UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael RAMER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13-3644.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted May 15, 2015. Decided May 29, 2015.
837 F.3d 837
Six months is not an apt presumptive minimum for establishing a violation. Judges who lean toward such a presumption may be unfamiliar with the nature of modern prison segregation and the psychological damage that it can inflict. Segregation isn‘t just separating a prisoner from one or several other prisoners. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Wilkinson case, “almost all human contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor room.” 545 U.S. at 223-24, 125 S.Ct. 2384. The serious psychological consequences of such quasi-solitary imprisonment have been documented. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bennion, “Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment,” 90 Indiana Law Journal 741 (2015); Stuart Grassian, “Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement,” 22 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 325 (2006); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, “Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement,” 23 N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 477 (1997).
Kervin, however, was placed in segregation for at most 30 days and, more importantly, does not allege that he suffered any significant psychological or other injury from it. So the judge was right to dismiss his suit. But we take this opportunity to remind both prison officials and judges to be alert for the potentially serious adverse consequences of protracted segregation as punishment for misbehavior in prison, especially the kind of nonviolent misbehavior involved in the present case.
AFFIRMED.
Gregory J. Haanstad, Attorney, Office of the United States Trustee, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Daniel J. Hillis, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Springfield, IL, John C. Taylor, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Urbana, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Michael Ramer was convicted after a bench trial of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. See
Before the Government filed its brief, however, the district court had amended the judgment to state that Mr. Ramer‘s obligation to pay $100 each month as part of his supervised release is “conditioned on” his ability to pay. That modification was made in response to the parties’ joint request, and thus the Government argues in its brief that Mr. Ramer‘s appeal is moot. Mr. Ramer, inexplicably, has not moved to dismiss his appeal. See
We begin by addressing whether the district court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to revise the judgment after Mr. Ramer had filed a notice of appeal. Ordinarily, filing a notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction. See United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir.2013); United States v. McHugh, 528 F.3d 538, 540 (7th Cir.2008). But there are exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., Brown, 732 F.3d at 787 (stating that district court may address ancillary issues such as attorneys’ fees and clerical mistakes after notice of appeal is filed); United States v. Centracchio, 236 F.3d 812, 813 (7th Cir.2001) (explaining that district court retains jurisdiction despite Government‘s interlocutory appeal under
Under
In his brief Mr. Ramer asks only that we remand with instructions to modify his obligation to pay restitution while on supervised release to reflect that it is dependent on his ability to pay. The district court already has properly granted that relief. Accordingly, we agree with the Government that the appeal is moot because we cannot give Mr. Ramer any effective relief. See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996); A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 790 (7th Cir.2004).
DISMISSED.
