MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 26, 2013, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against
Warmington pled guilty to Count One on February 10, 2014, and awaits sentencing. Miller filed several pretrial motions.
The court held a motion hearing on July 28, 2014. As to certain motions or portions of them, the defense submitted on its filings. Testimony was presented with respect to the arrest of the defendant on June 24, 2013, the search of the rental car that defendant was operating at the time of his arrest, as well as statements allegedly made by Miller after his arrest. Due to the filings by defense counsel on the eve of the motions hearing, the court allowed the government to submit a post-hearing supplemental response, and to call additional witnesses at a second hearing, to be held on October 3, 2014. Moreover, the government has not yet had an opportunity to
1. Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained by Electronic Surveillance and Interception (ECF 74, ECF 95-2).
On May 6, 2013, Joseph Cassilly, State’s Attorney for Harford County, Maryland, submitted an ex-parte application for a wiretap order, supported by a 48-page affidavit executed by Detectives Aaron Penman and Thomas Gregory of the Har-ford County Sheriffs Office and Maryland State Police Detective Neil Miranda. See “Wiretap Affidavit,” ECF 78-3. On the same date, the Honorable Angela Eaves, Associate Judge of the Circuit Court for Harford County, signed an ex parte order authorizing interception of cellular telephone number (443) 545-4592 “and any telephone lines utilized” by Miller. Order of May 6, 2013, ECF 78-4. On June 4, 2013 and June 5, 2013, Judge Eaves signed ex parte orders related to additional telephones utilized by defendant.
In ECF 74, Miller contends that the wiretаp orders issued by Judge Eaves violated 18 U.S.C. § 2516, § 2518(l)(c), § 2518(5), and §§ 2518(3)(a) and (b). ECF 74 at 4, 6, 9, 10. Therefore, he contends that he is entitled to suppression under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). Id. at 11. Moreover, Miller contends that the wiretap orders constituted general warrants, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In ECF 95-2, defendant relies on C.J. § 10-408(c)(3) for the contention that Judge Eaves was only permitted to authorize the interception of electronic communications so long as the communications were “ ‘received or sent by a communication device anywhere within the State so as to permit the interception of the communications regardless of whether the communication device is physically located within the jurisdiction of the court in which the application was filed at the time of the interception ....’” Id. at 1-2 (quoting C.J. § 10 — 408(c)(3)) (emphasis added by defendant). Miller asserts that the Harford County Task Force unlawfully intercepted calls bеtween defendant and Heberto Ortiz-Gutierrez, who lived in Pennsylvania, while the two were in Pennsylvania. But, Miller maintains that only those communications occurring within the State of Maryland could be lawfully seized under Judge Eaves’s Order.
I will address each of Miller’s contentions in turn.
C.J. § 10-408(c) permits a Maryland judge to enter an ex parte order authorizing the interception of “wire, oral, or electronic communications ... sent by a communication device anywhere within the State.” The Maryland Court of Appeals has construed portions of the Maryland statute to be in pan materia with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
As noted, Miller advances several arguments challenging the legality of the wiretap. He contends that the ex parte orders were based on affidavits that lacked probable cause; that the monitoring agents failed to prоperly minimize calls; that the investigators failed to exhaust other less intrusive investigative procedures; that the wiretap orders constituted general warrants; and that the Harford County Task Force unlawfully intercepted calls between defendant and Mr. Gutierrez when both were in Pennsylvania, and thus the interception was outside the jurisdiction of the State of Maryland. See ECF 74; 95-2.
Under Maryland law, before authorizing interception of wire or electronic communications, a Maryland circuit court judge must find the following, in accordance with C.J. § 10-408(c), which states, in part:
(c) Issuance of order. — Upon the application the judge may enter an ex parte order ... authorizing interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction permitted ... if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that:
(i) There is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit а particular offense enumerated in [C.J.] § 10-406 of this subtitle;
(ii) There is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through the interception;
(iii) Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; and
(iv) There is probable cause for belief:
1. That the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of the offense
These Maryland statutory requirements are consistent with those articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). Accordingly, I look to federal cases for guidance.
In United States v. Clerkley,
In analyzing a given case, the federal courts have considered three principal factors: (1) the nature and scope of the alleged criminal enterprise; (2) the government’s reasonable expectation as to the content of, and parties to, the conversations; and (3) the degree of judicial supervision while the wiretap order is being executed.
In my view, and as discussed, infra, these factors weigh in favor of the government.
The standard of probable cause for the issuance of a wiretap order is akin to the probable cause standard that governs an ordinary search warrant. See United States v. Biaggi,
The Wiretap Affidavit contains detailed information pertaining to the involvement of Lyndon Miller in narcotics distribution. ECF 78-3. It describes information pertaining to defendant’s drug trafficking “from three separate proven reliable confidential informants and two confidential sources.” ECF 78-3 at 11. The affiants also recount controlled drug purchases made by an informant from Miller. Id. at 10. A drug exchange is described in detail on page 16. And, beginning on page 16, and continuing through page 18, the affi-ants describe defendant’s “long history of renting vehicles,” id. at 17, and aver that drug dealers “commonly use rental cars to distribute drugs,” for the reasons explained in the affidavit. Id.
The Wiretap Affidavit contains other substantial information, such as an investigation of defendant’s financial status. The investigation revealed no reported Maryland wage history for Miller, suggesting that he had an illegitimate source of income. ECF 78-3 at 39. In addition, the affidavit identified a'variety of telephone numbers linked to Miller.
Generally, the burden is on defendant to show illegality in connection with the issuance of the wiretap order. United States v. Matlock,
In my view, the Wiretap Affidavit articulated ample grounds to support the finding of probable cause made by Judge Eaves, the issuing judge, to the effect that Miller was involved in the trafficking of controlled substances, had used and would continue to use the targeted telephones in furtherance of those crimes, and that evidence of those crimes would be obtained if communications were intercepted.
Defendant also contends that investigators failed to comply with the minimization requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). ' Title 18, § 2518(5) states, in part:
Every order and extension thereof ... shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon the attainment of the authorized objective ....
The Order of May 6, 2013 issued by Judge Eaves expressly provided that monitoring of conversations was to terminate if it was determined that the conversations were unrelated to communications subject to interception under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 as well as C.J. §§ 10-401 through 10-414. ECF 78-4 at 7. In addition, Judge Eaves incorporated by reference “Minimization Guidelines” approved by the State court. Those guidelines are contained at ECF 78-5, and provided that, for the first three days, all calls intercepted
To be sure, unnecessary intrusions are to be avoided to the extent possible. In determining whether the minimization requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) has been met, the court applies a standard of reasonableness on a case-by-case basis. United States v. Bautista,
In the course of interception, it is difficult to know in advance which conversations ultimately might be “irrelevant and should have been terminated.” United States v. LaGorga,
In addition, the degree of judicial supervision of the surveillance is relevant. See United States v. Charles,
“Where the authorizing judge has required and reviewed [analytic] reports at frequent intervals, a reviewing court may take such supervision through reports into consideration in determining whether a reasonable effort to minimize was attempted.” United States v. Armocida,
Judge Eaves required the submission of weekly progress reports, informing her of various aspects of the monitoring of the calls. See, e.g., ECF 78-7. At the conclusion of each report, Judge Eaves authorized continued interception. The government explains that, “in many instances investigators did not know the identities of numerous co-conspirators that were obtaining narcotics,” ECF 78 at 10, and cell phones were used by unknown persons. In addition, the government observes that there was a high volume of calls, but the calls were generally of short duration.
As the government points out, “courts generally draw а line at the two- or-three-minute mark and exclude such short-duration calls from consideration.” ECF 78 at 12. See, e.g., United States v. Yarbrough,
Miller also contends that the government failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c). In his view, “the affidavits demonstrate that the investigative techniques in place were flourishing,” and “[n]umerous investigative tools were working well to provide incriminating information.” ECF 74 at 9.
The Maryland and federal statutes include corresponding provisions regarding the requirement that all wiretap applications demonstrate exhaustion of other investigative techniques. Compare C.J. § 10-408(a)(l)(iii) and C.J. § 10-408(c)(l)(iii) with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). As the Fourth Circuit said in United States v. Bullock,
Of import here, in order to obtain authorization for a wiretap, the government is not required to demonstrate that other investigatory methods have been “wholly unsuccessful” or that it has exhausted “all possible alternatives to wiretapping.” United States v. Smith,
Conversely, the purpose of the statutory requirement “is not to foreclose electronic surveillance until every other imaginable method of investigation has been successfully attempted, but simply to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques.” United States v. Pacheco,
Due to the nature of certain criminal organizations, informants are often unable to have contact with the individuals who are at the highest levels of the organization, thus making wiretaps necessary. Clerkley,
The government’s burden of showing the need for a wiretap “is not great, and the adequacy of such a showing is ‘to be tested in a practical and commonsense fashion’_” Oriakhi
Courts have also held that, in assessing the need for a wiretap, affiants are authorized to rely upon, and courts are entitled to consider, their knowledge, training, and experience as to whether a particular investigative technique will succeed or fail. See Smith,
Here, the Wiretap Affidavit recounts the many investigative steps that were utilized, others that were tried, and others regarded as too dangerous or unlikely to succeed even if tried. ECF 78-3 at 36-42. To illustrate, although confidential informants were able to make controlled purchases from the defendant, they were unable to provide information as to the defendant’s source of supply. In addition, the affiants stated that the defendant resided in a “private gated community, meaning to gain access to the complex, you must enter through a security gate.” ECF 78-3 at 38-39. As a result, they claimed that it was “difficult to conduct surveillance” of Miller. Id. at 39. And, the affiants recounted: “MILLER is continually renting new cars each week.” Id. This added to the challenge of conducting surveillance of Miller.
Judge Eaves determined that the exhaustion requirement was satisfied. I see no basis to disagree with her conclusion.
Miller also complains that the challenged wiretap orders “allowed law enforcement officers to continue searching until, in the sole discretion of law enforcement, they felt they had enough evidence.” ECF 74 at 10. He asserts: “The challenged orders failed to designate any ‘authorized objectives’ that would serve as a check on law enforcement discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).” Id. Miller adds: “The challenged orders statutory deficiencies under § 2518(5) giving the officer’s [sic] unbridled authority to search, allottеd in thirty day increments, crossed the line drawn by the Particularity Clause of the Fourth Amendment and converted the surveillance into a general search.” Id.
As indicated, Miller also argues that calls between Ortiz-Gutierrez and defendant were unlawfully intercepted when both were located in Pennsylvania. The defendant is incorrect. Davis v. State,
In Davis, Montgomery County, Maryland law enforсement officers, situated at a “listening post” in Montgomery County, intercepted a mobile phone communication from a target mobile phone, caller, and receiver, all located in Virginia. The law enforcement officers were acting in accordance with an ex-parte order issued by a Montgomery County circuit court judge pursuant to C.J. § 10-408(c). As a result of the intercepted communications, the police seized drags from Davis. He alleged that the seizure was illegal, because the wiretap order did not authorize interception of “extra territorial communication.”
The court recognized that the Maryland statute is an “ ‘offspring1 ” of Title III. Id. at 214,
In this case, Detective Aaron Penman, a member of the Harford County Narcotics Task Force and a Sheriff in Harford County for almost 15 years, testified at the motions hearing that the “listening post” in connection with the investigation of the defendant was situated in Harford County, and it was used throughout the investigation. Noting that all intercepted calls were routed to Harford County, Penman stated that all intercepted conversations were heard in Harford County, regardless of the location of the defendant. Therefore, Miller’s challenge is unavailing.
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that there is any merit to any of defendant’s arguments, I would be compelled to find that the law enforcement officers were entitled to rely on facially valid wiretap orders. In doing so, they acted in good faith, within the meaning of United States v. Leon,
Defendant has moved to suppress evidence obtained by or derived from GPS monitoring. Defendant challenges the court orders that were issued by the District Court of Maryland authorizing, for a period of 60 days, the use of an electronic tracking device attached to the exterior of certain vehicles. See “GPS Motion,” ECF 75.
At oral argument, defense counsel submitted as to the contention that the applications for the court orders were not supported by probable cause and that, to the extent the applications and orders authorized the use of GPS devices on “future rental cars that may be utilized by the defendant,” the “prerequisites for anticipatory search warrants have not been met.” See ECF 75 at 5. But, defense counsel argued that, with respect to the Court Order of April 30, 2013 (ECF 75 at 13, Ex. A-2), the use of the GPS devices should have been limited to the two vehicles rented by defendant in April 2013, which were specifically identified in the corresponding application for the use of a GPS device (ECF 75 at 8, Ex. A-l). He rеasoned that the order only authorized the use of GPS on “the aforementioned vehicles,” and the two vehicles rented in April 2013 were the only vehicles specifically identified in the application.
On or about April 30, 2013, Harford County Detective Aaron Penman applied, under oath, for a court order authorizing the use of an electronic tracking device (“GPS”) to be attached to the exterior of rental vehicles to be “utilized” by Miller for the next 60 days. ECF 75 at 9, Ex. A-1. The application explained that Miller operated multiple rental ears to engage in drug transactions, noting that he rented one from Dollar/Thrift in the second week of April 2013, and one from Avis in the last week of April 2013. In addition, the application recounted that records from Dollar/Thrift revealed that Miller had rented vehicles on a weekly basis since 2011. Id. And, the application recounted that Miller used a rental vehicle as far back as 1997, to transfer 45-50 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 11.
The District Court for Harford County issued an order on April 30, 2013 (“Order of April 30, 2013), authorizing an electronic tracking device upon “the exterior of the aforementioned vehicles, utilized by MILLER .... ” ECF 75 at 14, Ex! A-2.
Detective Penman applied for another GPS authorization on May 8, 2013, with respect to a white 2004 Ford van. ECF 75 at 17, Ex. B-l. The application stated that the vehicle was owned by Charmaine Coldiron and operated by Miller. Id. Penman recounted that defendant was seen operating that vehicle on May 7, 2013, during a drug transaction. Id. at 19. The court issued an Order authorizing the requested relief on the same date. ECF 75 at 23, Ex. B-2.
On May 26, 2013, Detective Penman submitted another “Application For Court Order,” (ECF 75 at 26, Ex. C-l), requesting authorization to place an electronic tracking device on a brown 2004 Dodge sedan owned by Warmington and “associated” with defendant. The application stated that, after intercepted drug conversations, Miller was observed entering the trunk compartment of the vehicle. Id. at 28. The court issued an order the same day, authorizing the requested relief. See ECF 75 at 2, Ex. C-2.
Then, on June 11, 2013, Detective Penman submitted another “Application For Court Order,” to place an electronic tracking device on a 2004 Toyota Camry 4S, registered to Warmington and “associated”
Defendant asserts that all of the applications and court orders are “nearly identical in almost every respect.” ECF 75 at 2. However, he complains that the application submitted under oath by Detective Penman on April 30, 2013, did not identify a specific vehicle by registration number, in contrast to the other applications. And, as noted, he claims that the Order of April 30, 2013 applied only to the “aforementioned” two rental vehicles specifically identified in the application, which were rented by Miller in April 2013.
I shall assume, arguendo, that Miller has standing to challenge the use of the GPS devices on vehicles that were not registered to him or owned by him. Of import here, the government notes that at trial it only intends to introduce evidence recovered from the 2004 Ford van registered to Ms. Coldiron. It also represents that the evidence was obtained pursuant to a search warrant predicated on independent probable cause. See ECF 78 at 23; Warrant, ECF 78-8. On this basis, defendant’s GPS claims appear moot.
Alternatively, as to the Order of April 30, 2013, I am satisfied that the State judge had probable cause to believe that Miller was using rental vehicles for his drug distribution, and that he frequently, if not weekly, changed rental vehicles. Moreover, law enforcement could not know in advance the particulars of the vehicles to be rented in the future by Miller. The reference in the application to the vehicles from Dollar/Thrift and Avis in April 2013 served to illustrate to the State court the frequency with which Miller rented (and changed) vehicles. The only sensible interpretation of the order’s reference to “the aforementioned vehicles” was that it authorized, for 60 days, the use of a GPS device on any vehicles that Miller would rent in that limited time frame. Law enforcement could not know in advance the particulars of those vehicles.
In any event, Detective Penman acted in good faith in relying on the court order authorizing the use of the GPS devices on unknown vehicles to be rented by Miller in the ensuing 60 days.
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was first announced by the Supreme Court in 1984 in United States v. Leon,
Notwithstanding the importance of the exclusionary rule to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court determined in Leon that “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Leon,
Ordinarily, a “ ‘warrant' issued by a magistrate ... suffices to establish’ that a law enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith in conducting the search.’ ” Leon,
In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.
The Leon Court also said, id. at 922,
Leon made clear that there are four circumstances when exclusion of evidence remains the appropriate sanction, even if an officer “has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms.” Leon,
The four situations when the sanction of exclusion is an appropriate remedy are as follows: 1) the magistrate or judge who issued the warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known but for his reckless disregard for the truth; 2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role; 3) the affidavit supporting the warrant is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existеnce entirely unreasonable’ ”; 4) the warrant is “so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon,
I am mindful of what the Supreme Court said in Davis v. United States, — U.S. -,
With these principles in mind, I see no basis to suppress on the grounds advanced by Miller. Law enforcement authorities acted in good faith in construing the order to apply to vehicles that Miller would rent
3. Motion to Suppress Warrantless Search of Cellphones
In ECF 99, defendant challenges the post-arrest warrantless search of his cellphones, based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Riley v. California, — U.S. -,
Of import here, defendant was arrested on June 22, 2013. Thus, his arrest occurred a full year before the decision announced by the Supreme Court in Riley.
According to Detective Penman, six cellphones were recovered from the rental vehicle at the time of Miller’s arrest on June 22, 2013. Detective Gregory activated them, ie., turned them on without a warrant. However, he did not read or review the content contained on the phone. Rather, he sought to identify the seized phones. Put another way, Gregory activated the phones to сonfirm the phone numbers, by way of a call to the wire room, to verify that the phones seized from the defendant’s vehicle had the same phone numbers that had been intercepted pursuant to court authorized wiretaps.
At the time law enforcement activated defendant’s cellphones, there was binding judicial precedent in the Fourth Circuit that permitted the warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone, incident to arrest. See United States v. Murphy,
In my view, in June 2013, law enforcement agents were not required to anticipate the decision in Riley, decided in June 2014. Therefore, the exclusionary rule is inapt .here. Because the warrantless inspection of Miller’s cell phones upon his arrest preceded the Riley decision, I agree with the government that it is entitled to rely on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, discussed supra. See Leon,
The exclusionary rule is a “ ‘prudential’ doctrine,” fashioned “to ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.’ ” Davis v. United States, — U.S. -,
To be sure, “[exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large,” because “[i]t almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence.” Davis,
The cost of exclusion is particularly high — and often disproportiоnate to exclusion’s deterrent effect — “when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor.” Leon,
“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”
See also Herring,
The “good faith” exception carries equal force when law enforcement agents act in reasonable reliance on judicial decisions authorizing their conduct, although the conduct is subsequently deemed unconstitutional. See Davis,
In Davis,
The Davis Court held that when law enforcement agents conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedеnt, police culpability is wholly absent.
The officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence. Nor does this case involve any ‘recurring or systemic negligence’ on the part of law enforcement. The police acted in strict compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless the exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability regime, it can have no application in this case.
The Court elaborated: “[W]hen binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety responsibilities.” Id. at 2429 (emphasis in original). In the.Court’s view, “all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police work.” Id.; see also Illinois v. Krull,
United States v. Wilks,
As noted, the government urges that the exclusionary rule is not appropriate here, because at the relevant time law enforcement agents were acting in accordance with what was the law, i.e., that under Murphy, supra, the warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest was lawful. I agree. Therefore, I decline to apply the exclusionary rule to the search of the cell phones at the time of Miller’s arrest.
Defendant asserts a boilerplate challenge to the search of his residence in Owings Mills on June 22, 2013. The search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant for defendant’s home, obtained on June 14, 2013. The application and affidavit are set forth at ECF 78-8.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees, inter alia, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” “ ‘[T]he underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable.’ ” United States v. Sowards,
“ ‘At the very core’ ” of the Fourth Amendment “ ‘stands the right of a man to rеtreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”. Kyllo v. United States,
Of particular relevance here, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. This clause requires an affidavit supporting a request for a search warrant to show some factual basis for the belief that the suspect occupies or is otherwise connected to the targeted premises and that contraband or evidence will be found in that particular place. This is known as the particularity requirement. See Illinois v. Gates,
In Maryland v. Garrison,
The affidavit contains ample probable cause to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. It also satisfies the particularity requirement. Therefore, there is no merit to this claim.
Notes
. Trial is scheduled for November 17, 2014. Delays in this case have bеen occasioned, inter alia, by a substitution in defense counsel for Miller, see ECF 35, 36, 81; a competency evaluation of Miller, see ECF 68, 69; and the filing by Miller of many pretrial motions.
. ECF 77 is an amendment to ECF 74, but it pertains only to the Pen Register/Trap and Trace issue within ECF 74, and not the portion of ECF 74 challenging the wiretaps.
.Some of the motions were filed by Miller’s previous defense counsel. Because Miller is represented by able counsel, I will deny his pro se motion to suppress wiretap evidence, filed September 8, 2014. See ECF 114. Counsel's motions for extensions (ECF 95, 99) are granted.
. In particular, this Memorandum Opinion does not resolve arguments as to the use of a pen register/trap and trace, including the reference to the name “Dwight Narcis”; the motion to suppress defendant's statements on the date of Miller’s arrest; the motion challenging the search of the rental vehicle on the date of defendant's arrest, or the wiretap challenge contained in ECF 117.
. I was not provided with copies of Judge Eaves's subsequent ex parte orders.