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United States v. Nancy Mageno
762 F.3d 933
9th Cir.
2014
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*4 Mageno was charged counts; two with one Before: J. WALLACE, CLIFFORD alleging she, Burgos, and others con- RAYMOND FISHER, C. and MARSHA spired to distribute more than 50 grams of S. BERZON, Circuit Judges.

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 Opinion by Judge BERZON; Dissent by §§ U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(l)(A)(viii) and Judge WALLACE. 846, and the other accusing her of distrib- uting more 50 grams than of methamphet-

OPINION amine, violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), §§ 841(b)(l)(A)(viii) and BERZON, Circuit Judge: 2,§ U.S.C. on or about October Nancy Mageno’s godson, a leader of a methamphetamine conspiracy, did not The Drug Agency Enforcement began speak English so fluently, Mageno trans- investigating methamphetamine distribu- telephone lated calls for him. result, As a tion in the Billings, Montana area with the Mageno prosecuted for knowingly aid of an officer, undercover Agent Joseph joining and participating in the drug con- Kirkland. After purchased Kirkland high- spiracy by fostering communication grade be- methamphetamine from two broth- tween its participants godson. and her In ers in the Billings area, he traced the a separate disposition, reject Mageno’s brothers’ supplier to Las Vegas. The sup- the evidence against plier, Paco Flores, Francisco eventually was insufficient to sustain the conviction. led Kirkland to Burgos, the individual the Here, we consider related issues com- government now maintains was at the cen- mendably raised government itself ter of the distribution operation. Burgos on appeal: Did the prosecutors’ several identified himself to Kirkland “Virrio,” as misstatements of fact during the closing invited Kirkland to travel to Vegas Las specified never though Kirkland Kirk- provided and methamphetamine, buy re- drugs. Burgos’s was for “price” him. to contact number phone with a land question, also “price” sponse against develop a case help To was, “This time by Mageno, translated ob- associates, his and can time he price. Next it’s the same Burgos’s phone. tap a warrant tained right now cheaper because you it to give intro- At a hard time.” having they’re in- calls intercepted of five a total duced (4) 4, 2010, call phone be- A November volving Mageno: Burgos, caller tween an unknown call phone (1) A September they ar- translating Mageno Burgos, man and an unknown between translated meeting. ranged a translator. acted as which description of his that, caller’s the unknown complained man unknown got garbage. car. just I stuff “[t]he like, like looks it’s full of cut.... It’s 17, 2010, (5) phone call A November stupid.” I look up I soap. [cook] “Paco”1 identified as a caller between this meant agent testified

An hints that Mageno, which could not poor quality drugs were phone might concerned she is he was said that The caller resold. be hap- what was asked tapped: be When *5 it” out of the rock to “take going “can’t responds that she Mageno pening, “other on” the a “return wanted and say phone.” over the stuff.” testi- also included at trial The evidence 1, 2010, call be- (2) phone An October 2010, just November mony that on Asher, Burgos, John co-defendant tween call, Mageno intercepted the last before for Mageno translated Mageno. and family Burgos and his driving with was says right saying to Asher: “He Burgos, fol- they being were they realized when What he anything. he doesn’t now mon- agent confronted the Mageno lowed. They’re any good.... have is not does you “Why are demanding, Burgos, itoring come to shipment new waiting for—the encounter, Ma- After following me?” in.” family leave her his Burgos and made geno (3) phone call be- An October the end that was not apartment. But in which Burgos, Kirkland and tween long Burgos. Not relationship with her a they arranged Mageno translated out, traveled Mageno Burgos moved after on Burgos Kirkland called meeting. others, including her and two him with Las planned day, the date Yakima, Washington, which son-in-law, to call, During Vegas transaction. to be by the asserted was communicating with Burgos had trouble She, Burgos, and drug hub.” “known translat- Mageno so English Kirkland drug enforcement were detained others ques- the conversation. part of ed found drugs no were but authorities translated Mageno responses tions car. their providing the transaction facilitated defense, Mageno ex- her Testifying in car, location about Kirkland’s details conver- did not know that: she plained a ques- conveyed also clothing. Mageno references contained she translated al~ “price,” sations as to Kirkland from tion conspiracy. drug distribution volved with the whether “Paco” It is not clear in- Paco was the same who call was phone impression being deported, under the in 2007 before drugs govern- and “was to work”; [Burgos’s] to do with that it had ment asked whether knew he calls, Burgos phone about the she asked deported. Mageno’s attorney object- was the calls always and he said had do with ed on the ground the answer called laborer; day Burgos told her his work as a speculation. After a sidebar discus- complaint shoddy call first was sion,2 “[j]ust agreed to ask cement; workmanship laying in the question” Burgos concerning one his that when the caller com- understood deportation, so, prosecutor and the prod- couldn’t “cook” the plained that he asking, Burgos, going “Mr. back to ... uct, referring mixing cement in a he was why you the reason deported were mixer; Burgos ship- told her the concrete you was because trafficking were meth- into the October 1 call was ment referred amphetamine, right?” Burgos isn’t that purchase; translating a cement affirmative, answered in the gov- and the call, Mageno thought October 7 Kirkland ernment Burgos moved on. But never connecting Burgos’s one of she was work- said that he was de- employer, ers so that the worker ported why, Mageno— and neither did employer could to his for a follow home she was never asked. job. This questioning truncated line of was Also, according Mageno: she did not centerpiece transformed into a of the clos- dealing drugs Burgos know until the ing arguments. prosecution argued Burgos events of November when ad- knew that had been they mitted his involvement realized deported for drug trafficking, and so must followed; they being were reason she have known the calls she translated relat- speak to Paco was hesitant later that drug ed to trafficking: day because she did not know Paco rival, well and he was son’s romantic There’s one [version events] *6 phone big, because she feared the was government bad has looped and, tapped; Yakima, to trip to she Nancy Mageno unfairly into this large, relative, purpose was told its was to visit a multi-state drug conspiracy all because drugs. not to deal accidentally she got phone on a couple calls where she thought she was assist- Testifying Mageno’s trial her de- ing cement sales pool and cleaners fense, Burgos said was “an inno- and coordinating day laborers who were person,” cent and “it wouldn’t be fair for having meetings clandestine in parking judged by her to be crimes another lots of Burgers. In-and-Out That’s one person has done.” He confirmed that he story. Mageno they going told were to Yakima to relative,

visit an ill but that Mageno denied And there’s another one. There’s him questions asked the phone about calls story that, second and that’s like every she interpreted. streets, individual walking the she had a examination, On cross choice. She had a choice whether to let questioned Burgos a prior, drug- godson about her already who she knew had deportation. related After he deported testified been distributing metham- for that he lived with Mageno year for phetamine about move with her. She had sidebar, 2. At incorrectly the district court she knew.” asserted, Burgos’s testimony, "He said stand, Now, and [Burgos] said on a choice whether had choice. She sure, it’s percent I’m a hundred begin and phone get to He either things. or two that dealt either one calls translating phone coordinating said, and she knew about deported I was shipments cut and deported, I but it, knew was or she meetings. these he know she is how would question and she’s choices had these She say, up Did he come why? knew on those get choice to made the who one dealing way, I’ve been by the hey, one who made is the She phones. know, I’m Virrio, you gone? drugs, one help godson, to choice dis- deported been already who had for fact, neither that had testified In That methamphetamine. tributing nor that deported knew he was That this case. story line of second why. she knew (Emphasis case is about. is what conspir- jury Mageno on A convicted added.) one, acquitted her of charge, count but acy specifically went on prosecutor The her, the October against count the other knowledge Mageno’s jury to infer ask The methamphetamine distribution. sup- translating from her was what she Mageno to 87 sentenced district court drug- prior Burgos’s knowledge of posed years five followed prison, months first prosecutor The deportation. related supervised release. that, explained you “Virrio told the her, living with he was knew because II back[,]” and later described comes he then us is central before Mageno’s as the voice phone voice on not introduce suf- that the “already in her head who person aof jury’s ver- support ficient evidence translating Virrio, she was person gov- charge. conspiracy dict on the distributing metham- for, history of has a evidence was ernment maintains his concluded The prosecutor phetamine.” But, sufficient, commend- agree.3 and we this same note: closing argument on raises, separate as a ably, the government be- guilty find jury should error, repeated misstate- the prosecutors’ translating Mageno “knew she cause that Bur- closing argument during ments methamphetamine dealer.” a known for knowledge had gos testified rebuttal, picked up prosecutor a second On drugs. dealing deportation Burgos’s *7 2007, already knows. “[I]n theme: deported He’s been past prologue? it Is gov not Mageno did methamphet- trafficking he was Burgos’s testi of misstatement ernment’s He living with her. he was while amine trial, argument not raise this mony at did deported.” why he was she knew testified brief, it adopt not and did opening in her argu oral reversal until ground Bur- as also misstated attorney govern consider we of ment. Should as a result testimony perhaps gos’s — these circumstances? under ment’s error hearing —but that we should.4 We conclude assuredly: not error, but, acknowledged unlike ward and in mem- sufficiency is addressed issue 3. stage here, concurrently with en banc disposition do so until the filed it orandum opinion. United questioning. See repeated and after prose- presenting a similar case In a recent error, for- government also came cutorial 940

Generally, an final in original) (citing issue raised be alteration United Olano, may 725, 732-36, court not be consid fore the district States v. 507 U.S. 113 appeal. 1770, (1993)). time on See ered for first S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d 508 As Robertson, 789, v. 52 F.3d appear, United States will we conclude that all of these (9th Cir.1994); see Manta v. requisites 791 also are met. (9th Chertoff, 518 F.3d Cir. Mageno’s failure to gov raise the 2008). exceptions, are of But there which opening ernments’ misstatements in her “plain error has occurred and one is where not, appeal brief on does in this unusual injustice might an otherwise result.” instance, application affect our of plain Flores-Montano, v. 424 United States Generally, error doctrine. an issue not (9th Cir.2005) curiam) 1044, (per 1047 F.3d raised in an opening brief will not con be Robertson, 791); (quoting 52 F.3d at see e.g., sidered. McKay Ingleson, See v. 558 States, v. also Gaither United 413 F.2d (9th 888, Cir.2009); F.3d 891 n. 5 Stivers v. (D.C.Cir.1969) 1061, (recognizing 1079 Pierce, Cir.1995); 71 n. 5 [prosecutorial] noticed courts “have errors Martini, United States v. 31 F.3d they objected where were not to at or (9th Cir.1994) curiam). 2n. (per But that appeal”). even on principle exceptions. admits of We consid Federal Rule Criminal Proce er an argument not raised in an opening 52(b) provides dure “[a] (1) shown,” if: “good brief there is cause rights may that affects substantial be con or “failure to do so in would result mani though it brought sidered even was not (2) injustice”; fest the issue raised As court’s attention.” laid out Unit (3) brief; appellee’s or failure to properly 52(b) Olano, ed States v. “Rule review-so- raise the issue prejudice does not the de ‘plain-error called review’—involves four fense of the opposing party. United States (1) steps,, prongs’’: “there must be an Ullah, (9th Cir.1992) 976 F.2d error or ... that has not defect been ... (citations quotation and internal marks affirmatively appellant”; waived[] omitted). Here, the second and third cir (2) legal “the error must be clear or obvi cumstances justify exist and our reaching ous, subject rather than to reasonable dis the issue.5 (3)

pute”; error must “the have affected (4) the appellant’s rights”; substantial As to the justification, second satisfied, “if prongs the above three are arguments consider open raised the court appeals has the ing discretion to brief when addressed in the appellee’s remedy if seriously the error the error response; an appellee’s brief that merely fairness, integrity affect[s] the or public observes that appellant failed to raise reputation judicial proceedings.” Puck an issue is insufficient. City See Eberle v. States, 129, 135, Anaheim, ett v. Cir. (2009) (inter 1990). S.Ct. 173 L.Ed.2d 266 key inquiry is whether “the omitted; nal quotation emphasis marks and discussion of the issue briefs is [the] *8 11-50311, Maloney, States v. No. justifications 5. Because two of the for ad WL 801450 Cir. Feb. dressing opening an issue not raised in an 2014). gov- We reversed on the basis of the apply, brief we do not consider whether this concession, though ernment’s even the issue involving is a case injustice.” "manifest Ul presented to in opening us the brief was lah, (internal quotation 976 F.2d at 514 appellant whether the was denied surrebuttal omitted). marks argument improperly. Id. at 2014 WL at *1 n. 1. pursuant to which alleged exception,” “new resolution an informed permit sufficient “considering argu the are an purportedly application [to its we dispute and Ullah, by at 514. time F.2d raised for the first appellant].” ment hearing argument.” panel of our member consideration, lack of third analysis preceding But the Dissent at 30. closely opposing party, to the prejudice that that our conclusion make clear should party the the second. Where related prosecution’s the misstate may reach we "fully addressed appeal an has opposing failure to raise the despite Mageno’s ments briefing, appellant’s in the its issue” the turns on the opening in her brief issue opening in an the issue to raise failure the issue having canvassed govern the impair “not generally will brief the lack of response, in its length at gov and the appeal,” on position ment’s government to the from consid prejudice therefore, not, prejudiced be will ernment government itself eration of the issue the of the issue. consideration by the court’s of appellant’s embrace raised —not on the Id. argument. at questioned error when the Here, prose- raised the government the no to create a new Accordingly, have need in answer- its misstatements issue cutorial already it well-established exception, as cited government’s brief ing brief. The raised for an issue may we consider that length, and acknowl- testimony Burgos’s by appellee. time an the first Affordable government statements that four edges Fresno, City Corp. Dev. Hous. testimony. that of closing misstated made (9th Cir.2006). the court also government argued of this error spite reverse in should significance light, in this the Considered (1) by the lack bad faith cited: the of oral the issue at Mageno’s adoption of of (2) contempora- the of lack government; court or Mageno, not this argument is (3) general judge’s objection; neous ap- of her is the master government, by lawyers that comments admonition ar- purposely Mageno could have peal. evidence, and that the closing are not and no sufficiency of evidence gued (4) itself; and facts for decide the must reasons, strategic because other issue for In error review. failings on claim’s only if no retrial she wanted a reversal all, spans issue six the discussion of the checking assure By occur. would pages. case, not circum- not the we did ample discus- Given usually consider precept vent error, sufficient- sion Again, raised the briefs. issues the issue ly addressed issue was raised misconduct full to allow for that issue’s misstatements government. briefing, albeit the same rea- appeal. For exploration son, prejudiced is not not ade- Moreover, if issue is even appeal.6 issue on consideration our we are not briefing, in the raised quately 52(b) it. Rule addressing precluded from contrary, our dissent- arguing In reviewed says nothing about issues “creat[ing]” an faults us for ing colleague merits makes several its brief to the dissenting colleague maintains 6. Our arguments against reversal. prejudiced it "did government was because addition, fully parties the trial opportunity recited not have the In both brief purposes, render- majority.” length by the Dis- for other precise issue reached evidence statement, prose- impact of the ing our assessment This is a curious sent at 952. misstatements well-informed. pages of cutorial government devotes six *9 942

plain having error to be by raised relied in part on the principle that “the 52(b) parties. applies And Rule on appeal, court, option, at its may notice a plain plain only errors became appeal. on error presented”7 principle stated —a — States, Henderson v. United U.S. in language markedly similar to the lan- -, 1121, 1127, 133 S.Ct. 185 L.Ed.2d 85 guage 52(b), of Rule which the Court also (2013). 718, cited. at Id. 82 S.Ct. 1287. Justice 52(b)

Furthermore, Rule meant as a Kennedy has likewise noted that while “restatement existing of law.” Fed. “[i]n most cases ... party will have 52(b) advisory R.Crim.P. committee’s note raised the alleged error on appeal,” some- (1944 adoption). Supreme Court has times “a court notices an error on its own long 52(b) recognized Rule came —before initiative under Federal Rule of Criminal into exceptional existence—that “[i]n cir- 52(b).” Olano, Procedure 507 U.S. 741- cumstances, especially in cases, criminal 42, 113 J., S.Ct. 1770 (Kennedy, concur- appellate courts, in the public interest, ring) Silber, (citing 718, 370 U.S. at 82 may, motion, their own notice errors to of 1287). S.Ct. which no exception taken, has been if the short, In obvious, when a errors are they represen- or if otherwise seriously fairness, tative affect the concedes that there integrity, was a or substan- public reputation judicial of tial error in proceedings.” the trial court proceedings Atkinson, United States v. 157, involving prosecutorial conduct, and we 160, 391, (1936) 80 L.Ed. 555 conclude the plain error standards added). (emphasis laid out Olano are otherwise met— including that “the error seriously Supreme affects Court has itself reversed fairness, integrity public or plain reputation where issue was “not judicial presented of proceedings,” to the 736, Court of 507 Appeals and U.S. at (internal not briefed 113 argued” or S.Ct. 1770 Supreme quotation marks States, Court. Silber v. omitted), United 370 alteration U.S. we may consider 717, 717, 1287, 82 8 and, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 798 if otherwise appropriate, (1962) curiam). (per so, To do the Court reverse the conviction.8 7. Silber cites Revised Supreme Cir.2009) Rules (citing Musquiz, United States v. 445 States, 963, Court of the 40(l)(d)(2), United (5th Rule Cir.1971) F.2d 966 (reversing a con U.S.C., 28 appears which now viction for insufficient evidence aon basis not slight at Rule modification 24. 370 U.S. advanced in the appeal)); district court or on Noting 52(b) S.Ct. Gonzalez, that Rule United States v. 259 F.3d 359 law, (5th existing Cir.2001) restates the the Advisory (vacating Com- sentence for mittee Adoption Apprendi

943 representatives as and stature their status exercising that favor of Counseling in have an prosecutors government, primary two are in this authority instance making to avoid “obligation affirmative was first, the issue considerations: jury sup- not of fact to the briefed, and appellee; raised, and dur- evidence introduced by proper ported a only criminal second, this is not Gaither, 1079. 413 F.2d at ing trial.” 160, Atkinson, at 56 case, 297 U.S. see a 391, in which one but S.Ct. in argument are free Prosecutors con- at issue. We is error representative’s jury make “reasonable suggest that the to to raise failure despite clude presented at from the inferences” evidence in her misstatements Sayetsitty, v. 107 States trial. United reversal, is this case ground a for briefs Cir.1997). (9th But 1405, even 1409 F.3d plain for may reverse in we one which where it would be reason in circumstances are met.9 standards if the Olano error argue and for the prosecutor a able for from the a certain inference jury to make III prosecutors must presented, evidence flatly misstate during closing factors, we con- Addressing the Olano testimony appear to make it so as met. factors are that all the clude affirmatively inference permissible First, to reverse for us v. See United States by witness. stated case, error there must be in verdict this Cir.1989); 1411, (9th 1417 Gray, 876 F.2d 732-34, Olano, plain. is Small, 74 F.3d v. States United 1770. (D.C.Cir.1996). thus We 1280-82 prosecutor plain made have a defendants Criminal claims.... unsupported factual “ma[kes] “not to be convicted right constitutional States definitely improper.” United is [it] evidence adduced the basis of except on (9th Cir. F.3d 1321 Kojayan, v. 8 Schuler, F.2d v. 813 United States trial.” 1993). Cir.1987). it (9th Accordingly, at the close in this circuit the rule long been has important evi- trial misstated introduc from “must refrain prosecutors clearest repeatedly. did so dence and the record.” ing evidence came error Artus, instance v. rebuttal, prosecutor when the second curiam). Indeed, on Cir.1979) light (per 28 U.S.C. Cir.1985) (re- corpus proceedings under (1st habeas phy, 762 F.2d whether be- now decide § not raised We need not versing conviction where appeal until ripe from a direct and not raised punting trial court otherwise issue fore McKinney, argument); justi- United States oral ever corpus appeal to habeas review Cir.1983) (holding case, government has where the fied. In this rights under the Confrontation briefed, defendant’s error, the issue is conceded its reversing judg- were violated Clause injustice complete, greater the record though amendment sixth "[t]he ment even one, prison wait require a defendant in the district court was not raised issue two, get years longer to three or more argued nor neither briefed method such a circuitous Nor is same result. court”). necessarily from the desirable retrial is inevitable perspective, as the if dissenting colleague insists that even 9. Our further, difficulty of find- and the pushed back now, we should may review com- ing with fresh recollections witnesses to, Mage- exercise our discretion pounded. actually, an ineffec- raise the no could issue— variant of it—in of counsel tive assistance *11 jury: “[Burgos] [Mageno] told testified amine. This is something [Burgos] ex- why knew was deported.” he Burgos plained had you she knew he was testified this fact. Although her”; living and, with “That’s the voice on prosecutor asked if he the phone already in her head knew deported, was he never answered that person she translating for, was question, nor testify did he that Mageno has history a of distributing methamphet- knew that he was deported. amine.” list, To this add one more: The government’s statement that Mageno prosecutor,

The first in several other she “knew translating for a known statements, referred to Mageno’s knowl- methamphetamine dealer.”11 edge Burgos’s of past. criminal He did not ask jury infer. so He did not prosecutors’ That the during statements use an phrase,” “introductory such as “I closing argument improper were is there- submit,” to jurors “alert[ ] the that defense fore plain. counsel fact, stating but asking them to their use common sense in draw- Second, as we are conducting ing an inference.” Id. at Instead, 1321. plain review, we must ask if the prosecutor’s second later direct mis- errors affected “substantial statement of Burgos’s testimony would rights,” i.e., whether they were sufficiently have confirmed to jury, the earlier prejudicial that there exists a “a reason like, references sounded and were likely to able probability that the error[s] affected as, be taken assertions fact based on the outcome Marcus, of the trial.” direct testimony.10 U.S. at 130 S.Ct. 2159. mayWe

Up to point, government agrees. reverse on “only review if the government recognizes that prosecutor[s’] fol- improper conduct ... taint lowing statements made in the initial clos- ed the verdict deprived and [Mageno] of a ing argument, as well as the already iden- fair trial.” United Sanchez, States v. tified rebuttal, statement made amount Cir.2011) (citation and to error: “[Mageno] ... let godson internal quotation omitted). marks We who already knew had been deported consider the statements the context of for distributing methamphetamine move in the entire including curative instruc her”; “[Burgos] was arrested and given tions jury weight deported for distributing methamphet- the evidence against defendant, to as- Any 10. inference would have fairly been weak 958. The did not in its own evidence, from the actual which did not even review of the record see the statements that directly establish knew of way. recognized It in its brief that there were ” deportation. Mageno's knowledge of Bur- several "incorrect (emphasis gos’s deportation could have been added) inferred and cited to three of the statements from her Burgos, closeness to but establishing dissenting our colleague insists were knowledge of the deportation reason for the Moreover, proper. the dissent’s view is be- require would then an inference from an in- lied themselves, the statements which do ference. request jury that the infer the stated facts but recite them as having been affirmatively dissenting Our colleague accepts, as established. he While the could must, prosecution that the "invite[d],” made one misstate- Kojayan, 8 F.3d at ment, protests but first four times the to infer knew about Bur- prosecution made point the same explicit- gos’s less deportation provided argument con- ly, the just requests were cerning infer- favoring inference, facts such an ences from id., other facts record. Dissent at it did not do so. Id.; attorney did not catch the likely effect.12 the statements’ certain error, jury likely accepted govern- Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d United States Cir.2005). characterization of the evidence as ment’s given. jury’s And if the own recollection closing clearly misstat comments at Burgos’s testimony differed from the evidence, implicitly by explicitly ed recitation, jury likely all, times in testi stating, five *12 speculated prosecu- would have that the previously he was Mageno fied that knew at tors’ misstatements had least some fac- Misstating drug trafficking. for deported is, tual that prosecutors basis—that the particularly a from trial is the evidence so, if knew the statement was even there misconduct, because it form of prejudicial testimony.13 was no such rely jury information the is to distorts the Darden v. reaching on in a verdict. Moreover, the erroneous comments fea- Cf. 181-82, 168, 106 Wainwright, 477 U.S. in both prominently tured (1986). 2464, By L.Ed.2d 144 S.Ct. 91 closing arguments, including plea the last so, jury’s usurps preroga it also the doing jury the members of the heard drawing, otherwise drawing, tive An primary closing argument. error that permissible inferences. “emphasized during trial” is [a] likely jury. Roger more to influence a See addition, judge the trial did not ad-

In Traynor, The Harmless Error J. Biddle jury disregard these mis- monish the (1970). Here, very in his last 75 state- gave the Although judge statements. jury, prosecutor first tied ment to the that statements from standard instructions directly to the that erroneous fact central evidence, jury are not and that the lawyers case, telling jury issue in the of the rely is to on its own recollection guilty because she “knew she trial, these instructions were evidence at translating methamphet- for a known expressly tied to the misstatements. never added.) (Emphasis amine dealer.” Combs, 564, v. 379 F.3d See United States reiterated the errone- prosecutor second (9th Kerr, Cir.2004); States v. 575 by Burgos, explic- this time (9th Cir.1992). ous statement 1050, “[T]he 981 F.2d 1054 itly, during prominence rebuttal. The judicial jury’s standard caution description of the “cure-all,” government afforded its recollection controls” is not Gaither, 1079, testimony closing argu- nonexistent in its especially 413 F.2d where, here, point the critical role the repeated misstatements of ments reflects play convincing jury uncorrected. Because was meant to fact went response dissenting colleague prosecutor’s would have on distorts this Our 12. judge fairly.” Virginia jury’s ability to the evidence analysis by applying v. the Jackson 1, 12, Young, 105 reviewing sufficiency United States of the standard (1985). doing 84 L.Ed.2d 1 In S.Ct. analysis to an mis- evidence that, jury presume that the took we do not during closing argument. 307, 326, the view of the evidence most favorable U.S. 99 S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 560 may (1979). government, as it well not have "presum[ption] ... Our that the tri- See, Williams, e.g., done so. Dixon v. conflict[ing inferences] er fact resolved ... Cir.2014) curiam). (per prosecution,” Dissent at 958 in favor Jackson, (quoting 443 U.S. at 2781), reason, applies sufficiency-of-the-evi- assuring jury in the 13. For that context, prejudicial govern- support not the error con- dence facts not in evidence case, constituting that an er- addition to trial text. When review effect ment's error, right due jury can violate a defendant’s ror had on the outcome of criminal Combs, probable process. effect See 379 F.3d we “must consider the had been in- To buy Mageno’s explanation, in drug activity volved had translat- to believe that Mageno would not have ed his calls. suspected known or godson’s involve- ment in the drug trade. If she knew or short, In not a situation in which suspected involvement, her insistence “potential prejudice of the prosecu- that she believed the discussions were tion’s comments was mitigated” because day laborers and cooking cement “the pervade comment did not pro- decidedly would be less credible. And for ceedings and was not emphasized.” Hein v. Mageno, who testified in behalf, her own Sullivan, Cir.2010). her credibility was critical. By misstating Burgos’s testimony to include the assertion The misstatement of the evidence was knew of Burgos’s prior drug important also in its effect Mageno’s trafficking methamphetamine trafficking — defense, and in its connection to the other *13 particular in prosecutors vastly de- —the evidence jury. before the The defense any creased likelihood that would conceded that there conspiracy was a to believe her. distribute narcotics the amount alleged The prosecutors’ may misstatements government, putting its in- eggs have also confused defense counsel. There stead the “knowledge” basket. Mageno was no break between the insisted that she was Burgos’s dupe—she initial closing argument and the defense used was to translate purposely opaque argument. Defense counsel followed the conversations and was lied to about their lead misstating Burgos’s content. Consistent with defense, testimony, although with the caveat that Mageno’s during counsel closing argument he was not sure say that Ma- characterized the question central in the geno knew the reason for the deportation. as, case know[,] “What did she and when Then, feeling that he poke had to holes in did she know it?” And again: she “[D]id the foundational basis for Burgos’s non- know what was happening and was it her existent testimony, defense counsel intention to further this conspiracy?” De- launched a weak counterattack, arguing: fense counsel repeatedly argued in closing question “[T]he is how would he know she (1) Mageno did not know that knew why? Did he come up [to her] and coded conversations she translated were say, hey, by way, I’ve been dealing (2) drug activity; that at the time drugs, you know, and gone?” I’m Defense she translated the conversations she be- counsel thereby challenged the credibility they lieved that “had cement”; to do with of its key own witness, Burgos, who had (3) that Mageno first learned Burgos stated that Mageno “an per- innocent was involved in drug trafficking on No- son.” To attack Burgos’s credibility on vember when Burgos and Mageno the basis of something he say did not likely were being followed (Mageno wanted to damaged the overall, defense by undermin- know they followed, were and Burgos ing Burgos’s general of corroboration Ma- why). told her geno’s version of events.14 14. dissenting Our colleague thinks we should ney error, "introduced” Dissent at 949- Mageno’s attorney's hold feet to the fire for misconstrues the record: The failing prosecution's misstate- acknowledges it Burgos’s misstated testimony ments and echoing prosecution’s then er- three times Mageno's before attorney ap- closing. rors in his Dissent 961-62. But proached Mageno’s the lectern. attorney And the dissent’s contention that attor- never committed himself the most incrimi- evidence, plain error govern- rights trial. substantial Lacking any direct therefore, solely against Mageno relied ment’s case met. requirement evidence—principally, circumstantial Finally, we consider whether calls phone -the the content of fairness, seriously “the error affect[ed] to Yakima—and trip translated reputation judicial integrity public or of infer jury should argued that the Marcus, proceedings.” U.S. topics in the to know the discussed had may ‘seriously 2159. “An error af S.Ct. illicit. Aside from phone calls were fairness, integrity public repu fect the testimony, was no direct there misstated judicial independent proceedings' tation knowledge drug evidence of innocence”; “[c]onverse of the defendant’s in it. As trading, alone involvement let ly, affecting rights error plain substantial closing: “Mage- out in lawyer pointed more, not, satisfy [this] does without stan brought bought drugs, never no never Olano, 736-37, dard.” 507 U.S. at never drugs, sought drugs. She never already observed S.Ct. We drugs. even had drugs.... She never sold error in this likelihood testified that she had No witness high. case affected the outcome is We summary didn’t.” That drugs because she type further conclude that no government presented is accurate: something occurred is the “more” that Mageno was ever in the evidence that drugs never drugs. prong And were presence of satisfies fourth phone calls explicitly mentioned Ma- By stating key that a analysis: repeatedly *14 translated, not In a based geno once. case gave damaging testimony that he witness inference, entirely the on in give, prosecution fact the en Burgos “testified [Ma- bald assertion the on couraged jury convict deported for geno] knew” he was prosecution’s of own state the basis the methamphetamine trafficking stands alone ments, on adduced rather than evidence powerful, direct evidence seriously impeded during trial. This error Burgos’s history of involve- knew about an jury’s ability impar to function as the trade, drug in and so must have ment the fact-finder, the thereby affecting fair tial on in going phone known what was the judicial proceedings. of integrity ness and past prologue?” ... calls. “Is ... col- dissenting and our argument, in prosecution asked its rebuttal suggest prong the fourth league driving presen- this in its final home theme met, plain error review jury. tation intentionally prosecution did not misstate Furthermore, had the statement about argument. during closing the evidence made, knowledge been it would reject contention for two reasons. We surely Burgos almost have been believed. defense, pre- in testifying Mageno’s First, our “warrant” address sumably his help godmoth- would want to from defen prosecutorial error “arises case, er’s and so had-no motive lie guaran to a trial’ right broad ‘fair dant’s concerning prior drug his what she knew Clause[,]” Due by the Process teed history. trafficking (Trott, J., F.3d 1152 Weatherspoon, 410 concurring dissenting part), in part, factors, all the we con- Weighing above analysis of due process “the touchstone clude that the misstatements trial, of the likely prejudiced the outcome of ... fairness why deported. nating prosecution—that knew from the statement prosecutor.” prosecutor culpability Smith United v. Car- States 209, 219, rillo, Cir.1994), Phillips, for (1982). 71 L.Ed.2d 78 Prosecutorial mis- example, misstated a fact on which the can constitute “even placed defense much But significance. they apparently ... were made in where prosecutor prefaced his misstatement Gaither, 1079; 413 F.2d at good faith.” “I saying, may your be wrong, recol- Gershman, Culpa- Bennett L. Mental see controls, thought lection but I ...and Misconduct, bility and Prosecutorial followed the reminding misstatement (observ- (1998) L. Am. J.Crim. 122-25 that, “[a]gain, your recollection law, ing, surveying after case Here, controls.” Id. in contrast to Carril- objective generally apply ap- courts lo, prosecutors to rely heavily chose on to claims of miscon- proach testimony their own recollection of the of a duct, prosecutor’s and “do not consider a they whom witness had not themselves rule”). intent to violate a trial For exam- so, By doing used their ease in chief. ple, prosecutor’s we have held a invocation they took the risk that their recollection of knowledge personal “unquestionably prove evidence would erroneous—as it improper,” even while “recognizing] prosecutor did. And then the second exac- difficulty identifying errors absent an problem erbated the by relying objection,” and even while “commending] mistake in rebuttal—“He testified she Attorney” deported.” he was “conceding] the error” on appeal. Rangel-Guzman, United States v. matters; closing argument “Evidence (9th Cir.2014). And, as matters; the prosecutor statements from stated, already such misstatements are great matter a deal.” Kojayan, 8 F.3d at type possibly that where determi- Although there is no evidence that native can affect the fairness and integrity misstatements were inten- a jury regardless of a prosecutor’s tional, we nonetheless conclude that *15 subjective intent. seriously affected the of fairness Ma-

Second, geno’s trial.15 while the misstatements here do not rise to the level of intentional miscon- sum, In

duct, based on our reckless, review of they exceedingly were and the against Mageno, case it paid too we find rea short shrift the prosecutors’ sonably probable “obligation” that to seek she was convicted a conviction on Gaither, based on the basis of facts in the false account the of record. Burgos’s testimony. 413 F.2d at 1079. If the prosecutors We commend the were government unsure Burgos actually missteps about what for bringing testi- to, they fied should have this case to qualified our attention. it their While could accordingly—especially statements be said that on re- our decision to reverse is buttal, questioned proof after defense of adage counsel the old good that “no deed whether testify Mageno goes unpunished,” that it do see that knew the deported. reason he was way. “[L]awyers representing govern- By pointing government Marcus, out though may that evant it be. See 560 U.S. reckless, suggest we do not However, recklessness at culpa- S.Ct. 2159. such prosecutorial culpability or other level of bility justify can dismissal of an indictment as a prerequisite to a determination that the sanction, remedy unnecessary a a we find fairness, seriously integrity affects the Kojayan, here. See 8 F.3d at 1325. public reputation judicial proceedings, rel- instructions, and curative court’s district and truth cases serve in criminal ment unintentional. were any misstatements spe a have Prosecutors Id. first.” justice ac “those provide responsibility cial implies majority’s language Finally, the (quoting Id. trial.” a fair crime cused of gov- judge and court the district DeChristoforo, Donnelly v. errors Ma- serious committed ernment L.Ed.2d 431 648-49, 94 S.Ct. fact, own Mageno’s it was trial. In geno’s By ac J., dissenting)). (1974) (Douglas trou- the most committed attorney who gov appeal, its error knowledging in her trial. errors bling admi function performed has ernment also created But rably. I. therefore, will, re and we problem, at one admits may that she conviction so Mageno’s verse jury, closing arguments in its point maintaining her at shot an untainted that Nan- erroneously stated a prosecutor dam prosecution’s without innocence Fe- Guadalupe Jesus Mageno’s godson, cy aging misstatements. he knew that she had testified Burgos, lix REMANDED. AND REVERSED deport- convicted and previously had been fact, In offense. drug-related for ed dissenting: WALLACE, Judge, Circuit rela- about his close Burgos had testified did not dissent. respectfully I he had and that tionship with mis- alleged deported convicted previously been trial, argue that did not statements specifi- offense, he had not but drug ap- in her prejudiced her why he cally testified appeal meets Mageno’s pellate briefs. attor- But deported. had been consideration exceptions for our none of object to ney did following Instead arguments. waived misleading statement. argument deeming the precedent our caution, govern- In abundance an excep- a new waived, majority creates appellate brief asserted ment also raised for tion, considering in its made other statements three appellant time not first posi- improper, closing argument were briefs, by a member of but appellate nor agrees. now which tion with argument. Consider- hearing panel our were view, these my In in these circumstances of the issue ation knowledge erroneous and the law our case inconsistent the evi- *16 from inferred properly could be preserv- rules about our behind purposes the jury about the to dence submitted for appeal. issues ing Ma- Burgos and relationship between close majority improperly the only does Not attorney ob- Mageno’s Regardless, geno. despite statements the reach mislead- allegedly of none these jected to waiver, also incor- the Mageno’s ing statements. prosecutors’ that the rectly concludes government prosecutor recap, the To Only error. constituted statements Ma- that closing statements argued first improper. was of the statements one her let whether a choice geno “had by submitted evidence was so much There had been knew already she who godson Mageno would at trial that government the methamphet- distributing deported regardless the been convicted her,” Mageno and that in with amine move Mage- prejudice Some statements. Vir- godson, help choice to “made the mitigated was may have suffered no rio, one had already who deport- been gos’s deportation, Burgos had not testified distributing ed for methamphetamine.” Mageno knew. Both the defense ar- Mageno’s attorney did not gument government’s and the closing re- there was no direct evidence that Mageno arguments buttal were in error. knew Burgos had been deported for dis- Based upon trial, evidence at includ- tributing methamphetamine. ing four telephone calls obtained through later, A few minutes government lawful wiretaps Mageno between and drug Burgos “explained stated that you customers or federal agents posing drug deportation] knew [about his because he customers, where Mageno translated cer- her, was living with back,” then he comes suspicious tain words of Burgos, behalf Mageno “already in her head Mageno was convicted of conspiracy [Burgos], knew that person she was distribute a controlled substance. Mageno for, translating has a history of distribut- did not a post-conviction file motion to ing methamphetamine.” Mageno’s attor- vacate the judgment grant a new trial ney object. based on statements government concluded its argument during closing arguments. See Fed. on a similar the jury note: should convict R.Crim.P. Instead, 33. Mageno filed this Mageno because she “knew she was appeal trans- on single ground: that there was lating for a methamphetamine known deal- insufficient evidence support her convic- er.” Mageno’s attorney object. did not tion. She never raised govern- far, my view, Thus ment’s statements regarding her knowl- proper, statements were based upon the edge of why Burgos had deported. been inference facts, knew those In appellate brief, its the government “ad- why also knew Burgos had been de- mirably,” in the majority’s words, acknowl- ported, on the basis the evidence sub- edged the prosecutors’ possibly misleading jury mitted to the regarding their relation- statements. Majority Op. at In ship. brief, the government argued that In the defense nonetheless did not argument, warrant re- at- versal of stated, torney conviction, without “a percent” hundred because the prosecutors confidence, that had not Burgos made had in fact testi- faith, fied in bad that “knew was not deprived about” why he of a had been fair deported, or that district court “she knew instructed I deported.” arguments This is attorneys the actual are not evidence, was first introduced: and Mageno when Mageno’s would have been own attorney suggested convicted even if had had not testified that Mageno made why he statements. Mageno was thus deported. indisputably on notice of However, statements. she did not submit rebuttal, On followed any reply brief to adopt the statements as Mageno’s attorney and stated that Mageno a basis for reversal in her appeal. knew that Burgos had “been deported be- *17 cause he was trafficking methamphetamine At the first part of argument oral before while he was living with her. He testified court, this Mageno’s attorney did not affir- he was deported.” Mage- matively raise the argument gov- that the no’s attorney object. did not While there ernment committed reversible error. was sufficient indirect evidence the rec- More than four minutes of his allotted ten ord that Mageno knew the reason for Bur- passed minutes before a member of the govern- to review the attor- We should refuse Mageno’s this court asked panel of misstatements, alleged because statements. ment’s government’s ney about any argument Ma- judge, has waived discussion After further judge’s “plain to the the statements constituted error.” attorney responded geno’s by stating Mageno’s position assertion majority’s govern- review of the argu- were “a valid the statements wrong for at ment’s statements is least two then, reversal. Even support ment” majority it other reasons. The asserts attorney subsequent his spent Mageno’s “in prosecutorial comments considers had made the mis- why he explaining time Majority of the entire trial.” the context closing argument in his leading statement impossible at But such review is Op. 944. government’s arguing instead of Instead, briefing. without adversarial Near the Mageno. prejudiced statements the effect of majority repeatedly assumes time, Mage- argument of his allotted end from cold statements prosecutorial “I offhandedly stated don’t attorney no’s trial speculation prac- and its about record ’ government’s [the believe majority per- review the tice. Whatever very At the end harmless error.”1 were] forms, it review “in the context of is not attorney returned Mageno’s argument, the entire trial.” clearly passing, still point to the Finally, majority pros- considers the any had suffered arguing Mageno’s at- ecutorial statements because state- government’s prejudice from argu- at oral torney “adopt[ did the issue ] ments. court, review of the ment” before this so Mageno to remain the statements allows II. Majority appeal.” Op. “master of her consid- errs first even Mageno’s attorney’s indifferent 941. But con- to reverse ering whether from a member of responses questions state- on the viction based “adoption” not constitute panel do object Mageno did not ments. argument purposes for of our review. an trial. did statements at She reply or opening in either her argue A. that her conviction should appeal brief on object fails to criminal who In A convicted based on the statements. be reversed at trial judicial fact, on the to a lawyer only commented appeal if the mis it can still seek relief questioned unraised issue that affects substan plain take is “a argument. appel- an during oral When Marcus, v. rights.” tial argument for present lant does not 258, 262, 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d brief, usually con- U.S. we would review 52(b). (2010), quoting for reversal waived. Fed.R.CRIM.P. sider establishing entitlement that The “burden exceptions to recognize some We the defendant for error is on But, majority, none relief contrary to the rule. it, reasons here, claiming and for several exceptions apply of the easy not be too that burden should fully the issues government brief Dominguez defendants.” United States majority’s disposition. in the addressed reverse if so lawyer the statements was so indifferent to government's constituted the correct argument, he did not even state error,” than if the statements govern- 'plain rather legal standard for our review Op. Majority at 940. error.” were "harmless did not ment’s statements. *18 952 74,

Benitez, U.S. S.Ct. (2004). L.Ed.2d 157 majority may The asserts that we con appellant an Separately, when fails to sider statements because distinctly, an argue, specifically and issue government addressed the statements appeal, usually in opening his brief we brief, in appellate preju thus not appellant has waived hold his diced, so both the “second and third cir issue, right appellate review of that even justify cumstances Ullah exist [from ] [to] in criminal cases. United States v. Rodri- our reaching Majority Op. the issue.” at guez-Preciado, 399 F.3d government notify 940. While the us Cir.2005). possibly misleading of its in closing argument, government did not object any Mageno did not to opportunity fully have the two of brief trial, government’s statements at and did the issues by majority, reached that the argue statements merited re- prejudiced thus is majority’s rever her in opening versal of conviction her or sal on that basis. reply appeal. government briefs on repeatedly argued that “Mageno government op- has never had the argued has not state- portunity to legal rebut sources the reversal,” ments warrant she “has there- majority now offers to reverse Mageno’s Thus, fore a claim.” forfeited such under Majority conviction. Op. at 943M:9. Had practice, our normal we would not consider Mageno adopted op- her appeal. in this brief, reply tional government likely as the

assumed, would have then B. opportunity had the supplemental to file a respond brief or analysis to her in oral recognize I that our court sometimes argument. But did not file arguments open- considers raised in an reply failure, brief. Because of that ing precedent brief. Our makes clear that government never had the opportunity to the circumstances are limited to three (as later) explain I do the incorrect reason- “First, exceptions. well-established we ing used to reverse conviction. will present review issue not in an shown, opening good brief for Second, cause or if a has never had failure to do so would result in opportunity manifest to rebut majority’s injustice. Second, we have discretion nearly unprecedented relief of reversing a review an issue not appellant raised conviction based on an these fac- when it appellee’s is raised circumstances, brief. tual objected when not Third, may review an issue if the fail- trial or raised either an opening reply ure properly to raise the issue did not brief. The cites to no binding prejudice the defense of opposing par- authority past from the thirty years where Ullah, ty.” United States v. this court or the Supreme Court has re- (9th Cir.1992) (citations and internal versed a conviction defendant did omitted). quotation marks Contrary to an alleged government conclusion, the majority’s none of the ex- did not alleged raise the error in ceptions Further, apply here. brief, consider- opening and did not raise or ation of an thoroughly issue so waived is even refer to the alleged error in her purposes inconsistent with the optional of our rules reply brief. Even in United about preserving appeal. Atkinson, issues for States v.

953 so would to do or “failure shown” cause (1936), Su- where the 391, L.Ed. 555 80 Ullah, 976 injustice.” “[i]n recognized in manifest first result preme Court in circumstances, especially good not shown Mageno has exceptional F.2d at 514. may, cases, courts appellate prosecu- criminal raise failure to the for her cause to which motion, errors notice own of their opening in her brief. misstatements torial taken,” the Court been has exception no absolutely nothing fact, has shown In she here,” is presented case “no such held that brief, any reply file failed she to because “the because conviction and affirmed to show nothing in the record there subject not made assigned was issue, at the to raise was unable charge to request or exception appropriate See, e.g., Rosen latest, reply brief. in a 160, S.Ct. 391. at 56 Id. trial.” upon Francisco, Cnty. San City & v. baum in argument raised the Mageno had If Cir.2007) (9th 1142, n. 3 1150 F.3d 484 brief, could reply in not raised an argument an (considering specifically argue to prepared explained appellants brief because opening But argument. at oral not done they had why brief reply their in has thus The so. never did so). explain the opportunity not had the drastic implicate does this case a manifest suffer would Nor in Court Supreme remedy offered prose- consider if we did not injustice 717, States, 82 370 U.S. United Silber v. did suffer If statements. cutorial (1962) cu- (per 798 L.Ed.2d 8 S.Ct. from any prejudice this riam).2 reversal majority’s The her convic- statements, still have she could government. prejudices thus posture before vacated, her waiver despite tion sec- majority, neither Contrary to on based petition court, filing a habeas apply Ullah exceptions from third ond nor She of counsel. assistance ineffective here. judicial re- raise for properly then could and her view brief, to, failure attorney’s not raised an consider alsoWe approach This is the those statements. “good there is brief opening an majority ours only decision and im engages a serious majority 2. The cites, McKinney, F.2d 381 707 v. power to analysis our theoretical pressive 1983), Ma to us. with Kama presented (9th at plain errors not odds Cir. correct itself, dis- power is 52(b) But there jority Op. at 941-43. Rule but also with Jeffery, 473 F.2d v. cretionaiy. United States the Confron incorrectly reviewed whether 1973). Using that (9th Cir. 270 n. at objected to trial violation Clause tation authority discretion, our cabined we have doubt,” beyond a reasonable was “harmless under Silber errors unraised review 384-85, correct than under at rather id. de 52(b) circumstances to the three Rule alleged error was of whether standard Kama, v. United States See in Ullah. scribed Silber, “plain.” See Cir.2005) (holding Gomez, 1287; 725 F.3d United States exception apply [besides "we will not Cir.2013) alleged viola (subjecting accord”). own ] our from Ullah the three objected Clause not Confrontation tions of the recognizes "circum- majority review); McKinney, plain at trial to present them- these do not such stances J., dissenting) (Belloni, at 385 n. Op. at 942-43 Majority very often.” selves applied the in (recognizing that cir- suggests that such majority then 8. The Thus, applica standard). our legal correct with circuits arise in other do cumstances McKinney was rules waiver tion of the far-flung results But those frequency. some incon is also time and wrongly decided in Kama trump decisions do not our precedent. our later sistent Ullah. *20 by of our sister circuits. 9. But that argument point. taken some Unit misses the As Evans, 1192, above, ed States v. 131 F.3d 1193 I explain the ineffective-assistance (7th Cir.1997) (refusing to an address issue ripe, issue is not has not issue, raised defendant for the first time in a attorney fired her or raised the and brief, reply “may because the defendant the record Mageno’s attorney’s about stra present (or thereof) this contention under 28 U.S.C. tegic decisionmaking lack is 2255”); § see also United States v. Jerni complete. majority sug While the (11th 1273, gan, 341 F.3d 1290-92 Cir. gests injustice it would be an require to 2003) (Fullam, J., concurring) (appellants Mageno one, two, in prison “to wait three appeal cannot be afforded relief on direct years or longer get more to the same “but must await collateral attack via a result” of prison, release from pre is § they 2255 motion” because did not cisely what the Supreme requires: Court to the error at trial or raise the issue on even when a defendant has a meritorious appeal though even “neither re appellant assistance, claim for ineffective the defen trial”). fundamentally a ceived fair wait, prison, dant often must to file a collateral having attack instead of a court Requiring Mageno to raise the ineffec- decide the issue on appeal. direct Massa tiveness of her counsel in a pro- collateral States, 500, 504, ro v. United 123 particularly here, ceeding necessary is be- 1690, (2003) (“in S.Ct. 155 714 L.Ed.2d employs cause still the same most a brought § cases motion under 2255 deficiently counsel who acted at trial and preferable appeal deciding direct for appeal. I have found no case where a assistance”). claims of ineffective court has counsel held to be ineffective lawyer represents still the defen- 3. Mageno’s attorney dant. acting is still agent, I responsible so she is understand that our rules pre- negligent may serving acts he have committed. issues can sometimes seem aca- 722, Coleman Thompson, formalistic, v. 501 demic and U.S. 753- rather prac- than 54, (1991); result, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 tical. As a we often see serious Bowersox, accord Walls v. disagreements 151 F.3d regarding whether to apply (8th Cir.1998) 836 (viewing “counsel’s the rules in face pro- alleged of an “manifest See, regarding injustice.” nouncements e.g., Chavez, his [own ineffec- Ward v. 678 (9th performance tive] with skepti- Cir.2012); extreme F.3d 1052 n. 6 id. at cism”). (Wallace, J., 1053-54 dissenting); Hall v. City Angeles, Los 697 F.3d 1070- Because wrongly concludes (9th Cir.2012); (Ikuta, J., id. at 1077-78 that the second and third exceptions Ullah dissenting). apply, it “do[es] not consider whether this ” involving case injustice.’ ‘manifest There are indeed important “formal” Majority Op. at n. Regardless, it holding reasons for that a party waives an my criticizes view that should if specifically issue he fails distinctly raise the provide argument statements about the issue at trial proceeding collateral after firing her attor- in appellate briefs. judges Because ney “greater because this would be a injus- pigs, “are not like hunting for truffles bur- tice,” and states that briefs,” “[w]e need not now ied we require parties pre- decide punting whether ripe otherwise serve valid issues to assist our review. issue appeal F.A.A., from a direct to habeas cor- Greenwood v.

pus justified.” Cir.1994), review is ever Dunkel, Id. at 943 n. citing United States v. prosecutorial not consider Cir.1991). should a we As. at all. an adversarial matter, general do courts “appellate where system, court in legal boards as self-directed not sit C. as arbi essentially research, but quiry to consider majority’s decision ar presented questions legal ters of only incon- is not Nat’l them.” before parties gued pur the formal case law and sistent Nelson, Admin. Space &

Aeronautics *21 are also rules. There our waiver bases for 746, n. 134, 131 S.Ct. rules, our for reasons practical important (2011); v. Serv. Em Knox L.Ed.2d by appeal. this — are well-illustrated which Union, U.S. Local Int’l ployees 2298, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 -, describes, can we majority theAs in the J., concurring (2012) (Sotomayor, govern- if the conviction reverse F. O’Seann- Diarmuid also see judgment); “affected misstatements alleged ment’s ” Judge Under the Federal lain, Role The of in that rights’ .‘substantial Perspectives Some the Constitution: from Ma- sufficiently prejudicial.” “they were Circuit, & Pub. J.L. the Ninth Harv. carefully majority The at 944. jority Op. (2010). also should Pol’y We 975-78 preju- the to determine the record reviews issues before raise to encourage parties itBut may have suffered. dice compe greater have judges, who district by gov- a statement missed may have us to rule facts, allows to which tence find judge district court or the ernment Steinman, E. Joan record. complete aon that Ma- any prejudice mitigated further Responders: First Courts as Appellate comments. from the geno suffered Propriety Constitutionality and incorrectly assessed may have majority in the Resolving Issues Courts’ Appellate submitted the evidence extent of Instance, First DaME L.Rev. Notee Because Mageno. against Further, (2012). we do not 1521, 1602-04 reply or in-opening the issue failed raise examine to be able resources have the been afford- has not brief, without assis record minutely every trial reference to submit opportunity ed the if a to determine litigants from tance the tone regarding argument evidence have been rights constitutional defendant’s prosecutors used or inflection Cravens, Involved M.R. Sarah violated. statements, considerations making Maeq. Judging, 88 Appellate L.Rev. re- important are recognize which (2004). 272-73 argument attorney an whether viewing on our personal views of our Regardless Co., 399 v. Ford Motor Lasar improper. we, judge three waiver, as a law about Cir.2005). (9th All 1101, 1114-15 a to create new power no panel, six cold record majority has is from Ullah. three beyond the exception appellate brief government’s pages (“we will Kama, at 1238 394 F.3d See Mage- to reverse deciding for basis three from exception apply [besides no’s conviction. accord”). areWe our own Ullah] on states, correctly majority Indeed, as the proce a about prior a decision bound state- consider we must no less waiver like appellate rule dural trial.” entire “in the context ments rule. a than a decision substantive way is no But there at Majority Op. Gammie, Cir. 335 F.3d 889 Miller trial without of this the context to examine banc). (en case does 2003) Because Instead, briefing. Ullah, adversarial from exceptions not meet from other generalities attorney cites to cases and adopted the issue at oral argu- speculation understanding its own of ment. Majority Op. at 941-42. “[m]isstating trial practice: evidence Mageno’s attorney But did not adopt the prejudicial particularly from trial is a form argument. merely He agreed with a 945; misconduct,” jury likely id. “the member of this court that it was “a valid accepted characteriza- argument.” He never made coherent “likely tion” and would have speculated reverse, we should in misstatements had at misstating stead legal standard for our basis,” 945; least some factual id. “[a]n passing responses review. His do not con ... ‘emphasized during [a] stitute adoption argument. of an See La likely trial’ is jury,” more influence a id. Calderon, boa v. 980 n. 6 (citations omitted); prominence “[t]he Cir.2000) (refusing to an argu consider afforded reflects the criti- suggested by ment petitioner habeas cal point play role the was meant to *22 “cryptic” stated with “passing” and convincing jury that Mageno knew references, because “we [do not] see how Burgos had been involved in drug activi- wholly crafting an id.; argument on ty,” peti [the “[t]he misstatements tioner’s] behalf could be may counsel,” anything prej but have also confused defense Warden”); udicial to the attorney and that the defense Swipies accord v. “fe[lt] Kofka, Cir.2005) poke he had to holes in 419 F.3d the foundational Burgos’s (refusing basis for non-existent testimony,” argument review an when the 946; Mageno’s id. at attorney’s petitioner object statement habeas did not at trial or “likely damaged overall,” id.; the defense briefs, raise the appellate his and “had the statement Mageno’s light of his “inaction” and “relative indif made, knowledge been it would almost ference” to argument).

surely believed,” have been id. at 947. These are generalizations, speculations, E. and assumptions jury’s about the response, intent, government’s Mageno’s at- Under our usual rules requiring ap- torney’s They grounded actions. are not pellant briefs, to raise an issue in Mage- its record, in the and are necessarily true no has waived review of the of the actual trial we are reviewing. allegedly improper statements. This ap- If we statements, refused to review the peal does not meet of the exceptions Mageno a petition could file habeas based we recognized to overcome a such on ineffective assistance of counsel. That Instead, waiver. majority up makes a would provide allow her to specific record exception cloth, new out of whole at odds evidence about the actual trial we are re- with the nature of the American adversari- viewing. But the majority’s premature system al and inappropriate in pos- consideration fails review the comments ture. There is no basis for the majority’s in the context of the entire trial. misguided govern- consideration of the ment’s alleged misstatements in

D. trial. When a judge question asks a or Finally, that, majority makes statement suggests that as the record here, review proves honors the principle Mageno was not adopted by defense appeal,” counsel, “master of her and that it only question the statement or is not reviews the comments appellant’s appeal. issue on of whether question flat

III. deported. was why Burgos knew Mageno govern- to consider if we were Even prosecutor stat- statements, argument, errs In rebuttal ment’s why she knew he Mageno Burgos “testified conviction. ed reversing Mageno’s statements, was incor- so we This statement deported.” made should But the other statements error. We rect. plain for review (2) “(1) error; closing argument are is an if there reverse obvious, Burgos sub- testified that he clearly rather than false. clear or error is (3) (his godmoth- living Mageno the error had dispute; been ject to reasonable er), trafficking, and rights, deported drug appellant’s substantial affected the jury it af- in with her. The ordinary case means then moved back in the which Burgos court knew the district could infer both the outcome of fected (4) seriously why he had been deported the error had been proceedings; fairness, argue are integrity public Prosecutors free deported. affects the record. Mar- from the judicial proceedings.” reasonable inferences reputation of (cita- cus, Gray, 130 S.Ct. 2159 omitted). Cir.1989). sup- of the other Each and alterations tions posed misstatements here. The error exists No was based on the reason- closing made in inferred evi- from the indirect could have knew able inference why Burgos had dence Ma- insofar as deported, had been gov- means that the which deported, been *23 Burgos Burgos were close geno and only one misstatement. ernment made years for three Mageno’s house left prosecu- that all of the accept Even if we then, mysteriously, returned. erroneous, issue were tors’ statements the convic- majority, no basis to reverse we do not Contrary there is still “so “fairly did not tion because the statements that inference was review whether 10, as to weak,” trial with unfairness n. or even Majority Op. at 944 infect[] a denial of resulting “requested] conviction government make whether 477 Wainwright, at 944 process.” Darden facts stated.” Id. jury due infer the 2464, 181, L.Ed.2d 168, 11, Kojayan, 8 S.Ct. States v. citing U.S. n. Cir.1993) (1986). Mageno against (holding The evidence jury would have misconduct strong was so not commit government did things same verdict without infer jury reached the “invite[d] when it statements, prejudice evidence,” she suf- holding some of the but from the court’s inverse, jury the district invite the mitigated fered was a failure to instructions, mis- any neces jury curative inference would reach a reasonable Instead, were inadvertent. we review improper). sarily be was “reason inference only whether the

A. 1411; see also Gray, 876 F.2d able.” Small, 1276, 1281, States v. Burgos stated that he United testimony, In his (in (D.C.Cir.1996) an out-of-circuit and 1284 living Mageno with had been majority, the court held by the was traf- case cited deported because he that he was in unreasonable was an that a statement After he re- ficking methamphetamine. there because from the evidence ference States March turned to the United the state support was “no evidence” Because Mageno. in with he moved back ment, the convic- nonetheless affirmed but Burgos never answered objection, tion). Here, justified the inference was reasonable when “it is probable more than there was indeed some evidence to not that materially the misconduct affected verdict”). Mageno the inference that knew the support deported. why Burgos had been Addition- telephone Jurors heard four calls from ally, ap- review a conviction on lawfully wiretaps obtained Mage- between peal presume we “must if it does —even drug no and agents customers or federal affirmatively appear in the record— calls, posing drug customers. In those the trier of fact resolved such Mageno translated conversations for Bur- conflicting pros- in favor of the inferences] gos. A law enforcement agent testified ecution.” v. Virginia, Jackson that the conversations included code words 307, 326, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 for narcotics and narcotics sales. (1979).3 After confronted an undercover most, then, At I believe the her, agent who following was and Burgos one, five, rather than made erroneous told her that he drug was involved in closing arguments: statements in namely, activities, she Burgos’s refused to mention had testified that Mageno location to a caller “over phone,” be- godson deported.4 “things cause happening are also here.” agent An knowledge with of this conversa- B. tion testified at trial that intended for the caller to call Burgos on a different agreed But if I even that all of the number in case a law enforcement offer government’s statements were based on listening. After indisputably unreasonable inferences from the evidence Burgos’s activities, knew of drug she trav- erroneous, and thus there was sufficient Yakima, eled with him to Washington. evidence at trial that it improbable jury would have reached different ver- This regardless evidence shows that if dict had not made them. prosecutors whether had made the Majority statements, atOp. (agreeing 939-40 would still have con- *24 the government that the evidence was suf- Mageno. victed Although “there was no verdict); support jury’s ficient to the Unit- direct evidence of Mageno’s knowledge of ed States Christophe, v. drug trading,” Majority Op. at the (9th Cir.1987) (reversal of conviction testimony at trial demonstrated that Ma- based on prosecutorial only geno misstatements continued to Burgos interact with majority disputes 3. The the government, relevance of Jack- 4. The in an abundance of cau- tion, Majority Op. son. at 945 n. suggested 12. But it is in its brief that three of the actually majority’s the citation to Dixon v. improper. other statements were But the Williams, (9th Cir.2014) 750 F.3d 1027 argued that is jury also "[t]he that could Here, Mageno irrelevant. had reasonably not submitted have [Mageno] found that would "considerable evidence" that likely she did not have known the that circumstances sur- why Burgos know deported. was [Burgos's] Id. at 1036. deportation," rounded which only The evidence submitted was that only would mean that one of the statements close, Burgos and were supports which Gray, the was erroneous. See 876 F.2d at 1417. reasonable inference that knew majority The government’s latches on to the case, Burgos deported. suggestion was In such a that the three additional state- presume jury should improper, analyze followed that ments were but fails to Also, later, correct, reasonable inference. Dixon was decid- and "harmless,” ed under the “plain," rather than that those three proper. statements were Ma- error standard. Id. at jority Op. 1034-36. at 944 n. 11. one more time: Finally, judge repeated knew indisputably she twice after least of the at- and statements arguments “The was drugs, when she dealing he was you remem- not evidence. If caller, torneys are and telephone towards the evasive way differently the facts from ber Her continued Yakima. trip to them, you should attorneys have stated certainly after she interaction you remem- your decision on what base provides in narcotics he was involved knew ber.” circumstantial evidence strong along. all his involvement to follow juries presumed are Because them, given to the district

instructions C. mitigated statements judge’s curative Mageno may have suffered from prejudice statements if Even See States v. United misstatements. error, Mage- prejudice of the most were Cir.1995) 1421, 1431 Bracy, 67 F.3d by the mitigated may have suffered no (even if the statement First, jury instructions. court’s district caution to the the district court’s improper, statements, judge stat- opening before “ objections, ‘[questions, state- jury lawyers and of the questions that “the ed ments, are arguments and counsel not evidence. What arguments are their ... neutralized evidence in the case.’ it’s say evidence so witnesses state- prosecutor’s effect the prejudicial witnesses, the testi- had”). may have ment witnesses, important.” that’s mony of instructions, closing ar- jury before During distinguish this majority tries to The court instructed district guments, rather than by arguing “general” rule that: mitigate do not “specific” instructions by prosecutorial mis verdict, prejudice caused you may con- reaching your In Majority Op. at 944- of fact. testimony and exhibits only the sider can do so 45. But following in evidence. received Though we our decisions. overreading you may things are not evidence general jury instruc suggested facts deciding them what the consider fully always do “neutralize” one, state- tions questions, are: Number prosecutorial com improper ments, by harm objections, arguments Kerr, ment, F.2d v. States again. Number United me start the —let (9th Cir.1992), statements, one, objections, questions, Cir.2004), Combs, lawyers are not by the arguments instruc general held that we have never lawyers are not wit- evidence. our determi wholly irrelevant to tions are you may consider Although nesses. *25 in have held fact prejudice, an- understand the nation lawyer’s questions to Sullivan, v. opposite. Hein witness, precisely the lawyer’s ques- of a swers (“much Cir.2010) (9th 897, 914-16 Similarly, 601 F.3d what tions are not evidence. prosecu prejudice of opening potential of the said in their lawyers have The trial mitigated. say at their tion’s comments statements, they will what objections times, a number court sustained at other arguments, closing to the cautionary instructions timely gave evi- you interpret help intended to general instructions jury, including dence, not evidence. If but it is summation”); Bra nature of the hortative them differ from you remember facts as here, Where, as them, cy, at 1431-32. your 67 F.3d lawyers state way jury reminded the judge thrice the district memory of them controls. only the evidence could be prosecutorial considered this case verdict, reaching recog- its our case law affected his rights.” substantial As I have of the mitigation prejudice Mageno nizes stated, there is no reason to believe the may improper have suffered from the jury accepted Mageno’s would have story statements. that she did not know of the conspiracy given her close relationship Burgos,

D. and her continued association with him indisputably even after she knew he was Lastly, there is no evidence the rec- dealing majority narcotics. The also cites ord that the misstatements a law review article that Though were intentional. observes the “touchstone analysis “generally” courts process apply objective, of due cases rath- alleged prosecutorial intent-based, misconduct is the er than approach prosecu- fairness of culpability prosecu- torial Gershman, misconduct. Bennett L. tor,” Phillips, 209, 219, Smith v. Culpability Mental and Prosecutorial (1982), 71 L.Ed.2d 78 we Misconduct, (1998). 26 Am.J.Cmm. L. 121 repeatedly recognized “[ajnyone only Not is a fifteen-year-old academic mistake,” can make a so to “determin[e] survey of out-of-circuit case gen- law and proper remedy” for prosecutorial mis- eral perceptions of that law not binding statements, govern- “we must consider the us, upon actually article concluded that ment’s in committing willfulness the mis- there are several prose- instances when a willingness conduct and its up own to cutor’s mental state should be relevant and Kojayan, Here, it.” 8 F.3d at 1318. suggests that explicitly “[c]ourts iden- government has been willing up to own tify prosecutor’s culpability mental in de- arguable misconduct, pointing out the termining whether the conduct was im- questionable statements to us and to Ma- proper.” Id. at 164. geno appellate in its despite brief Mage-

no’s complete implies prosecutorial failure to trial or raise the in her intent appellate only issue matters briefs. when the willingness, This part on the of the govern- qualifies the Majority misstatements. Op. ment, up possible to own to its 948-49, errors citing Carrillo, United v. provides yet another reason that the state- (9th Cir.1994). 16 F.3d But ments not affect Mageno’s substantial recognized have not such a distinction. rights, meriting reversal of conviction. See, e.g., v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d Jeffries (9th Cir.1993) (“[w]e do not believe more, Once the majority offers little in the [error] rendered Jeffries’ trial the face of our cases recognizing the im fundamentally First, unfair. the state- portance Majority intent. ment was inadvertent and not a prosecuto- Op. at law, 947-48. From our majori rial attempt to elicit otherwise ty inadmissible cites our decision in United States evidence”); States, Gage v. Rangel-Guzman, Cir.1948) (“[i]nsofar Cir.2014), 125-26 where we the ap affirmed pellant’s inaccuracy existed in prosecu- conviction because “there’s no reason to tor’s statement jury, believe the it appears would have ac *26 cepted unintentional,” the version of have been posited events by supported which appellant] [the ... at our trial —even conclusion that “alleged absent the error is prosecutor’s the erroneous not such as could have seriously preju- [statement]— so appellant] [the has failed to demonstrate rights diced the of appellant as to require the district implicitly also condemns jority absence it in the notice of to take us in- t[ying]” the error”). “expressly for not court assignment of objection misstate- the structions statements government’s of the most As truly negli- But the at 944-45. ments. Id. from inferences reasonable based on were attorney, her Mageno’s gent actor record, they the testimony and Burgos’s only in passing. mentioned at Gray, 876 F.2d not erroneous. were majority explicitly does not Although the much evidence so Mageno faced 1417. attorney’s deficient Mageno’s point out is no “reasonable that there trial her even his errors are obvious performance, any government that absent probability” the rec- majority’s description of from the ac- have been she would misstatements “put[ eggs its] defense Mageno’s ord. Hein, dis- F.3d at 914. The quitted. Id. at 946. ‘knowledge’ basket.” in the the admonished repeatedly court trict case, her attor- theory of the Despite this lawyers were the statements that government ney failed to evidence, mitigated further which stated unambiguously suggested and then may have suffered. prejudice had been why Burgos Mageno knew that The record 1431. Bracy, 67 at supposed deported, which eviscerated any mis- made that shows After he strategy. Id. 939. defense re- inadvertently, and when it statements focus object, he still maintained failed to errors, our brought them to alized closing argu- knowledge in F.3d at 1318. Kojayan, 8 attention. he then Shockingly, at 946. ment. Id. re- had not waived Thus, if even and, testimony Burgos’s himself misstated statements, prosecutorial of the view dramatically un- majority, according outcome of affect the did not statements Id. theory the case. his own dermined seriously affect trial and did not assumes, without The at 946. so there judicial proceedings, fairness citation, any record and we should no a weak “launch[ ] made him reverse her conviction. counterattack,” the defense and “damaged object when Id. Then he failed IV. overall.” the evi- clearly misstated implications disagree with the Finally, I Burgos testified arguing that by dence The majority uses. language of the been de- why he had Mageno knew “prosecutors’ majority states (which is accurate at 947 ported. Id. were closing argument during statements). the five only one of 944, implies Op. at Majority improper,” de- majority overlooks truth What the failed to “serve prosecutors at- trial is scription first,” and states justice id. objected to the torney never who “created prosecutors it was statements, and he did harmful allegedly ma- Id. at 949.5 The here. problem” 2014) (en banc). comparison is irrele- appeal to our majority compares this misleading: case in- highly vant and prosecutori- presenting a similar case "recent troubling more and far came volved intentional government also [where] al government, error, but, by misconduct un- acknowledged its forward Office, Attorneys’ States United here, banc different so until the en it did not do like Attorneys in United the Assistant States repeated questioning.” Ma- stage and after potentially erroneous brought discussing this case jority Op. at n. 939-40 answering their 11-50311, attention in to our statements brief, Maloney, No. panel. questioning after Cir. Feb. 2014 WL 801450 *27 file a motion for a new trial. He not did volvement in drag activity. The other this appeal to court the basis of not about Mageno’s knowledge government’s statements. Even after the were fair from the inferences record. potentially raised the Moreover, errone- if even all of the statements brief, answering ous statements he improper, were we still should reverse brief, reply did not file a as he was entitled because the of the trial result would have to, adopt argument pointed to out been the without same the statements. government. Finally, error, he did not raise regardless “Reversal for of its effect argu- these statements at oral on the judgment, encourages litigants ment this Only before court. a judicial abuse the process and bestirs the judge panel brought of this up public state- it.” Roger Traynor, ridicule J. Mageno’s attorney ments did (1970). state that The Riddle Harmless Error 50 judge good argument. a raised He did Additionally, I am concerned neg- adopt specifically enunciate the ligent le- actor responsible most mis- gal argument. trial, takes at Mageno’s own attorney, goes unnamed in majority’s opinion. majority

The reminds us that “[p]rose- special cutors have a responsibility to pro On the actual basis of appeal, ” ‘those vide accused of crime a fair trial.’ her argument that there was insufficient Majority Op. quoting Kojayan, 8 evidence of her involvement in conspir- F.3d at 1323. But “[t]he acy, affirm, we should because a reason- for, not responsible and hence not able to able could conclude that Mageno prevent, attorney errors will result in knew that was Burgos dealing drugs and reversal of a conviction or sentence.” that her facilitated conspira- conduct Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. cy. Nevils, (1984).6 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). 1163-64 I dissent.

V. majority simply wrong. We

should not review the state- closing

ments from the arguments. Even did,

if we should review one state-

ment: testified that Mageno

knew he deported because of his in- majority disagree- and I Regardless Mageno's factual perform- counsel’s ance, over attorney ment whether "intro- I Mageno's would not reverse convic- error, tion, duced” the disagreement based on our because "the proceeding result of the government's about whether the first three would [not] have been different” in the ab- improper. statements were Majority Op. Strickland, sence of his errors. 466 U.S. at not, majority 946-47 n. 14. But the does 104 S.Ct. 2052. did not suffer cannot, question the per- other prejudice serious errors sufficient that we could determine by Mageno's independent formed counsel acquitted would have been absent statements, his own erroneous including prosecutorial statements, his and thus did failure to to the prejudice state- suffer from her counsel's deficient ments, his failure to file motion for a performance. new It is the that should me, appeal his failure to agree “hold[ing] Mageno’s attor- court, brief, reply fire,” his failure file a ney's feet given its own recitation prepare his failure to to discuss the litany state- of his errors and its conclusion argument. ments at oral prejudiced. Notes from 1944 defendant, Rule error not raised 52 Rule, in turn reference the but same Revised raised "in the interest as well provisions candor”); as "[s]imilar Granados, United States v. rules of (8th several appeals.” circuit courts of Cir.1999) (reversing and remanding although sentence defendant 8. Our dissenting colleague is of course cor- "failed to arguments raise these in the district rect that circumstances such as these do court”); court or before this United States v. present But, very they Pineda-Ortuno, themselves often. are 952 F.2d Cir. See, not so rare as 1992) the dissent e.g., insists. (vacating co-defendant's sentence even $185,336.07 United States v. Sum though U.S. Cur- he did not "raise[] the issue in the rency, (2d Cir.2013) (vacat- 731 F.3d trial court or on appeal,” and holding that ing and remanding forfeiture order even judicial "[flairness as well as economy dictate though appellant "did not raise this that we address now this issue that would in the District appeal”); Court doubtless otherwise raised subsequent be in a Whitfield, States v. proceeding”); habeas United States v. Mur-

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Nancy Mageno
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 11, 2014
Citation: 762 F.3d 933
Docket Number: 12-10474
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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