National Semiconductor Corporation (“NSC”) appeals the December 12, 2007 decision of the United States Court of International Trade awarding the government penalties under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4)(B) and prejudgment interest thereon for NSC’s underpayment of merchandise processing fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Court of International Trade’s penalty award but reverse the award of prejudgment interest.
I. BACKGROUND
Between 1993 and 2000, NSC erroneously underpaid merchandise processing fees owed on two groups of customs entries in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a). Upon discovery of its error, NSC voluntarily reported the underpayments to the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”).
Subsection (c) of § 1592 provides culpability-based maximum penalties for violations of subsection (a). Parties who voluntarily disclose their violations, as NSC did in this case, are rewarded with lower máxi-mums under subsection (c)(4). The maximum penalty for a voluntarily disclosed violation that occurred as a result of the violator’s negligence or gross negligence “shall not exceed ... the interest (computed from the date of liquidation at the prevailing rate of interest applied under section 6621 of Title 26) on the amount of lawful duties, taxes, and fees of which the United States is or may be deprived.” 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4)(B).
After accepting NSC’s payment of the overdue merchandise processing fees, Customs determined that the violation was the result of negligence, which NSC does not contest. Customs then issued penalty notices for $250,840.21, the maximum allowed by § 1592(c)(4)(B). An action to collect the penalty followed.
On June 16, 2006, the Court of International Trade awarded the government the interest on NSC’s underpayments from the dates of entry until the issuance of the pre-penalty notices under 19 U.S.C.
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§ 1505(c) and a $10,000 penalty under § 1592(c)(4)(B).
United States v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp.,
Slip Op. 06-90, Court No. 03-00223,
(1) the defendant’s good faith effort to comply with the statute; (2) the degree of culpability involved; (3) the defendant’s history of previous violations; (4) the nature of the public interest in ensuring compliance with the applicable law; (5) the nature and circumstances of the violation; (6) the gravity of the violation; (7) the defendant’s ability to pay; (8) the appropriateness of the size of the penalty vis-a-vis the defendant’s business and the effect of the penalty on the defendant’s ability to continue doing business; (9) the economic benefit gained by the defendant through the violation; (10) whether the party sought to be protected by the statute is elsewhere adequately compensated for the harm; (11) the degree of harm to the public; (12) the value of vindicating agency authority; (13) whether the penalty shocks the conscience of the court; and (14) such other matters as justice may require.
Id.
at *2-6;
see also United States v. Complex Mach. Works Co.,
Following the Court of International Trade’s denial of NSC’s motion for reconsideration of the § 1505(c) award, NSC appealed.
United States v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp.,
On remand, the court determined that in the absence of the § 1505(c) award, the ninth and tenth factors, i.e., the economic benefit gained through the violation and the adequacy of compensation to the government, no longer supported mitigation.
United States v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp.,
Slip Op. 07-178, Court No. 03-00223,
NSC thereafter appealed the judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
II. DISCUSSION
“Where, as here, Congress has delegated to the judiciary discretion to determine the amount of civil penalties under a statute, we review the trial court’s calculation of such penalties for abuse of discre
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tion.”
United States v. Ford Motor Co.,
NSC argues on appeal that the Court of International Trade abused its discretion both by awarding the maximum penalty and by awarding prejudgment interest. We take each issue in turn.
A. Section 1592(c)(4)(B) Penalty
NSC alleges two errors in the Court of International Trade’s award of the maximum penalty. First, NSC argues that the court’s Complex Machine Works analysis was improper because it focused solely on compensating the government for the loss of interest resulting from the late payments. According to NSC, § 1592(c)(4) is aimed at deterring violations, not compensating the government. Therefore, NSC alleges that the court abused its discretion by giving conclusive weight to compensation and failing to properly consider the rest of the Complex Machine Works factors, several of which were determined to favor mitigation in NSC II. Second, NSC argues that the court erred by awarding the maximum penalty for a merely negligent violation. Specifically, NSC alleges that because § 1592(c)(4)(B) provides the same penalty scheme for violations resulting from negligence as those resulting from gross negligence, the court abused its discretion by failing to explain why it was not reserving the maximum for grossly negligent violations.
We disagree that the Court of International Trade focused singularly on the compensation factor when determining the penalty. In
NSC II,
the court conducted a detailed
Complex Machine Works
analysis and concluded that several factors, including NSC’s history of violations, the degree of harm to the public, NSC’s ability to pay, and the effect of the penalty on NSC’s ability to continue operations, counseled against mitigation.
NSC II,
We also find no abuse of discretion in the court’s weighing of the factors to arrive at the maximum penalty. While NSC correctly argues that the court determined in NSC II that several factors favored mitigation, we conclude that the trial
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court’s discretion permits more than simply counting the factors pointing in each direction. This is consistent with our approach in
United States v. Ford Motor Co.,
where we rejected Ford’s argument that three potentially mitigating factors precluded the imposition of the maximum penalty.
NSC’s second argument, that the statutory scheme requires the court to reserve the maximum penalty available under § 1592(c)(4)(B) for grossly negligent violations, is unpersuasive. Section 1592(c)(4)(B) provides the same maximum penalty for both negligent and grossly negligent violations, but does not provide additional guidance on how the court is to determine the penalty in a given case.
See Complex Mach. Works,
Further, we note that of the fourteen
Complex Machine Works
factors, only four arguably depend on the violator’s culpability.
See Complex Mach. Works,
B. Prejudgment Interest
NSC alleges that the Court of International Trade abused its discretion by awarding prejudgment interest on the penalty imposed under § 1592(c)(4)(B). NSC relies on
Reul,
The government responds that § 1592 “has both penal and remedial aspects” and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to award prejudgment interest to prevent the violation from enriching NSC at the public’s expense. Appellee’s Br. 21. Further, according to the government, the penalty amounts to the readily ascertainable value of the interest on the unlawfully withheld payments for the time during which they were withheld. Id.
Our precedent is clear that “[p]re-judgment interest may not be awarded on punitive damages,” and, in our view, the plain language of the statute supports
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NSC’s position that the damages authorized by § 1592(c) are punitive.
See Reul,
Moreover, “[u]ncertainty in the amount of a claim is a ground for denying prejudgment interest.”
Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
*1371 Because the damages provided by § 1592(c)(4)(B) are primarily punitive and remain uncertain until the final decision of the Court of International Trade, we conclude that prejudgment interest on such an award is improper. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of International Trade’s award of prejudgment interest.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of International Trade’s penalty award and reverse the award of prejudgment interest.
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED-IN-PABT AND REVERSED-IN-PART.
Notes
. The government relied in its brief and at oral argument on several SEC cases that awarded prejudgment interest on the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, notwithstanding that those gains were “not easy to ascertain.”
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Appellee’s Br. 23. We do not find these cases persuasive, however, because while the values of the ill-gotten gains may have been difficult to calculate, they were nevertheless determined according to objective standards.
See, e.g., SBC v. First Pac. Bancorp,
