United States v. Mitchell Ray LeonardUnited States v. Mitchell Ray Leonard
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Higginbotham
Mitchell Ray Leonard pled guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
I
Leonard was indicted for being a three-time convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
Leonard pled guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of
II
Leonard does not challenge his conviction under
In the case of a person who violatessection 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to insection 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years....
[T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
The trial court enhanced Leonard’s sentence under
Leonard contends that
The government responds that in
We begin with the plain language of the statute. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a ‘clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’ ” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 101 S.Ct. at 2527.
Two circuits have recently rejected similar challenges to sentence enhancement under
It is clear from the language of the statute that all burglaries satisfy the prerequisites of§ 924 . As the trial judge correctly noted, if Congress intended to include only crimes in which serious physical injury was involved, it would have worded the statute to say “burglary, arson, or extortion, and involves use of explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another.
857 F.2d at 419 (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in
United States v. Portwood,
857 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir.1988), the Eighth Circuit rejected appellants’ claim that their prior convictions for second-degree burglary under Missouri law did not justify enhanced punishment under
[W]e find very little ambiguity on the face of the statute and, thus, no occasion to explore the legislative history. In our view, the statute says “burglary,” and we take that to mean “burglary,” however a state may choose to define it. Congress could quite reasonably conclude that no matter what the felon’s intent upon breaking in, the property owner may return, a neighbor may investigate, or a law enforcement official may respond. All of these scenarios present a grave threat of harm to persons. A person with three prior convictions for burglary, regardless of the details of each burglary, presents the type of potential threat to society that Congress sought to control by the enactment of§ 924(e) .
857 F.2d at 1223-24. Accord United States v. Taylor, 864 F.2d 625 (8th Cir.1989) (rejecting argument that second degree burglary is improper basis for sentence enhancement because, unlike first degree burglary, it involves no potential for violence).
We find further support for our conclusion in the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in
United States v. Sherbondy,
865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.1988). In that case, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a prior conviction for preventing or dissuading a witness from testifying qualified as a “violent felony.” As part of its inquiry, the court considered whether that offense fell within the scope of
One conclusion we draw from our review of the legislative history is that Congress consistently discussed subsection (ii) in categorical terms: i.e., in terms of what offenses it would include. There is no indication that Congress intended that a particular statutory or common law crime would in some circumstances constitute a violent felony and in other circumstances not, depending upon how the offense was committed. The first part of subsection (ii) sets forth specific property offenses that Congress expressly wanted to cover: that part, like subsection (i), is clearly categorial; a burglar, for example, cannot claim as a defense that his or her particular conduct was non-violent.
The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that when determining whether a prior offense is a “violent felony” under either subsection of
As the Ninth Circuit has noted, requiring trial courts to conduct a factual inquiry into the specific conduct underlying a prior offense presents several difficulties.
See Sherbondy,
865 F.2d at 1008. Evidentiary hearings would often require testimony about events many years past by witnesses who may no longer be available. Even if the court were to limit its inquiry to court records, substantial problems would arise where, as in Leonard’s case, prior convictions are based on guilty pleas and little or no record has been developed. In view of the absence of any statutory authorization or guidance as to the manner and scope of such an inquiry, we doubt that Congress intended the trial court to inquire into the specific conduct underlying each prior offense.
See United States v. Vidaure,
861 F.2d 1337, 1340 (5th Cir.1988) (determination of whether prior offense is a violent felony for purposes of
We therefore conclude that when considering whether a prior conviction falls within the’ categories of property crimes specifically mentioned in subsection (ii), the trial court must limit its inquiry to the fact of conviction and whether the prior offense, as denominated by the statute, comes within one of those categories of offenses.
Our interpretation of the multiple offender statute implies that those convicted of similar crimes in different states may be treated differently if the states denominate the crimes differently. This apparent anomaly is, however, a necessary incident to a statute that varies punishment on the basis of past convictions, and on the basis of the character of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted, rather than on the basis of the defendant’s specific behavior. As the text of the statute makes clear, Congress determined that it would be most practical to assess sentences on the basis of past convictions, rather than on the basis of underlying behavior. By deferring to state convictions and state law characterizations of offenses, Congress favored administrative practicality over uniformity. We have no warrant to re-weigh this choice.
In any event, if the various state statutes defining burglary are not entirely congruent, neither are they entirely divergent. States do not arbitrarily denominate crimes “burglary.” Rather, the names of the crimes reflect a general understanding of the crime, a common ground that will soften the uneven impact of the federal repeat offender statute.
An additional circumstance reduces any disparities. A prior burglary conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” for purposes of sentence enhancement only if the conviction was for a “felony” that is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
Headspeth
involved a prior conviction for “storehouse breaking,” an offense similar to burglary, but not so defined by the Maryland statute.
4
The court considered whether that prior conviction could serve as the basis for sentence enhancement on grounds that it was a form of “burglary” within the meaning of subsection (ii). The court found that since
An earlier version of the statute,
5
In considering whether Headspeth’s pri- or offense for “storehouse breaking” could nevertheless serve as the basis for sentence enhancement under
The Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that, in considering prior offenses for sentence enhancement under
The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed precisely this issue, and rejected the conclusions implied by the
Headspetk
court.
United States v. Hill,
863 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir.1989). After an exhaustive inquiry into the legislative history of
We conclude that a conviction for a crime which the state denominates “burglary” is a conviction for burglary within the meaning of
Ill
Leonard finally argues that
An
ex post facto
law is a criminal or penal measure which is retrospective and is disadvantageous to the offender because it may impose greater punishment.
Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981);
Dobbert v. Florida,
432 U.S. 282, 292-93, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2297, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). Leonard’s argument reflects a misunderstanding as to the function of his burglary convictions under the statute. Neither his conviction nor the sentence he complains of punishes him for those prior offenses. Those offenses merely led to an enhanced
In Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a recidivist statute operated retroactively as an ex post facto law simply because the offense that gave rise to the accused’s status as a habitual offender occurred prior to the effective date of the recidivist statute. The Court explained:
The sentence as a fourth offender or habitual criminal is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.
334 U.S. at 732, 68 S.Ct. at 1258.
Accordingly, we find that
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the enhanced sentence imposed by the trial court under
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. This issue was recently resolved in
United States
v.
Affleck,
861 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.1988) (
. “Burglary” is defined at common law as breaking and entering the dwelling house of another, in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a felony therein. Texas has expanded this definition to include burglary of a habitation, building, coin-operated machine, or of a vehicle.
. Missouri defines second degree burglary as “knowingly enter[ing] unlawfully or knowingly remain[ing] unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein.”
. Maryland defines “storehouse breaking” as “breaking [into] a storehouse, filling station, garage, trailer, cabin, diner, a warehouse or other outhouse or into a boat in the day or night with an intent to commit murder or felony therein, or with the intent to steal, take or carry away the personal goods of another of the value of $300 or more therefrom_” Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 32 (1987).
. The provisions contained in
.The Act defined burglary as “any felony consisting of entering or remaining surreptitiously within a building that is property of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State offense. 18 U.S.C.App.
. The conduct underlying this offense may well have been found to involve the potential for physical injury to others, since Headspeth had thrown a brick through the plate glass window of a jewelry store in committing the crime.
. The court noted that some twenty-six states, including Texas, have abandoned the common law definition of burglary in favor of one that varies the degree of the offense according to the nature of the structure, whether it was occupied, and/or whether force of injury was threatened. Five states make no such distinctions, and five other states have retained the common-law definition of burglary. Fourteen states were not surveyed. Hill, 863 F.2d at 1582 n. 5.