Lead Opinion
This сase presents the narrow question whether a federal district court may impose on a willing corporation as a condition of probation, in lieu of a fine, the requirement that it contribute money to a charitable organization that has not suffered actual damages or loss from the corporation’s criminal offense. We conclude that the district courts lack authority to impose such conditions of probation. We overrule the decision of a panel of this court in United States v. William Anderson Co.,
I.
This case has a complicated procedural history. On December 23, 1981, the United States entered a prеindictment plea agreement with Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc. and its subsidiary, Missouri Valley Construction Company. Under the agreement, Missouri Valley was to plead guilty to a two-count indictment alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, arising out of Missouri Valley’s alleged conspiracy with other contractors to rig bids and allocate highway construction contracts. Two corporate employees were also to plead guilty to criminal violations of the Sherman Act.
Pursuant to the аgreement, Missouri Valley on January 14, 1982 entered a plea of guilty to the two-count indictment. On February 19, 1982, the district court sentenced Missouri Valley, rejecting the Government’s recommendation of a $1,000,-000 total fine and imposing instead a fine of $1,000,000 on each count, the statutory maximum. On appeal, this court vacated that sentence because the district court failed to advise the defendant, before sentencing, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2), that the defendant would have no right to withdraw its guilty plea if the district court rejected the Government’s sentencing recommendation. United
Between the time the district court initially sentenced Missouri Valley and the time this court vacated the sentence and remanded the case, Missouri Valley made two motions to the district court for reduction of sentence. The first, a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 contending that the fine imрosed was substantially higher than that imposed by other courts in bid-rigging cases, was denied on the ground that the circumstances of this case justified the maximum statutory penalty.
The second motion requested the district court to consider imposing an “alternative sentence” on Missouri Valley, in lieu of the $2,000,000 fine. Missouri Valley proposed that its fine be reduced to $100,000, and that, as a condition of probation, it contribute $1,400,000 to the University of Nebraska Foundation, either (1) to endow a professorship in ethics or (2) to fund the construction of an addition to the University’s College of Engineering and to establish a permanent program of seminars on ethics in business and engineering. Missouri Valley explained that the Kiewit organization had a long and close association with the University of Nebraska, many of its leading figures having been educated thеre, and the University having received substantial contributions from Kiewit and its executives over the years. Missouri Valley also observed in its motion that the district court had recently approved “alternative sentences” for a number of other corporate defendants.
Indeed, while Missouri Valley’s first appeal was still pending in this court, a panel of this court affirmed one of the “alternative sentences” the district court had imposed on other corporate bid-riggers. See United, States v. William Anderson Co., supra,
Some seven months after our Anderson decision, and three months after we vacated the initial Missouri Valley sentence, the district court resentenced Missouri Valley. The court again imposed a fine of $1,000,-000 on each of the two counts. In response to Missouri Valley’s “alternative sentence” motion, however, the court suspended all but $325,000 of the fine, placing the corporation on probation for five years, subject to the condition that it contribute $1,475,-000 to the University of Nebraska Foundation “for the purpose of permаnently endowing and supporting a chair in ethics.”
The United States objected at the sentencing hearing to the imposition, as a condition of probation, of a payment to the University of Nebraska Foundation in lieu of a fine. The Government renews this challenge on appeal.
II.
This appeal was originally set for submission to a three-judge panel of this court. Under Eighth Circuit practice, however, a case will be submitted to the full court en banc, on the court’s own motion, without a poll of all the judges in regular active service, if a majority of the panel to which the case is initially assigned requests the full court to hear the case.
The panel to which this case was initially assigned requested that the case be heard en banc for a number of reasons. First, this court’s decision in Anderson, supra,
Because this appeal raised the possibility that Anderson might be overruled, and because only the court en banc can overrule precedent established by a panel in an earlier case, the three judges to whom this case was initially assigned thought it provident to refer the case to the full court. The United States had submitted a brief to the panel attempting to distinguish this case from Anderson, but was granted leave, after the case was reset for argument before the court en banc, to submit a supplemental brief urging the court to overrule Anderson.
III.
The power of the federal courts to suspend sentences and place defendants on probation arises entirely from statute; it is not inherent in the courts. United States v. Fultz,
when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well*1547 as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court dеems best.
The statute elaborates upon this general grant of discretion, however, by specifying a number of different conditions of probation that the trial court may impose. With respect to monetary payments, the statute provides that,
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant—
May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and
May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had; and May be required to provide for the support of any persons, for whose support he is legally responsible.
Though the statute does not expressly forbid the imposition of other kinds of monetary payments than those enumerated, several considerations lead us to conclude that the enumeration should be construed as a limitation on the authority of the courts to exact monetary payments as a condition of probation.
Initially, we are guided by the general principle of statutory construction, which other courts have applied to section 3651, that where a statute contains both general and specific language on a subject, the specific language governs. See United States v. Prescon Corp., supra,
The courts have, virtually without exception, construed this language narrowly. Thus it has been held that a defendant who has been accused of embezzling or converting a large sum, but who has pleaded guilty or been convicted under an indictment alleging the embezzlement or conversion of only some smaller amount, cannot be required, as a condition of probation, to make restitution of any sum greater than the amount specified in the particular counts on which conviction was had. See United States v. Gering,
Likewise, where a defendant has been charged with crimes against several persons, but convicted on only some of the counts, the court may not order the defendant, as a condition of probation, to make payments to any persons who were not aggrieved by the precise acts charged in those counts on which conviction was had. See Karrell v. United States, supra,
Finally, restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties may be ordered only for such amount of actual damage or loss as has been precisely ascertained by a court or by stipulation of the parties. See United States v. Gering, supra,
The strictness with which the courts have consistently applied the monetary-payment provisions of section 3651 leaves little room for the inference that those provisions do not circumscribe the broad grant of discretion contained in the first sentence of section 3651. If the statutory language on support payments and restitution were merely precatory or illustrative, many of the monetary conditions of probation disapproved by the decisions cited in the previous three paragraphs would have been permissible. The consistent strictness with which the courts have applied the provisions in question leads us to conclude that the only monetary payments permissible as conditions of probation are those expressly authorized by the statute: payments to the treasury (fines), to persons for whose support the defendant is legally responsible, or to aggrieved parties who suffered actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had, in the amount of such damages or loss.
Both the Fourth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have reached the same conclusion in cases closely similar to this. In United States v. Wright Contracting Co., supra,
In United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Association, supra,
Finally, in United States v. Prescon Corp., supra,
The payment to the University of Nebraska Foundation ordered in this case likewise meets none of the statutory criteria. In particular, the Foundation suffered no actual damage or loss from Missouri Valley’s bid-rigging, nor does it appear that the amount in question — $1,475,000—is related in any way to the amount of harm caused by the defendants’ offense. (Rather, the amount is related only to the amount of the fine in lieu of which it is exacted.) We conclude that the district court lаcked authority under the statute to order payments to the University of Nebraska Foundation in this case.
It is of no consequence that the district court did not label the payment restitution or reparation, for if a mere disclaimer that the payments were in the nature of support, restitution, or reparation could exempt payments to third parties from the strict requirements of the statute, those statutory requirements would cease to have any force. See United States v. Wright Contracting Co., supra,
We note also that the effect of the monetary-payment conditions of probation in this case is to transfer to a private entity designated by the district court a substantial sum of money that would otherwise
Finally, some considerations of public policy lead us to conclude that the courts should not direct criminal defendants, as a condition of probation, to pay money to private entities that did not suffer damages or loss resulting from the defendants’ offenses. The courts are ill-equipped to pick and choose, among countless worthy causes, which nonaggrieved charitable organizations should receive large sums of money that would otherwise be paid to the treasury as fines. In the absence of clearer authorization from Congress, we reject the concept here that the general grant of discretion in section 3651 empowers the courts to dispense largesse to nonaggrieved parties, however worthy their activities. The involvement of the courts in the selection of the recipients of such benefits raises, additionally, the prospect of conflicts of interest and unnecessary criticism of the courts.
Our decision in this case does not call into question the validity of corporate probation generally, see United States v. William Anderson Co., supra,
We vacate the sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing in light of this opinion. In order that the defendant not be penalized by the appeal in this ease, the district court on remand shall not impose any fine or monetary conditions of probation in excess of $1,800,000, the amount for which Missouri Valley was liable under the conditions of probation from which the Government appealed. See United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Association, supra,
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. The employees’ convictions are not involved in this appeal in any way.
. Only the sentences of the corporate defendаnts, not those of the individual defendants, were on appeal in Anderson.
. The court rejected Missouri Valley’s new proposal, submitted after this court vacated the original sentence, under which the corporation would pay a $100,000 fine, contribute $700,000 to the University of Nebraska Foundation to endow the professorship of ethics, and contribute $350,000 to Crime and Community, Inc., an organization concerned with promoting alternatives to incarceration, which had assisted the district court in developing a number of the alternative sentences imposed against defendants in other bid-rigging cases.
. Thus the contribution would not qualify as a deductible trade or business expense. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(f). Nor, presumably, would Missouri Valley be entitled to claim the payment as a deductible charitable contribution under 26 U.S.C. § 170.
. After this case was set for argument before the court en banc, but before such argument was held, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, rejecting our Anderson analysis. United States v. Wright Contracting Co.,
. The restitution provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3579, enacted as part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub.L. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1253, have no relevance to this case. Section 3579 applies only to defendants convicted of offenses under Title 18 and under certain provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, not to those convicted of criminal violations of the Sherman Act.
. Some courts have, however, recognized an exception to the rule limiting restitution to the amount specified in the count on which conviction was had: where the defendant agrees as part of a plea bargain or civil consent judgment to pay the aggrieved party restitution in excess of the amount specified in the indictment, the dеfendant may be required, as a condition of probation, to fulfill the terms of the plea bargain or consent judgment to which he agreed. See Phillips v. United States,
. We do not think that United States v. Mitsubishi International Corp.,
On appeal, the corporate defendants contended that the terms of probation, including the loan of the executives, were unlаwful because, taken together, they were more punitive than the maximum fine authorized by statute. The Ninth Circuit held that, viewed as a whole, the sentence did not impose a harsher penalty than that authorized by the Elkins Act, because if the defendants regarded compliance with the terms of probation as more burdensome than pay- . ment of the statutory maximum fine, they were free to pay the fine. The court expressly declined to consider whether the terms of probation were themselves proper.
. We emphasize that, in this case, the proposal that the defendant contribute to the University of Nebraska Foundation rather than pay the full fine originated with Missouri Valley itself. At the time of resentencing, moreover, this court's Anderson decision, which, as noted, the Government did not seek to have overturned in the Supreme Court, appeared to authorize just the kind of innovative corporate probation the district court imposed in this case. See Anderson, supra,
Concurrence Opinion
with
whom HEANEY, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in the result and dissenting.
I agree with the result reached by the Court today, but I respectfully dissent from its action in overruling United States v. William Anderson Co.,
The Court recognizes that probation is entirely a creature of statute. The Court acknowledges the broad language of 18 U.S.C. § 3651 that a defendant may be placed on probation “upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best” and the further enumeration that “among the conditions thereof, the defendant may be required to pay a fine” and “may be required to make restitution or reparation to аggrieved parties” and “may be required to provide for support of any persons.” ■ It further clearly recognizes that the statute does not expressly forbid the imposition of other kinds of monetary payments. It then rests its conclusion on a general principle of statutory construction and several decisions from other circuits, looking primarily to the ultimate conclusions in those cases.
The Court relies on the principle, the specific language governs the general, but it is in reality invoking the maxim, expres-sio unius est exclusio alterius. The rule is essentially one of negative implication, and the Court errs in resting so significant
When we look at the context of 18 U.S.C. § 3651 as Professor Dickerson suggests, and as a careful interpretation requires, with or without principles and maxims, we are met by broad and inclusive language rather than the narrow and abstemious approach taken by the Court. The court is given the broad power to place the defendant on probation “upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.” When the Court looks specifically to the language in which it finds restriction, it must grapple with an enumeration that is introduced by the inclusive phrase “among the conditions thereof” and three specific phrases, each commencing with “may be required.” The inclusive word “among” is followed by three permissive phrases. To find limitation in the three phrases flies in the face of their nonrestrictive nature. It simply does not follow that the specific but permissive phrases must constrict the inclusive “among.”
Because the Court’s opinion today rests so substantially on a rule of construction, this discussion of the maxims ejusdem gen-eris and expressio unius is of particular significance.
Some rules of statutory construction come down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of an act to its narrowest permissible compass. However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating generаl purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
The Court’s reliance on other cases citing this maxim find support in the results
Similarly, United States v. Wright Contracting Co.,
This final observation of Wright Contracting demonstrates the weakness in the Court’s opinion today as well as the inapplicability of both Wright Contracting and Prescon, supra. Wright Contracting and Prescon involved only the payment of money to charitable organizations. While our decision in Anderson, supra, did not make it abundantly clear, it was evident that the contributions in Anderson by the corporation went to the charitable projects in which its corporate officers were to perform their personal service. The district court there stated that “causing a corporation to put money into a project in which one or more of its decision makers [i.e., the individual defendants] has a stake in a direct interest assists the corporation’s attitude.”
It is significant that in this case, as in Anderson, no objection was raised that a condition of probation requiring individual defendants to render personal services to charitable organizations is contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Numerous cases have approved such sentences. E.g., United States v. Arthur,
The eases relied on by the Court today, Wright Contracting, Prescon, and United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass’n,
As recognized in United States v. Mitsubishi Inter. Corp.,
Contrary to the point of view of the Court today, the broad discretion placed in district courts to tailor probation to the particular circumstances in each case was recognized in Burns v. United States,
As the Court reasoned in Anderson and as developed in the Yale Law Journal Comment cited above, corporations play a predominate role in our society, and their essence is far more than the legal fiction giving rise to their existence. Their management and functioning are intrinsically that of the individuals managing and controlling the organization. Insofar as the conditions of probation in Anderson affect the managers and decisionmakers and recognize the interrelationship between those Individuals and the corporation, the Anderson conditions are in full accоrd with the purposes and goals of section 3651.
The shortcoming of the probation imposed on Missouri Valley is that it has none of the limitations recognized in Anderson. Specifically, there is no connection between the payment of money and programs in which individual corporate officers will be involved as a part of their probation. What we have in Missouri Valley is simply the payment of money to a designated charity, without any tie to the probation of the individuals, precisely the type of payment condemned in Prescon and Wright Contracting. It is for this limited reason that I agree that the Court has reached the right conclusion with respect to Missouri Valley. In doing so, however, I believe that the Court makes a great mistake in failing to distinguish the limited situation in Anderson, and in discarding the valuable role that it can play in corporate probation.
The sentence in Missouri Valley illustrates the particular abuse that is possible when a district court orders payment of funds to an entity other than the governmental institution or the party directly damaged. The record is plain that the Chairman of the Board of Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., the corporate parent of Missouri Valley, has close ties with the University
For thesе reasons I agree with the holding of the Court today. My dissent is limited to the overruling of Anderson.
ROSS, Circuit Judge, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
. Dickerson gives this further pointed criticism:
Several Latin maxims masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more than describing results reached by other means. The best example is probably expres-sio unius est exclusio alterius, which is a rather elaborate, mysterious sounding, and anachronistic way of describing the negative implication. Far from being a rule, it is not even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes it does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of cоntext. Without contextual support, therefore, there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, this maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.
The Interpretation and Application of Statutes at 234 (footnotes omitted).
. See Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 Yale L.J. 353 (1979).
Concurrence Opinion
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result reached by the majority and join in Judge Gibson’s dissenting opinion. I would go one step further and sustain payments to charitable foundations or educational institutions under the guidelines set forth below.
The present practice of punishing corporate crime with fines paid to the United States Treasury has done little to deter corporate crime. Once the payment is made to the Treasury, the public promptly forgets the transgression, and the corporation continues on its way, with its reрutation only slightly tarnished by what it usually describes as a “highly technical violation.” On the other hand, if a corporation is required to fund a chair in corporate ethics at a distinguished university as a condition of probation, and if the chair is identified as one funded through an involuntary contribution, there is at the very least a strong probability that there will be an improvement in corporate conduct both in the near and long term. Probation conditions similar to those imposed here are used daily for individual defendants. These conditions are generally recognized as being effective in deterring crime and bringing benefits to the communities that have been harmed by the transgression.
We err greatly in shutting the door on probationary conditions of this nature for corporate defendants. To be sure, there are potential problems. The judge must be careful to avoid any conflicts of interest and must make sure that posterity will understand that the chair was established by court order to punish illegal and unethical conduct. But we give district court judges broad discretion in scheduling and trying cases. We are even more loath to interfere with their sentencing discretion, frequently sustaining sentences that we feel are entirely too long. Why then does the Justice Department and a majority of this Court insist on tying the hands of the district courts when it comes to imposing conditions of probation on corporate defendants, when the statutes do not require such restrictions? It seems to me that, in reality, we do so for two reasons: first, in a shortsighted effort to protect government revenues derived from criminal fines, and second, out of an inordinate fear that our district court judges will not have the wisdom to avoid possible conflicts of interest. Neither reason is sufficient for me.
