Respondent Jerry Nachtigal was charged with operating a motor vehicle in Yosemite National Park while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 36 CFR §§ 4.23(a)(1) and (a)(2) (1992). Driving under the influence (DUI) is a class B misdemeanor and carries a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, § 1.3(a); 18 U. S. C. § 3581(b)(7), and a $5,000 fine, §§ 3571(b)(6) and (e). As an alternative to a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court may impose a term of probation not to exceed five years. §§ 3561(a)(3), (b)(2). The sentеncing court has discretion to attach a host of discretionary conditions to the probationary term. § 3563(b).
Respondent moved for a jury trial. Applying our decision in
Blanton
v.
North Las Vegas,
The District Court reversed the Magistrate Judge on the issue of entitlement to a jury trial, commenting that the language in our opinion in
Blanton
was “at variance with the Ninth Circuit precedent of
United States
v.
Craner,
[
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court, holding that
Blanton
is “[inapposite,” that
Craner
сontrols, and that -respondent is entitled to a jury trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a, judgt. order re
*3
ported at
Unlike the Court of Appeals and the District Court, we think that this case is quite obviously controlled by our decision in Blanton. We therefore grant the United States’ petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis is granted.
In
Blanton,
we held that in order tо determine whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, the court must examine “objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.”
Blanton,
Applying the above rule, we held that DUI was a petty offense under Nevada law. Since thе maximum prison term was six months, the presumption described above applied. We did not find it constitutionally significant that the defendant would automaticаlly lose his license for up to 90 days, and would be required to attend, at his own expense, an alcohol abuse education course. Id., at 544, and n. 9. Nor did we believe that a $1,000 fine or an alternative sentence of 48 hours’ community service while wearing clothing identifying him as a DUI offender was more onеrous than six months in jail. Id., at 544-545.
The present case, we think, requires only a relatively routine application of the rule announced in Blanton. Because the maximum term of imprisonment is six months, DUI under 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is presumptively a petty offense to which no jury trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals refused to apply the Blanton presumption, reasoning that the Secretary of the Interior, and not Congress, ultimately determined the maximum prison term. But there is a controlling legislative determination present within the regulatory scheme. In 16 U. S. C. § 3, Congress set six months as the maximum penalty the Secretary could impose for a violation оf any of his regulations. The Court of Appeals offered no persuasive reason why this congressional determination is stripped of its “legislative” character merely because the Secretary has final authority to decide, within the limits given by Congress, what the maximum prison sentence will be for a violation of a given regulation.
*5
The additional penalties imposed under the regulations are not sufficiently severe to overcome this prеsumption. As we noted in
Blanton,
it is a rare case where “a legislature packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with onerous penalties that nonethelеss do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line.”
Blanton,
Nor do we believe that the probation alternative renders the DUI offense “serious.” * Like a monetary penalty, the liberty infringement caused by a term of probation is far less intrusive than incarceration. Ibid. The discretionary probation conditions do not alter this conclusion; while they obviously entail a greater infringement оn liberty than probation without attendant conditions, they do not approximate the severe loss of liberty caused by imprisonment for more than six mоnths.
We hold that the Court of Appeals was wrong in refusing to recognize that this case was controlled by our opinion in Blanton rather than by its previous opinion in Craner. An individual convicted of driving under the influеnce in viola *6 tion of 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The petition of the United States for certiorari is accordingly granted, and the judgmеnt of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
There are 21 discretionary conditions which the sentencing court may impose upon a defendant. Undеr 18 U. S. C. § 3563(b), a court may require, among other things, that the defendant (1) pay restitution; (2) take part in a drug and alcohol dependency program offerеd by an institution, and if necessary, reside at the institution; (3) remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights and weekends for a period not exceeding the term of imprisonment; (4) reside at or participate in a program of a community correctional facility for all or part of the probationary term; or (5) remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours, and, if necessary, this condition may be monitored by telephonic or electronic devices. §§ 3563(b)(3), (b)(10), (b)(11), (b)(12), (b)(20).