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United States v. Milton Milan
304 F.3d 273
3rd Cir.
2002
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*1 273 (1984). agreement prosecutor’s and the remarks L.Ed.2d 674 Lam has failed to facing if consequences Yeung any about the he show prejudice from trial counsel’s did not tell the truth. We will not disturb performance, as the state appellate court court’s determination that nei- the state considered vouching arguments Lam’s de- imper- ther of these statements constitute spite trial object. counsel’s failure to vouching. Thus, missible rejection District Court’s of this argument should be affirmed. matter, an initial Lam point As does not portion plea agreement out a that IV. CONCLUSION improper assuring has the effect of Lam has established that she is entitled testimony that jury Yeung’s is credible. to habeas relief on process her due claim Rather, portion agreement of the plea involving the voluntariness of her April by Lam open possibility cited leaves statement and the 7April telephone call to Yeung’s Yeung statements are false: It objectively unreasonable, Xie. was it family protection and his will receive “if light of Supreme holding ... Court’s is further found that truthful [his] Fulminante, 279, Arizona v. cooperation ... U.S. reveals” activities of indi- 1246, (1991), S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d 302 for the against viduals who use violence his Pennsylvania Superior family. Court to find those responses voluntary. prosecutor’s statements also with- will, therefore, We affirm that prosecutor part stand habeas review. The told the District jury Court’s October 20 Yeung ruling would “risk his life” granting habeas relief by not based on re- telling plea agree- the truth his Lam’s sponses to the ment. undercover officers. This statement should not be con- We will reverse that part ruling of its improper, granting sidered as we have approved habeas relief based on Xie’s prosecutor’s use of subtle statements. less statements We will also affirm the District addressing consequences Court’s of witness’s earlier order See, denying habeas relief testify truthfully. failure to based e.g., Oxman, (3d on Lam’s Confrontation United States v. Clause due Cir.1984), process claims vouching. related to grounds reversed on other sub Pflaumer, nom. United States v. 473 U.S. (1985). 105 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d

Thus, we see no basis for habeas relief

based on the state appellate ap court’s

proval of those statements. UNITED STATES of America 3. Ineffective assistance. Finally, Lam claims her trial MILAN, Appellant Milton

counsel was ineffective because he failed to No. 01-2603. object to impermissible vouching at trial. reject

We this claim. Appeals, United States Court of An brought ineffective assistance claim Third Circuit. requires under the Sixth Amendment two Argued May 2002. first, showings: performance that counsel’s Filed Sept. deficient, second, constitutionally performance the deficient prejudiced

the defense. Washington, Strickland v. 668, 687,

466 U.S. 104 S.Ct. *3 A. Coughhn (argued),

Richard Julie McGrain, of the Federal Public De- Office fender, Camden, NJ, Appellant. Cleary, United States Attor- Robert J. (ar- N.J., Newark, ney, Norman Gross Attorney, gued), Assistant United States Chief, (argued), Appeals Leone George S. Division, of the United States Attor- Office Camden, NJ, ney, Appellee. BECKER, Judge, Before: Chief GREENBERG, Judge, and Circuit BARZILAY, Judge, U.S. Court *. International Trade THE OF COURT OPINION GREENBERG, Judge. Circuit this court on This case comes on before judgment final of conviction appeal from a entered the district and sentence Mi- defendant-appehant Milton following jury on 14 counts of lan’s conviction fraud, fraud, money laundering, mail wire part conspiracies criminal and related in while for his activities undertaken Milan, district court sentenced office. The * Barzilay, Judge, designation. United Honorable Judith M. Trade, sitting by States Court of International city key council mayor presi- testimony witnesses whose advanced former Camden, City Jersey, New Milan’s convictions on those counts.

dent imprisonment. months to 87 Finally, Milan maintains we should vacate his sentence remand the case appeal, advances three On resentencing because the district court overturn his conviction on all grounds to applying erred in upward depar- 3-level First, counts. he contends under public corruption ture for Milan’s acts of Kentucky, Batson v. 476 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 2C1.7, Application under U.S.S.G. Note (1986), 90 L.Ed.2d 69 the district 5, to the final combined offense'level after in finding govern- court erred grouping rather than to the offense level peremptory ment’s decision exercise *4 established for corruption juror by was not challenge to motivated charges only. alternative, discriminatory intent. In the panel unanimously agrees The that the Milan maintains district mis- judgment of conviction should be applied legal Supreme standards the affirmed joins on all by unanimously enunciated in Batson counts thus improperly Court aspects all deferring prosecution’s opinion except le- of the for section proffered E. justifications Upward II. “3-Level gitimate using Departure.” three of however, Judge peremptory challenges Greenberg, four of its to strike believes that jurors judgment from should panel. African-American be reversed to the imposed extent that it Lastly, suggests Milan the district sentence and by filing separate opinion thus is using phrase dissenting court erred “moral certainty” jury charge in its on reasonable from the of the sentence. affirmance doubt. I. BACKGROUND challenges specific Milan also counts of A. Milan’s Crimes his Private Ca- First, argues

his conviction. he that we pacity should reverse conviction on counts 3 his (wire conspiracy arising and 9 fraud and trial evidence at the demonstrated illegal receipt following.1 out of his of monies and the In October Milan office) during other benefits his tenure in Contracting formed the Atlas Company (“Atlas”) government friend, premised because the its case with his Gholam H. Da- largely testimony rakhshan, on from a cooperating to undertake commercial and witness im disclosing without material residential projects construction in the peachment (tape 11, 1994, evidence August recorded con Camden area. On Atlas versations) Brady in violation of v. Mary obtained a contract for the construction of land, 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 10 13 homes at Arthur’s Court in Camden. (1963), imposes duty L.Ed.2d 215 required Inasmuch as the contract Atlas provide on the the defense a performance payment secure bond, potential exculpatory impeachment with it entered into a surety arrange- Second, Milan argues evidence. that we Surety ment Amwest Insurance should reverse his conviction on Company counts in which agreed Amwest to is- 9, 15, 16, and 17 because the sue bonds for each phase construction. Amwest, however, improperly credibility vouched required Atlas to post point challenge 1. We out that Milan does not conviction. sufficiency support of the evidence to his Company pro- issu- from Selective Insurance for Amwest as a condition collateral against damage loss or to the ma- the bonds. tect ing chines. obligation post securi- satisfy To Darakhshan borrowed Milan and

ty, 31, 1995, Milan Dara- On December Rivera, own- $65,000 in from Jose cash staged burglary khshan sham store which func- parts an automotive er of office, removing property Atlas and break- a front to launder the part tioned ing They a window. later filed a false Realizing drug dealers. of local profits property report stolen with the Camden money had obtained the loan that Rivera property and a lost worksheet with police activities, and Dara- from nefarious company. the insurance Atlas received utilize the concocted a scheme to khshan $4,743.50 from Selective satisfaction of arous- proceeds nareoties-related without kept the false claim. Milan one of the the Internal Revenue suspicions computers personal August use until law, which, curren- domestic Service to it to a when he sold former student reports deposits for cash cy transaction intern. $10,000 Specifical- sent. or more must be *5 into amounts of they divided the cash ly, B. Milan’s Crimes as a Public Official $10,000 to they distributed less than a Milan was elected member who, turn, in trans- and relatives friends 7, 1995, city council on Camden November money Atlas in the form of ferred the to 1, president January and was elected its on personal checks or checks. Milan bank 13, 1997, Milan elected May 1996. On was some of deposited and Darakhshan also Camden, position a to which he mayor of into an account. directly the cash Atlas 1,1997. July sworn in on $60,900 a certificate They purchased then In March Milan met Daniel Dai- in and deposit from a bank Camden Natale, done, Ralph an associate of a noto- it to Amwest as collateral securi- assigned in organized Philadelphia. crime boss rious a few over the course of ty. Subsequently, had recruited Daidone previously Natale months, a Milan and Darakhshan issued Ortiz, busi- a Puerto-Rican and Caesar than in amounts of less series of checks contractor, man- and to nessman electrical $10,000made out from Atlas to themselves Trans-Aero, a operate govern- and age family and members or to various friends minority-owned certified business ment Milan repayments.”2 ostensible “loan gov- to enterprise compete which was eventually cashed and Darakhshan behalf. contracts on Natale’s ernment $65,000 to- repaid Rivera the checks $10,000in interest. gether would Correctly anticipating in ex- receptive accepting to kickbacks laundering, Milan money In to addition Trans-Aero secure change helping perpetrate used Atlas to and Darakhshan Camden, in Daidone de- projects business Febru- fraud. June 1994 and insurance in cash payment an initial livered $500 agreement into an ary Atlas entered Milan, reported to Na- a transaction he Leasing Corporation T Capital with AT & Thereafter, Daidone, acting on Na- tale. computers, print- two two for the lease of behalf, periodic continued to deliver ers, then tale’s machine. Atlas copy and one (occasionally at his office to Milan insurance bribes property secured commercial checks. wrote the words some 2. Milan and Darakhshan repayments" memo lines of on the "loan Hall)

in City request, Camden until Ian’s company Milan’s arrest installed an air told, system June 1998. All Milan received be- conditioning personal at Milan’s $30,000 $50,000 cash, tween includ- pay residence. Milan did not for these $1,433 a payment January toward a services and did not receipt disclose his 1998 Florida vacation for himself and his them on his financial disclosure state- Milan, turn, services, $3,346, then fiance. did numerous ments. The valued at organized favors for Natale and his crime took two days complete. men six associates, including lobbying on their be- In April a concrete recycling half federally-subsidized to secure con- company, River Recycling, ap- Delaware struction contracts in a empow- Camden plied County to the Camden Solid Waste zone, attempting erment to contact the Advisory permit operate Council for a Hill, mayor Cherry Jersey, New to ob- month, recycling facility. That same tain a liquor license for a restaurant Milan asked Casey, Robert the owner of associates, owned one of Natale’s and Delaware Recycling, River to do home arranging a meeting between Natale’s as- improvement work at private Milan’s resi- sociates and presid- officials Casey obliged, dence. sending work ing over Camden waterfront renovation garage crew tear down a remove projects.3 Casey paid tree. also for the instal- $700 cash,

In addition to Milan received lation carpeting of new at Milan’s home. improper Milan, during services, benefits his tenure in pay who did not for these office. On December Mi- capacity wrote letter his official on 3, 1998, lan arranged to have the title of a 1990 September appli- supporting Lumina Chevrolet Van transferred to his cation of Delaware River Recycling. Ca- *6 fiance from Towing, sey Nick’s an outfit which forwarded the letter to the Camden provided towing services to the City County Advisory Solid Waste Council. Camden.4 approxi- Milan also obtained inAs the other instances we have re- mately ten months free use of a respect 1996 GMC counted with improper to bene- Monaco, Jimmy fits, truck leased to Dominick Milan did not disclose his receipt Towing. the owner of Nick’s March gifts Casey. On these from 27, 1997, city council of Camden 1998, July In Milan received an estimate awarded a contract Towing to Nick’s to R Improvement from & G Home for the towing provide two-year services for a installation of new windows his resi- term at a contract price not to exceed G, dence. R operated by & owned and $480,000. Milan publicly did not disclose Ralph Jr., Ralph Cruz Sr. and pro- Cruz receipt gifts his of these from Nick’s Tow- figure vided a that included costs for mate- ing on his state-mandated financial disclo- labor, supplies rials and but not for sure statements. anticipation that Milan in turn would 1997,

In Ryan June B. Air James take the necessary steps expedite to pay- Conditioning Company a executed three- ments owed to R & G for work it had done year City contract with the City Camden for for the enough, Camden. Sure on 14, (five the servicing maintenancing and of air con- August days after R & G ditioning systems and in heating estimate), various submitted its arranged Milan a 1998, city-owned buildings. May In himself, at Mi- meeting among Sr., Ralph Cruz Cherry mayor nothing improp- 3. The Hill did 4. through Nick's effectuated the transfer a support and application. er did not party. third from the check. Jr., proceeds cash On June and the director Ralph Cruz 12, $5,000 Bradley and gave Willis Department Housing Services Camden $2,500 turn, in Bradley, gave to Milan. September From unpaid bills. discuss $5,000 attorney partial as a ap- R installed & G until December repayment expenses. at Milan’s for vacation new windows proximately Milan charging without home official, public required As a Milan $1,800 it incurred. in labor costs Jersey complete under New state law to an annual financial disclosure statement other, public office Milan abused his detailing his interests and sources business he ways. April creative more completed, signed, of income. Jersey New Election with the established 1997, 1998, mailed those forms a Commission Joint Law Enforcement but, indicated, (“JCC”) as we have failed to mention to raise Candidates Committee receipt his of the benefits we have de- city council can- funds for three campaign scribed. Mi- affiliated with him. politically didates aide, Bradley, Milton

lan installed his History C. Procedural Milan later informed treasurer. JCC 23, 2000, political his grand jury sitting that he and several of March a Bradley On celebratory taking returned a 19-count indictment supporters would Camden May Rico after the A against superseding vacation to Puerto Milan. indictment He then directed July council elections. was returned on 2000. Counts city trip charged finance the with funds from Bradley through scheme to defraud Bradley devised a pub- Milan and of Milan’s honest services as a the JCC. disguise the disbursement as in violation of the mail and wire scheme to lic official 1343, 1346, acts, §§ expense business for the JCC. fraud legitimate 18 U.S.C. Willis, 1, 4, Mark the owner of counts and 8 in- They Specifically, asked Milan’s building mailing office of Milan’s financial dis- Camden volved statements, locat- campaign headquarters was count involved mayoral closure ed, and Milan to draft a fake lease demonstrate call between Daidone phone were due monthly payments (during sup- lease which Milan asked Daidone to *7 “resources”), though even Mi- count 3 involved campaign ply from Milan’s him with using 2, office from a campaign January was Willis’s a 1998 fax transmission lan’s trip Milan’s space charge. agency concerning without travel Florida, and involved Mi- and counts 5 6 1997, 1,May flights and hotel reser- On Casey supporting to Robert lan’s letter a through booked trip vations for this were Recycling Delaware River application of people, including Mi- agency travel for 15 recycling permit. for a group The vacationed lan and his fiance. 9, Milan 20, involving conduct while May May Count in Puerto Rico from until office from March 1996 1997, per- on the was expenses charged public with 1998, to travel charged conspiracy a account of a Cam- June Express American sonal and return, facilities to solicit Milan had and use interstate attorney. Upon den his a $7,500 to influence servant accept on the bribes Bradley draw check § in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Counts payable to Willis’s man- JCC bank account and 4, charged conspiracy Milan with de- and agement company. On June Willis § and 18 under 18 U.S.C. corporate bank extortion posited the check into his 1951(a), alleging § and, through a series of transac- U.S.C. account $7,500 municipal public in threatened to remove obtained parties, tions with third appointed defender from office unless he contributed and the Federal Public Defend- $5,000 political post-verdict to a action committee er to file repre- motions and 2001, sent Milan at aligned sentencing. May with Milan. attorney new Milan’s wrote a letter to the 13, 12, and 14 charged Milan Counts prosecutor requesting copies of con- taped campaign using political contributions (or documenting versations evidence their Puerto Rico pay vacation prior attorney) disclosure to his of Natale acts, mail and wire violation of the fraud during his incarceration from October to 1343, §§ and 2. Spe- 18 U.S.C. December 1999. tapes, by The recorded predicated cifically, count -on a Prisons, indicated, the Bureau of allegedly phone agency call from domestic travel among things, that Natale expected Rico, to a hotel in Puerto count 13 on a early agree- release as result of his for an airline computer request ticket from ment to cooperate government. with the Tulsa, Oklahoma, an airline in and count Milan subsequently for a moved new trial $7,000 payable 14 on a mailed check to a on the counts to which testimony Natale’s company. card credit (3 9) grounds was directed on the 15, 16, charged conspir- Counts and 17 the government’s failure to disclose the acy currency to structure transactions tapes, germane impeachment purposes § violation of 18 a conspiracy U.S.C. trial, at Milan’s violated Brady and the money laundering to commit in violation of Act, § Jenks 18 U.S.C. 3500. The district 1956(h), money § laundering 18 U.S.C. motion, court denied the concluding 1957(a). in violation of 18 U.S.C. These tapes sufficiently were immaterial such charges pertained to Milan’s financial their non-disclosure did not under- $65,000 involving transactions loan integrity mine the of the verdict to war- Contracting from Jose Rivera to Atlas rant a new trial. Company. Finally, counts 18 and 19 15, 2001, On June the district court sen- charged mail fraud in violation of 18 tenced Milan to 87 imprisonment, months §§ predicated U.S.C. on Mi- in part arriving at figure by departing mail in lan’s use of the connection with his upwards 3 levels per- reason of Milan’s staged burglary of Atlas to collect insur- systematic vasive and corruption gov- proceeds. ance ernment function. Milan unsuccessfully Jury selection commenced on October objected to the court’s sequencing method- During the final pro- selection ology, arguing that the departure should attorney cess Milan’s raised an unsuccess- have been added to the counts objection ful government’s Batson grouped as corruption-related rather than peremptory challenges. use of its *8 combined, to the total offense level calcu- portion evidence the trial began of on No- lated grouping. after If the court had 6, 2000, vember and was concluded on accepted argument Milan’s his sentence jury December 2000. The convicted range would have been lower. The court 2, 5, 6, 10, Milan except on all counts and judgment entered the of conviction and II.5 15, 2001, sentence on June and Milan sub- verdict, Following the court at Mi- sequently timely filed a appeal. We have request lan’s jurisdiction removed his trial attorney § under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 18 2, 5, jury acquitted 5. The Milan on counts 10 and counts and 6. 11 and was unable to reach a verdict on

281 challenges to strike Caucasian peremptory 3742(a), the district and U.S.C. potential alternates. jurisdiction pur- matter subject exercised § 3231. 18 U.S.C. to suant perempto fifth of After the round government (during ries struck which II. DISCUSSION Robinson), Milan raised a Batson ob Mr. Challenges Batson A. jection bench conference. at a Under progeny, and its courts should Batson challenges, Batson In one of his two equal protection a of an vi evaluate claim district court erred that the argues 7 the follow jury using olation in selection deci government’s that the concluding (1) objec process: has ing three-step jurors hot one of the to strike sion by prima a tor established case facie We discriminatory intent. by motivated peremptory of demonstrating pattern fact this finding of on review court’s race?; jurors of a challenges particular error, v. clear United issue (2) defending the yes, party if did the (3d Uwaezhoke, 388, 394 Cir. F.2d challenges prima case rebut facie factual de 1993), accept will its and thus tendering explanation a race-neutral (1) com it “either is unless termination (3) so, strikes?; if the objector has evidentiary sup minimum devoid of pletely purposeful proving his carried burden credibility, some hue port displaying discrimination, by showing for instance (2) relationship to the rational bears no explanation pretextu proffered data.” evidentiary Haines supportive York, v. New U.S. al. See Hernandez (3d Inc., F.2d Group, Liggett 1859, 1866, 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct. Dinan, Cir.1992) Krasnov v. (quoting Batson). (1991) (citing L.Ed.2d 395 Cir.1972)). (3d 1298, 1302 Nevertheless, dis even surrounding before high publicity Owing to had whether Milan an trict court evaluated case, court conducted district case, govern dire, presented prima questioning pro- individual voir facie ment, in the context as is common directly allowing and jurors spective immediately responded objection, Af- Batson follow-up questions. attorneys ask explanation a race-neutral by stating hardship, for cause ter dismissals challenges. gov final each of its contested 12 individuals from the court seated Hargis that Ms. had lived At ernment noted pool at random. pre-qualifíed County primarily in Essex her adult life prosecution defense and point, both the Jersey and had moved chal- northern New peremptory initiated their exercise Jersey, where New Camden three of southern government utilized lenges. The located, earlier. years three Conse challenges to strike African- its first four that she would Gorrell, it a concern quently, stated Americans, Ms. Hargis, Ms. jurors who remaining “blend” Robinson, not challenge one Mr. used geog- the local far more familiar with two were It also exercised strike Caucasian.6 Nonetheless, analysis gov the Batson tions. 6. Under Fed.R.Crim.P. ten. the Fifth Amendment peremptories and the defense erns this because has six case challenge peremptories two apply Both had federal sides does *9 potential alternates. equal protection generally requires the same Amendment cases. analysis as Fourteenth in Batson, prosecu- a state 7. which involved Leslie, See, e.g., 813 F.2d United tion, Four- Supreme Court construed the the banc). (5th 1987) (era Cir. Clause, Equal Protection teenth Amendment's prosecu- govern federal not itself does in raphy higher being pretextual camouflage and had a level of interest to a race-con- familiarity community percolating and with the issues scious motive beneath. prosecutor trial. relevant to Milan’s The argument Milan now focuses his on the explained that Ms. Gorrell had indicated finding respect Hargis. with to Ms. that holding religious beliefs interfered court, evaluating government’s in the stat- ability judgment her on pass with striking ed motivation for Hargis Ms. —her people. Finally, prosecution empha- the inability to “blend” with jurors the other sized that Mr. had Robinson substantial because of her lack familiarity with difficulty answering ques- a number of the Jersey agreed south some extent with —to tions and acknowledged being unsure of that reasoning defense seemed what “impartial” prosecution meant. The somewhat attenuated considering that elaborated that it was not confident of his nothing in her background suggested else ability complexi- to follow the nuances and inability adequately function aas counts, ties of a case which included 19 juror. Nevertheless, App. See at 694. involving fairly some intricate financial prosecution’s court determined that transactions, witnesses, over 70 and hun- reason was sincere and therefore survived dreds of exhibits. scrutiny. Batson rejected

The court Milan’s Batson ob- finding clearly This was not erroneous. jections, informing parties with, begin it To the facts underlying would rulings make further after the government’s com- concern were accurate: lead- Thereafter, pletion jury trial, selection. ing up to the Hargis Ms. indeed had issue, revisiting when the court Jersey made lived south period shorter First, the following findings. agreeing than any initially jurors. of the 12 seated government’s Moreover, explanations were patently it was not unsound or facially indeed neutral with respect prefer unreasonable for the race, prosecutors juror the court noted that the greater with community ties had made no during statements voir regional familiarity.8 dire recognize We any which would indicate latent bias the prosecution did not strike two other against Second, jurors African-Americans. relatively with transient ties to the court noted that the Jersey had cho- south community: Ms. Bond who sen not to strike three other African- had resided in the only years area for four Americans who were seated the final before had lived on the west coast jury. Finally, the court a credibility made and Ms. Cain who had resided in the area determination respect prosecu- years. six Yet absent further tors, holding that their reasons were genu- motive, evidence probative prejudicial ine and in “good made faith” rather than minor discrepancy,9 particularly 8. We analysis might note that neither we nor the district be different if the were reverse reject logic See, must endorse or e.g., Ryan, true. Jones v. government's long nonracial motive so as it is (3d Cir.1993) (rejecting prosecutor’s genuine deemed and credible. See Hernan proffered explanation striking race-neutral dez, ("In 500 U.S. at S.Ct. at jurors prosecutor black where the did not typical peremptory challenge inquiry, apply jurors the same rationale to white question decisive will be whether counsel’s position). identical or more extreme It also explanation peremptory race-neutral for a mentioning bears that Milan struck Ms. Bond believed."). challenge should be Cain, gov- Ms. albeit in rounds after Hargis. ernment struck Ms. Hargis The fact remains that Ms. had the briefest recent residence of the. three. Our *10 proffered for explanations prosecution the peremptories of number the finite light of peremptory challenges. of integrity its exercise available, undermine the not does distinct from his finding. argument This factual court’s factual the of district govern- respect contention record, including the in the Nothing else challenge Hargis. Typically, to Ms. ment’s crimes, the de- race of nature of the review of a plenary we exercise district witnesses, govern- any or fendant application legal precepts. of See court’s and Mr. Ms. Gorrell of ment’s strikes Co., Dredge & Dock Shade Great Lakes (unassailed suggests on appeal), Robinson Cir.1998). (3d gov- The into ac- race took government that however, suggests, that our ernment re- To the exercising its strikes. count by the more strin- governed here is view its it did exhaust contrary, though not because Milan gent plain error standard peremptories, allocated object court’s meth- district failed African-Ameri- three of six did not strike odology in the district court. See Fed. fact, of percentage In jurors.10 can 52(b) (“[pjlain errors or defects R.Crim.P. jury ap- on the seated African-Americans rights may be noticed affecting substantial percentage have exceeded pears to brought not to the although they were total among venireper- African-Americans court”). Milan counters attention Moreover, suspect nothing find we sons. preserve did with the assertion that he the term government’s in the use by pressing his appellate claim for review that, circum- in some a word “blending,” argument, which generic discrimination a stances, could be cue conceivably on notice put the court that presumptively discriminatory of a sublimated presence apply legal correct stan- a failure to court Ultimately, district motive.11 objectionable. to the facts would be dards credi- explanation government’s found the that ble, suggests us nothing before Nevertheless, we need not determine short, finding. upset we should definitively because standard review regard- finding factual court’s the district de expansive the more novo even under clearly erroneous. Hargis was not ing Ms. without merit. Milan’s claim is standard the district explicates record argument, Batson In his second three-prong properly applied court disregarded that the district claims delin- progeny that Batson and its analysis judg- analytical framework the correct instance, Milan In the first raised eated. by failing to objections Batson his of the first four objection when three race-neutral an appropriately the scrutinize accentuating (e.g., characteristic prosecu- innocuous that a recognize that the fact We status, government’s peremp- age, mari- geography, socio-economic not exhaust tor did venireper- which, challenges status) black tory to exclude all in the interest so-called tal prosecutor did does not mean that the coincidentally sons blending,” correlates "jury not challenges in any peremptory a exercise not may realities and demographic to certain States v. discriminatory United manner. See See, another. one from serve cleave race Cir.1988) (3d Clemons, 843 F.2d Batson, at 106 S.Ct. e.g., 476 U.S. including ("[W]e significance of doubt the J., ("A (Marshall, concurring) prosecu- time, if, panel at the same single black on a conscious or unconscious racism tor’s own peremptory most of its used easily to the conclusion lead him with back- challenges ... to strike blacks 'sullen,' ‘distant,’ juror prospective black ultimately jurors grounds similar to the white would not have come a characterization selected.”). juror had acted identi- mind if a white to his cally.”). might prosecutor couch realize that a 11. We homogeneous jury preference for more *11 jurors struck cause the district court diluted the consti- prospective gov- Then the African-American. tutionally were required proof standard of in its ernment, the court determined before jury instruction on reasonable doubt. As prima, threshold had whether trial, facie objection Milan did not raise this at crossed, quickly articulated race-neu- been we review this contention for plain error. challenged for all three explanations tral Wolfe, See States v. United court, The district as re- venirepersons. (3d Cir.2001). 260-61 Batson, the strictures contem- quired by trial, At the of the gave outset the court explanations and the plated proffered a brief definition proof beyond it and a reason- concluded ultimate- before evidence had not the defense carried its ly able doubt as evidence of “such a convinc- showing purposeful discrimina- burden of ing person character that a reasonable government. of the For part tion on the without rely upon hesitation would and act example, reviewing challenge to Ms. it in important the most of his or her own Gorrell, court, in line with Batson step App. affairs.” at 738. The court also three, that it not find “the noted did exer- explained presumption af- innocence challenge racially of that to have been cise forded to Milan persua- and the burden of at 693. App. motivated.” government, sion demanded of the Perhaps the court could have articulated the latter satisfied on basis of finding clearly more its basis “evidence that produced during government’s explanations race-neutral course of this trial.” App. legitimate “expressed good were trial, At the close of the the court in- App. Notwithstanding, at 670. faith.” See jury charge structed its final court, specifically citing quoting to and law, follows, well as our related part: Batson as case relevant (3d Casper, F.2d 416 United A reasonable doubt is a doubt which a Cir.1992),12 proper legal as the standard person reasonable has carefully after claim, analyze under which to fulfilled weighing all of the upon evidence based required constitutional task evaluat- its reason and common sense. It is the government’s against reasons kind of doubt that would make a reason- backdrop of the record to see whether person Now, able hesitate to act ... purposeful there had been discrimination. possible reasonable doubt is not a doubt Finding no basis cast doubt on the or a fanciful A doubt. reasonable doubt government’s explanations, race-neutral is not a doubt arbitrarily capriciously objection. overruled Milan’s the court As by juror asserted because of his or her scrutiny special required,13 no the dis- perform reluctance to a difficult task. It legal trict court did not commit a error. arising is not a doubt from the natural B. Doubt Reasonable Instruction sympathy which one an- have for ... argues necessary Milan it is not next we should for the reverse all his conviction on counts be- prove guilt court, however, App. 12. See at 689-95. group. racial The Uwaezhoke immediately qualified position, explaining Uwaezhoke, points 13. to a statement in disparate impact that the existence aof does 995 F.2d at that a trial court should legal not judge alter the standard the trial special scrutiny exercise in the third Batson apply. should See id. at 393 n. 4. step government's explanation when disparate impact particular would have on a *12 this burden of to the defendant. And or doubt possible all beyond defendant ex- If that a doubt certainty. proof beyond reasonable a mathematical to ever rule, would to each essential ele- persons few tends and relates the were they might convicted, guilty charged. however ment of the crimes be world of in this reason is that be. added). (emphasis at 3610-12 App. to be impossible ours, practically it is equat- in the court’s posits Milan error of convinced completely absolutely and beyond reasonable doubt proof of a its nature is by fact which disputed any defining or certainty” without “moral with certain- mathematical susceptible to not See United contextualizing phrase. the case, it in a criminal ty. Consequently, (3d 1219, Jacobs, 44 F.3d v. States the proofs if the show is sufficient Cir.1995) (“moral certainty” should not be a reasonable beyond guilty defendant viewed as a charge). in When used doubt. doubt, all beyond possible not whole,14however, did not the instructions in you concept the up I will sum And jury that the a create reasonable likelihood Reasonable doubt way. this convict that it could would have believed when, any exist in case said after proof a of lower based on standard Milan consideration impartial of careful Due Process required by the than evidence, con- jurors do not the the feel v. See Victor of the Constitution. Clause certainty that a a moral vinced defen- 1239, 6, Nebraska, 1, 114 S.Ct. 511 U.S. fair, however, a If, after guilty. dant is (1994). Rather, we 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 of all consideration and careful impartial comprehen- that the court’s are satisfied of the you are convinced evidence any by taint created charge mitigated sive beyond a reason- guilt of defendant phrase of the single, isolated utterance its doubt, duty to return your it is then able clearly it and re- certainty,” as “moral to that respect guilty of with verdict jury to consider admonished the peatedly hand, such a after charge. On the other (rather subjec- than its only the evidence fair, consideration and careful impartial sensibilities) and allocated the moral tive evidence, you if have reason- all the of prov- within proof squarely burden guilt, doubt as to defendant’s able (the prosecution burden ince duty to find the defendant your it is then “remains with proof offense particular of the guilty not “extends and case” and throughout every Keep mind charged. of the essential element to each relates case, certainly in this one criminal Moreover, charge charged”). crimes well, upon govern- the burden doubt meaning of reasonable explained guilt be- prove the defendant’s ment and without great length, appropriately, The burden a reasonable doubt. yond objectionable phrase. We reference a reason- guilt beyond their proving jury, guid- to doubt no reason see remains with able doubt instructions,15 comprehensive these case, shifts ed and it never throughout the 214, jury followed presume that We Thayer, 201 F.3d 15. States v. United See v. Francis instructions. See district court’s Cir.1999) (in (3d evaluating challenge Franklin, S.Ct. 324 n. 471 U.S. instructions, totality “we consider jury (dub (1985) n. 85 L.Ed.2d particular sen- instructions and not underlying assumption” our bing it a "crucial isolation”) (quoting paragraph tence carefully jurors follow in system trial structions) (citation (3d Coyle, United Moreover, omitted). Cir.1995)). presumption, with record is consistent eight days of jury, after considering that the correctly law applied the its delibera- Natale through Daidone from March 1996 Natale, tion. to June 1998. signed who a coop- erating plea agreement in September 1999 correctly expressly notes that we respect informations, to two criminal discouraged certainty” have use of “moral principal was a government witness at Mi- language in a reasonable doubt instruction. Daidone, however, lan’s trial. did not tes- Jacobs, *13 However, See F.3d at 1226. Natale, tify. who also was slated testify presence phrase jury mere of the in a for the separate orga- not render charge does instructions nized crime prosecution brought in the Victor, constitutionally defective. See Eastern Pennsylvania District of against 16, 114 at (engaging U.S. S.Ct. in a Merlino, Joseph was incarcerated pending case-specific analysis to conclude it not Milan’s trial at F.C.I. Allenwood where the reasonably likely that a jury understood Bureau of Prisons monitored and recorded certainty” “moral “suggesting words phone number of his conversations. proof a standard of lower than due process requires allowing or as conviction on fac The defense in the Merlino case learned government’s tors other than the proof’); of the existence of the tapes and success- Alabama, see also Johnson v. 256 F.3d fully preservation moved for their and dis- (11th Cir.2001) (“use 1156, 1192 of the Saturno, closure. R.J. an FBI agent who certainty’ ‘moral term a reasonable worked on both the Milan and Merlino fatal”). doubt instruction not As we are cases, subsequently transported tapes charge satisfied district court’s office the United Attorney adequately ensured the “moral cer in Philadelphia. tainty” terminology reasonably would not jury Before began selection in Milan’s government’s be understood lower the trial, an Assistant Attorney United States burden, Milan fails to plain demonstrate from the District of New Jersey learned error, prejudicial i.e. unfair impact an on the tapes. Accordingly, prosecutor con- of the case.16 outcome

tacted the Attorney’s United States Office C. Brady Claim in Philadelphia regarding the tapes and transcripts but was advised that that of- argues government’s next that the fice, them, on the basis of its review of failure to reveal exculpatory evidence re- they determined that contained irrele- quires that we reverse his conviction on vant family discussions of matters and the counts 3 and 9. Our review of the denial of App. like. See at 3772. a motion for new trial on the basis Brady argument de novo with respect to 23, 2001, May On some four months the district court’s conclusions of law and after completion trial, of the Milan is based on “clearly erroneous” stan- government provided attorney Milan’s new dard respect to its findings of fact. with copies tapes, of the as well aas Perdomo, See United States v. 929 F.2d summary written of the conversations and (3d 967, Cir.1991). transcripts of particular three conversa-

Counts 3 and 9 centered around Milan’s tions. Milan moved for new trial on the receipt of cash and other benefits from basis tapes on June but the deliberation, returned mixed verdict Thayer, of con- 16. See United States v.

victions, acquittals, hung (3d Cir.1999). counts. See 222-23 Gilsenan, (3d United States 949. Cir.1991). versation, informs one of his Natale Milan’s during the motion denied court to be home “not daughters expects that he sentencing hearing. at 4067. In App. far in the future.” too 9, 2001, court issued the district July On addition, Na- demonstrate that tapes its deni- opinion explaining a memorandum in the that his involvement suggested tale made Revising statements al as follows. about a lucrative book might bring case the court concluded hearing, during the at 3922. Milan App. deal. See movie easily have “could relevant to tapes were maintains obligation and had tapes reviewed credibility by demon- impeach Natale’s information con- so” because to do falsify his connection strating his motive “easily accessible.” in them was tained aor Milan to secure a reduced sentence Nevertheless, App. at financial windfall. not Milan’s defense ruled that *14 inability attorney’s by his trial prejudiced in record a review of the extensive After cross-examining Natale. in tapes to use case, govern- that we conclude agree. We tapes did not divulge failure to ment’s States, 405 Giglio v. United Under as a whole integrity of the trial impair the 768, 766, 150, 154-55, 31 92 S.Ct. U.S. light a so in such different put the case or (1972), must 104 L.Ed.2d in the verdict. confidence as to undermine question go to materials that disclose outset, mentioning that it bears theAt well as materials as or innocence guilt benefit of the potential Milan overstates jury’s judgment affect the might that they inasmuch as to his defense tapes wit prosecution a credibility of crucial included, alia, inculpatory inter Natale’s Bagley, v. States See also United ness. Milan,” “buying that he was statement 3375, 676-77, 667, 105 3380- S.Ct. U.S. 473 4131, by Natale and a at statement App. (1985). However, to 81, L.Ed.2d 481 87 up” story make a “I don’t have to that reversal, evidence the withheld warrant a nothing” “promised he had been because is, sig material, of sufficient that must at 4074-75. App. government. from deprived suppression that its nificance Furthermore, they dem- to the extent trial. United a fair See defendant anticipated gov- that Natale once onstrate 97, 108, 96 427 S.Ct. Agurs, U.S. coop- leniency exchange for his ernment (1976); 2392, 2399, also 342 see 49 L.Ed.2d by Natale’s eration, tapes are undercut 57, Ritchie, 480 U.S. Pennsylvania v. plea collo- at his subsequent recognition (1987) 989, 1001, 40 94 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 107 tape after the last five months some quy, (evidence only if there is material had recorded, district court that, had the evi probability “reasonable any government reject discretion defense, the been disclosed dence for a reduced § 5K1.1 motion U.S.S.G. have been would proceeding of the result and never- grant the motion sentence omitted). different”) (citations at id. any See limit reduction. theless Likewise, the district court 775-76. reveal that tapes Portions noted, that Natale correctly suggestion from early release expected Natale capital- to lie and a financial incentive had with cooperation as a result of his prison considering far-fetched his crimes is ize on in one con example, For government. aof evidence there was no credible D’Ambrosia, a for Daniel versation fact, movie deal. book or potential associate, surmises crime Natale mer ease the Merlino during testified one to two Natale approximately likely release when prospects inflated his he had con- In another App. at 3840. years. See speaking to wife and daughter his order in evaluating credibility of witnesses it assuage their concerns over mounting any could consider plea arrangements in Appellee’s financial woes. See SuppApp. which the agreed urge le- Furthermore, at niency 797-99. there was an at sentencing exchange for wit- why obvious non-fmancial cooperation during reason Natale ness investigation and daughter his wife and would tell he trial. See id. to be home soon: to comfort expected sense, In that distinguishable this case is they pres- in a time when

them missed his upon by from those relied Milan where the ence in their lives. withheld evidence was material because it deprived the any defense of reasonable importantly, Most the additional evi- opportunity pursue particular avenue merely dence would have been cumulative. See, impeachment. Wilson, e.g., Crivens v. See Hollman v. (7th Roth, (new (3d Cir.1999) Cir.1998); Hill, F.3d United States v. (3d Cir.1992). trial warranted where the state govern- F.2d failed to turn ment disclosed to Milan a im- over the criminal history wealth of records of Natale, its peachment impeachment materials witness for concerning purposes); Inc., including history, his entire criminal tran- United States v. Service Deli (9th Cir.1998) (new scripts testimony of his before United 942-44 trial *15 required States Senate Subcommittee investigating because failure to disclose infor- crime, organized a civil complaint, RICO regarding mation government the central 302s, witness, scores of FBI intercept- hundreds of which included statements attrib- ed recorded conversations between uting Natale inconsistent testimony to “a stroke associates, and other crime wiretap affida- which affected memory,” his completely vits, cooperation agreement, his the two foreclosed certain impeachment strate- to which pleaded informations he had gies). guilty, transcript of guilty his plea Moreover, even without access to the

hearing, an audiotape parole and hear- largely redundant tapes, Milan’s attorney ing. Amply equipped with materials pursued a number of other means of at- evincing that cooperated Natale with the tacking Natale’s credibility, including high- government in return for possibility of lighting a prior criminal record that in- sentence, a reduced attorney Milan’s trial complicity cluded in more than a dozen exploited this fact on cross-examination: attorney murders. Milan’s inquired also Now, Attorney: getting back to plea into relationship Natale’s with a previous agreement. understanding Your is as city Camden president, council with whom your a cooperation, gov- result Natale had met face-to-face on numerous prepared ernment to file what is occasions to bribe. This line of question- known as a substantial assistance mo- ing cast doubt on Natale’s claim that he tion, 5K1.1, known as a correct? to pay had Milan off using Daidone aas

Natale: Correct. middle man in order to avoid atten- Attorney: And particular that motion tion. you would allow escape to the manda- short, In attorney Milan’s pre- was not tory life you’re looking [sentence] cluded pursuing any from theory of im- at, correct? peachment with respect to Natale. See

Natale: True. Johnson, United States v. 199 F.3d addition, (3d App. Cir.1999) at 1512. the district (rejecting Brady chal- specifically jury instructed the lenge where the defense otherwise was Vouching constitutes an “assurance wit prosecution cross-examine to allowed attorney of the credibil by prosecuting affecting credibili “many areas on nesses through per witness ity of Government other evi- considerable ty”). As there information knowledge or sonal conviction to sustain dentiary support testimony jury.” of the before outside to 9,17 entitled Milan is not S and on counts Walker, 180, 184 v. 155 F.3d United States Price, 13 See, States v. e.g., United relief. Cir.1998). (3d danger Vouching runs Cir.1994).18 (3d 711, 722 its jury disregard influencing privileging fact-finding mandate favor of Vouching Improper D. of the deferring to the view perhaps and by sovereign repre evidence as endorsed on challenges his conviction Milan Young, States v. sentative. See United 3, 9, 15, ground 17 on the counts 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 470 U.S. in for the vouched (1985) for witnessés (vouching L.Ed.2d these of its case on strength tegrity concerning opinions expressing personal complains Specifically, counts.19 imprima carries “the guilt of the accused vouching when improper there was induce tur of the Government testimony introduced prosecutor judgment jury to trust the Government’s in approv role district court’s about the evidence”). than its own view of the rather testimony about wiretaps, elicited engendering also runs the risk of Vouching witnesses, and cooperating truthfulness in the of outside jury belief existence pros testimony concerning position introduced tending support information Jose government. witnesses See United ecution Cir.1949) (3d Toner, 140, 142 they decided Febo before and Saul Rivera “right (acknowledging defendant’s Because, as he acknowl cooperate. *16 by or innocence determined guilt have his at trial objection no Milan raised edges, him”). against presented the evidence the vouching, we review alleged to the See plain error. v. Dis in United States example, contention For (3d Inc., Saada, 210, 224 172 F.3d 212 F.3d poz-O-Plastics, United States Cir.1999), prosecutor’s remark found a (3d Cir.2000). we Milan, meeting well as reiterate, with charge, first done's a wire fraud count 17.To wit- government agents who testimony a scheme to alleged carried out from that Milan by apartment of his honest services exiting the defraud Natale's Daidone nessed Beach, paid golf vacation to Palm accepting Milan, a nearby. There was parked with meet government bolstered Natale’s Florida. an Italian testimony from the owner of also agency records testimony business with travel paid him effect that Natale to the restaurant trip in paid for the showing that Daidone $1,000 cover the cost of approximately cash, investigators who wit- testimony from evening previous the at the restaurant dinner plane to board the Milan and Daidone nessed mayor. celebrating election as Milan’s Florida, employee con- testimony a hotel from arrival, and other evidence firming their the the issue of whether We do not reach doing and Daidone was demonstrate that constructive knowl- actual or prosecution had City of Camden. seeking with the business transcripts as their tapes and edge of the illegal accept charged conspiracy to Count 9 materially impair the fair- suppression did not in violation of payments from Natale trial. ness of the that Daidone func- demonstrate Travel Act. To intermediary between Natale tioned as Milan, testimony wit- counts involved 19. These tape re- government introduced alleg- government whose behalf nesses on be- cording conversation of a March 1996 edly discussing vouched. Dai- Daidone and Natale tween fluous, Department of the policy personal about a of Jus- opinions prosecutor of the give tice not to “two-for-one deals” improp- Saada, vouching a witness. See for. er it was meant to because convince the (two F.3d at 225 required criteria to find jury prosecutor somehow knew (1) vouching are: prosecutor must as- truth, telling that the witnesses were sure jury testimony gov- of a i.e., that department give would not (2) credible, ernment witness is deal in guilty pleas return for the two assurance must be based on either the unless it convinced that was there were prosecutor’s personal knowledge or other separate two offenses. See also United record). information not contained DiLoreto, (3d States v. 888 F.2d Likewise, respect to the cooperat- Cir.1989) (reversing convictions where the Natale, Rivera, ing Febo, witnesses prosecutor attempted to bolster the credi- prosecutor inquired into previous their bility of cooperating its witnesses stat- cooperation agree- convictions and their ing during closing rebuttal: “We don’t ments, specifically aspects requiring those put take liars. We don’t liars on the exchange truthfulness in leniency for a that”).20 stand. We don’t do recommendation, but never any made specific While Milan attacks and isolated plausible statement that invited a jury in- strategic prosecution pursued choices the proof ference of reliability extra-record trial, he fails to demonstrate that a government’s possession. exclusive representative government gave in- Ramos, See United States v. 27 F.3d appropriate personal assurances concern- (3d Cir.1994) (no 4n. improper vouching reliability of a witness based on where merely made reference jury. instance, facts not before the For provision” “truthfulness plea suggests Milan prosecutor’s pur- agreement). As fails to show that testimony concerning judicial suit of ap- prosecutors referred to facts not ad- proval wiretaps21 “appear- created the duced at trial personal or offered opinions very ance that the court where the trial integrity bolster the and believability of participated heard had in and ap- witnesses, their carry he does not his bur- proved investigation.” den of showing prejudice. See United evidence, Br. at 90. though But this Turcks, (3d States v. tangential considering relevance that Mi- (an Cir.1994) *17 “plain” error is if it attorney sought lan’s never “serious- challenge ly fairness, government’s the integrity affect[s] use of or wiretap public tech- niques, and, (ci- reputation judicial was nevertheless of admissible22 proceedings”) significantly, omitted). more did super- not involve tations Zehrbach, trial, 20. United 47 objection absence of an say at we must (3d Cir.1995) (en banc), 1267 overruled DiLo legitimate we can see no reason for the applied per reto because DiLoreto se rule in "right reference to here in Camden.” We However, analysis. its Zekrbach did not over point prosecution also out that if the stated to rule the result reached in DiLoreto. See id. at jury judge thought that the defen- 1254 n. 1. guilty might dant was the comment be so prejudicial require as to a new trial. Agent 21. The asked Saturno wiretaps whether "the on Natale's residential 22.The opened by intimating defense the door telephone by authorized [were] a District during opening Camden,” govern- statements that the Judge right Court here in to which willing replied, "yes.” engage ment was App. improprieties— he in at 1163. While we devils,” pact see no basis to find that had made vouching App. there was "a by question, reason of particularly this in the in order to convict Milan.

291 Specifically, government. confidence in Departure Upward, 8-Level E. 2C1.7, guideline § used to U.S.S.G. that the dis contends Lastly, Milan for the adjusted offense level calculate applied it 3-level when erred trict court crimes, is entitled Group Two combined offense to his departure upward Involving Deprivation “Fraud Intan- corruption public than to rather level the Honest of Pub- gible Right to Services of in the effect only, which had counts Officials; by to Defraud Conspiracy lic by 16 months.23 On creasing his sentence Func- with Governmental Interference affirms majority panel point, this tions,” commentary Ap- within its contains however, court; Judge Green- the district 5, which states: plication Note opinion, this of the rest of the author berg, the defen- the court finds following portion Where The would reverse. therefore, systematic of a represents part dant’s conduct was opinion, joined governmen- in pervasive corruption Becker as or Judge views of Chief function, or office that Judge Greenberg process, tal Barzilay, with Judge gov- disagreement public cause loss of confidence for his offering the reasons ernment, may be upward departure an dissenting opinion, separate in a infra. Five, Part K Chapter warranted. See with adopted, the court sentencing, At (Departures). calculations objection, grouping out Report Investigation Presentence government’s mo- granted The court (PSR) which, set methodology applying tion, upward departure adding 3-level 3D1.2,24 Mi trisected forth U.S.S.G. for a total offense level Milan’s combined ac groups distinct convictions into lan’s base of 27 as follows: nature of the offenses: cording to the Section SDl.lt fi One, unlawful involving Milan’s Group Units Group Adjusted Level for Offense concerning the loan nancial transactions 23 One: (counts 15, 16, 17); Group from Rivera Group Adjusted Offense Level for Two: Two, public crimes as a involving Milan’s Group Adjusted Level for Offense 9, 12, 13, (counts 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, official Three: Three, 14); involving Group Total Units 1-1/2 Adjusted Offense Level Greater Contracting Atlas Com burglary of staged Level Increase Offense fraud subsequent insurance pany and Departure Increase Section 2C1.7 ' 19). Offense Level (counts 18 and Total history criminal at 21-27. With upward See PSR moved for I, 70 to sentencing range was category Milan was grounds that departure on the months, the max- imposed and the corrup- pervasive systematic involved range. available within imum term which caused a loss office tion of a *18 assigned an offense group then is 3D1.2. Each court’s construc- of the district 23. Our review highest plenary. Sentencing is count with the Guidelines based on the tion of the level Swan, 275 group. 275 F.3d U.S.S.G. See United. States See offense level within (3d Cir.2002). one Finally, there is more than § if 3D 1.3. the com- provides that group, section 3D 1.4 (a) guidelines estab- 24. Section 3D 1.1 by determining level is derived bined offense determining three-step procedure for lishes a adding offense group and for each "units” that involves proper level in a case the offense group to the offense for each level increases First, counts multiple of conviction. counts highest specified group the with the level for grouped "closely related” must that are level. offense provisions of section with the accordance 292

Milan maintains that the district court Part A of Chapter Five that corresponds applied departure only should have the to the offense history level and criminal adjusted level, Group (h) Two offense the determined; category previously deter group encompassing public Milan’s acts of mine from B through Chapter Parts ofG corruption departure to which the ap- Five sentencing requirements op and plicable, before applying multiple- probation, tions related to imprisonment, grouping adjustments found in U.S.S.G. conditions, fines, supervision and restitu § 3D1.4. Applying public the 3-level (i) cor- tion; and, to Parts H K “[r]efer and ruption departure only to calculate the Five, Chapter Specific Offender Charac adjusted offense level of the cor- and Departures, teristics to any and ruption charges yielded would have policy commentary statements or in the following results: guidelines might warrant consider 3Dl.Jp Section ation in imposing sentence.” U.S.S.G. Units 1B1.1(a)-(i). § We have held that these Adjusted Group Offense Level for One: steps 23 applied are to be sequentially by the Adjusted Group Offense Level for sentencing court. See United States v. (with Two three-level section Johnson, (3d Cir.1998) 684 departure applied): 2C1.7 21 Adjusted Group Offense Level for (“The court reads these instructions as Three: providing sequence steps for Total Units Adjusted Greater Offense Level to follow in the order in which they ap Increase in Offense Level pear.”); McDowell, United States v. Total Offense Level (3d Cir.1989) (construing I, history With a criminal category § 1B1.1 as reflecting “[t]he intent of the sentencing range proposed under Milan’s Sentencing Commission ... methodology would have been 57 to 71 formula; Guidelines be applied like a months. court ... should go guideline down each § Under 1B1.1 steps U.S.S.G. order, calculations”). making necessary (a) calculating a sentence are as follows: As we will explain infra, we think that the applicable guideline determine section applicable structure here. (b) Two; for each offense from Chapter Milan contends that determine the district court base offense level and apply § erred in any applying the appropriate “specific Application 2C1.7 offense charac (after teristics, (i) Note 5 references, upward departure step cross special and in (d) step grouping) step structions” contained in the rather than at particular (b) (before (c) Two; guideline grouping). in Chapter apply asserts adjustments Note 5 appropriate departure as is specific related to vic 2C1.7 tim, role, justice type not the general, obstruction of of more “unguid- from A, B, (d) Three; (i) Parts ed” Chapter Chapter and C of 5 departure to which step (a) (c) repeat steps through refers. each count This conclusion supported, ac- adjust Milan, accordingly cording offense level if by the language of Note conviction; (e) multiple there are counts of narrowly written and directed apply adjustment appropriate toward the offense level determination for acceptance defendant’s of responsibili §a 2C1.7 reason, offense. For the same (f) ty Three; from Part E Chapter Milan submits that applying the Note 5 *19 determine the history defendant’s criminal departure adjusted base lev- offense category specified as in APart of Chapter el grouping before is more consistent with Four; (g) guideline determine the in range the “punishment fits the crime” logic of 5 is a “cross argument that Note any upward depar- in that the Guidelines the reference,” reasonably do so nor could he to ought corruption governmental ture § that- 2C1.7 does not light of Ms of the fact portion tied to that specifically provisions— a four crimes as include Note 5 within its to his relates that sentence § des 2C1.7(c)(1)-(4) expressly U.S.S.G. official. — references,” see United ignated as “cross by arguing counters government (10th Gay, v. States in- methodology is proposed Milan’s that Cir.2001) (concluding the Guidelines’ that Spe- text. the with Guidelines’ consistent provision, offender U.S.S.G. career the that contends cifically, government the part 4B1.1, § is not a reference” “cross a “specific is neither departure Note such), nor does it. not labeled as is because characteristic,” refer- a “cross offense sentencing the court to Note 5 instruct instruction,” and ence,” “special nor a a re which is any guideline, other apply ambit of the not fall does therefore within the definition under Guidelines’ quirement (b). Rather, the step § 1B1.1 See U.S.S.G. a “cross reference.” of a reference to contends, simply Note 5 is a reference” (defining § 1B1.5 “cross the that departure Chapter of type the another offense apply instruction to “an consider may properly sentencing court guideline”). ad- (i), multiple-groups only after the step Fur- performed. have been

justments 5 does it clear that Note also think We thermore, argues “special a argues, as qualify, as Milan not con- is more methodology court’s district a instruction,” is used as phrase a principles Guidelines general sistent The Guide- art in the Guidelines. of term judge to assess in that it allows “special label instruc- care to take lines after in Note factors listed many subsec- expressly as such tions” informa- all of has considered judge See, e.g., U.S.S.G. Chapter Two. of tions whether determining relevant tion 2B4.1(c). 2B1.1(d), 2A3.1(d), Note §§ the de- such as appropriate, is departure however, “special labeled expressly is not and whether history fendant’s criminal of statu- apply the rules We instruction.” responsibility accepted has defendant interpreting when tory construction his acts. Robinson, Guidelines, see United position government’s hold that the We (9th Cir.1996), and un- correct, court did district is statutory the well-established canon der sen- 5 to Milan’s applying Note not err est exclu- expressio unius construction con- reach this grouping. tence after We alterius, failure to ex- the Guidelines’ sio find the text because we primarily clusion “special Note 5 as designate pressly clear on this Sentencing Guidelines conspicuous- is when label instruction” plain think it particular, we point. within provisions many ly affixed by Application warranted departure sign chapter is a clear same “specific amount does not Note 5 intend did not of the Guidelines authors reference,” characteristic,” “cross offense instruc- operate “special 5 to as a Note instruction,” only three “special Indeed, promi- provisions all of tion.” to which sentencing adjustments types ap- “special instructions” nently labeled as (b) explicitly refers. step Guideline, each the text of pear within within which appears Note Note 5 is not a unlike Milan has conceded that if Milan Even commentary to 2C1.7. characteristic,” Mi- see “specific offense apply it more “intuitive” not raised he has correct Br. at Reply lan’s *20 that, departure, system- form, the Note 5 which is for while different in are similar in function to governmental very atic these three pervasive corruption specifically or contrast, defined Guideline terms. sub- causing of confidence in govern- loss (i) 1B1.1, § section of which step is the at ment, only to Milan’s offenses that relate which the district court applied Note official, a public to his crimes as where the does contain a provision “catch-all” that clear, of appears text the Guidelines itas “any policy refers to statements or here, does may whatever “intuition” we commentary in guidelines might yield have language must to the of the warrant consideration in imposing sen- Guidelines. Moreover, tence.” Milan’s contention that Milan argues that even if Note 5 is not Note 5 equivalent is functional of a expressly designated as a “special instruc- “special instruction” is simply restate- tion,” it equivalent is the functional there- ment of claim his ought Note 5 to be of, ought and therefore to be treated as (b) applied (i); at step rather than at step (b) such for the purposes step of of words, in other Note 5 only is a functional § 1B1.1. disagree. As We mentioned equivalent of a “special instruction” if Mi- above, lBl.l(b) § the text of only refers lan is correct that Note 5 should be applied characteristics, “specific offense cross ref- adjustment. before the grouping For the erences, instructions,” and special and above, reasons stated reject we this asser- any does not include sort “catch-all” tion on the basis of the Guidelines’ clear provision for commentary subsections or text.25 support position,

25. As 1B1.1(b). for his Milan cites to purposes § instructions” for (11th Nguyen, United States v. 255 F.3d 1335 Op. Dis. at reasoning Nguyen 45. The Cir.2001), in which the United States court, however, Court of only implicit was and never Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was called explicit, as the court made no effort to recon- upon sentencing to determine when the cile its plain language conclusion with the ought applied Application to have Note 1 of Indeed, (b). step Nguyen court addressed 2A1.1, commentary § to U.S.S.G. only paragraph, issue in one see provides departure may be warranted 1344-45, at summary offered in a murder conviction where the defendant sentencing conclusion that the court "did not intentionally did knowingly not cause departing err in first downward from the base (such death "felony- as in the case of so-called offense level for applying murder and then murder”): (b) during step § IB 1.1 se- grouping ...." rules Id. at 1345. Fur- quence, or after the determination of the com- thermore, Nguyen arguably distinguishable is level, (i). step bined Interestingly, offense application because it addressed an note from departure because the Nguyen at issue in entirely guideline different section than upward downward depar- rather than an presented Although here. applica- ture, parties Nguyen the roles of the were Nguyen, § tion note Ap- considered in 2A1.1 government argued reversed: applying plication Note application similar to the offense, departure only particular to the note at issue expressly here in that it is not argued and the applying defendant instruction,” "special labeled aas it is differ- departure to the combined offense level. The explicit ent in that it makes no citation to agreed Eleventh Circuit with the Five, "Chapter (Departures)," Section K proper concluded that it was § Application does 2C1.7 may Note 5. It sentencing well apply departure only court to be, therefore, (b) argument that a better can be step murder offense at before deter- mining Application § made that 2A1.1 the combined Note is a offense level. equivalent "special functional instruc- Nguyen does not dissuade us from conclud- put tion” than can forth on behalf of argument that Milan's is incorrect. As out, § Application 2C1.7 points Note 5. Nguyen dissent the court in "implicitly” Nguyen concluded holding today illustrates how our 2A1.1 Note departure comparable "specific always government's not offense be to the advan- characteristics, references, Rather, special cross tage. as counsel for the *21 a whether determines the court depar- Note 5 before Moreover, the applying an provides range that within Sentencing sentence logical. is grouping after ture for defendant punishment the appropriate the Guide- prescribed range the within In necessary. departure a is norm, whether and or the to be supposed lines is sense, “flag” to U.S.S.G., simply Note 5 serves see this exception, the departures judge aggravating an sentencing the for A, Comment One, Intro. Chapter Part §a likely to occur in 2C1.7 circumstance only when 4(b) permitted (departures the more at for later consideration or offense aggravating “an. court finds sentencing Then, stage.26 discretionary departure kind, a or to of a mitigating circumstance Note sentencing court considers when the consid- taken into adequately not degree, (i), propri may it determine step in 5 at Sentencing Commission by the eration in of full informa light ety departure of a re- that should formulating the guidelines factors relevant regarding tion other that de- from different in a sentence sult sentence, 3553(b))). such as the defen § defendant’s 18 U.S.C. (quoting scribed” conduct, character. background, calculate dant’s to first it is sensible Therefore 1B1.1(e)-(h).27 contrast, § range See U.S.S.G. sentencing correct Guidelines however, (i). the dissent step opinion, In our in which argument, in cases at oral conceded the two distinction between taken one has departure than rather a downward is it to which issue, types of conduct provisions be it would that is at upward departure —the erroneously from inferred they apply advantage have to government’s —and another, distinc- unrelated distinction this before from the sentence departure deducted Trans, depar- apply each point which to tion—the at See afterwards. rather than grouping justification this infer- ("This for always ture. We see no 44-45 isn't Argument at Oral ence; § defendant, 5 and 5K2.7 fact that Note the mere may be that if it to hurt going not types does of conduct going apply to different there’s where get a situation you they apply at should also us departure, indicate to that the defendant a downward sequence. § applied stages IB 1.1 departure after having the different off better [S]o, procedure this isn’t grouping .... ”). .... always helps 5K2.0, § that entitled language of U.S.S.G. The 27. Attorney's for the Statement),” Office United The (Policy Departure “Grounds therefore, appar- has Jersey, of New District phenomenon akin to contemplate a seems it would decision that ently made tactical notes: presented itself here. It has what applied after departures be these that prefer specific of- may be listed as a factor [A] appears to be a decision grouping, guideline but under one characteristic fense office, strategy of its sister with the conflict it because guidelines. Simply all not under Attorney’s for the Office United States may there not mean that does was not listed Nguyen. Georgia, in District of Northern factor that when circumstances not be ex- sentencing. For would be relevant depar- that the Note 26. The dissent observes listed weapon been has ample, the use corruption pervasive systematic or ture under characteristic specific offense aas may cause loss guide- but not under many guidelines, government is from distinct confidence Therefore, weapon is relevant if a lines. govern- "disruption of departure for § 5K2.7 of these oth- sentencing one under factor to Op. 300 n. See Dis. function.” mental depart the court guidelines, However, er how this we fail to agree. see We reason. question of any light on the sheds distinction added.) excerpt con- (Emphasis This sequence to § IB 1.1 U.S.S.G. when re- a factor that when firms our conclusion departure. dissent's apply the Note instruction,” is not but "special sembles we know since reasoning to be that seems such, Guidelines specifically labeled applied at departure to be § 5K2.7 by the sentenc- to be considered for it intend (i), from Note 5 is different step fact step stage, which is departure at the it conduct to which of the § 5K2.7 in terms (i) sequence. IB 1.1 apply at not Note 5 does applies indicates scenario, under Milan’s the sentencing that, ognize as the dissent correctly ob- *22 be to departure court would forced make a serves, neither Johnson nor McDowell it any decision before had made of these considered whether all of the steps of which would findings, have the effect of § ought 1B1.1 to be applied sequential placing, as the colorfully ob- order, we see no logical why reason serves, departure “the cart before the rule in each endorsed decision should not Range Guidelines horse.” (i). extent to subsection The dissent believes that if even we are Moreover, we think that the dissent is correct that a departure Note 5 must be incorrect in its view as why the authors applied only (i), step “it during does not to,” Guidelines use the term “refer logically follow court apply (i). rather than “apply,” step The de- the departure final only offense (i) partures in step referenced are discre Rather, level.” Op. Dis. at 299. the dis- tionary in nature. See United v. submits, (i) sent step because directs a Kikumura, (3d 918 F.2d Cir. to,” sentencing court to “refer rather 1990) (noting that district courts have a than “apply” the Chapter departures, Five “substantial amount of discretion” in decid “ the sentencing court is free to ‘refer’ to a ing whether depart). It is for this (i) provision of guidelines step at but (and, reason discern, as far as we can ‘apply’ departure nevertheless then at alone) reason that the Guidelines instruct an earlier step of its calculations.” Id. We the district court merely to “refer to” the find the dissent’s reading supposed of a departure provisions. “Refer” is defined distinction between “refer” and “apply” to by attention,” Webster’s as “to direct Web- be inconsistent our with case law inter- ster’s Third New Int’l Dict.1907 B. (Phillip § preting 1B1.1 imposing a sequential ed., 1966), Gove precisely this is what (a) order for the of application steps (i) step intends to do—direct the attention (i). through Johnson, See United States v. of the sentencing judge to the appropriate (8d Cir.1998) (“The 155 F.3d court factors to be considered in deciding wheth- reads these instructions as providing a se- er depart. to,” therefore, “Refer is a quence steps of for the court to follow in more appropriate term for the inherently (second the order in they appear.”) which discretionary exercise of departing than added); emphasis United States McDo- “apply,” which is by defined Webster’s as well, (3d Cir.1989) (con- effect,” put “to into id. at and con- § struing 1B1.1 as reflecting “[t]he intent rote, mechanical, notes a non-discretionary of the Sentencing ... Commission execution of duties. We believe that it is Guidelines applied formula; be like a reason, for this and not for the reasons go should guideline each down dissent, (i) offered that step uses order, calculations”) making the necessary “refer to” instead “apply.” added). (emphasis Under dissent’s For proposed (i) reasons, the foregoing reading, step we departures hold that could applied (b), the district court was retroactively step at correct to apply the there- by creating an departure (i), Note 5 require- end-around to our at step after the ment that steps § counts, 1B1.1 be applied grouping of the and we will there- in strict sequential order. While we fore ree- affirm the sentence.28 that, Finally, 28. we dissenting (i), note as our step than the court still could have arrived colleague Judge Greenberg pointed out dur- at the same final willing sentence had it been colloquy counsel at seven, three, depart than rather levels argument, oral sentencing had the court ap- pervasive Milan's systematic or corruption. plied (b) the Note departure step rather commen- Note 5 of the Application basis III. CONCLUSION 2C1.7,1 guideline tary to U.S.S.G. reasoning set with our accordance level adjusted offense to calculate used judgment above, affirm we will forth crimes, states: Group Two June entered and sentence conviction the defen- court finds Where systematic part conduct dant’s GREENBERG, Judge, Circuit governmen- corruption of pervasive *23 dissenting. may function, or office process, tal argument Milan’s rejects majority The gov- in confidence public a loss cause ap- when it erred court district may be ernment, departure upward an his departure upward a 3-level plied Five, K Part Chapter warranted. See rather than to level offense combined (Departures). however, I, only. counts corruption public point. on this dissent granted The court original). in (emphasis indicates, sentencing at majority theAs de- motion, upward adding 3-level into Milan’s convictions court trisected level offense combined to Milan’s parture One, Mi- involving Group groups: distinct of 27 as follows: a total base for con- transactions unlawful financial lan’s Section 3D1.4 (counts 15, Rivera loan from cerning the Units Two, involving Milan’s 17); Group and Group Adjusted for Offense Level 23 One: (counts 3, 4, 7, official as a crimes Group for Adjusted Level Offense Three, 14); Group and 9, 12, 18 Two: of Atlas burglary staged involving the Group Adjusted Offense Level Three: in- subsequent Company Contracting Units 1-1/2 Total 19). (counts fraud surance Adjusted Level Offense Greater Level in Increase Offense upward an moved The Departure Increase 2C1.7 Section Milan was grounds on the departure Offense Level Total cor- pervasive systematic in a involved offense level 21-27. The total at PSR See caused which public office ruption history cat- with a criminal combined on the when in of confidence loss argument, it while explained at oral cal- counsel hypothetical following represents the The sentencing possible for the have been would culation: under Mi- impose the same sentence court to 3D1A Units Section method, would doing court so the in lan’s Group One: Adjusted Level for Offense upward- propriety of "justify” the N> U> have had Group Two Level for Adjusted Offense merely than departing levels rather ly seven (with departure 2C1.7 section seven-level three, been difficult may which have yi N applied): Trans, of Oral See sentencing to do. court Group Three: Adjusted Level for Offense hi M Moreover, ex- as we at Argument 61-62. nj Units Total lO (i) above, step at rather by departing plained Adjusted Level Offense Greater N) (b), court has the sentencing step at than in Offense Level Increase t-J already all of having Level Offense considered Total benefit N) -J (c) through in subsections factors listed holding, there- import of our practical sen- (h) to the defendant’s that are relevant fore, possible for it is in that be limited tence. same final sentencing to reach court govern- or the Milan’s under either sentence Deprivation of Involving However, "Fraud Entitled methodologies. proposed ment’s Services Right to the Honest Intangible doubt, is, importance our without there Officials; Conspiracy Defraud Public the district it is that deciding by route which Functions.” Governmental Interference As defense final sentence. arrives its I, egory yielded a sentencing range of 70 offense level accordingly if there are multi to 87 months. The court then imposed ple (e) conviction; counts of apply the ad 87-month sentence. justment as appropriate for the defen acceptance dant’s of responsibility from majority indicates, As the main- (f) E Three; Part of Chapter determine tains that the district court should have the defendant’s criminal history category applied departure only to the Group specified Four; Part A of Chapter (g) adjusted level, Two offense the group en- determine guideline range in Part A of compassing Milan’s of public acts corrup- Chapter Five that corresponds to the of tion to the departure was applicable, fense level and history criminal category before applying multiple-grouping ad- (h) previously determined; determine from justments found U.S.S.G. Ap- 3D1.4. Parts B through ofG Chapter Five the plying the 3-level public corruption depar- sentencing requirements and options relat ture to calculate adjusted offense *24 probation, ed to imprisonment, supervision level of the public corruption charges conditions, fines, restitution; (i) and and, would yielded have the following results: “[rjefer to Parts H and K of Chapter Five, Section SDl.Jt Specific Offender Characteristics and De Units partures, any and to other policy state Adjusted Group Offense Level for One: 23 ments or commentary in guidelines the Adjusted Group Offense Level for might that warrant consideration in impos (with Two three-level section 1B1.1(a)-(i). § sentence.” U.S.S.G. departure applied): 2C1.7 21 Adjusted Group Offense Level for government The interprets section 1B1 Three: 11 Total Units as requiring a district court to apply any 2 Adjusted Greater Offense Level 23 departures that do not qualify explicitly as Increase in Offense Level “specific characteristics, offense cross ref- Total Level Offense erences, and special (which instructions” The total offense level of 25 combined are (b) considered during step in calculat- with a criminal history category I would ing level) the offense during the last step yielded have a sentencing range of 57 to 71 in process the and only thus after grouping months. only and combined, to the total offense Thus, goes level. the argument, inasmuch I believe approach Milan’s is cor- as 2C1.7, the section Application Note 5 rect and thus I dissent on point. this As departure for systematic or pervasive cor- the majority forth, sets under U.S.S.G. ruption part the of “commentary in the 1B1.1, § sequence the for calculating a guidelines” but not a “specific offense (a) sentence is as follows: determine the characteristic,” reference,” “cross or “spe- applicable guideline section for each of- cial instruction,” the court apply it (b) Two; fense Chapter from determine only after completing the grouping calcula- the base offense level apply and any ap- (i) during tions step listed above. The propriate “specific characteristics, offense majority accepts the government’s ap- references, cross and special instructions” proach. particular contained the guideline in (c) Chapter Two; adjustments apply believe, I however, the govern- appropriate victim, role, related to and position ment’s is off the begin mark. To justice obstruction of A, B, with, from Parts the text the guidelines of is more (d) C of Three; Chapter (a) repeat steps ambiguous than posits. (c) through for each and adjust count the Accepting arguendo government’s ini- any “fajpply” to a court instruct clearly 2C1.7, Applica a section premise tial of ad- role, justice victim, obstruction like applied be must departure tion Note (c) calculating after step during justments only during departure KPart Chapter “fajpply” to level4 and offense the base under appear (i) not it does step because adjust- responsibility acceptance any “spe headings 2C1.7 section any of the (e) after applying during step ment refer “cross cific offense characteristic/’ total of- to determine grouping rules instruction,”2 not does it ence,” “special or v. McDo- United fense level.5 See may apply court logically follow Cir.1989) (3rd well, offense to final only departure for ac- adjustment (“With respect 1B1.1(i) a court directs U.S.S.G. level. the Guidelines responsibility, ceptance Part K Chapter simply “refer”3 should be adjustment specify policy state any departures combined”) are counts made after before commentaries guideline ments added). the court can Plainly However, (emphasis sentence. a final on settling guidelines provision “refer” or at rigidly how dictate do not guidelines “apply” the (i) then but step nevertheless departure process in the point what calcula- step of its earlier at an contrast, departure In marked applied. tions.6 very Instructions Application 1B1.1 section McDowell, 1998); (3d Cir. the fact emphasizes also

2. Thus, makes neces *25 at 292-93. expressly references 5 Application Note that step in order each But, sary under calculations Five, (Departures).” Part K "Chapter determining the base guideline, (choosing the that things: either one of two mean this could etc.) level, adjustments, until applying offense type of departure ais Note 5 Application (i). step At this step, arriving at final 5, that it departure or K Chapter Part to”) (i.e. "refer[s] considers point, the court general purposes of the for analogous to one and De Characteristics Specific Offender depar all applicable to policy considerations any other as well as Chapter Five partures of Reyes, 239 F.3d v. States See United tures. commentary in the policy statements The Blue Cir.2001); see also (5th 746 Once imposing sentence. guidelines before (Colum System Citation A book: of Uniform consultation, literally it that court makes ed., eds., The et al. 17th Ass’n Review bia Law sequential- (i) keeping with our step fulfills 2000) at 22-23 Review Ass'n Law Harvard of canons as fundamental as well rule order the cited (the that signal "see” demonstrates See, e.g., United interpretation. statutory proposition,” "clearly supports authority 1993) (3d Cir. Wong, 3 F.3d step the au between drawing an "inferential plain and statutory language, ("As with supports.” proposition it thority cited and Sentencing language of unambiguous However, that "the reflect does not "see” for their recourse the best affords Guidelines cited by the directly stated ... proposition ap Under interpretation.”). proper following merely from authority” than rather by the action taken any course of proach, it). by cabined is not that consultation after court IB 1.1. methodology section sequential Emphasis added. in con doubt that no Certainly can be there 2C1.7, Application a section cluding that added). 1B1.1(c) (emphasis infra § 4. U.S.S.G. step during applied is to be departure Note “specific (b) equivalent added). as the functional 1B1.1(e) (emphasis 5. U.S.S.G. reference,” characteristic,” “cross offense instruction,” conflict not in I am “special accept purposes for I the extent 6. To Moreover, plausi one precedents. our with sentencing must con- argument do precedents not argue that our bly can 2C1.7, Note de- Application a section sider entirety of proposition (i), stand I am consistent step parture during Application Instruc Sentencing Guideline (a) through steps holding that precedents our in which in the order applied are tions sequential order. (i) strict applied in a are actually stated Johnson, Johnson they appear. See, e.g., States v. United Furthermore, though it does appear not I point make is consistent with the under the heading “specific offense charac- Sentencing Commission’s contemplation of teristic,” reference,” “cross or “special in- two distinct types of departures: those in struction,” a departure systematic or which guidelines “the provide specific guid- pervasive corruption of a government ance departure by analogy byor function is within public identified cor- numerical or non-numerical suggestions” ruption guideline itself, 2C1.7, section not and those catch-all departures that “re- within Chapter Part K. Listed as an main unguided,” resting upon either “Application Note” the commentary, “grounds it referred Five, to Chapter Part expresses the position of the Sentencing K (Departures) or on grounds not men- court, Commission in aggravating tioned guidelines.” in the U.S.S.G., ch. circumstances such present as those 4(b). here, A, pt. So-called “guided depar- (ie. adjusting consider the sanctions guideline tures” —where a or related com- level) increasing the offense specifically for mentary suggests that a departure may be corruption-related offense conduct that warranted under certain specific circum- falls within the scope Section 2C. That stances considered the Sentencing say, is to placement cor- Commission8—“are more akin adjust- ruption departure within the Chapter ments, such as in Chapters those Two and public corruption guideline Three, itself rather which judges use to calculate the than within the generic rubric of Chapter applicable range, Guidelines rather than a strongly suggests that the departure Commission from the range.” Guidelines intended for departure to be consid- Michael al., S. Gelacak et Departures Un- ered at the moment the court consults the der the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: section guideline 2C1.7 to calculate the of- An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analy- fense pertinent level for sis, crimes.7 A con- 81 Minn. L.Rev. (1996); see *26 trary reading, hand, on the other con- also Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, founds a uniform, systematic reading of An Examination Emerging Departure of guidelines by virtue of a consequently Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentenc- scattershot application, with portions some ing Guidelines, 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. a given of guideline in applied (1991) (A computing “guided” departure involves the offense level and applied others at “instances which a guideline or related some stage later process. commentary suggests that under partieu- (a)-(g) provide subsections rigid se- language of section 5K2.7 would seem to quence steps. of See 155 683-84. encompass departure Appli- formulated in Likewise, McDowell adjust- held that an Yet, cation Note 5 of section 2C1.7. as even acceptance ment for responsibility of under argument conceded at oral (e) step must applied be after the combined and as the majority acknowledges, the two offense level has been calculated in departures order distinct, are indeed a circum- pursuant (a)-(d). steps to See 888 F.2d at stance which I find indicative of the drafters' 292-93. simply The cases do not address the understanding that the particularized more question of whether the 2C1.7, serial method ap- of section Application departure Note 5 is plying (i). IB section 1.1 step extends to to be applied only in tire context precise of the guideline in which the Sentencing Commis- fact, 7. In Chapter already provides for an deliberately sion it. situated analogous departure in circumstances where a “defendant’s significant See, conduct results in a 2B1.1, e.g., § U.S.S.G. Application Note disruption of governmental 15; 2D1.1, function.” § Application 14; U.S.S.G. Note §

U.S.S.G. 5K2.7. glance, At first 2G1.2, sweep- § U.S.S.G. Application Note 12. the Eleventh for Appeals of the Court warrant- departure lar circumstances issue with re- a similar confronted Circuit ed”). departure a downward applying to spect section Moreover, application 2A1.1, Application Note under U.S.S.G. after departure 5Note 2C1.7, Application may be departure that a provides lends analysis the grouping of completion where conviction in a murder warranted case, In this outcomes. untenable to itself intentionally or did not the defendant district in the instance, it resulted one of Nguyen, cause death. knowingly punishment enhancing Milan’s court’s multiple was convicted the defendants unre- substantively temporally crimes including conspiracy, RICO in a counts It office. public his abuse to lated sentencing the district At felony murder. whereby, anomaly sentencing created level under the offense court calculated charges distinct try to by opting simply 6 levels 2A1.1, downward departed section able to was together,9 1, and then Note Application to pursuant de- corruption a 8-level bootstrap to determine rules grouping applied money laun- unconnected parture Nguyen, See level. offense the combined guideline drove charge which dering at 1344-45. 23of (an level offense adjusted range counts). advanced the the defendant appeal, corruption On to 18 opposed case, namely in this position en- government’s in essence court differently, the Put have first should convictions district laundering money hanced applied and then range was the offenses One), guideline grouped (Group whose the combined Chapter departure under the downward separately calculated appeals disa offense-specif- court of S, level. the basis offense on Section 2A1.1, Ap sec- section an unrelated holding contained greed, departure ic con concerning public departure Note guidelines plication of the tion (b) step contra- methodology in the aforementioned This sidered corruption. id. grouping See determination. design level express base offense vened an words, the for- the court im significance “limit In other rules to at 1345. 3, pt. ch. identi U.S.S.G. a departure charging decision.” concluded mal plicitly See also an offense Commentary. commentary D, Introductory fied 4(a) (“the A, Commis- of “specific pt. ch. comparable U.S.S.G. guideline references, treatment for the characteristics, rules its cross written sion has fense *27 eye to- purposes convictions of multicount instructions” special and that unfair treatment eliminating 1B1.1(b), properly and thus ward U.S.S.G. manipulation”); from count of flow the base might determining considered (the Sentencing A, pt. ch. While grouping. U.S.S.G. before level fense uniformity horizontal promote not does Nguyen Guidelines indicates majority similarly by requiring sentencing that Milan’s concluding it from dissuade similar- are sentenced defendants situated and notes incorrect argument ly). issue addressed court Nguyen rul Nguyen still the paragraph, single comparison closest case In the from escape I no and see clear ing is Ngu- v. aware, United am which I we result reaching our Cir.2001), (11th conclusion 1335, 1345 yen, grouping rules. under the level course, trial in itself the consolidated Of 9. offense combined in an increased resulted are creating Barclays conflict between two cir- Investors, Global N.A.; Green course, cuits. Of way as majority points Partners, L.P.; Greentree Part out, the conflict apparent ners, reflects an L.P.; rift Third-Party Plaintiffs between the United States Attorneys’ of- v. fices New Jersey and the Northern Cooper; David B. Edison; Julian I. Pe District Georgia.10 Edison; ter A. Evans; Jane Michael Freund; H. Michner; Karl W. Alan D.

Overall, I am satisfied that a section Miller; Newman; Andrew E. Alan A. 2C1.7, Application 5 departure Note Sachs; Craig Schunck; D. Martin systematic or pervasive corruption of a Sneider; David Corriveau; O. James government function, like “specific offense Corley; W. Henrion; Walter S. Mark characteristics, references, cross spe- Levy; H. Vittert; Mark B. Dave & instructions,” cial adjust be applied to Busters, Third-Party Inc. Defendants only the base level of specific, offense corruption-related offenses to which it ap- Barclays Investors, Global N.A. Green Thus, plies. I believe that the district way L.P., Partners, and Greentree applied erred when it the 3-level Partners, L.P., individually and in departure to a final combined offense level capacity their representatives class after applying the grouping methodology of all members of the defendant class to multiple disparate counts. Conse- certified in action, third-par quently, I dissent point. on this ty plaintiffs, Appellants.

No. 01-1864. United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Argued: July 2002. Filed: Sept.

EBS LITIGATION LLC

BARCLAYS GLOBAL INVESTORS,

N.A.; Greenway Partners, L.P.; Partners, L.P.;

Greentree Wilshire Incorporated;

Associates N.A. Mellon

Bank; IBM Trust; Retirement Fund Baebler;

Drew Laura Baebler doubt, however, I do not sophisticated “heads, wins, rule is tails the defense attorneys reading opinions here defendant loses." Nguyen will conclude that actual

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Milton Milan
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Sep 3, 2002
Citation: 304 F.3d 273
Docket Number: 01-2603
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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