UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry NORFLEET, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 04-5764.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Filed: Aug. 10, 2005.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 13, 2005.
145 Fed. Appx. 647
Howard L. Wagerman, Jake E. Erwin, The Wagerman Law Firm, Memphis, TN, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before KENNEDY and MOORE, Circuit Judges; and RESTANI, Judge.*
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.
The Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in violation of
BACKGROUND
On the evening of December 7, 2000, Sergeant Mark Calvi, a drug detector dog handler, received information that an employee of the U-Stor storage facility in Shelby County, Tennessee, discovered a large sum of cash hidden inside unit T-12 at the U-Stor facility. Since the storage unit‘s lessee had become delinquent in his payments, a U-Stor employee sought to determine if the lessee had vacated the unit. To do so, the employee cut off the
While the officers waited for the search warrant, a bronze or gold Ford Explorer drove up to the U-Stor lot and stopped at the entrance gate. The manager told Sgt. Calvi that he believed that this vehicle was the same one that he had seen the previous day when the men had renewed unit T-12‘s lease. To gain access to the storage facility, one has to input a code at the entrance gate. Each storage unit is assigned a unique code. The driver entered a valid code. Later, the officers learned that the driver had entered the code assigned to unit K-3, the other unit to which the drug detection dog had alerted. After gaining entrance, the Explorer drove toward building T. Sgt. Calvi then called the other officers in to do a take-down to investigate the occupants of the SUV. The officers followed the Explorer which stopped in front of the T building. After positioning vehicles both in front and behind the Explorer to prevent any potential escape, the officers approached the Explorer with their guns drawn, ordered the occupants, who consisted of the driver, Darelle Jones, and the lone passenger, the Defendant, from the vehicle, patted them down, handcuffed them, and placed them in one of the officers’ vehicle. In order to secure the scene, the officers transported the Explorer, Jones, and Defendant to the parking lot of the grocery store across the street. When they arrived at the grocery store parking lot, Sgt. Calvi detailed his narcotics detection dog around the Ford Explorer and the dog gave a positive alert. The officers searched the vehicle and found two kilogram wrappers containing cocaine residue. The officers also found Coastal transmission fluid in the rear seat, and two keys, one of which opened the lock that had been placed on unit T-12 the day before.
A short time later, Officer Bierbrodt arrived with search warrants for units T-12 and K-3. Inside unit T-12, officers
After his arrest, the Defendant was brought to Shelby County Jail and booked on Friday, December 8, 2000, at 6:24 p.m. While held at the Shelby County jail, the Defendant made five telephone calls, all between the time of 6:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, December 9. The calls were recorded and contain numerous inculpatory statements. There are several signs posted near the telephones at the jail that notify the inmates that their telephone calls are subject to monitoring and recording. Moreover, when the recipient of an inmate‘s call accepts the call (all calls from the jail are collect calls), an audible recording is heard by both participants to the call that informs them that the call is subject to monitoring and recording.
After the jury found the Defendant guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in violation of
ANALYSIS
I. Motions to Suppress
A. Physical Evidence
We first consider whether the district court erred in denying the Defendant‘s motion to suppress all physical evidence on the ground that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger, and that the Defendant‘s detention ripened into an unlawful arrest.2 We review a district court‘s factual findings concerning a motion to suppress for clear error and its determination as to the existence of reasonable suspicion de novo. United States v. Jacob, 377 F.3d 573, 577 (6th Cir. 2004).
An investigatory stop of a vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Since an investigatory stop is less
The Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress all physical evidence since, he claims, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Thus, we must consider whether the Defendant was unlawfully detained, and, if so, whether the discovered evidence was a fruit of that unlawful detention. United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 594 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996). Because we conclude that the Defendant was not unlawfully detained, we need not address whether the discovered evidence was a fruit of an unlawful detention.3
It is clear, in considering all the factors, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger. After receiving the information that a large amount of cash was discovered in unit T-12 at the U-Stor facility by one of its employees, Sgt. Calvi‘s drug detection dog gave a positive indication to the odor of narcotics in that unit. The U-Stor facility manager told Sgt. Calvi that men in a gold SUV type vehicle had come to the U-Stor facility the previous night to pay up on that unit. While Sgt. Calvi was with the U-Stor manager, a gold Ford Explorer entered a valid access code at the entry gate and entered the facility. The manager told Sgt. Calvi that that vehicle was the same one he had seen the previous night. Upon receipt of this information, the officers followed the Ford Explorer, which drove to building T. At this point, the officers seized the vehicle. Clearly, at the moment the officers seized the vehicle, reasonable suspicion existed to believe that the men in the Ford Explorer were possibly engaged in criminal wrongdoing since a reasonable officer could conclude that the men were associated with unit T-12, which they had been told by the facility‘s manager contained a significant sum of cash, and to which a drug detection dog had given a positive indication of the presence of narcotics.
The Defendant also argues that even if there were reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle, his subsequent detention ripened into an unlawful arrest without probable cause since the officers approached the vehicle he was in with their guns drawn, ordered the occupants out of their vehicle, handcuffed them, placed them in back of a patrol car, and drove them to the parking lot of a grocery store next to the U-Stor facility. Whether a detention based upon reasonable suspicion ripens into an unlawful arrest without
The officers’ decision to approach the vehicle with their guns drawn, order the men out of the vehicle, pat them down for weapons, and to handcuff them was reasonable, as concern for the officers’ safety was at its height under those circumstances. This Court has concluded that officers who stop a person who is reasonably believed to be either carrying or dealing drugs “are ‘entitled to rely on their experience and training in concluding that weapons are frequently used in drug transactions,’ and to take reasonable measures to protect themselves.” Jacob, 377 F.3d at 579 (quoting Heath, 259 F.3d at 530). It was also reasonable under the circumstances for the officers to place the Defendant and Jones in a patrol car and to move them across the street in order to maintain the integrity of the scene where the search warrant would be executed and to clear the scene in case someone else, such as a co-conspirator, drove up, during the ongoing investigation. When the officers moved the Defendant, the driver, and the vehicle across the street, Sgt. Calvi promptly detailed his drug detection dog around the vehicle and received a positive alert. This provided the officers with probable cause to search the vehicle. Upon the search of the vehicle, the officers discovered kilogram cocaine wrappers and a key to unit T-12. At this point, the officers had probable cause for the Defendant‘s arrest. Since the officers’ conduct in detaining the Defendant and in pursuing a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly was reasonable under the circumstances, we conclude that the Defendant‘s detention did not ripen into an unlawful arrest.
B. Recorded Jail Telephone Conversations
We next consider whether the district court erred in denying the Defendant‘s motion to suppress all the recorded telephone calls he made while in jail. The Defendant submits that, since he was not arrested pursuant to a warrant, the failure to bring him in front of a magistrate within forty-eight hours after his arrest for a probable cause determination violated the Fourth Amendment. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53, 58, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). The Defendant argues that “but for this illegal detention, the government would not have been able to obtain the jail house recordings.”
The Supreme Court has concluded that although the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests, persons arrested without a warrant must be promptly brought in front of a magistrate for a probable cause determination. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). In McLaughlin, the Court defined what is “prompt” under Gerstein. 500 U.S. at 47, 56. The Court concluded that “a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as
The Defendant was booked into the Shelby County Jail at 6:24 p.m. on Friday, December 8, 2000. He was not taken before a magistrate until 10:28 a.m. on Monday, December 11, 2000. Thus, he was detained without a probable cause determination for sixty-four hours.4 Since the Defendant was held in excess of forty-eight hours without a judicial determination as to probable cause, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an extraordinary circumstance to justify the delay. It has failed to do so. The fact that the Defendant‘s detention occurred over a weekend is not an excuse. See Id. (noting that intervening weekends do not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance). We conclude, therefore, that the Defendant‘s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, as set forth in McLaughlin, was violated.
This conclusion, however, does not dictate that the Defendant‘s recorded conversations made while in jail must be suppressed. The Defendant made the five telephone calls over a half hour time period from 6:30 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, December 9th, 2000. When he made these calls, he had only been in custody for a little over twelve hours. Since these telephone calls were made before the McLaughlin violation occurred, they cannot be a fruit of his unlawful detention, as his detention did not become unlawful until approximately thirty-six hours after he made the calls. See United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the suppression of evidence obtained before the occurrence of a McLaughlin violation is not appropriate since such evidence is not obtained as a result of the violation).
II. Sufficiency of Evidence
We next consider whether the government offered sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant both conspired to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine and aided and abetted the possession of a controlled substance intended for distribution. When a defendant challenges his conviction on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the government. Id.
To convict the Defendant of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance and aiding and abetting the possession of a controlled substance intended for distribution, the government must establish the
The Defendant argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt on either the charge of conspiring to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine or on the charge of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine intended for distribution. The Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial establishes that the Defendant was merely riding in Jones’ vehicle. He notes that mere association with someone who possesses or deals drugs is insufficient to prove a conspiracy. See United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir. 1999).
We conclude that the government offered sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both conspiracy to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine and of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine intended for distribution. The government introduced evidence connecting the Defendant to both units T-12 and K-3. Upon search of the Explorer, officers not only discovered a key to the lock on unit T-12, a unit which contained $56,000 in cash and Coastal transmission fluid boxes, but also kilogram cocaine wrappers and additional Coastal transmission fluid boxes. Although the lease agreement for unit T-12 named Marcus Brown as the lessee, the address on the agreement was the same as the Defendant‘s.
Most damaging to the Defendant‘s sufficiency argument, however, are the recordings of the five calls that he made while in jail. In the first recorded call, the Defendant instructs a female friend to tell “Mar” to deny knowledge of Nathaniel Williams and to have Mar say that he got the storage unit in November and that some money was seized from it. He further instructs his female friend to inform Mar to deny having any knowledge as to what was in the storage unit. The Defendant also instructs her to tell Mar that “they” are going to ask Mar who the Defendant is and why Mar and the Defendant have the same address. The Defendant tells her what Mar should say if questioned. The Defendant also instructs her to tell Mar to say that Mar got the storage unit to store lawnmower equipment. Moreover, he instructs her to say that he works in landscaping and to tell Marcus that “they” had to cut the locks in the storage room, because they did not find keys.
In the second telephone call, the Defendant instructs his female friend to hide money and to remove a gun from the house and throw it in the garbage somewhere. He also tells her to tell Marlo to say that he (Marlo) does not know Nathaniel Williams, and to tell individuals that “we ain‘t snitched on them.” He further expresses his desire to have individuals
From these calls, and from the physical evidence introduced, a juror could certainly conclude that the Defendant not only participated in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, but also sought to have it succeed. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the government introduced sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Sentencing
The Defendant argues that the district court erred in both calculating his base offense level and in enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice. While this case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which held that the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), applied to the federal sentencing guidelines. 125 S.Ct. at 755-56. Thus, Booker made applicable to the Guidelines the Supreme Court‘s past holding that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt” or else the Sixth Amendment is violated. Id. at 756. Since the Defendant failed to raise a Blakely/Booker challenge to his sentence in district court, we can reverse only upon a showing of plain error. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 2005).
In this case, the district court found, based upon the telephone calls that the Defendant made while in jail, that the Defendant obstructed the administration of justice and increased the Defendant‘s offense level by two levels pursuant to
While remand for re-sentencing is required under Booker, we consider the Defendant‘s claims regarding the district court‘s application of the Guidelines since the district court will need to consider the correct Guideline-recommended sentence in fashioning its own post-Booker sentence on remand. See United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2005).
The Defendant‘s claims that the district court erred in applying the Guidelines are without merit. The Defendant first argues that the district court erred in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to
IV. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Defendant‘s conviction, VACATE the Defendant‘s sentence, and RE-