Noriega over to the United States. While he was still ensconced in the nunciature, American troops stationed outside pelted the building with loud rock-and-roll music blasted through loudspeakers. The music was played continuously for three days until church authorities protested the action as offensive. After an eleven-day standoff, Noriega finally surrendered to American forces, apparently under pressure from the papal nuncio and influenced by a threatening crowd of about 15,000 angry Panamanian citizens who had gathered outside the residence. On January 3, 1990, two weeks after the invasion began, Noriega walked out of the Papal Nunciature and surrendered himself to U.S. military officials waiting outside. He was flown by helicopter to Howard Air Force Base, where he was ushered into a plane bound for Florida and formally arrested by agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency. During the course of this litigation, which has included several hearings, no evidence was presented nor suggestion made that Noriega was in any way physically mistreated.
As is evident from the unusual factual background underlying this case, the Court is presented with several issues of first impression. This is the first time that a leader or de facto leader of a sovereign nation has been forcibly brought to the United States to face criminal charges. The fact that General Noriega’s apprehension occurred in the course of a military action only further underscores the complexity of the issues involved. In addition to Defendant Noriega’s motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense and sovereign immunity, Defendants Noriega and Del Cid argue that they are prisoners of war pursuant to the Geneva Convention. This status, Defendants maintain, deprives the Court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case. Additionally, Noriega contends that the military action which *1512 brought about his arrest is “shocking to the conscience”, and that due process considerations require the Court to divest itself of jurisdiction over his person. Noriega also asserts that the invasion occurred in violation of international law. Finally, Noriega argues that, even in the absence of constitutional or treaty violations, the Court should dismiss the indictment pursuant to its supervisory powers so as to prevent the judicial system from being party to and tainted by the government’s alleged misconduct in arresting Noriega. 2 The Court examines each of these issues, in turn, below.
1. JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
The first issue confronting the Court is whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction over Noriega’s alleged criminal activities. Noriega maintains that “the extraterritorial application of the criminal law is unreasonable under the unique facts of this case, and cannot be relied upon to secure jurisdiction over a leader of a sovereign nation who has personally performed no illegal acts within the borders of the United States.” 3 Although the defendant attempts to weave his asserted status as a foreign leader into his challenge to the extraterritorial application of this country’s criminal laws, the question of whether the United States may proscribe conduct which occurs beyond its borders is separate from the question of whether Noriega is immune from prosecution as a head of state. This distinction is made clear in the defendant’s own discussion of the applicable international law on extraterritorial jurisdiction, which does not look to a foreign defendant’s official status but rather to the nature and effect of the conduct at issue. The Court therefore reserves analysis of Noriega’s claim to head of state immunity and confines its discussion here to the ability of the United States to reach and prosecute acts committed by aliens outside its territorial borders. 4 While the indictment cites specific instances of conduct occurring within the United States, including the shipment of cocaine from Panama to Miami and several flights to and from Miami by Noriega’s alleged co-conspirators, the activity ascribed to Noriega occurred solely in Panama with the exception of the one trip to Cuba. Noriega is charged with providing safe haven to international narcotic traffickers by allowing Panama to be used ^ as a location for the manufacture and shipment of cocaine destined for this country’s shores.
Where a court is faced with the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the analysis to be applied is 1) whether the United States has the power to reach the conduct in question under traditional principles of international law; and 2) whether the statutes under which the defendant is charged are intended to have extraterritorial effect. As Noriega concedes, the United States has long possessed the ability to attach criminal consequences to acts occurring outside this country which produce effects within the United States.
Strassheim v. Daily,
More recently, international law principles have expanded to permit jurisdiction upon a mere showing of
intent
to produce effects in this country, without requiring proof of an overt act or effect within the United States.
See United States v. Wright-Barker,
Cases involving intended but unrealized effect are rare, but international law does not preclude jurisdiction in such instances, subject to the principle of reasonableness. When the intent to commit the proscribed act is clear and demonstrated by some activity, and the éffect to be produced by the activity is substantial and foreseeable, the fact that a plan or conspiracy was thwarted does not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to make its law applicable.
§ 402, Comment d.
In the drug smuggling context, the ‘intent doctrine’ has resulted in jurisdiction over persons who attempted to import narcotics into the United States but never actually succeeded in entering the United States or delivering drugs within its borders. The fact that no act was committed and no repercussions were felt within the United States did not preclude jurisdiction over conduct that was clearly directed at the United States.
United States v. Wright-Barker, supra
(“The purpose of these [narcotics laws] is to halt smugglers
before
they introduce their dangerous wares into and distribute them in this country.”) (emphasis in original);
United States v. Quemener,
These principles unequivocally support jurisdiction in this case. The indictment charges Noriega with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States and alleges several overt acts performed within the United States in furtherance of the conspiracy. Specifically, the indictment alleges that co-conspirators of Noriega pur *1514 chased a Lear jet in Miami, which was then used to transport drug proceeds from Miami to Panama. Moreover, Noriega’s activities in Panama, if true, undoubtedly produced effects within this country as deleterious as the hypothetical bullet fired across the border. The indictment alleges that, as a result of Noriega’s facilitation of narcotics activity in Panama, 2,141 pounds of cocaine were illegally brought into Miami from Panama. While the ability of the United States to reach and proscribe extraterritorial conduct having effects in this country does not depend on the amount of narcotics imported into the United States or the magnitude of the consequences, the importation of over 2,000 pounds of cocaine clearly has a harmful impact and merits jurisdiction. Finally, even if no overt acts or effects occurred within the territorial borders, the object of the alleged conspiracy was to import cocaine into the United States and therefore an intent to produce effects is present.
The defendant’s argument that the exercise of jurisdiction over his alleged activities in Panama is unreasonable is simply unsupportable in light of established principles of international law and the overwhelming case law in this Circuit upholding jurisdiction under similar circumstances. 5 Other than asserting his status as a foreign leader, which presents a different question from the one posed here, Noriega does not distinguish this case from those cited above. He cites the principle of reasonableness recently articulated in the Restatement (Third) § 403, but fails to say how extending jurisdiction over his conduct would be unreasonable. In fact, the defendant’s invocation of a reasonableness requirement supports rather than undermines the application of jurisdiction in the present case. Thus, for example, Noriega quotes the following language from the Restatement:
In applying the principle of reasonableness, the exercise of criminal (as distinguished from civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive.
It is generally accepted by enforcement agencies of the United States government that criminal jurisdiction over activity with substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than civil jurisdiction over the- same activity, and only upon strong justification.
Restatement (Third)
§ 403, Reporters’ Note 8. However, the same section of the
Restatement
establishes that narcotics offenses provide the strong justification meriting criminal jurisdiction: “Prosecution for activities committed in a foreign state have generally been limited to serious and universally condemned offenses, such as treason or traffic in narcotics, and to offenses by and against military forces. In such cases the state in whose territory the act occurs is not likely to object to regulation by the state concerned.”
Id.
(citations omitted). The
Restatement
therefore explicitly recognizes the reasonableness of extending jurisdiction to narcotics activity such as that alleged here.
See also United States v. Wright-Barker,
This conclusion does not end the Court’s analysis, however, since a further requirement is that the criminal statutes under which the defendant is charged be intended to apply to conduct outside the United States. Noriega is charged with violations of 21 U.S.C. § 959 (distributing a controlled substance with the knowledge that it would be unlawfully imported into the United States); 21 U.S.C. § 952 (importing a controlled substance into the United States from a place outside thereof); 21 U.S.C. § 963 (conspiring to commit the above offenses); and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting the violation of § 959). The indictment also alleges that Noriega participated in a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of the above crimes, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d), and caused the travel and use of facilities in interstate and foreign commerce in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
Section 959, prohibiting the distribution of narcotics intending that they be imported into the United States, is clearly meant to apply extraterritorially. The statute expressly states that it is “intended to reach acts of manufacture or distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 959(c). The remaining statutes, by contrast, do not on their face indicate an express intention that they be given extraterritorial effect. Where a statute is silent as to its extraterritorial reach, a presumption against such application normally applies.
United States v. Benitez,
With respect to 21 U.S.C. § 952, it is apparent from the very nature of the offense that the statute was intended to reach extraterritorial acts. Section 952 makes it unlawful to import narcotics “into the United States from
any place outside
thereof .. ” (emphasis added). Because importation by definition involves acts originating outside of the territorial limits of
*1516
the United States, the Court can only infer that § 952 applies to conduct which begins abroad; any interpretation to the contrary would render the statute virtually meaningless.
United States v. Cadena,
Whether the RICO and Travel Act statutes reach conduct abroad is a more difficult question. None of the cases cited by the parties address this point and the Court is unaware of any case reaching the issue. 6 The question of these statutes’ extraterritorial effect is therefore a matter of apparent first impression. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d), and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), apply to conduct outside the United States.
Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for “any person associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ...” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (emphasis added). Section 1962(d) similarly makes it illegal for “any person to conspire to violate” Section 1962(c). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (emphasis added). These prohibitions are on their face all-inclusive and do not suggest parochial application. Indeed, if any statute reaches far and wide, it is RICO. 7
When Congress passed RICO, it was primarily concerned with eradicating the destructive influence of organized crime on our society:
(1) organized crime in the United States ... annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy ... (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Na *1517 tion’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens.
RICO Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong.
&
Admin.News 1078, 1073. Though its emphasis is on economic effects, RICO itself is not so limited; it’s history demonstrates concern with our domestic security and welfare as well as our gross national product.
Marcos III,
While the Statement of Findings and Purpose speaks of criminal activities “in the United States,” the Court must be cognizant of the overall purpose of the Act and the extent to which Congress intended it have effect. The legislative history leaves no doubt that RICO was to be read expansively as a means of attacking organized crime at every level and on an unprecedented scope. Congress noted that:
What is needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
S.Rep. No. 91-617, p. 76 (1969) (emphasis added). It is in this spirit of attacking crime “on all fronts” that all of the Act’s provisions must be read.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
[I]n RICO, we confront a statute which is ... above all, deliberately and extraordinarily broad ... In defining the key terms of the statute, such as ‘person,’ ‘enterprise,’ and ‘racketeering activity,’ and in leaving undefined such broad terms as ‘conduct’ and ‘participate,’ Congress deliberately chose to employ broad terms which would defy judicial confinement ... Congress [chose] to employ that extraordinarily broad language in order to achieve its desired goals. In response to suggestions that the statute be more narrowly tailored to prevent unexpected applications, Congress clearly preferred breadth to precision.
Haroco Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co.,
Given the Act’s broad construction and equally broad goal of eliminating the harm- \ ful consequences of organized crime, it is apparent that Congress was concerned with the effects and not the locus of racketeering activities. The Act thus permits no inference that it was intended to apply only to conduct within the United States. Such a narrow construction would frustrate RICO’s purpose by allowing persons engaged in racketeering activities directed at the United States to escape RICO’s bite simply by moving their operations abroad. Yet in the context of narcotics activities, perhaps the greatest threat to this country’s welfare comes from enterprises outside the United States such as the Colombian cocaine cartels. Keeping in mind Congress’ specific instruction that RICO be applied liberally to effect its remedial purpose, the Court cannot suppose that RICO does not reach such harmful conduct simply because it is extraterritorial in nature. As long as the racketeering activities produce effects or are intended to produce effects in this country, RICO applies.
Noriega is also charged with violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), by causing foreign travel and the use of facilities in foreign and interstate commerce to promote an unlawful activity. The indictment alleges that, on two separate occasions, co-conspirators of Noriega used an airplane to transport drug proceeds from Miami to Panama.
*1518
Like RICO, the Travel Act was originally designed to combat organized crime. Specifically, “the purpose of the Travel Act was to aid local law enforcement officials. In many instances, the ‘top men' of a given criminal enterprise resided in one State but conducted their illegal activities in another; by creating a federal interest in limiting the interstate movement necessary to such operations, criminal conduct beyond the reach of local officials could be controlled.”
United States v. Nardello,
In this case, the defendant allegedly participated in a criminal syndicate which utilized the channels of commerce to carry out illegal drug activities in the United States. His location may have differed from the typical defendant charged under the Travel Act but the nature and effect of the alleged activity is the same, and implicates the same congressional desire to reach conduct which transcends state lines both physically and symbolically.
Support for extraterritorial application of § 1952(a)(3) is also found in the statutory language, which suggests no restriction based upon the locus of conduct other than that it result in activity crossing state lines: 9
The words of section 1952 are general; they contain no restriction to particular persons or to particular kinds of gambling, liquor, narcotics, and prostitution offenses.
... [A]s we read the legislative record, Congress meant exactly what the language of Section 1952 states — it deliberately chose to make the statute applicable generally, and without crippling restrictions, to any person engaged in any kind of illicit business enterprise in one of the four fields of activity specified in the statute, which experience showed to be those in which organized racketeers commonly engaged.
United States v. Roselli,
Jurisdiction over Defendant’s extraterritorial conduct is therefore appropriate both as a matter of international law and statutory construction.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Court next turns to Noriega’s assertion that he is immune from prosecution based on head of state immunity, the act of state doctrine, and diplomatic immunity.
A. Head of State Immunity
Grounded in customary international law, the doctrine of head of state immunity provides that a head of state is not subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, at least as to official acts taken during the ruler’s term of office.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700,
In order to assert head of state immunity, a government official must be recognized as a head of state. Noriega has never been recognized as Panama’s Head of State either under the Panamanian Constitution or by the United States. Title VI, Article 170 of the Panamanian Constitution provides for an executive branch composed of the President and Ministers of State, neither of which applies to Noriega. Officially, Noriega is the
Commandante
of the Panamanian Defense Forces,
12
but he was never elected to head Panama’s government and in fact abrogated the Panamanian presidential elections of May 7, 1989. More importantly, the United States government has never accorded Noriega head of state status, but rather continued to recognize President Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate leader of Panama while Noriega was in power. As this Court held in a previous case involving the Republic of Panama, the Executive’s decision to recognize President Delvalle and not the Defendant as Panama’s head of state is binding on the Court.
Republic of Panama v. Air Panama,
Aside from the fact that neither Panama nor the United States recognizes Noriega as a head of state, the defendant concedes that he does not fit within traditional notions of a head of state as defined by customary international law.
13
He nonetheless argues that he is entitled to head of state immunity as the
de facto
ruler of Panama, “regardless of the source of his power or the nature of his rule.” The defendant cites numerous newspaper reports and excerpts of congressional testimony to the effect that Noriega effectively controlled Panama. In fact, this Court has previously acknowledged that, despite the official recognition of Delvalle, Noriega was the
defacto
head of Panama’s government.
United States v. Noriega,
The “head of state” argument comes to the Court unencumbered by evidence; the arguments were made largely on the basis of general information made available by the media. However, accepting as true statements of counsel regarding Defendant’s position of power, to hold that immunity from prosecution must be granted “regardless of his source of power or nature of rule” would allow illegitimate dictators *1521 the benefit of their unscrupulous and possibly brutal seizures of power. No authority exists for such a novel extension of head of state immunity, and the Court declines to create one here. Since the United States has never recognized General Noriega as Panama’s head of state, he has no claim to head of state immunity.
B. The Act of State Doctrine
Noriega next argues that the act of state doctrine prohibits the Court from adjudicating the legality of his official actions in Panama. Unlike head of state immunity, the act of state doctrine presents no jurisdictional question but instead addresses the Court’s permissible scope of inquiry into certain governmental acts. It is more properly understood as an issue preclusion device rather than an immunity prohibiting prosecution.
Restatement (Third)
§ 443, Reporters’ Note 11.
See also National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
The classic expression of the doctrine is stated in
Underhill v. Hernandez:
“Every sovereign is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgement on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.”
Although stated in terms of acts of the “State” or “sovereign,” the doctrine also extends to governmental acts of State officials vested with sovereign authority.
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A.,
In order for the act of state doctrine to apply, the defendant must establish that his activities are “acts of state,” i.e., that they were taken on behalf of the state and not, as private acts, on behalf of the actor himself.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
The Court fails to see how Noriega’s alleged drug trafficking and protection of money launderers could conceivably constitute public action taken on behalf of the Panamanian state. Certainly no evidence has been presented to this effect, despite Defendant’s burden of proof on the issue.
Dunhill,
Defendant does little more than state that, as the de facto ruler of Panama, his actions constitute acts of state. This sweeping position completely ignores the public/private distinction and suggests that government leaders are, as such, incapable of engaging in private, unofficial conduct. Aside from its lack of logic, suffice it to say that this argument has been implicitly rejected in several cases distinguishing the private from public conduct of heads of state and foreign dictators.
See Marcos I,
Even though characterized as a dictator, appellant was not himself the sovereign — government—of Venezuela within, the Act of State Doctrine. He was chief executive, a public officer, of the sovereign nation of Venezuela. It is only when officials having sovereign authority act in an official capacity that the Act of State Doctrine applies.
Appellant’s acts constituting the financial crimes ... were not acts of Venezuela sovereignty ... [E]ach of these acts was “for the private financial benefit” of the appellant. They constituted common crimes committed by the Chief of State in violation of his position and not in pursuance of it. They are as far from being an act of state as rape ...
Id. at 557-58.
No fundamental difference separates this case from
Jimenez.
Nor is the Court persuaded by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Marcos II, supra,
upon which Defendant
*1523
heavily relies. The court in that case held that deposed dictator Ferdinand Marcos’ alleged theft and conversion of property and funds belonging to the Philippine republic were acts of state since “they are activities that Marcos could only have undertaken pursuant to his powers as President of the Philippines.”
Yet another consideration counsels against application of the act of state doctrine to this case. Although originally couched in terms of sovereign immunity, the doctrine as presently developed does not rest on principles of international law or respect for sovereign independence. More recent interpretations of the doctrine instead emphasize the separation of powers rationale — more specifically, the need to preclude judicial encroachment in the field of foreign policy and international diplomacy.
See Sabbatino,
C. Diplomatic Immunity
Noriega concedes at the outset that his assertion of diplomatic status does not fit within the confines of either the Diplomatic Relations Act 15 or the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 16 the two bodies of law governing diplomatic privileges and immunities. Among other deficiencies, the government of Panama never requested that Noriega be accredited as a diplomat and the United States at no time granted Noriega such status, as required by the Convention, Articles 9 and 10. 17 Nor did Noriega ever meet the Department of State’s standards for accreditation, which require, inter alia, that the individual reside in the Washington D.C. area and devote official activities to dip *1524 lomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. 18 As Defendant himself states, “[diplomatic immunity generally deals with eligible persons who are present in the United States.” 19 In this case, Noriega was neither eligible nor present in this country as a diplomat.
In light of his failure to satisfy the conventional requirements for diplomatic status, Noriega relies principally on the fact that he traveled on a Panamanian diplomatic passport and was on three occasions granted an “A-2” visa by the United States. In the first place, issuance of the Panamanian diplomatic passport is a matter solely of Panamanian law and has no effect on its holder’s status in another state. Though diplomatic passports issued by Panama to reflect the esteem which that nation assigned to Defendant may have obtained Noriega certain courtesies in international travel, they are without significance in international law and United States law and do not, by themselves, entitle Noriega to any internationally or domestically protected status. “Generally, a sending state issues a diplomatic passport to its diplomatic agent and the receiving state gives him a diplomatic visa, but such passports and visas are sometimes issued as a courtesy also to persons other than diplomats, and they do not prove that the holder enjoys diplomatic status or is entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities in the receiving state.”
Restatement (Third)
§ 464, Reporters’ Note 1 (citing
United States v. Arizti,
Nor does the “A-2” visa establish anything of significance in the way of diplomatic immunity. The issuance of United States visas is an administrative action in connection with United States immigration law and is quite independent of the process of diplomatic accreditation. In October 1985, the Department of State reminded all diplomatic missions in the United States by diplomatic note that:
“[U]nder U.S. law, the issuance of visas is a procedure by which immigration to and visits in the United States are administratively controlled. * * * * Under the applicable regulations A-category visas are issued to thousands of persons each year, many of whom never perform diplomatic or consular functions in the United States. * * * * The mere possession of an A-category visa by a person not accredited to the United States in accordance with these procedures [promulgated by the Chief of Protocol] gives such person no claim to diplomatic or consular status in the United States, and thus no entitlement to the privileges and immunities extended to persons in diplomatic or consular status.” 20
In other words, mere possession of an “A-2” visa does not confer diplomatic immunity; other criteria, none of which are satisfied here, must be met.
See United States v. Kostadinov,
III. DEFENDANTS’ PRISONER OF WAR STATUS
Defendants Noriega and Del Cid contend that they are prisoners of war (“POW”) within the meaning of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, (Geneva III), 21 a status, Defendants maintain, which divests this Court of jurisdiction to proceed with this case. For the purposes of the motion at bar, the Government does not maintain that Defendants are not prisoners of war, but rather argues that even were Defendants POWs, the Geneva Convention would not divest this Court of jurisdiction. Thus, the Court is not presented with the task of determining whether or not Defendants are POWs under Geneva III, but proceeds with the motion at bar as if Defendants were entitled to the full protection afforded by the Convention. 22 Defendants’ arguments under the Geneva Convention are grounded in Articles 82, 84, 85, 87, and 99, and 22, each of which is examined, in turn, below,
x. Article 82
A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed. If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.
As is evident from its face, Article 82 pertains to disciplinary and penal procedures against POWs for offenses committed after becoming POWs, allowing for prosecutions against POWs only for acts which would be prosecutable against a member of the detaining forces. Thus, Article 82 is clearly inapplicable to the instant case because Noriega and Del Cid are being prosecuted not for offenses committed after their capture but for offenses committed well before they became prisoners of war.
x. Article 84
A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect to the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.
In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with military courts over all violations of the laws of the United States committed by military personnel. 23 The indictment *1526 charges Defendants with various violations of federal law, including narcotics trafficking, RICO violations, and RICO conspiracy. These are allegations of criminal misconduct for which any member of the United States Armed Forces could be prosecuted. Consequently, the prohibition embodied in Article 84, paragraph 1 does not divest this Court of jurisdiction.
It has not been argued by Defense Counsel that the district court does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality “as generally recognized ...” Neither do Defendants contend that they will not be afforded the full measure of rights provided for in Article 105. Those rights include representation of counsel and prior notification of charges. See 6 U.S.T. at 3396. Indeed, Defendants will enjoy the benefit of all constitutional guarantees afforded any person accused of a federal crime.
x. Article 85
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.
Rather than supporting Defendants' overall position pressed under the Geneva Convention, this Article appears to recognize the right to prosecute asserted by the Government. The Article refers to “prisoners ... prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power” (i.e., the United States) and for acts “committed prior to capture.” Further, the benefits of the Convention shall be afforded the POW “even if convicted.” The indictment charges the Defendants with violations of the laws of the United States allegedly committed between December 1982 and March 1986— well before the military action and apprehension by surrender. 24
x. Article 87
Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of the Detaining Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed forces of said Power who have committed the same acts ...
Article 82 reflects the principle of “equivalency” embodied in other Articles of the Convention. That principle provides that, in general, prisoners of war may be prosecuted for criminal violations only if a member of the armed forces of the detaining country would be subject to like prosecution for the same conduct. The specific application of the ‘equivalency principle’ in Article 87 prevents prisoners of war from being subject to penalties not imposed on the detaining power’s soldiers for the same acts. Assuming Defendants are convicted of one or more of the crimes with which they are charged, they face ^ criminal sentences no greater nor less than would apply to an American soldier convicted of the same crime. The instant prosecution is therefore consistent with the provisions of Article 87.
x. Article 99
No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at time the said act was committed.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.
No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his defence and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel.
Article 99 proscribes the prosecution of prisoners of war under ex post facto laws, and prohibits coerced confessions. This Article further codifies other fundamental rights secured to any criminal defendant under the Constitution of the United States of America. All accused defendants, “prisoner of war” status notwithstanding, are guaranteed these basic protections.
The Defense has not contended, and of course cannot contend, that the narcotics *1527 offenses with which Defendants are charged were permitted under U.S. law at the time the acts were allegedly committed. Neither has there been any assertion that Defendants were coerced into admitting guilt or that any effort was made in that direction. Defendants are represented by competent counsel and are being afforded all .rights to which they are entitled under the law. Article 99 thus does not operate to divest the Court of jurisdiction,
x. Article 22
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as possible to a more favourable climate. The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with their consent.
Defendants maintain that Article 22 deprives the Court of personal jurisdiction by requiring that they be returned to Panama and detained along with other Panamanian prisoners of the armed conflict. The Court perceives no such requirement in Article 22, which relates to the general conditions, and not the location, of internment. The provision upon which Defendants rely states that prisoners shall not be interned with persons of different nationality, language, and customs, and “shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture.” 6 U.S.T. at 3336. According to Defendants’ interpretation, Article 22 would require that all prisoners of war from the same armed forces be interned together in a single prisoner of war facility. Yet this clearly cannot be Article 22’s intent, since internment under those conditions would likely violate its overall concern for healthy and comfortable conditions of internment. Indeed, Defendant Noriega undercuts his own argument by suggesting that he be detained in an agreeable third country, an action which would certainly separate him from members of Panama’s armed forces being detained in Panama. The more obvious interpretation of the provision that it prevents prisoners belonging to the armed forces of one nation from being forcibly interned with prisoners from the armed forces of another nation. Such is not the case here.
Moreover, nothing in Article 22 or elsewhere prohibits the detaining power from temporarily transferring a prisoner to a facility other than an internment camp in \ connection with legal proceedings. Because the Convention contemplates that prisoners of war may be prosecuted in civilian courts, it necessarily permits them to be transferred to a location that is consistent with the orderly conduct of those proceedings. It is inconceivable that the Convention would permit criminal prosecutions of prisoners of war and yet require that they be confined to internment camps thousands of miles from the courthouse and, quite possibly, defense counsel.
The remaining provisions of the Convention cited by Defendant Noriega lend little, if any, support to his argument regarding jurisdiction. Article 12 of the Convention, which Noriega contends mandates his removal to a third country, in fact limits the ability of the United States to effect such a transfer:
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they are in custody.
6 U.S.T. at 3328.
Finally, Noriega cites Article 118 of the Convention, which requires prisoners *1528 of war to be released and repatriated “without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” 6 U.S.T. at 3406. That provision is, however, limited by Article 119, which provides that prisoners of war “against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offense are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment.” 6 U.S.T. at 3408. Since criminal proceedings are pending against Noriega, Article 119 permits his detainment in the United States notwithstanding the cessation of hostilities.
x. Extradition Treaty Between Panama and the United States
Defendants argue that Geneva III operates to divest this Court of jurisdiction over Defendants because they could not have been extradited from Panama to the United States for the crimes with which they are charged. The genesis of Defendants argument is not in the language of the Convention, but rather is found in the Red Cross Commentary on Geneva III (the “Commentary”) which, in discussing Article 85, states that:
[I]n general, acts not connected with the state of war may give rise to penal proceedings only if they are punishable under the laws of both the Detaining Power and the Power of origin. As a parallel, reference may be had to extradition agreements or to the customary rules concerning extradition. An act in respect of which there could be no extradition should not be punished by the Detaining Power. One may also examine whether prosecution would have been possible in the country of origin. If the answer is in the negative, the prisoner of war should not be tried by the Detaining Power.
Ill International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 419, J. Pictet (Ed.1960).
First, it must be underscored that the Red Cross Commentary is merely a discussion suggesting what the author believes should or should not be done as a matter of policy; the Commentary is not part of the treaty. Nowhere does the text of Geneva III purport to limit the jurisdiction of domestic courts to extraditable offenses. Defendants would infer this limitation from Commentary on the Geneva Convention. The Supreme Court has, however, held that in order for an international treaty to divest domestic courts of jurisdiction, the treaty must expressly provide for such limitation:
If [the defendant] committed an offense against the United States and its liquor importation laws, [he] cannot escape conviction, unless the treaty affirmatively confers on [him] immunity from prosecution. There certainly are no express words granting such immunity. Why should it be implied? If it was intended by the parties why should it not have been expressed?
Ford v. United States,
Moreover, the Commentary itself does not support Defendants’ position. The Commentary suggests that extradition treaties in existence may serve as a guiding “reference” in determining what acts should be punishable by the Detaining Party. Defendants entire argument is premised on the observation that the act of narcotics trafficking is not one of the thirteen crimes listed in the extradition treaty between Panama and the United States. Defendants overlook, however, the fact that the narcotics offenses with which Defendants are charged not only constitute the kinds of offenses which could be the subject of extradition under customary international law, but are specifically contemplated by subsequent treaties between the United States and Panama. Under Article 36 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407 T.I. A.S. No. 6298, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1441, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, offenses relating to the production, possession and distribution of narcotics are “deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty between the Parties.” 26 U.S.T. at 1451-1452. Furthermore, in the event an *1529 offender is not extradited, Article 36 of the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs specifically provides that the offender “shall be prosecuted by the Party in whose territory the offence was committed.” Id. at 1452. Thus, the Single Convention amends the Extradition Treaty of 1904 between the United States and Panama to include narcotics offenses, and also makes clear that such offenses constitute prosecutable crimes in both Panama and the United States.
As is evident from its text and construed as a whole, the essential purpose of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War is to protect prisoners of war from prosecution for conduct which is customary in armed conflict. The Geneva Convention was never intended, and should not be construed, to provide immunity against prosecution for common crimes committed against the detaining power before the outbreak of military hostilities. It therefore has no application to the prosecution of Defendants for alleged violations of this country’s narcotics laws. Indeed, the Court has not been presented with any provision of the Convention which suggests or directs that this proceeding is one which, in deference to the Convention, should be terminated.
The humanitarian character of the Geneva Convention cannot be overemphasized, and weighs heavily against Defendants’ applications to the Court. The Third Geneva Convention was enacted for the express purpose of protecting prisoners of war from abuse after capture by a detaining power. The essential principle of tendance liberate, pervasive throughout the Convention, promotes lenient treatment of prisoners of war on the basis that, not being a national of the detaining power, they are not bound to it by any duty of allegiance. Hence, the “honorable motives” which may have prompted his offending act must be recognized. 25 That such motives are consistent with the conduct and laws of war is implicit in the principle. Here, the Government seeks to prosecute Defendants for alleged narcotics trafficking and other drug-related offenses — activities which have no bearing on the conduct of battle or the defense of country. The fact that such alleged conduct is by nature wholly devoid of “honorable motives” renders tendance libérale inapposite -to the case at bar.
IV. ILLEGAL ARREST
Noriega also moves to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the manner in which he was brought before this Court— as a result of the United States government’s invasion of Panama — is “shocking to the conscience and in violation of the laws and norms of humanity.” He argues that the Court should therefore divest itself of jurisdiction over his person. In support of this claim, Noriega alleges that the invasion of Panama violated the Due x Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as international law. Alternatively, he argues that even in the absence of constitutional or treaty violations, this Court should nevertheless exercise its supervisory authority and dismiss the indictment so as to prevent the Court from becoming a party to the government’s alleged misconduct in bringing Noriega to trial.
A. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Argument
It is well settled that the manner by which a defendant is brought before the court normally does not affect the ability of the government to try him. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine, as this rule has come to be known, provides that a court is not deprived of jurisdiction to try a defendant on the ground that the defendant’s presence before the court was procured by unlawful means.
Ker v. Illinois,
[W]e are convinced that under well established case law of the Supreme Court and this Circuit, a defendant in a criminal *1530 trial whether citizen or alien, whether arrested within or beyond the territory of the United States, may not successfully challenge the District Court’s jurisdiction over his person on the grounds that his presence was unlawfully secured.
Noriega does not challenge the validity of the Ker-Frisbie rule but instead relies on what is commonly referred to as the Toscanino exception carved out by the Second Circuit.
United States v. Toscanino,
The type of governmental conduct necessary to invoke the Toscanino exception and warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal was subsequently clarified and narrowed by the Second Circuit in
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510
F.2d 62 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied,
Before addressing the substance of Noriega’s claim, the Court is faced with the threshold issue of Toscanino’s continued vitality in light of subsequent Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit decisions. The Government argues that Toscanino has been undermined by the Supreme Court, citing in particular the Court’s holdings in
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
These cases are distinguishable from Toscanino and therefore do not prove the Government’s point; neither involved the type of inhumane governmental conduct “shocking to the conscience” to which Tos-canino was addressed and, as such, merely reaffirmed the general Ker-Frisbie rule that an illegal arrest, without more, does not bar prosecution. As Toscanino establishes, there is a difference between conduct which is merely illegal and conduct so egregious it shocks the conscience.
The Government next argues that, even if good law, Toscanino has nonetheless been rejected by this Circuit. In
United States v. Rosenthal,
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has under certain limited circumstances allowed one party standing to assert another party’s rights,
see, e.g., Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,
B. Violations of International Law
In addition to his due process claim, Noriega asserts that the invasion of Panama violated international treaties and principles of customary international law— specifically, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 29 Article 20[17] of the Organization of American States Charter, 30 Arti *1533 cles 23(b) and 25 of the Hague Convention, 31 Article 3 of Geneva Convention I, and Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. 32
Initially, it is important to note that individuals lack standing to assert violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest from the offended government. Moreover, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine establishes that violations of international law alone do not deprive a court of jurisdiction over a defendant in the absence of specific treaty language to that effect.
United States v. Postal,
As a general principle of international law, individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the sovereign involved.
United States v. Hensel,
No such rights are created in the sections of the U.N. Charter, O.A.S. Charter, and Hague Convention cited by Noriega. Rather, those provisions set forth broad general principles governing the conduct of nations toward each other and do not by their terms speak to individual or private rights.
See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
It can perhaps be argued that reliance on the above body of law, under the unusual circumstances of this case, is a form of legal bootstrapping. Noriega, it can be asserted, is the government of Panama or at least its de facto head of state, and as such he is the appropriate person to protest alleged treaty violations; to permit removal of him and his associates from power and reject his complaint because a new and friendly government is installed, he can further urge, turns the doctrine of sovereign standing on its head. This argument is not without force, yet there are more persuasive answers in response. First, as stated earlier, the United States has consistently refused to recognize the Noriega regime as Panama’s legitimate government, a fact which considerably undermines Noriega’s position. Second, Noriega nullified the results of the Panamanian presidential election held shortly before the alleged treaty violations occurred. The suggestion that his removal from power somehow robs the true government of the opportunity to object under the applicable treaties is therefore weak indeed. Finally, there is no provision or suggestion in the treaties cited which would permit the Court to ignore the absence of complaint or demand from the present duly constituted government of Panama. The current government of the Republic of Panama led by Guillermo Endara is therefore the appropriate entity to object to treaty violations. In light of Noriega’s lack of standing to object, this Court therefore does not reach the question of whether these treaties were violated by the United States military action in Panama.
Article 3 of Geneva Convention I, which provides for the humane treatment of civilians and other non-participants of war, applies to armed conflicts “not of an international character,” i.e., internal or civil wars of a purely domestic nature. 6 U.S.T. at 3116.
See American Baptist Churches v. Meese,
Finally, Defendant cites Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, which proscribes war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg Charter sets forth the procedures by which the Nuremberg Tribunal, established by the Allied powers after the Second World War, conducted the trials and punishment of major war criminals of the European Axis.
*1535
The Government maintains that the principles laid down at Nuremberg were developed solely for the prosecution of World War II war criminals, and have no application to the conduct of U.S. military forces in Panama. The Court cannot agree. As Justice Robert H. Jackson, the United States Chief of Counsel at Nuremberg, stated: “If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us.”
34
Nonetheless, Defendant fails to establish how the Nuremberg Charter or its possible violation, assuming any, has any application to the instant prosecution. As stated above, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine makes clear that violations of treaties or customary international law alone do not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the defendant in the absence of limiting language to that effect.
See United States v. Winter,
C, Supervisory Authority
Having determined that Defendant Noriega fails to state a valid defense based on due process and international law principles, this Court’s inquiry is nonetheless unfinished, as Defendant Noriega alternatively bases his motion on the inherent supervisory power of the Court. Noriega alleges that, by asserting jurisdiction over him, this Court would thereby sanction and become party to the Government’s alleged misconduct in invading Panama and bringing Noriega to trial.
The supervisory power doctrine, while it may serve to vindicate a defendant’s rights in an individual case, “is designed and invoked primarily to preserve the integrity of the judicial system” and “to prevent the 1 federal courts from becoming accomplices” to government misconduct.
United States v. Omni International Corp.,
In response, the Government argues that, even pursuant to the Court’s inherent supervisory authority, Noriega may not seek dismissal of the indictment based on alleged violations of the rights of third parties — in this case, the rights of individual Panamanians or of the Panamanian state. The Government’s position thus seems to be that a defendant’s own constitutional or statutory rights must be violated in order to trigger the exercise of a court’s supervisory power. This stance blurs the critical distinction between the use of supervisory authority on the one hand and the courts’ rulings based on violations of constitutional and statutory law on the other. Since, as stated earlier, use of supervisory authority presents an independent body of law and does not depend on the existence of a constitutional or statutory violation, the fact that a defendant’s own such rights have not been violated is not decisive.
(See United States v. Leslie,
The majority ruling in
Payner, supra,
cited by the Government, is distinguishable on its facts and thus does not constrict this Court’s exercise of its supervisory authority in the instant case. In
Payner,
the Supreme Court held that the supervisory power doctrine could not be used to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a third party’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because evidence is excluded under the Fourth Amendment only where an unlawful search or seizure violates the defendant’s own constitutional rights, the Court refused to allow a different result under the supervisory power doctrine as that approach would circumvent “the careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court.”
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if its fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.
This Court may someday have occasion to apply Justice Brandéis’ wise words, but this is not that day, for we are confronted not with the above hypothetical but rather a military war in which innocent lives were unfortunately lost in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Although the motives behind the military action are open to speculation, the stated goals of the invasion were to protect American lives, support democracy, preserve the Panama Canal Treaties, and bring Noriega to the United States to stand trial for narcotics offenses. 36 Because the President ordered Noriega arrested “in the course of carrying out the military operations in Panama,” 37 the capture of Noriega was incident to the broader conduct of foreign policy. While the Government’s asserted rationales for the invasion are not beyond challenge and need not be blindly accepted by this Court, counsel for Noriega have offered no evidence to the contrary and the evidence they have offered in fact bolsters the conclusion that the invasion was primarily an exercise in foreign policy. A report by the “Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama,” which is attached as an exhibit to Defendant’s brief, alleges that the invasion was carried out primarily to promote U.S. economic interests in Panama and to “maintain the Southern Command’s use of Panama as a forward base of military operation throughout the region.” 38 Indeed, the Commission specifically rejected the arrest of Noriega on drug trafficking charges as a reason for the invasion, stating, “[t]he U.S. attempted to justify its brutal invasion by charging Gen. Noriega with drug laundering operations. The Commission outrightly rejects that as a legitimate justification or the reason for the invasion.” 39 The Court cites the Commission’s findings not as affirmative proof of the invasion’s objectives — the report was not received into evidence — but simply to underscore the fact that no evidence has been presented which suggests that military troops were sent into Panama for the singular or even primary purpose of enforcing U.S. narcotics laws by bringing a suspected drug dealer to trial. The additional fact of Noriega’s declaration of war against the United Státes shortly before the invasion only further undermines that premise. 40
*1538 That foreign policy objectives rather than just law enforcement goals are implicated radically changes the Court’s consideration of the government conduct complained of and, consequently, its willingness to exercise supervisory power. For the question then posed is whether a court may, under the guise of its supervisory authority, condemn armed conflict as “shocking to the conscience.” Any such declaration not only runs squarely into the political question doctrine, which precludes courts from resolving issues more properly committed to the political branches, but would indeed constitute unprecedented judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy.
Although the judiciary clause of the Constitution does not limit the ability of federal courts to adjudicate issues merely because they present political questions, judges have nevertheless defined a category of executive and legislative branch actions as beyond the scope of judicial inquiry ever since the Supreme Court first claimed the power of judicial review in
Marbury v. Madison,
While the exact contours of the political question doctrine are ambiguous and remain a source of some confusion, 41 the Court is guided by Justice Brennan’s oft-quoted formulation of the doctrine in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, supra:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of deciding it without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; [4] or the impossibility of a court’s taking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
at 217,
Noriega does not, and legally cannot, allege that President Bush exceeded his powers as Commander-in-Chief in ordering the invasion of Panama. Rather, he asks this Court to find that the deaths of innocent civilians and destruction of private property is “shocking to the conscience and in violation of the laws and norms of humanity.” At bottom, then, Noriega’s complaint is a challenge to the very morality of war itself. This is a political question in its most paradigmatic and pristine form. It raises the specter of judicial management and control of foreign policy and challenges in a most sweeping fashion the wisdom, propriety, and morality of sending armed forces into combat — a decision which is constitutionally committed to the executive and legislative branches and hence beyond judicial review. Questions such as under what circumstances armed conflict is immoral, or whether it is always so, are not ones for the courts, but must be resolved by the political branches entrusted by the Constitution with the awesome responsibility of committing this country to battle. 43 In this case, the decision to send troops into Panama was made by the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, and he is on this matter “accountable only to his .country in his political character, and his own conscience.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165. The Court has no authority to pass moral judgement upon that decision under the cloak of its supervisory authority.
Defense counsel condemn the military action and the “atrocities” which followed and, having established this argumentative premise, then suggest that such conduct should not be sanctioned by the Court nor should the fruits, i.e., the arrests, of such conduct be permitted. It is further urged that to permit this case to proceed is to give judicial approval to the military action defense counsel condemn. As indicated above, this reasoning fails to recognize the constitutional separation of powers and functions. Any suggestion that rejection of Defendant’s position is somehow an approval of governmental conduct described as egregious is misplaced. There are other forums in which complaints about our Government’s political activities can be made. To the extent legally permissible by the attendant facts, this Court proposes to try the case within the issues framed by the indictment and the defenses which will be presented by Defendants.
The complexity of the question Noriega poses is further compounded by the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards. In
Da Costa v. Laird,
If the courts are incapable of determining whether bombing constitutes an escalation of war or what the effect of missile deployment is on world peace, it would likewise seem beyond our province to determine whether or under what circumstances war is immoral. What would be the criteria for determining when armed conflict is ‘shocking to the conscience’? Defendant’s counsel makes much of the numbers of innocent civilians killed and the extent of property damage, but the Court fails to see what that argument proves; the death of but one woman or man is one too many. Having said that, the Court is here reminded of then Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger’s opinion in another case implicating foreign policy concerns:
That appellants now resort to the courts on a vague and disoriented theory that judicial power can supply a quick and persuasive remedy for one of mankind’s great problems is no reason why we as judges should regard ourselves as Guardian Elders ordained to review the political judgements of elected representatives of the people. In framing policies relating to the great issues of national defense and security, the people are and must be, in a sense, at the mercy of their elected representatives. But the basic and important corollary is that the-people may remove their elected representatives as they cannot dismiss United States judges. This elementary fact about the nature of our system, which seems to have escaped notice occasionally, must make manifest to judges that we are neither gods nor godlike, but judicial officers with narrow and limited authority. Our entire System of Government would suffer incalculable mischief should judges attempt to interpose the judicial will above that of the Congress and President, even were we so bold as to assume that we can make a better decision on such issues.
Pauling v. McNamara,
Finally, it is worth noting that even if we assume the Court has any authority to declare the invasion of Panama shocking to the conscience, its use of supervisory powers in this context would have no application to the instant prosecution for the reasons stated. Since the Court would in effect be condemning a military invasion rather than a law enforcement effort, any ‘remedy’ would necessarily be directed at the consequences and effects of armed conflict rather than at the prosecution of Defendant Noriega for alleged narcotics violations. The Defendant’s assumption that judicial condemnation of the invasion must *1541 result in dismissal of drug charges pending against him is therefore misplaced.
In view of the above findings and observations, it is the Order of this Court that the several motions presented by Defendants relating to this Court’s jurisdiction as well as that suggesting dismissal under supervisory authority be and each is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED.
Notes
.
United States v. Noriega,
. Defendant Del Cid’s motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, the Mansfield Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment due process clause was subsequently withdrawn and is therefore not before the Court. Defendant Del Cid’s Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Properly Effectuated Jurisdiction (March 23, 1990).
. Defendant Noriega’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, p. 9 (Sept. 15, 1988).
. No jurisdictional obstacle would be present were the defendant a United States citizen, since a country may regulate the acts of its citizens wherever they occur.
United States v. Columba-Colella,
. Defendant's citation to
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia
for the proposition that extraterritorial jurisdiction must be exercised delicately does not balance in his favor. In that case, which involved a grand jury subpoena served upon a Canadian-chartered bank located in the Bahamas, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that enforcing the subpoena might provoke international friction but nonetheless held that it "simply cannot acquiesce in the proposition that United States criminal investigations must be thwarted whenever there is a conflict with the interest of other states."
Similarly unpersuasive is Defendant's reference to a legal treatise arguing that the effects doctrine should not be applied to extraterritorial conduct resulting in “more or less remote repercussions.” See Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 Brit.Y.B.C.L. 146, 159 (1957). Since Noriega is alleged to have conspired to import narcotics into the United States, the delivery of over 2,000 pounds of cocaine into Miami-far from being a ‘remote repercussion’ of the conspiracy — is in fact a direct and intended result of his alleged activities in Panama.
. In
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos (Marcos II),
the Philippine government brought a RICO action against deposed president Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda for allegedly converting funds belonging to the Philippine people for their own personal use. The indictment charged that some of the funds were invested in properties in the United States and that other monies and valuables were transported to Hawaii upon the Marcos’ arrival there. On the question of RICO’s applicability, the court in dicta suggested that the Marcos’ alleged conduct in the Philippines could not be reached but did not ultimately decide the issue since it upheld jurisdiction based upon the Marcos’ alleged transportation of stolen property into the United States. The holding in that case thus provides little, if any, guidance on the issue.
. Much has been written and said about RICO’s extensive reach in a manner perhaps unforseen at the time of its enactment. Recently, for example, RICO actions have been brought against anti-abortion protestors seeking to block access to abortion and family planning clinics.
See, e.g., West Hartford v. Operation Rescue,
. Pub.L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to—
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,-000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section “unlawful activity" means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States (2) extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States, or (3) any act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title.
. The Court is, of course, mindful that the Supreme Court has cautioned that Congress did not intend "a broadranging interpretation of § 1952."
Rewis v. United States,
. Given this rationale, there is ample doubt whether head of state immunity extends to private or criminal acts in violation of U.S. law.
See In re Doe,
. The Panamanian Defense Forces are a creation of Noriega’s under which he combined the National Guard, other Panamanian military and police forces, and some bureaucratic departments.
. The provision of customary international law cited by Defendant as an acceptable definition of a head of state would not include Noriega. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (T.I. A.S. No. 8532; 28 U.S.T.1975) defines “internationally protected person” as “(a) a Head of State, including any member of a collegial body performing the functions of a Head of State under the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister of Foreign Affairs ...” Noriega has not shown that he was either the ceremonial or official head of government, and he does not otherwise fulfill the definition.
. This principle undermines Defendant’s reliance on the government's position in
Republic of Philippines by Central Bank of Philippines v. Marcos,
. Pub.L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978), codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-e.
. T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 23 U.S.T. 3227, April 18, 1961.
.Affidavit of Richard Gookin, Assistant Chief of Protocol, United States Department of State, attached as Exhibit "D” to Government’s Motion In Opposition to Defendant Noriega's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (October 20, 1988).
. United States Department of State memorandum, attached as Exhibit "C" to Government's Motion in Opposition to Defendant Noriega’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Oct. 20, 1988).
. Defendant Noriega’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, p. 45 (Sept. 15, 1988).
.United States Department of State memorandum, attached as Exhibit “E” to Government’s Motion in Opposition to Defendant Noriega’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Oct. 20, 1988).
. There are in fact four Geneva Conventions of 1949: (1) the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field; (2) the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; (3) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and (4) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
. The Third Geneva Convention defines a "prisoner of war" as a person who has fallen into the power of the enemy, and is (1) a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; (2) a member of the militia or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces; or (3) a member of regular armed forces who professes allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the detaining power. Geneva Convention, Article 4, Section A(l), (2).
.See United States v. Mariea,
. Defendant Del Cid was arrested on December 26, 1989. Defendant Noriega was arrested shortly thereafter, on January 3, 1990.
. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, J. Pictet (Ed.1960) on Articles 83 and 87.
.
Cf. United States v. Blue,
. On the present record, the only incident which comes close to any kind of personal mistreatment is the above-mentioned event in which American troops blasted the Papal Nunci-ature in Panama City with loud rock-and-roll music in an apparent effort to drive Noriega out. While there are those who might consider continued exposure to such music an Eighth Amendment violation, it is the opinion of the Court that such action does not rise to the level of egregious misconduct sufficient to constitute a due process violation.
.The Court assumes without deciding that, consistent with Toscanino, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process extends to aliens abroad. In
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
— U.S.-,
. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter provides, in relevant part, that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 59 Stat. 1031, 1037, T.S. 993.
. Article 20[17] of the O.A.S. Charter provides that “[t]he territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indi *1533 rectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.” 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2420.
. Article 23(b) states that "it is especially forbidden ... [t]o kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;” Article 25 provides that “[t]he attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." 36 Stat. 2277, 2301-02 (1907).
. Noriega also asserts that the United States military action in Panama violated the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), U.N.Doc. a/32/144 Annex I (1977). The United States Congress, however, has expressly declined to ratify that Protocol on the grounds that it is "fundamentally unfair and irreconcilably flawed" and "would undermine humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war.” S. Treaty Doc. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. iii-iv (1987).
. The conclusion that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is not self-executing is supported by the decisions of other courts reaching the same conclusion with respect to various other provisions of the U.N. Charter.
See, e.g., Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua
v.
Reagan,
. International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945, Dept. of State Pub. No. 3080 (1949), p. 330.
.
See, e.g., United States v. Archer,
. Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant Del Cid’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment and Defendant Noriega's Challenge to the Court's Jurisdiction, pp. 2-3 (Feb. 2, 1990).
. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the President of the United States (Dec. 20, 1989) cited in Government's Memorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Feb. 2, 1990, p. 3.
. Defendant Noriega's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Exhibit "A”, p. 1 (March 22, 1990).
. Id., p. 9.
. The Court therefore does not face the task of resolving the exact motives behind the invasion, a question which may well be beyond its expertise and resources.
See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan,
.
See Goldwater v. Carter,
. The provisions of the Constitution relating to President's powers in diplomatic and military affairs provide that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy” (article II, sec. 2, cl. 1); that the President "shall have the power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur" (article II, sec. 2, cl. 2); that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” (article II, sec. 2, cl. 2); “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" (article II, sec. 3); and "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" (article II, sec. 3).
The provisions of the Constitution relating to the war powers of Congress provide that Congress has the power "[t]o declare War;” (article I, sec. 8, cl. 11); and to make laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers (article I, sec. 8, cl. 18).
.
Cf. Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan,
