Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINS and Judge KING joined.
OPINION
Michael Jones appeals from the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2000). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
On March 16, 2000, the grand jury indicted Jones for his role in a drug trafficking conspiracy that was responsible for distributing cocaine base in Jefferson County, West Virginia, from 1996 through 1998. On April 14, 2000, while Jones was on pretrial release, he allegedly discharged a firearm in the direction of Jerome Scott during a domestic dispute. Based upon this shooting incident, the Government moved for pretrial detention of Jones, arguing that he was a danger to the community. At the detention hearing, Jones testified and denied possessing or discharging a firearm on April 14, 2000, “at or near” Scott. (J.A. at 97.) Upon considering this testimony and the testimony of several other witnesses, the magistrate judge concluded that the Government had not met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Jones posed a danger to the community and denied the Government’s motion for pretrial detention.
On August 2, 2000, the grand jury returned a seven count indictment superseding the March 16, 2000, indictment charging Jones with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999) (Count One), four counts of distribution of in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999) (Counts Two, Three, Four, and Six), one count of possession with intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base (Count Five), and one count of aiding and abetting the distribution of approximately 2.94 grams of cocaine base, *427 in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1999) (Count Seven). Following a two-day jury trial, Jones was found guilty of Counts One through Six; the Government voluntarily dismissed Count Seven.
In the presentence report, the probation officer found that Jones shot at Jerome Scott on April 14, 2000, and thus, concluded that Jones committed perjury during the detention hearing on April 27, 2000, when he testified and denied possessing or discharging a firearm on April 14, 2000, “at or near” Scott. (J.A. at 97.) Based on this perjury, the probation officer applied the enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. At the sentencing hearing, Jones argued that the Government had not proved that Jones committed perjury by a preponderance of the evidence and that § 3C1.1 did not apply because the shooting incident was not related to the offenses charged. After hearing additional evidence to determine whether Jones committed perjury, the district court found that Jones did commit perjury and that the § 3C1.1 enhancement applied.
On appeal, Jones contends that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and by conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the enhancement was warranted.
1
We address each issue in turn, reviewing the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.
United States v. Dawkins,
II.
Jones argues that his conduct does not satisfy § 3C1.1 because the content of the alleged perjury was not related to the investigation, prosecution, and/or sentencing of his drug convictions but instead related to a domestic dispute. (J.A. at 453-54 (detailing sentencing hearing testimony that the shooting incident was not drug-related and was unrelated to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the offenses charged in Jones’s indictment)). We reject Jones’s argument as contrary to § 3Cl.l’s text, commentary, and the relevant case law.
Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement of the defendant’s base offense level where
(A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction ...; or (ii) a closely related offense.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The commentary to § 3C1.1 makes clear that the phrase “obstruct ] or impede[ ] ... the administration of justice” in clause (A) of § 3C1.1
*428
includes committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury.
2
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(b) (“The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which this adjustment applies: ... (b) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury .... ”);
see also United States v. Dunnigan,
In a case involving § 3C1.1 prior to its amendment in 1998,
3
this court concluded that the perjurious statements need not be about the offense of conviction; it is enough if the perjurious statements were given “ ‘during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.’ ”
United States v. Romulus,
Clause (B) provides that the obstructive conduct must either “re-late[ ] to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense.” According to the Sentencing Commission, the amendment was designed to “resolve[ ] a circuit conflict on
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the issue of whether the adjustment applies to obstructions that occur in cases closely related to the defendant’s case or only those specifically related to the offense of which the defendant [is] convicted.”
4
U.S.S.G. Supp. to app. C, amend. 581 (1998). “The amendment, which adopts the majority view, instructs that the obstruction must relate either to the defendant’s offense of conviction (including any relevant conduct) or to a closely related case.”
Id.
In light of the stated purpose of the amendment, other circuits have rejected the argument that the addition of clause (B) rendered § 3C1.1 more rigorous and have instead construed the amendment as expanding the types of obstructive conduct warranting an enhancement.
United States v. Verdin,
Because clause (B) does not narrow the types of conduct that qualify for application of the enhancement, we find Jones’s challenge to the district court’s calculation of his base offense level to be without merit. Consequently, we hold that when a defendant commits perjury “to gain an unwarranted release from custody,”
Romulus,
*430 i — i i — i i — i
Jones next contends that the district court should not have held an evidentiary hearing on the obstruction of justice enhancement but should have instead deferred to the magistrate judge’s earlier findings crediting Jones’s testimony. At the outset, we note that Jones has misapprehended the magistrate judge’s earlier credibility findings. The magistrate judge did not, as Jones suggests, accept Jones’s testimony as credible. To the contrary, the magistrate judge stated that he had doubts about Jones’s truthfulness but denied the Government’s motion for pretrial detention because the Government failed to satisfy its burden of showing “clear and convincing evidence” that Jones posed a danger to the community. (J.A. at 108 (“[Fjrankly, [there are] parts of his testimony that I find not particularly credible either.”).)
In any event, the Sentencing Guidelines provide that the district court has the discretion to conduct an evidentia-ry hearing at sentencing when “any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3;
see also
Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1) (“The court may, in its discretion, permit the parties [at the sentencing hearing] to introduce testimony or other evidence on objections.”);
Dunnigan,
<
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jones’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. In a letter styled as notice of supplemental authority submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), Jones argued for the first time that his sentence is erroneous under
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
. For a sentencing court to apply the obstruction of justice enhancement based upon perjury, it must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant when testifying under oath (1) gave false testimony; (2) concerning a material matter; (3) with the willful intent to deceive (rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory).
United States v. Dunnigan,
. Before its amendment, § 3C1.1 provided for a two-level increase in a defendant's offense level "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1997).
. Prior to the amendment, several circuits had taken the view that the enhancement applied if the defendant obstructed or attempted to obstruct justice in a closely related case.
See, e.g., United States v. Acuna,