51 Colo. 425 | Colo. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court:
The bond .in question was executed under the provisions of the act of 1894, and the only question we-are required to determine is, whether the act of 1905 in any manner affects the right of the plaintiffs to-resort to the bond. If it does, then it is because the-latter act operates retrospectively. In behalf of defendants in error it is contended that the forum and procedure are governed by the amendatory -act, and that the action is premature, the contract as yet not having been completed.
Without expressing an opinion on the power of Congress to pass an act which affected the substantial rights of parties in bonds given under the original act of 1894. it is clear from a comparison of the two acts, if the later is given a retrospective effect, that it works a radical change in the rights of plaintiffs, to their great detriment. Under the act of 1894 the plaintiffs could bring suit in any court of competent jurisdiction upon default of the contractor to pay what it might be owing them for labor performed and materials furnished in executing the contract, and prosecute the same to final judgment and execution. By the amendment, if it applies, suit can only be brought in the first instance by the United States, and plaintiffs would only have the right' to interven? and have their claims adjudicated in such action and judgment ren
But the statute is not susceptible of a construction which would bring about such unjust results. Its language Is prospective. It provides that "Hereafter any person or persons entering Into a formal contract with the United States, etc.” Clearly, this applies to the future. The amendment is not confined to procedure, if the limitation as to the forum where such suit can be brought on the bond can be regarded as a matter of procedure, but deals with substantive rights. That is to say, on the bond contemplated by the amendment, the United States is given a preference over all other creditors, and the right of laborers and material men to sue in their own behalf is suspended until after the completion of the contract and final settlement, and for six months thereafter, during which period the United States alone can sue upon the bond. These various provisions are all contained in one section; and if Con
This conclusion, in our judgment, is fully supported by Struthers, Wells & Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 306. Counsel for defendants in error contend that this case is distinguishable from the one at bar for the reason it appears that the rights of the plaintiffs in that action had fully accrued prior to me enactment of the amendment of 1905, and that as it does not appear from the complaint in this action that the rights of plaintiffs had attached prior to the date when the amendment took effect, that the case is not in point. What the complaint may disclose in this respect we do not regard as material. The turning point in the case is the date of the execution of the bond. It is true that in the Struthers case it is said: “That Congress did not intend that the amendment should apply to cases where the bond had already been executed, the work done, the respective rights of the parties settled, and the cause of action already in existence.”
We do not understand, however, that the amendment was held inapplicable on this state of facts alone. In concluding the opinion it is said:
“Viewing the whole section, we think Congress meant that only in future cases should the provisions of the amendment apply, although some trifling portion of those provisions might be regarded technically as in the nature of procedure. It is, therefore, wiser*434 to hold the entire section governed by the usual rule, and as ápplying only to the future.”
Certainly, there is no language in the act from which, it can be said that it was the intention of Congress to make it retroactive. On the contrary, its language indicates that it is prospective only. To give it a retrospective construction can only be brought about by supplying words or giving it an intendment which its whole purport does not justify, and which would bring about such unjust results that we are satisfied Congress did not intend any such consequences.
Other authorities supporting our .conclusion are: U. S. A., for Strait, v. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 80 Vt. 84; Burton v. Frank Seifert Plastic Co., 61 S. E. 933; Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United States, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony with the views expressed in .this opinion.
Judgment reversed.