2:94-cr-00356 | E.D. Pa. | Mar 3, 2010
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRIMINAL ACTION
v. No. 94-356-01
ROBERT MCQUILKIN
MEMORANDUM
On June 1, 2009, defendant Robert McQuilkin filed a motion seeking a reduction
of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows this court to “modify a
term of imprisonment” “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission.” Defendant argues that Application Note 2 to section 4B1.1 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), which became part of the
Guidelines as Amendment 506, “defines the term ‘offense statutory maximum’ in § 4B1.1
to mean the statutory maximum prior to any enhancement based on prior criminal record,”
Mot. at 2, and that his sentence on the basis of an “offense statutory maximum” including
enhancements based on his prior criminal record was therefore impermissible.
The current version of Application Note 2 is unambiguously at odds with
McQuilkin’s interpretation: It states that the “offense statutory maximum” “refers to the
maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction that is a crime of
violence or controlled substance offense, including any increase in that maximum term
under a sentencing enhancement provision that applies because of the defendant's prior
criminal record.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, Application Note 2 (emphasis supplied).
Even if Application Note 2 could be interpreted as McQuilkin suggests, however,
he would not be entitled to relief. Defendant presented the same argument to the Third
Circuit on appeal from his judgment of sentence at a time when Application Note 2 did,
in fact, “direct the sentencing court to ignore any increases in the offense statutory
maximum based on the defendant’s prior criminal record.” United States v. McQuilkin,
97 F.3d 723" date_filed="1996-10-15" court="3rd Cir." case_name="United States v. Robert McQuilkin">97 F.3d 723, 731 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit nevertheless rejected McQuilkin’s
argument, holding that the relevant portion of Application Note 2 was invalid in light of
the clear language of 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), which directs the United States Sentencing
Commission to “assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at
or near the maximum term authorized for” defendants who have been previously
convicted of certain felonies. Id. at 731-32. The Supreme Court of the United States
subsequently agreed. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751" date_filed="1997-05-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="United States v. LaBonte">520 U.S. 751 (1997). Defendant’s
argument that Application Note 2 entitles him to relief is accordingly foreclosed by
Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent as well as by the current language of the
Guidelines.
In his motion and reply brief,1 McQuilkin raises several other arguments
1
This court construes defendant’s Motion for an Enlargement of Time to File
a Response in Traverse to the Justice Department’s Response to Petitioner’s § 3582(c)(2)
-2-
concerning his sentencing. None of these arguments, however, concerns the lowering of
a sentencing range by the Sentencing Commission. They are therefore not appropriately
considered on this motion.
Similarly, McQuilkin filed a “Motion in Supplement” to his § 3582(c)(2) motion
on February 22, 2010, that supplement argues that Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1" date_filed="2004-11-09" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Leocal v. Ashcroft">543 U.S. 1 (2004),
constitutes an “intervening change in the law” that entitles him to relief. Mot. in Supp., at
6. Leocal, however, is not an intervening change, given that it was decided four and a
half years before defendant filed his § 3582(c)(2) motion on June 1, 2009. It also is not
the proper subject of a § 3582(c)(2) motion, as it is a Supreme Court decision concerning
deportation proceedings, not an alteration of the Guidelines by the Sentencing
Commission.
For these reasons, defendant’s motion and motion in supplement will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Motion (docket no. 128) as a motion for leave to file a reply brief before July 31, 2009.
So construed, the motion is, nunc pro tunc, granted.