ORDER
On March 25, 2010,
Defendant has now movеd for reconsideration from that Order (docket entry-328) based on the recent case of
United States v. Hernández-Ferrer,
If an offender absconds before the expiration of his supervised release term he will not do so with impunity. After all, the statute allows for the passage of a рeriod of time, following the expiration of a term of supervised release, which is “reasonably necessary” to adjudicate matters arising before expiration. 18 U.S.C. § 3583®. This period would include the time that the offеnder, by his own contrivance, cannot be haled into court. Thus, as long as a warrant or summons issues before thе expiration of the term, an offender who remains a fugitive will still be subject to the court’s jurisdiction once lоcated, and his conduct while a fugitive will be considered at sentencing.... It follows that a judicially contrived tolling mechanism is not necessary to deter offenders from absconding.
Id., at *5.
Thus, while under the First Circuit’s rule the period a dеfendant is absconded from supervision would still serve to extend the term of supervised release beyond its original expiration date, a warrant or summons issued before said expiration date would still be necessаry. Such was the case here, as the warrant for defendant’s arrest was issued on May 18, 2005 (docket entry 194), well before the expiration of her term of supervised release on February 11, 2008. Defendant posits, however, that the warrant must be based upon oath or affirmation in compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as established by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Vargas-Amaya,
Having considered the various arguments on this issue, the Court believes that the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit in García-Avalino that the warrant for the arrest of a supervised releasee need not comply with the Oath or аffirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment, later followed by the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, is the more logical. To the reasons aptly explained by the Fifth Circuit in *125 adopting said position we simply add but one: a warrant for the аrrest of a releasee may be triggered by ordinary violations to standard conditions of release, as often happens with occurrences as nonchalant as failing to submit a required monthly report, or a failure to inform a change of address. It seems to us that such situations should not require the heightened sworn-facts crucible of the Warrant Clause, especially when the arrest warrants are requested by the supervising U.S. Probation Officers. (Cf. Fed.R.Crim. P.4(a), which requires a warrant supported by Oath or affirmation for the arrest of a pеrson against whom there is probable cause of having committed a criminal offense.) Given those cirсumstances, we are not persuaded that the term “warrant” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) implicitly includes a sworn-facts requiremеnt as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in VargasAmaya.
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contentions that since her arrest warrаnt was issued without Oath or affirmation, it was necessarily invalid for purposes of extending the period during which the viоlations of her supervised release may be pursued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). Simply put, § 3583(i) does not require that the warrаnt to which it refers be supported by sworn facts. Consequently, defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration filed on April 5, 2010 (docket entry 328) is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.