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United States v. Michael A. Whren
111 F.3d 956
D.C. Cir.
1997
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*1 Holder, Jr., Eric H. States Attor- United Fisher, America, R.

ney, Appellee, Assistant United John UNITED STATES of Attorney, Washington, DC. v. WHREN, Appellant. Michael A. WALD, WILLIAMS, TATEL, Before No. 95-3193. Judges. Appeals, Opinion for the PER District Columbia Court filed Circuit. CURIAM. 30, Argued Jan. 1997. May 6, Decided 1997.

PER CURIAM. presents ques No. 96-3083 the threshold filing-fee provisions

tion whether Litigation Act

Prison Reform of 1995

(“PLRA”) apply proceedings under 28 presents § 2255. No. 96-5200 question respect

same to 28 U.S.C. publish opinion 2254. We order to

express circuits, agreement with our sister uniformly inappli PLRA held the proceedings.

cable to such See Smith v. (4th 1126,

Angelone, 111 F.3d 1129-31 Cir.

1997); Singletary, v. Anderson F.3d 801

(11th Cir.1997); Simmonds, United States (10th 737, Cir.1997); 742-45 Naddi (9th Hill, Cir.1997); 106 F.3d Cole,

(5th Cir.1996); States, Santana v. United (3d Cir.1996); 755-56 Martin v. States, 855-56 Cir.

1996); Keane, (2d Reyes v.

Cir.1996). publish disposition

We need of appellants’ appeals,

merits of which will issue separate orders.

Nancy Page, Attorneys, U.S. R. Assistant DC, Washington, were brief. HENDERSON, GINSBURG, and Before TATEL, Judges. Circuit

Opinion for the Court filed Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Concurring opinion Judge filed Circuit HENDERSON.

GINSBURG, Judge: In are asked to decide a criminal ease we whether defendant whose to have remanded the district court for re- may raise for time there the first challenge a sentence is unrelated the reason the remand. We hold newly-raised not do so unless his objection sentence based error so or it for him. Background

I. on four Michael Whren was convicted One, possession with intent counts: grams more of distribute 50 or cocaine base (the Two, count); distribution grams with intent to distribute 50 1,000 of a more of cocaine base within feet (the count); schoolyard Three, posses- school Four, possession marijuana; sion of and phencyclidine, Pursuant to the POP. a/k/a Guidelines, Sentencing prison was 168 months sentenced serve pay a assessment $150. offense level for distribution The base drugs count, quantity of determined involved, which, considering Whren’s was 32 history, produced a sen- Category II criminal months. The base tencing range of 135-168 schoolyard count was offense level for Wright, Lisa B. Assistant Federal Public 32 for the the same Defender, appellant, argued cause be- plus two-level enhancement involved Kramer, whom Federal Public De- A.J. drugs “directly protect- involved cause the fender, DC, Washington, was on briefs. ¶ 2D1.2(a)(l). An ed location.” U.S.S.G. Danello, of 34 an offender with U.S. Attor- offense level Elizabeth H. Assistant history Category produces II ney, argued appellee, with criminal the cause for Holder, range Jr., Attorney, of 168-210 months. Whren whom Eric H. U.S. Fisher, Trosman, court’s dispute the district determina- R. John Elizabeth Congress: Report the correct base offense Feder- tion that was Cocaine and 1995), Sentencing Policy (February al level for his violation stat- Sentencing which the The district court then Commission asserts ute. sentenced justification large there is no to the maximum of 168 months on the disparity prescribed between the and to minimum 168 distribution count *3 count, a crack cocaine offense and that for a schoolyard on sen- months the the powder involving similar cocaine. concurrently. offense tences be served urged grant Whren also the court to a down- arguing, appealed Whren to this departure in light ward of educational things, among other that the distribution prison. argued efforts Whren next that he count it is a should be vacated because lesser should receive the two-level sentence en- schoolyard of included offense the count. normally out hancement meted for a convic- that, acknowledged Whren because he statute, schoolyard under tion the see schoolyard for the the sentence 2D1.2(a)(l), § presence U.S.S.G. because his conviction, vacatur of the distribution count (He a near school was fortuitous. was driv- upon would have no his overall sen- effect arrested.) by ing stopped when he was tence other than to reduce his assess- Finally, argued that district the ment $50. give court did not have him a discretion court affirmed on Whren’s convictions pass schoolyard enhancement, on the then it Two, Three, Four, Counts as did the grant offsetting should him an downward — Court; -, Supreme U.S. 116 S.Ct. departure because not run his offense did (1996). 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 We reversed purpose afoul the of the stat- One, however, on Whren’s conviction Count ute. holding that with the intent The district court that ruled lacks au pos- distribute is a lesser-included offense of thority request to consider Whren’s for a session with the intent to distribute within departure upon Special downward based the 1,000 “Consequently of a feet school. ... we Report Sentencing the Commission. remand[ed case] to the District challenge ruling. Whren does not that entry judgment anof amended and resen- testimony district about received tencing Counts One and Two.” United progress prison Whren’s educational but (1995). Whren, ultimately post-sentenc concluded that such why say We did vacatur the distribu- ing ground conduct not a proper is for a tion a count necessitated remand for resen- departure challenge either. Whren does upon schoolyard count, tencing but ruling challenge oblique but his is both —not Whren concedes that the remand was consis- say belated, cryptic coming as it .to —and general tent with this court’s rule that when brief; reply in a does footnote to his absent cannot “we ascertain whether the District (not extraordinary present circumstances Court’s sentence on valid conviction was here) we do not entertain an influenced on a separate conviction brief, reply for the first time in a Forman v. count on appeal, that is later overturned Co., Ltd., Air Lines Korean proper course that is to remand so the Dis- (D.C.Cir.1996), matter, or for that a foot trict Court im- reconsider sentence Washington Legal note. Clinic posed.” Lyons, (D.C.Cir. Barry, Homeless (1983). n. 335 25 1997). Finally, the court expressly district arguments declined to consider Whren’s sought At his hearing Whren against penalizing proximity him to a four that raise issues he had not raised that school because it concluded our mandate either prohibited implicitly doing it from It so. is appeal. None of the four issues was in that decision review. we now way related to this court’s vacatur of the argued distribution count. Whren first that Analysis II. grant the district court downward departure pursuant argues 5k2.0 of the Sen- that when the court of . Guidelines, tencing Special resentencing, view remands case for computing the defendant’s base offense level. authorized presumptively district novo; Upon resentencing it turned out de some the defendant PSR, findings in the when the immaterial appellate in the order limitation larger quantity of consid- was in this ease—could none court —and sees ered, would affect a sentence based role after the re- district court’s limit the drugs. hand, smaller Government, other mand. The implicit- ease in this argues that mandate rejected has the de Seventh court from consider- ly precluded holding “only approach, novo an issue anything than our vacatur of the ing other arising of the correction of the sentence out the defen- count distribution appeals] ordered could be [the schoolyard count. subsequent appeal.” raised in a Parker, have held when *4 circuits Several Cir.1996). case tried The defendant in that appeals a sentence the dis- of vacates court appeal to raise in that he his second issues remand, any may, take evi- upon court trict (and had not raised previously that neither any argument that it could and hear dence appeals nor the court of original sentencing considered in the have upon) had ruled that were therefore ever and Atehortva, v. See States proceeding. United resentencing. remand affected for 679, (2d Cir.1995); 685 United States 69 F.3d By failing upon to raise the the first issues 145, Cir.1996); Jennings, 83 151 v. F.3d held, appeal, appeals court of the defen- Cornelius, 703, v. 968 F.2d 705 States United Id. waived them. had Ponce, (8th Cir.1992); v. 51 United States (9th Cir.1995); 820, United v. 826 previously adopted circuit has (10th Cir.1996). Moore, 1231, 1235 scope resentencing approach either of given prac- for this rationales been Two have hold in remand. We did United States Moore, In resentencing. the Leonzo, of de novo 1086, (1995), tice upon 1088 that when Tenth Circuit reasoned not offer new remand the Government could for vacated and the count remanded has been sentencing support in of level evidence in resentencing is the same the defendant unsuccessfully argued for at the which it had was in for position he before sentenced hearing. original sentencing Absent 1235. time. F.3d at This is the first 83 justifying the Government’s circumstances Although upon approach. formalistic rather carry produc- its of initial failure to burdens case appeal first we remanded the Whren’s reason persuasion, tion saw “no and of vacating resentencing without his sen- why get apple.” it a second bite at should tence, rely now we do not want to the Although argues should that Leonzo Whren vacatur and re- technical distinction between party tries in which a be limited to cases apparent no evidence, mand —to which we attached rather new remand to offer significance at the time —when substantial sug- legal argument, than make a new of) rights (and are involved. for this gests we can think no reason distinction. Jennings In the Sixth offered approach of the Sev- novo We think the waiver functional rationale for de novo parties preferable both to the de upon remand: would enth Circuit is otherwise approach in other and more every sen- followed circuits litigate forced to conceivable be hearing, reasoning in Leonzo. tencing regard- initial consistent with our own issue relevance, they resentencing is in a license precluded be De novo essence less of its lest issues, argu- to introduce raising parties from later issue becomes ments, they subsequent evidence events. and relevant because of hearing. original Jennings objected had not introduced at the defendant in The requiring parties hearing first to certain alternative at his original sen- issues at the report. in raise all relevant findings pre-sentence his and effi- tencing hearing equity both resen- serves appeals then remanded for ciency: gets early notice of the party tencing court had over- Each because the district can and the position, in other’s to be used stated 960 course, early

resolve material issues on—-when under Federal of Criminal all Of Rule 52(b) single in in is fresh mind —and record Procedure thereby minimizing scope proceeding, belatedly even an raised if it consider issue i.e., proceeding, first second should the prejudicial obvious both and and therefore that, note had result in a remand. We also arguably “plain rises to the level of error.” sentencing argument Whren his Olano, 725, 734, 507 U.S. the district first time before 1770, 1777-78, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. appeal, in remand his this court but (1993); Saro, see only if would have reversed his sentence (D.C.Cir.1994) (error 283, 286 must be “so plain have shown it was a could plain judge prosecutor the trial were Myles, error. it, countenancing in derelict even absent the (D.C.Cir.1996). In this second timely detecting defendant’s assistance would be both anomalous inefficient it”). error, Relief is available for how- place having in á position better ever, only relatively in those rare “circum- neglected to raise a relevant justice miscarriage stances which a trip either court or the district first would otherwise result.” the court than he would be in he Frady, 456 U.S. 163 n. 102 S.Ct. neglected had raise it the district (1982). 1592 n. L.Ed.2d court. *5 In this case the district did hold, therefore, We a resentenc- plainly failing err in to on its notice own remand, ing by a occasioned unless the argument that the enhance appeals expressly otherwise, directs apply ment should not to Whren’s offense may new consider such presence his because near at the school arguments newly or new facts as are made time of his arrest was fortuitous. We had by appeals’ relevant the court of decision— already rejected in United or reasoning whether the result. McDonald, 868-70 Jennings right- While we think the court was (D.C.Cir.1993). Nor the district court ly might that a concerned defendant not have plainly sponte err in not departing sua down at raised an issue his ground purpose ward that the of the because it was not then to material — schoolyard enhancement would not be served resentencing find at that the be- issue had legal this case. If there is no clear rule— come material —the solution tailored to that expressed prior whether in a decision or problem is for district not to resen- governing issue, then the dis tence the defendant de novo but to consider elsewhere — trict court’s plain decision cannot be a error. newly relevant issue. A defendant Merlos, should not held to be have waived an issue (D.C.Cir.1993) (jury equating instruction he did have a to reason raise it his at “strong “beyond belief’ with belief a reason original sentencing; but neither de- should a plain able doubt” not error at because time of fendant to be able raise an issue for first appellate trial no court had held instruction time resentencing if he did have reason erroneous). point Here was far from but failed it in nonetheless to raise the earli- clearly only appellate established. -The au approach er proceeding. Under our a defen- thorities Whren could may argue support muster at position McDonald, of his were dicta in appeals’ has decision breathed life issue, (passenger carrying drugs F.2d at 870 previously into dormant but he subway speeding by train “might or school revive in the round second an issue he departure”), warrant and in just allowed to in the That die first-. what (3d Rodriguez, to n. belatedly tried do when he Cir.1992) (downward sentencing arguments departure in an would effort to low- be sentencing range permissible hypothetical involving er his from 168-210 “defen months just speeds to 135-168 months. He had much dant who in a train as school reason, sale”). ability, way and no less to make the same other vehicle on the to a narcotics arguments original sentencing hearing. at his But it is not a error for a trial court not court, ion.* was clear to the it of the court of dictum follow mere Warren, is clear to me and should have been clear

appeals. See United counsel, (D.C.Cir.1994). According- whose failure to raise defense 657-58 merger argument first failing at plainly err in meritorious trial court did not ly, the sentencing necessitated the remand. argument. sponte notice sua aside, scope of counsel the mandate defense III. Conclusion raising the fortuitous knew that the time long past. proximity issue was She failed above, judgment given the reasons For argue first point and on the district court is reasonably request a appeal. could not She Affirmed. particular apple, third at that .however bite declining it tantalizing, after twice. HENDERSON, KAREN LeCRAFT Judge, concurring: but see no need I concur the affirmance analysis or announcement extended rule on remand.

of a new appellate panel remanded for the

The first resentencing on count two result

ministerial count

ing from vacatur of the one cónvict * were, panel’s resentencing discussion in its concluded that section 841 offenses fact, The first 860(a) entirely paragraph, one takes one sentence of included lesser offenses of section appel- government agrees wit: offenses. Consequently,pursuant argument. lants' Appellants their convictions for contend that agreement parties, remand to the will 841(a)(1), pro violation of 21 entry judgment District Court an amended con with intent distribute scribes *6 on Counts and Two. One base, substances, including cocaine trolled Whren, (1995) be vacated because that section de added). (emphasis remanding panel could offense of scribes lesser-included have, succinctly directly and more than more 860(a), proscribes with in did, simply court to vacate instructed controlled substance within tent distribute a and sentence count one and conviction Appellants rely one thousand feet of a school. Williams, reimpose fact the sentence count two. The F.Supp. 8- on United States precise (D.D.C.1992), language its opinion, that its is less does not affect without aff'd (D.C.Cir.1993), my meaning view. which the District

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Michael A. Whren
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date Published: Jul 10, 1997
Citation: 111 F.3d 956
Docket Number: 95-3193
Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.
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