This is a direct appeal from a conviction of interstate gambling in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
The evidence shows that the apрellant was actively engaged in bookmaking in Colorado. Mr. Huber, the Government’s only witness to testify as to the interstate character of the offense, is a Wisconsin businessman who had met appellant in Denver. The appellant provided Mr. Huber with his phоne number and explained that if Huber wished to place a bet he should call the appellant in Denver. At one point thе phone number was changed. Huber placed two or three calls a week during two successive football seasons, сalling early in the week to get the odds, and calling back on Saturday or Sunday to place his bets. *446 He testified he did not place straight bets but parlayed three or four teams with the Doyle system, which he could not bet elsewhere. Nearly all of the cаlls were placed from Monroe, Wisconsin, to Denver, Colorado, and the witness talked to Mr. Torneo personally.. The witnеss Huber testified he came to Denver from time to time, saw Mr. Torneo socially, and had discussed the possibility of Mr. Torneo being a representative of Mr. Huber’s business. The two had been acquainted since 1963 or 1964.
There is no question that the appellant wаs engaged in the business of betting and wagering; the question is whether appellant’s acts constituted a crime within the meaning of the statute under which he was charged. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) reads:
“Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communicatiоn facility for the transmission in interstate . commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event . . . , or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imрrisoned not more than two years, or both.”
As to the actual placing of bets, appellant argues that the word “transmission” in the statute means sending and not receiving, and it is pointed out that appellant only received the bets, Huber having placed them. With regard to the transmission of odds, appellant argues that the indictment charges transmission “from Monroe, Wisconsin, to Denvеr and Adams County, Colorado,” and it is urged that it would have been physically impossible under the charge for the Denver-based appellant to have transmitted the information.
At present the Circuits do not agree on the meaning and scope of seсtion 1084(a). In Telephone News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,
The Government’s position received approval in Sagansky v. United Stаtes,
“The gist of this contention is that the offense is committed by the one who initially sends in the bet and not by the one who receives it; in other words, the meaning of ‘transmission’ as used in this statute does not embrace the act of receiving. While this might be a proper сonstruction of the term ‘transmission’ taken out of context, § 1084(a) does not punish the mere transmission of bets or wagers, but rather the ‘use’ of interstate wire communication facilities for their transmission. When a person holds himself out as being willing to make bets or wagеrs over interstate telephone facilities, and does in fact accept offers of bets or wagers over the tеlephone as part of his business, we think it is consistent with both the language and the purpose of the statute to hold that he has ‘usеd’ the facility for the transmission of bets or wagers.”
The differing results also arise from a different construction of the words “to *447 use” the сommunication facility. As it pertains here, section 1084(a) proscribes the use of the telephone for the “transmission” in interstate сommerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers. The conclusion in Telephone News that transmission means sending and not receiving is necessarily predicated on the notion that “use” connotes only the idea of immediate utilization, or single event, that is, the phone is used by the person who picks it up and places the particulаr call. In Sagansky, on the other hand, the concept of “use” is more encompassing; there it was concluded that the “usе” of a wire facility contemplates the broader notion of converting the facility to one’s service, that is, customаrily employing or making a practice of availing oneself of the facility. In our opinion, an unsophisticated and prаctical reading of the statute compels the latter interpretation. In reaching this conclusion, we give considerаtion, as did the court in Stone-house, to the fact that the telephone is designed for a two-way conversation and exchange of information. If we were to accept the appellant’s contention, we would effectively deny that any discussion or exchange took place, and we find that assumption rather strained. We also note that an interpretation of use of the wire facility which is limited to the isolated sending of messages does not meet the basic purpose of the statute and renders its scope more limited than an everyday experience with the telephone would dictate. The statute deals with bookmakers — persons “engaged in the business of betting or wagering.” Bookies take bets, they receive them, they handle thеm; it is a transaction requiring mutuality or a meeting of minds. It is unlikely in framing section 1084(a) that Congress considered betting transactions to move in but one direction in the use of the telephone.
We have considered appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Affirmed.