United States v. MousaviUnited States v. Mousavi
Sеyed Mahmood Mousavi appeals from his federal criminal convictions for, among other things, willfully providing services to Iran in violation of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA),
I
Mousavi immigrated to the United States from Iran in the late 1980s, becoming a legal permanent resident in 1991 and a naturalized citizen in 1999. At times relevant to this appeal, Mousavi and his wife owned Mousavi Digital Services, doing business as Global Digital Services, a partnership that installed television satellite systems. At the same time, Mousavi was president of the Hejrat Educational Center, a non-profit organization that provided services to the Islamic community, and also ran a businеss that organized travel packages to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage by obtaining necessary visas and arranging flights, hotels, and meals.
In January 2006, agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) discovered evidence of concealed income on Mousavi’s 2002 personal and business tax returns. In the resulting investigation, agents found evidence that some of Mousavi’s undisclosed income was from a Kuwaiti company, Al Mai Kuwaiti Company (Al Mai), which had entered into an agreement with Mousavi to provide consulting services rеlated to business ventures in Iran. Based on this evidence, a grand jury returned an indictment against Mousavi in March 2008, charging him with, among other things, conducting unlawful dealings with Iran in violation of IEEPA and the ITR.
At trial, the government presented evidence showing that Mousavi contracted with Al Mai to provide consulting services directed at establishing business ventures in Iran. To that end, the government produced a document entitled “Agreement,” signed by Mousavi and Mohammad A1 Sager, Chairman and Managing Director of Al Mai, dated June 11, 2002, and two attached documents: onе entitled “Incentive Plan,” also dated June 11, 2002; and the other a letter from Al Mai’s Assistant General Manager to Akbar Torkan, Chairman and Managing Director of Petroparts, Ltd. in Tehran, Iran, dated August 25, 2002.
The Agreement provides, in relevant part: 2
The two parties agreed on the following:
1. Al Mai will hire Mr. Mousavi (consultant) to help Al Mai in its endeavor to do the following:
a) To bid for GSM license jointly with Iran Electronic Development Company-
b) To help establishing a bank and leasing Co. with Industrial Development & Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO).
2. The consultants responsibilities will be to follow up with the authorities and concern parties all required steps to help establish and accomplish our planed co-joint projects.
4. Al Mai will hire the consultant for a period of six months for a remuneration of US$ 50,000 (U.S. $ fifty thousand only) to be paid 50% in advance and 15% after reaching a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with each party with the last project getting an extra 5% (total 100%).
5. Al Mai will appoint Mr. Mousavi in one of company established jointly by the Iranian Partners.
7. An incentive plan will be drafted and agreed upon separately in case that Mr. Mousavi accomplished any of the above joint cоmpanies.
The attached Incentive Plan provides for additional commissions to be paid in the event of success in several projects. For example, Section B(l) of the Incentive Plan provides: “Gravell Project: Al Mai will pay Mr. Mousavi after successfully completing the purchase of ship and establishing the company jointly with the Iranian partner US$ 50,000.” Section 3 states: “Also, Mr. Mousavi will be exclusive to A1 Mai on Iran and will not approach other parties for these projects.”
The attached letter from Al Mai to Petroparts references a meeting in Tehran regarding Al Mai’s interest in investing in the Iranian market, and notes Al Mai’s particular interest in “exploring further the feasibility of a project for commissioning a gas pipeline from the Republic of Iran (say, from Kharg Island) to Kuwait.” In the letter, Al Mai nominates “Mr. Mahmoud Al Mousawi as our liaison for this project.”
In addition to the Agreement, Incentive Plan, and letter, the government introduced evidence showing a course of dealings between Mousavi and Al Mal. The documents introduced at trial included Mousavi’s Iranian and United States passports with stamps indicating travel to Kuwait and Iran in late April and early June 2002, as well as a boarding pass from Iran Air dated April 22, 2002, found in the same file as the Agreement. The government introduced bank statements showing wire transfers from Al Mai into Mousavi’s personal account during the same time period. The statements showed transfers of $6,170 on April 17, $8,870 on June 6, and $30,000 on June 13, 2002, for a total of $45,040. Mousavi’s 2002 personal tax return, also introduced by the government, did not report any income from Al Mai. Instead, it indicated a total income of only $11,152, all from Mousavi Digital Services.
Finally, the government presented evidence to demonstrate that Mousavi was a sophisticated businessman, whose ties to Iran and organization of travel in the area would have made him familiar with the United States’ restrictions on trade with that country. This evidence included Mousavi’s naturalization application and resume, indicating that Mousavi grew up in Iran and was engaged in business there during the period following the embargo. Mousavi had high-level contacts in Iran and continued to travel to Iran regularly after moving to the United States. In addition, evidence indicated that Mousavi ran a business that provided travel packages to persons traveling to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage. In making travel arrangements for clients seeking to visit Iran as part of their pilgrimage, Mousavi sought visas from the Pakistani embassy; using that embassy is required, the gov
Also at trial, an employee of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the agency charged with administering the ITR, testified that, in his opinion, dealings such as those reflected in the Agreement would be a violation of the ITR absent a license from OFAC. The OFAC employee testified that Mousavi never aрplied for or received a license to conduct such business with Iran.
Following the close of the government’s case, Mousavi moved under
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Defense counsel renewed his motion under
II
We begin with a review of the relevant law. IEEPA authorizes the President to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign pоlicy, or economy of the United States.... ”
In response to the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979, President Carter issued a series of Executive Orders authorizing OFAC to promulgate regulations blocking transactions with Iran.
Dames & Moore v. Regan,
(a) Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part ... no United States person, wherever located, may engage in any transaction or dealing in or related to:
(1) Goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; or
(2) Goods, technology, or services for exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Government of Iran.
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the term transaction or dealing includes but is not limited to purchasing, selling, transporting, swapping, brokering, approving, financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing.
Ill
Mousavi makes two arguments as to why the evidence introduced by the government at trial was insufficient to allow any reasonable jury to convict him of a violation of IEEPA. First, he argues that the government failed to prove any violation of the ITR at all. Second, Mousavi argues that even if his acts constituted a violation of the ITR, the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence that such violation was willful.
A
Our review of the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction is governed by
Jackson v. Virginia,
which requires a court of appeals to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
B
We first turn to Mousavi’s contention that the evidence presented at trial is constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction because the government failed to prove any violation of the ITR. According to Mousavi, the government proved at most that Mousavi entered into an agreement to provide future services to a Kuwaiti сompany that sought to do business in Iran. Mousavi argues that because
We disagree. The relevant provision of the ITR prohibits “any transaction or dealing in or related to” providing “[gjoods, technology or services” to Iran or its government, whether directly or indirectly.
In light of this clear prohibition, the evidence presented by the government, viewed in the light most favorable to its case, was sufficient to establish a violation of the ITR.
See Nevils,
C
Mousavi nеxt argues that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence that Mousavi’s violation of the ITR was “willful,” as required for the imposition of criminal liability under IEEPA. As noted above, under
1
Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has previously addressed the definition of “willful” under IEEPA,
The Supreme Court’s cases do not make clear the practical effect, if any, of this heightened standard.
Bryan
and
Safeco
both identify
Cheek
and
Ratzlaf
as examples of cases where the heightened burden of proof applied.
See Bryan,
Even more to the point, the Supreme Court has not interpreted “willfulness” in criminal statutes to require the government to prove that a defendant was aware of a specific licensing requirement. In
Bryan,
the Supreme Court considered the arguments of a defendant convicted of a conspiracy to violate
In so holding, we join those of our sister circuits to have considered and rejected analogous challenges under IEEPA.
See United States v. Homa Int'l Trading Corp.,
Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case, we hold that in order to sustain a conviction for willful violation of the ITR at issue,
2
Using the correct definition of “willfully,” we now must determine whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational juror could conclude that Mousavi knew that his conduct was unlawful.
A rational juror could conclude that the evidence showed that Mousavi knew that his agreement with Al Mal, and his subsequent provision of services under that agreement, was unlawful. The evidence showed that Mousavi concealed his income from Al Mai from the government on his tax returns, and the Supreme Court has recognized such evidence of concealment as sufficient to indicate knowledge of unlawfulness.
See Bryan,
Furthermore, evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government indicated that Mousavi had first-hand knowledge of the embargo against Iran. A jury could reasonably conclude that a sophisticated and politically connected businessman like Mousavi who lived and conducted business in Iran after 1979 was aware of the 1979 United States trade embargo. Moreover, Mousavi had scheduled numerous trips for himself and others to Iran, which necessitated obtaining Iranian visas through the Pakistani embassy and coordinating travel through third-party countries because the embargo and
IV
Accordingly, for the reasons stated here and in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we affirm Mousavi’s conviction under
AFFIRMED IN PART & REVERSED IN PART.
Notes
. Mousavi also appeals from his convictions for unlawfully procuring naturalization,
. Errors appear in the original.
.