United States v. SandersUnited States v. Sanders
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Bowman, Lay, Beam
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
A South Dakota federal jury convicted Michael D. Sanders of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
On August 6, 1987, Sanders was a passenger in a pickup truck that was towing a trailer. Officer Kеith Jorgenson of the South Dakota Highway Patrol stopped the vehicle because one of the two taillights on the trailer was missing a red lens and was emitting white light from the exposed bulb. Approximately ten minutes later, Spеcial Agents John Buszko and Robert Beyer of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation arrived to provide backup. As Officer Jorgenson discussed the traffic offense with the driver, Ricky Standon, Agent Buszko approached Sаnders, who remained sitting in the passenger side of the truck. Agent Buszko asked Sanders if he possessed any guns or knives, and Sanders denied any such possession. Having observed a small, folded knife on the dashboard in front of Sanders, Agent Buszkо asked Sanders to step out of the vehicle for a pat-down search.
As Sanders exited the vehicle, Agent Buszko observed that Sanders had several unhealed sores and cuts, which are consistent with methamphetamine use. In addition, Agent Buszko noticed a ball of electrical tape where Sanders had been sitting. According to Agent Buszko‘s testimony at the suppression hearing, electrical tape frequently is used to conceal narcotics because it is thought to conceal their scent. Agent Buszko seized the ball of tape and asked Sanders about it. Despite having just been seated on this nearly baseball-sized ball of tape, Sandеrs denied any knowledge of it. When the Agents later opened the ball of tape, it was found to contain methamphetamine and marijuana.
While Agent Buszko questioned Sanders, Agent Beyer noticed a maroon bag in the bed of the pickup truck. Before touching the bag, the Agents questioned Sanders and Standon regarding its ownership. After both Sanders and Standon denied any knowledge of the bag, Agent Buszko removed the bag from the pickup and placed it on the ground between Sanders and Standon. Once again, the Agents asked Sanders
Standon later admitted that he owned the bag but claimed that Sanders had the gun with him when they began their trip to South Dakota. Agents later determined that Sanders‘s wife, Tina Sandеrs, owned the handgun. Sanders moved to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. Upon de novo review of the suppression hearing transcripts and exhibits, the District Court denied the motion. After a jury сonvicted Sanders of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
Sanders first challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. Sanders argues that Offiсer Jorgenson lacked probable cause to stop the truck and that the Agents lacked probable cause to search his person and the maroon bag. We review findings of historical fact made by the Distriсt Court for clear error but review the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to make a warrantless search de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
Sanders argues that Officer Jorgenson lacked probable cause to stop the truck because the taillights on the trailer in fact were not in violation of South Dakota law. The statute in question provides in relevant part:
Every motor vehicle, trаiler, semitrailer and pole trailer, except as otherwise provided in this section, and any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles shall be equipped with at least two tail lаmps mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required in § 32-17-4 shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of one thousand feet to the rear. However, motor vehicles, trailers, semitrailers and pole trailers manufactured and assembled prior to July 1, 1973, shall have one tail lamp mounted on the left side of the rear which when lighted
as required in § 32-17-4 shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear. . . . On vehicles with more than one tail lamp, the lamps shall be mounted on the same level and as widely spaced laterally as practicable.
The Government argues that, regardless of whether the trailer needed one or two taillights, it violated the statute because one of the taillights was missing a red lens.2 The District Court apparently agreed with this interpretation of the statute. A picture of the trailer “reveal[ed] two tail lights, one much higher and to the right of the other. The higher tail light is without a red lense as required by § 32-17-8 . . . .” Mem. Op. & Order Den. Mot. to Suppress at 6.
We find it unnecessаry to parse the words of the South Dakota statute in determining whether Officer Jorgenson had probable cause to stop the vehicle. Regardless of whether or not the trailer actually was in violation of the South Dakota statute, Officer Jorgenson was justified in making the stop if he “objectively ha[d] a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law.‘” United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996);
Regarding the searches that revealed the mеthamphetamine and the gun, we conclude that the Agents were justified in searching the maroon bag and the ball of tape. This case is controlled by United States v. Sanders, 130 F.3d 1316, 1317 (8th Cir. 1997), in which this Court concluded that the defendant‘s “statements to the officеrs that he did not own the bag were sufficient to constitute abandonment.” Even if the Agents knew that Sanders was lying when he claimed not to know anything about the ball of tape and the maroon bag, this Court still must conclude that the property was abandoned. See id. at 1318 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 935 F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1991)). Further, Agent Buszko‘s pat-down of Sanders, which caused the ball of tape that Sanders had been sitting on to be revealed in the first place, was legal under Terry
Because Officer Jorgenson had probable cause to stop the vehicle and because the maroon bag and ball of tape were аbandoned, we conclude that all of the evidence seized during the traffic stop was admissible.
Sanders next argues that the District Court erred in submitting Instruction 15 to the jury. Jury Instruction 15 stated:
The Court has ruled as a matter of law that the stop of defendant‘s vehicle, the subsequent search of the container in which the gun was found, and the seizure of the gun and items found in the cab were all lawful acts of the law enforcement officer performing law enforcement duties.
Tr. of Jury Trial at 198. A district court has wide discretion in submitting jury instructions. See United States v. Clark, 980 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1992). One purpose of instructions is to focus the jury‘s attention on the “essential issues” in the case. United States v. Ribaste, 905 F.2d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 1990). In this case, the District Court perceived that Sanders had confused the jury by asking witnesses repeatedly about the trailer taillights and the knife, as if to cast doubt on the legality of the stop and search. See Tr. of Jury Trial at 183-84. In fact, a member of the jury asked a question about searсh warrants during the course of trial. See Tr. of Jury Trial at 118, 183-84. We conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in making clear to the jury the extent of its role.
Finally, Sanders argues that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding testimony of Tina Sanders regarding her attempts to keep firearms away from him. The record simply does not support this argument. Tina Sanders testified that she put the firearm in the truck and that she failed to inform her husband. See Tr. of Jury Trial at
AFFIRMED.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.